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Abstract 
The royal supremacy established by Henry VIII was never fully defined or resolved. Was it 
an imperial kingship or a mixed polity - the king-in-parliament? Professor G.R Elton's theory 
of parliamentary supremacy has been accepted for many years, but more recently this theory has 
come under attack from Professors Peter Lake, John Guy, and Patrick Collinson. They have 
shown that it was not strictly the case that either the r<iral" supremacy or the ecclesiastical polity 
of the Tudors was a settled issue; there was a tension and an uncertainty that underlay both the 
Henrician break with Rome in 1534 and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559, yet this tension 
was not brought to surface of Tudor political debate until the latter part of Elizabeth I's reign. 
What brought the issue to the fore was the controversy between the puritans who opposed 
Archbishop John Whitgift's subscription campaign and the 'conformists' who sided with 
Whitgift's demand for order and congruity in the young Church of England. 
Part of this controversy was carried out in a literary battle between one of Whitgift's 
proteges, civil lawyer and high commissioner Richard Cosin, and puritan common lawyer James 
Morice. The debate focused on the legality of the High Commission's use of the ex officio oath 
and eventually came to hinge on the question of Elizabeth's authority to empower that 
commission to exact the oath by virtue of her leners patent. If the ex officio oath was strictly 
against the statutes and common laws of the realm, was the queen authorised to direct the 
commission to exact the oath anyway - over and above the law? To answer yes, as Cosin did, 
was to declare that the queen's royal supremacy was imperial and that her ecclesiastical polity was 
essentially theocratic. To answer no, as did Morice, was to assert that there were certain things 
that the queen could not do - namely that she was not empowered to direct the High 
Commission to contravene statute law, even in the name of ordering and reforming the church. 
Cosin's legal arguments for the imperial supremacy of the monarch were powerful, but his 
writings were steeped in a form of political rhetoric that was quickly coming into fashion in the 
late sixteenth century: the 'language of state'. The language of state was essentially an 
abandonment of the classical-humanist vocabulary of 'counseling the prince' for the sake of 
'virtuous government' in pursuit of a 'happy republic'. This new political language used by Cosin 
11 
and other conformists justified itself on the premise that the state was so thoroughly endangered 
by sedition and instability that an urgent corrective was needed: not wise or virtuous counsel but 
strict obedience to the laws dut preserved civil and religious authority. 
With the threat of presbyterianism at the doorstep of the English Church, Cosin -
protected and encouraged by d1e powerful Whitgift - was free to employ both his legal and his 
rhetorical skills in an effort to reinvigorate the English clergy by enhancing ilieir jurisdictional 
status over ilie laity. By ilie time James VI and I began his systematic revitalisation of ilie clerical 
estate in 1604, ilie vocabulary iliat would justify it had already been created. The influence of 
Cosin demonstrably permeated the early years of d1e Stuart Church suggesting dut Cosin might 
provide a link between d1e vague uncertainties of the Elizabethan Settlement and the stark 
realities of the Caroline Church. 
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From the perspective oflate Elizabethan England the Henrician break with Rome in the 
1530s seemed like a clean sweep: a new theory of kingship both secular and theocratic was 
secured, the church was freed from the control of foreign powers, and there was a newfound 
sense that England was and always had been an empire in its own right. 'Where by divers 
sundry old authentic histories and chronicles', it had been declared 'that (his realm of England 
is an empire', 'governed by one supreme head and king having the dignity and royal estate of 
the imperial crown of the same', Henry VIII's faithful subjects owed him no less than a 
'natural and humble obedience' seeing that he was endowed by God with 'whole and entire 
power, preeminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdiction to render. .. justice and final 
determination' to all people of the realm. 1 But how far did Henry's imperium ttulyextend? 
Parliament had affirmed that the king was imperial in his own realm in both church and state 
but had not defined what 'imperial' meanc. In theoretical terms the break with Rome was 
vague. For fifty years legal opinion regarding the royal prerogative remained more or less 
ignorant of the specific political powers allotted to the king by the reformation acts, mainly 
because there was no compelling reason to discover them. 
The tension in the royal supremacy was inherent from the beginning. One of the early 
defenders of Henry's supremacy, bishop Stephen Gardiner of Winchester, acknowledged in 
his De vera obedientia (1535) that there was a distinct English church and that the king was its 
head - not only by divine law but also by the authority of Parliament which represented the 
people. In attempting to cover all his bases by justifYing the supremacy on principles of 
ascending as well as descending authority, Gardiner had worked himself into a contradiction. 
He could not have it both ways, for if the king was the head of the English church by divine 
law, then Parliament's ratification of this truth (and thus its role in the supremacy) was 
meaningless. But if Parliament's endorsement of the supremacy had somehow been necessary, 
it was disingenuous to claim that the king was imperial by divine law. 2 
1 Excerpts from the preamhle to the Act of Appeals (24 Henry VIII c. 12). The Tudor constitution, cd. G.R. Elton (second 
edition; Cambridge, 1982) 353. 
2 John Guy, 'Scripture as authority: problems of imerpretation in the 1530s', Reassessinf( the Hent'icilln af(e: humanism, 
politics and reform, 1500-1550, ed. Alistair Fox and John Guy (Oxford, 1986) 206-8. For a discussion of the 
disagreement about the meaning of imperium in the 1530s, see Graham Nicholson, 'The nature and function of historical 
argument in the English Reformation', Cambridge U niversiry thesis, 1977, 92-110. 
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Yet this uncertainty was inconsequential until the closing years of Elizabeth's reign. Part 
of the reason for this was because Henry's royal supremacy was marked by a peculiar disparity 
between language and practice. Statutes of the 1530s had proclaimed that the king of England 
'oweth to be the supreme heed of the Churche of England', his people 'recognysyng noo 
superior under God but only your Grace'.3 But the daily execution of the supremacy bore 
little resemblance to this high-flown language. Henry VIII, though the most theocratic of the 
Tudors, still ruled through Parliament for the most part. He did not tax the people without its 
consent, and he did not order his ecclesiastical commissions to fine or imprison men at their 
discretion.4 The reigns of Edward VI and Mary and most of Elizabeth's reign were marked by 
an even greater reliance on Parliament as well as the privy council for the day-to-day workings 
of government. 5 The language of imperial monarchy continued in Elizabeth's Act of 
Supremacy (a near copy of the Henrician act) but the reality was still much closer to an 
aristotelian mixed polity, where the sovereign's power was balanced against aristocracy and 
democracy.6 This incongruity between theory and practice helped conceal the ambiguity in 
the royal supremacy for many decades. Advocates of a mixed form of government could be 
pacified by the reality of Tudor government, while partisans of imperial government could 
take comfort in the rhetorical imperium expressed in statutes, royal proclamations, and letters 
patent. 
But while this arrangement survived for two generations in Tudor England, by the 1580s 
it was no longer possible to ignore completely the glaring tension in the royal supremacy. The 
rise of puritanism, coupled with a Genevan-influenced clamor for further reformation, 
produced calls for a learned ministry, an end to pluralities, a curbing of abuses in the church, 
3 SR, III, 492, 464. The quotations are taken from the Act of Supremacy (26 Henry VIII c. 1) and the Submission of the 
Clergy (25 Henry VIII c. 19) respectively. 
4 Imprisonment at the discretion of ecclesiastical commissioners was not used until the reign of Edward VI, and discretionary 
fining was not authorised until Mary's reign. R.C. Usher, The rise and IfIll of the hiKh commission. ed. Philip Tyler 
(second edition; Oxford, 1968) 45. 
5 See n. Scarisbrick. lJenry VIll (London, 1968); Diarmaid MaeCulloch, The reiK17 of' Henry Vlll (London, 1995); Jennifer 
Loach, Pm'liament and fhe crown in the reign ofMmy Tudor (Oxford, 1986); John Cuy, Tudor England (Oxford, 1988); 
Patrick Collinson, The monarchical republic of Queen Elizabeth 1', Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library, 69 
(1986-7) 394-424; P:ltrick Collinson, Elizabethall E(Sil)'S (London, 1994). . 
6 For a discussion of the aristotelian or polybian mixed polity, see Markku Peltonen, Classical humaniml rlnd republicanism in 
English political thollKht. 1570-1640 (Cambridge, 1995) passim but especially 9-10, 47-8. 179-80, 181-5, 188-9. 269-70, 
309; Collinson, 'Monarchical republic'. 394-424; John Cuy, 'The Hcnrician age', The l'flrieties of British political thought, 
1500-1800, ed. J.G.A. Pocock, (Cambridf!;e, 1993) 35-44. 
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and more importantly - freedom of conscience with regard to the prayer book, the Thirty-
Nine Articles, and other lesser liturgical matters that were supposedly adiaphora. 7 Fearing the 
undoing of his authority by radical forces unable to unite or agree amongst themselves, 
Archbishop Whitgift became convinced of the necessity of increased central authority, both in 
church and state. He drew up what became known as the Articles of Subscription in 1584 in an 
effort to impose some standard of uniformity in religion on the English clergy. These articles 
required an oath of allegiance to the queen and acceptance of the Thirty-Nine Articles and the 
Book of Common Prayer, but they were unpopular with most clergy for two reasons: for the 
matter they contained and for the high-handed way they were forced on all practising 
ministers.R The enforcement of tl1ese articles in combination with \'Ilfhitgift's deployment of 
the high commission (a collective term for the sporadic ecclesiastical commissions whose duty 
it was to visit, regulate, and order the church) 9 for disciplinary purposes elicited the most 
serious opposition the established church had faced in decades. 
The puritans, outraged at this 'popish' new test of orthodoxy, began to claim that the 
new archbishop had no such power to enforce articles of subscription which were not binding 
statute but only the whim of one man. They likewise denied that the high commission could 
use disciplinary tactics contrary to common law. Whirgift was fully supported by Queen 
Elizabeth, however, and made clear the fact that his authority derived directly from her. Thus 
the question of the royal supremacy was finally called: could the sovereign, who since the late 
1530s had ruled in cooperation with parliament as the head of a mixed polity, suddenly 
govern her church without its consent? Could she regulate and order the church contrary to 
common law? The multi-faceted religious disturbances of the 1580s all touched on these 
questions to some degree. Those who wished for further reformation in the church saw the 
queen and Whirgift as roadblocks to their imended reforms. Such men thus found in the 
'mixed polity' view of the royal supremacy a theory of government suitable to their own 
political ends. Similarly, the 'conformists' who feared the destablisation of the church through 
7 Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethall puritall /tlOl'e7llmt (London, 1967) 243-62. 
8 Collinson, Elizabethan puritan 1!I0l'e7Ilcnt, 244-R. 
9 There were branches of the high commission in all dioceses, and act books survive from many of them, not just York but also 
Canterbury, Chester, Durham, Exeter, Gloucester, Norwich, Peterborough, Salisbury, and Winchester. R.H. Helmholz, 
Romtln Ctlnon law il1 Ref,n'mati"/1 EnJ(land (Cambridge, 1990),46-7. 
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too much popularity conveniently embraced the imperial verSlOl1 of the queen's supremacy. 
There needed to be a final determination, for without one the future of the English church 
and its government would be in grave doubt. 
This political debate, which has usually been seen merely in terms of parliamentary 
struggle, religious doctrine, and court intrigue, actually contained another pivotal element 
which was the thread that united the others: the role of language and rhetoric. 10 Political 
discourse took many forms: printed books, university debates, parliamentary bills, court 
counsel, and theological arguments being some of them. But all discourse, whether civil or 
religious in nature, was exercised through a medium of public dialogue, as much shaped by 
the art of classical and humanist rhetoric as by the political exigencies of the moment. It is 
essential to examine this angle of Tudor history as well as the others in order to arrive at a 
truer understanding of the complex issues involved in assessing the problem of the royal 
supremacy. 
The problem that Whitgift faced was, in its most basic form, a problem of authority. 
The presbyterians called for an end to episcopacy, and it was believed that they denied the 
queen's supremacy in the church, despite protestations to the contrary by Thomas Cartwright, 
leader of the English presbyterian movement. This threat coexisted with a different but 
equally powerful one: common lawyers, representing a variety of imerests,11 increased their 
attacks on ecclesiastical jurisdiction, hammering away at the high commission's use of 
procedures unfamiliar to common law and which many deemed contrary to the laws of the 
realm. Both of these movements eventually clashed with Whitgift and the governmem over 
the legitimacy of canon law. Whitgift and his polemicists such as Richard Cosin, the highest 
ranking civil and canon lawyer in England, based their judicial authority primarily on the royal 
prerogative but secondarily on the canon law, identifYing it as part of the 'queen's ecclesiastical 
laws'.J2 But had not the canon law been at least abridged if not abolished when [he pope's 
10 Quentin Skinner, RctlSOIl and rhetoric ill the philosophy of Hobbe.i (Cambridge, 1995); Peltonen, CWssiCtlI humanism; J .S. 
Benger, The authority of writer and text in radical protestant literature, 1540-1593', Oxford University divinity thesis, 
1989. 
11 Their motivation was a loose alliance of professional self-interest, anriclericalism, moderate puritan sentiment, and 
presbyterian reformism, bur primarily the first two. 
12 Richard Cosin, An IlpoloJ(ie /I)r slindrie proceedinJ(s ecclesitlsticall (second edition; London, 1593) (STC2 5821), III, 56-7. 
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authority was finally expelled in 1536? The puritans certainly thought so, but the question was 
much more complicated than it seemed, and men such as Richard Cosin exploited confusion 
on the subject. 
To discover what happened to canon law in England it is necessary to look back to 1532 
to a document drafted by the house of Commons called the Supplication against the 
Ordinaries. 13 This was a complaint by the Commons against certain practices of the clergy, 
namely, that through Convocation they put into practice customs and procedures that were 
repugnant to the laws of the realm. One of the primary complainrs in the Supplication was 
against ex officio procedure, which was a canon law custom in which ecclesiastical judges 
initiated cases personally by citing defendanrs to appear in court and answer questions 
administered in an inquisitorial fashion. The Commons complained that by this procedure 
men were tricked into accusing themselves, though there was no plaintiff to accuse them 
publicly. 14 The clergy responded to the Supplication with a defence of their former ways, with 
the exception that charging excessive fees and summoning out of the diocese were 
acknowledged by Archbishop Warham who promised imminent reforms. There was no 
recanration of ex officio procedures but only a promise to eliminate corruption from them. 15 
The Supplication was not enacted and by the rime of the next Parliament in 1533, Henry's 
divorce had become the primary matter to be dealt with, and the Supplication was forgotten. 
But in 1534 the Commons returned to the document and reshaped it, eventually drafting one 
bill to reform the heresy laws and another called the Act for the Submission of the Clergy. 
This act declared three things: first, that all canons derogatory to the royal supremacy or the 
laws of the realm were to be abrogated; second, that the king's assent was required for church 
13 Professor Elton's thesis that the supplication was a government dc-vice, created by Cromwell and representing the 
government's position was vigorously attacked by J.P. Cooper who claimed that Elton's theory rested on discrediting the 
evidence of Edward Hall, the chronicler who was a member of the 1532 Parliament. Cooper alleged that it was not at all 
clear that the government was even in favour of the supplication and in fact may have opposed it, and that it was more 
likely that the Commons, even against the wishes of the crown, drafted it themselves. J.P. Cooper, The Supplication 
against the Ordinaries reconsidered', English fJistorical Rcz,iew, 72 (1957), 616-41. The surrender of the clergy to this 
encroachment on their traditional legislative authority has for centuries been overrated. Michael Kelly has shown that the 
clergy in hct stood resolute against royal infringement until 1532 when, after constant rebuffs and intimidation from the 
king and anti-clerical royal counsellors, they failed to maintain a united front of defiance. The submission passed in 
Convocation, he asserted, only by a narrow margin and with a high absentee rate. Michael Kelly, The Submission of the 
Clergy', Transactiolls or the RO)'ld Historical Society, fifth series, 15 (1965) 97-119. 
14 There were other complaints in the supplication such as that the canons were not printed in English, thus preventing men 
from being able to avoid the penalties of transgressing them, that men were cited out of their diocese to appear in a 
faraway courts, and that the clergy charged excessive fees for a variery of services. Elton, Constitution, 333-5. 
15 Henry Gee and W.J. Hardy, Documents illllSt/"Lltiz'e or EIlJ!lish church history (London, 1896) 160-6. 
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councils to be summoned and for new canons to be put 111 use; and third, that all eXlstll1g 
canons were to be reviewed by a committee of thirty-two. 16 
The committee of thirty-two was to be drawn from the Lords, Commons, and clergy, 
and was to review canon lawl7 and make the necessary changes to reform it and bring it in line 
with the new supremacy. 18 In 1534, 1536, and 1544 Parliament reaffirmed the principle and 
intent of this plan, but the committee was not formed. 19 Henry never strove particularly hard 
to establish this body, although he requested help on two occasions in appointing 
commissioners (27 Henry VIII c. 15 and 35 Henry VIn c. 16). There were scattered attempts 
to gather canons together for consideration, but this was as far as it went, and the canon law 
remained unreformed at Henry's death in 1547.20 
The reVIew of canon law did not occur until the reign of Edward VI and was not 
completed ul1til 1552. The final product, entitled Reformatio legum ecclesiasticarum, was 269 
folio pages. 21 The committee included an interesting array of theologians and laymen (among 
them William Cecil), but the major players in drafting the Reformatio were Thomas 
Cranmer, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Martin Bucer, and Matthew Parker. Vermigli's and 
Cranmer's corrections and additions in particular are allover the manuscript. 22 The 
Reformatio was presented to the House of Lords by Cranmer in 1553, in hopes that it would 
16 The demands of the supplication were not enacted in 1533 for nne or more of these reasons: 1) the plague which hit 
London that year, 2) opposition from the Lords, or 3) the clergy had already agreed to submit. Cooper, 'Supplication', 
English Historical RN!iew, 72 (1957), 616-41. See also Sir Thomas More, The compleli' works or Sir Thoma., l'vfore, cd. 
John Guy, Ralph Keen, Clarence H. Miller, and Ruth McGugan (London, 1987) X, introduction. 
17 Bishop William Lyndwode published his Prol!inciale in 1430 which dealt with constitutions enacted by Convocation 
between 1222 and 1416. Also, John of Ayton wrote a commentary (called the Le.'!.atines) between 1333 and 1348 on the 
constitutions enacted by English leg:nine councils presided over by Cardinal Otho (1237) and Cardinal Octhobon (1268). 
Ayron's volume was published in Paris 15(Jl. In 1534 there appeared a joint publication of these works translated into 
English, though the Englished versions did not include the original glosses. It was these two books that constituted the 
'received' canon law in England and the coupling of them together in one book in 1534 may have indicated that they were 
the canon law texts targeted for review. Incidentally, Professor Spalding gives some interesting reasons for suggesting rhn 
Richard Taverner was the translator of this 1534 edition. James c. Spalding, The re{iJrllllltion "r the ecc!esiflStical laU's of 
England, 1552 (Kirksville, Missouri; 1992) 19, 21 footnote 32. 
18 Gee and Hardy, Documents, 177. In 1546 Thomas Cranmer mentioned a 'book' which was thought by recent historians 
to have been a collection of canons slated for review. This collection was found in 1974 and is presently stored in the 
British Libraty, Additional MS 48040, fos. 13-102v. (This collection, at one time in the possession of Sir Robert Beale, was 
formerly called Yelverton MS 45.) Although the collection is undated, there is internal evidence to indicate it was 
compiled between 1535 and 1539 but probably closer to 1535. External evidence also points to this date. F. Donald 
Logan, 'The Henrician canons', Bulletin or the [nstitute fOr His/oricllI Research, 47 (1974) 99-103. 
19 Norman L. Jones, 'Fine-tuning the reformation', LIIU' lind social chllnge i/l British history, ed. lA. Guy and H.G. Beale 
(London, 1984) 86. 
20 John Guy, The Elizabethan establishment and the ecclesiastical poliry', The Reign ofElizllbdh I: court lind culture i/1 the 
fllst decade, cd. John Guy (Cambridge, 1995) 146 foonotc 77. 
21 The manuscript can be found in BL, Harley MS 426. Spalding, Re{imulltion, xi. 
22 Spalding, Re{im7lation, xi-xiii, 37-8. 
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form a three-part foundation for the new Church of England along with the Forty-Two 
Articles and the second Edwardian Book of Common Prayer. (In fact, many of the 
participants involved in the drafting of the articles and the prayer book were also part of the 
committee of thirty-two for the Reformatio .)23 The Lords rejected the Reformatio, however, 
unpersuaded that the changes were for the better. An attempt was made to revive the 
committee of thirty-two in a bill introduced on 27 February, 1559, but the bill, though passed 
by the Commons, was snuffed by the Lords where there was still a catholic majority. The issue 
was raised one final time in 1571 bur was never brought to a vote.24 Canons were drawn up in 
1604 (of which there were one hundred and forty-one) which reorganised the old canons and 
made new ones, bur there was still no weeding our of the unreformed canons. 25 
Considering that the legal status of canon law was never satisfactorily established after 
the break with Rome, it is easy to see how this question emerged from nowhere during the 
tumultuous last decade of Elizabeth's reign. The 1534 stature confirming the Submission of 
the Clergy had declared many canons repugnant to the royal prerogative and the laws of the 
realm bur postponed the actual dismantling of those canons until it could be done effectively. 
The postponemenr rurned into inertia and at length the intended reform was pur aside. 
Writing in 1584 Richard Cosin stated that it was virtually impossible to reform canon law 
simply because of the hugeness of the task. 26 The authority of canon law in England therefore 
was unresolved, bur it was imperative that the issue be clarified since canon law was the 
immediate basis of Whit gift's disciplinary policies: he declared that the queen, being supreme 
governor of the church, was aurhorised to empower the high commission to order and regulate 
her church, and one of the means by which the commission chose to regulate the church was 
via ex officio procedure, a decidedly continental, canonical procedure in origin, dating back to 
the twelfth century.27 The puritans rejected both the validity of canon law and the queen's 
23 Spalding, Reform!ltion, xi, 1. 
24 Jones, 'Fine-tuning the Reformation', L!lW and social change, d. Guy and Beale, 86-7; Spalding, Reformalio, 45. John 
Foxe appropriated the original manuscript of rhe Reforllllltio plus another one (now lost) which belonged to Archbishop 
Parker and compiled a printed edition of the Re(orllZatifi in 1571. (This edition with a few corrections was reprinted in 
London in 1640 and 1641.) Spalding, Reformation, xi. 
25 Leonard Levy, Origins of the Fitth Amendment: the right against sel(incrimination (New York, 19(8) 203. 
26 Cosin, An Answer 10 the Iwo!ynt [lJId prin[·iptlll treatises 0( a certai l1e j;,ctious lib ell (London, 1584) (STC2 5819.7) sig. 
A4v-A5r. 
27 For a history of D: oftlcio procedure sec below, 43-51. 
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supposed prerogative to empower the commlSSlOn contrary to English statute and custom. 
The enrire jurisdiction of the commission itself thus became suspect, and by the early years of 
James' reign some of the puritans were beginning to claim that it was not even a valid court of 
law. 28 
Perhaps as a result of the uncertainty surrounding the post-Henrician status of canon law, 
there was also widespread confusion about the precise origins of the high commission. Late in 
the sixteenth century it came to be thought by both puritans and conformists, though 
wrongly, that the commission had been 'created' in 1559 by the Act of Supremacy. By the 
early seventeenth century this was practically a universal belief. Even the conformist civil 
lawyer John Cowell erroneously asserted in his legal dictionary The interpreter (1607) that the 
high commission was founded on the Act of Supremacy.29 Before this confusion set in, 
however, Elizabethan conformists believed that the commission had been founded in 1536 
when Henry VIII empowered Thomas Cromwell, as vicegerent, to appoint commissions. 30 
This was also the opinion of Professor R.G. Usher, who has done the only major study of the 
high commission, but his account of the commission's origins 'was confused and sometimes 
contadictory.'31 The commission was not in fact 'founded' in any sense of the word but rather 
evolved over many centuries. The puzzle might be clearer if the high commission's records 
were still available to us,32 but the recent discoveries of the act books of the northern 
commission at York have revealed nothing of the origins of the Tudor high commission. 33 
The most useful place to begin in examining the origin of the commission is actually the 
fourteenth century. The heresy statute of 1388 conferred authority on the crown to appoint 
ecclesiastical commissions to determine heresy, try heretics, and have them punished. The 
28 Nicholas Fuller stated this opinion in his Star Chamher rrial of 1609. Usher, Rise [lI7dfiIlI, cd. Tyler, 32-3. 
29 John Cowell, The interpreter (Camhridge, 16(7), reprimed hy Scolar Press (Mcnsron, 1972) sig. Q4v. 
30 Ir has tr:lditionally been assumed that Cromwell hecame vicegerent in 1535, hut in fact he only possessed visitatorial 
powers in rhat year. It was not umil 1536 that he was fully invested with the vicegerency in spirituals. F. Donald Logan, 
'Thomas Cromwell and rhe vicegerency in spirituals: a revisitation', English His/orical Rel1iew, 103 (1988) 658-67. 
31 Usher, Rise and fall, d. Tyler, xxi-xxii. 
32 It is possihle that rhe records were destroyed in the Great Fire of London which incinerated all documents kept at Sr. 
Paul's Cathedral. But Usher noted that it appears (he records were already lost hy 1645. In 1640 Laud complained ahout 
the fact rhat they had heen seized by his enemies, and at his trial he asked rhat they be produced, since he hdieved they 
would vindicate him. But the records were never heard from again, which suggests that the Long Parliament ordered all 
documents relating to the commission to be destroyed. Usher, Rise tlnd Fill, ed. Tyler, 38-9. 
33 In facr, rhe York records revealed no new informarion on rhe workings of the southern commission eirher, and rhus 
Professor Tyler notes that no information has come ro light on rhe southern commission since 1913. Usher, Rise tlnd fall, 
cd. Tyler, i, ii, xii. 
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ecclesiastical commissions of Richard II bore some resemblance to Henry VIII's commissions 
in that they were both empowered by the crown, were composed of clergy as well as laymen, 
and had similar discretionary powers. But it was a dear infringement of the rights of the 
church, claims Professor Tyler, thus to deal in the determination of a spiritual matter. 34 This 
encroachment of the secular arm of government into the realm of the spiritual was noted by 
Christopher St. German in his 1533 treatise Salem and Bizance, in which he claimed that the 
crown's prerogative to take cognisance of and punish heresy was a direct violation of the canon 
law Extra de haereticus}5 Nevertheless, it was established by the fourteenth century that the 
English crown was authorised to regulate and govern the church via specially appointed 
commissions. With minor variations these commissions continued down to the Tudor era, but 
the empowering principle behind dle high commission was not the royal supremacy but the 
king's ancient prerogative to reform and redress errors in the English church. 36 
Despite the savage reputation imputed to the high commission in the late Elizabethan 
and early Stuart years, it seems to have been much more arbitrary during the reigns of Edward 
VI and Mary. Its license to imprison offenders at will was no invention of Whitgift's 
conformity campaign but first appeared in the letters patent of Edward VI. 37 Professor Usher 
related the case of a puritan named Carew from 1583 or 1584 which he llsed to contrast the 
commission's procedure in Elizabethan times with its Edwardian and Marian progenitors. 
Some of the relevant details: Carew was asked to take the ex officio oath (a promise to answer 
any and all questions put to him), which he did, and he was then charged with certain crimes 
but was not allowed to see a written copy of (he charges. In the course of his trial he was 
suspended from preaching but went home and preached despite the sllspension. John Aylmer, 
the bishop of London, asked the commissioners that Carew be arrested by means of a writ of 
34 Usher, Rise and/iTll, ed. Tyler, xvii·xviii, xxi. 
35 The law stated 'that all powers and all lords temporal and rulers be prohibited, that they shall not in any manner take 
knowledge or judge upon heresy, since it is merely spiritual.' But St. German remarked that if this was true, all justices of 
the peace were excommunicate, since they had been authorised by the king's commission and by parliamentary statute to 
enquire of heresies. Christopher St. German, Salem {wd Biz{l/Ice (London, 1533) reprinted in More, Works, ed. Guy, 
Keen, Miller, and McGugan, X, 368-9. 
36 Queen Mary's own letters patent show that her commissions reflected 'the crown's influence in doctrinal matters lwhich] 
had not been excluded as a result of the reconciliation with the Papacy [in the 1554 Act of Repeal].' In fact, 'the simibr 
wording of the letters patent issued by all Tudor sovereigns, whether Catholic or Protestant, prove that each based the 
powers, jurisdiction, and procedures of his or hcr courts on the precedents provided by earlier rulers. There was no brC3.k in 
the sequence of commissions from 1539 to 1641.' Usher, Rise !/I1dfall, ed. Tyler, xxii-xxiii. 
37 Usher, Rise lind fllll, ed. Tyler, 45. 
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attachment. No such writ was issued, however, since (as Carew's lawyer argued) a man could 
not be arrested by a writ of attachment unless he had first refused to answer a summons to 
appear in court. Carew had not yet been cited to appear a second time before the 
commissioners, so the proper procedure should have been to issue a citation rather than an 
attachment. Usher pointed out that no commission in the 1540s or 1550s would have 
tolerated this kind of proceduralism. The high commission had unlimited powers of 
discretion and visitation and would have attached and imprisoned Carew anyway. The 
Elizabethan commission's acknowledgment that they could not legally attach Carew showed 
that it had become a court of law rather than simply a discretionary commission of 
visitation. 38 
But the Elizabethan high commission was not so much a slave of procedure as it was a 
master of procedure. It may have settled into a fixed COUrt with fixed procedures but it made 
powerful use of its own rules. For example, Robert Cawdrey, the famous puritan from 
Rutland deprived for defaming the prayer book, wrote to Lord Burghley in 1588, 
complaining of expenses incurred by his many trips to London. He had been summoned nine 
or ten times and been kept there for six weeks at a time, 'almoste to asmuche charge and 
hinderance, nowe these two yeares laste paste, as yf my Iyvinge hadde beene taken from me at 
the firste. '39 In a lener of 1591 he asked for Burghley's assistance to relieve his poverty, 
complaining (hat in the four years and seven months since he had fallen into trouble, he had 
been forced to make twenty-one trips to London, most recently being in attendance at court 
for thirteen solid weeks. 4o Hence, one of (he advantages of procedure was the commission's 
ability (0 use attrition as a device to wear down recalcitrant defendants. 
Strangely, the Elizabethan high commission took its final shape during Mary's reign. The 
letters patent of 1557 outlined the main duties of the commission as the following: to suppress 
heresies, seditions, and conspiracies as well as false rumors. It explicirly empowered the 
commission to exact the ex officio oath, and the commissioners were also to receive the 
38 After he was cited a second time, Carew refused to answer all the charges against him and was imprisoned in the Fleet for 
contempt. Usher, Ris,. andf;df, cd. Tyler, 77-8. 
39 BL, Lansdowne MS 58, doc. 20. 
40 BL, Lansdowne MS 68, doc. 57. 
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assistance of temporal officials in rounding up offenders. In the execution of these duties, the 
commissioners were bound (0 follow the express instructions laid out in their patent, 'any of 
our laws, statutes, proclamations, or other grants, privileges, or ordinances, which be, or may 
seem (0 be contrary to the premises, notwithstanding.'41 Elizabeth's first patent, issued in July, 
1559 was practically the twin of Mary's patent of 1557. Only four of the seventeen articles in 
Elizabeth's patent were new, and only one of those new clauses was significant. The 
professional makeup of the two commissions was also quite similar and there were several 
judges who were continued from one commission (0 the next. There was, therefore, nothing 
significant about the acceSSlOn of Elizabeth with regard to the evolution of the high 
commIssIOn. The real change in the operation of the commISSlOn came 111 1583 with the 
elevation ofJohl1 Whitgifi: to the see ofCanterbury.42 
The high commission first referred to itself as a 'court' 111 1586, though it had already 
been more of a court than a commission for the last several years. It became more 
sophisticated and complicated than before, employing more lawyers and relying on 
knowledge of civil, canon, and common law, including statutes. 43 Though a court in its own 
right by the 1580s, it was difficult to state just where the commission belonged in the judicial 
hierarchy. Writing in 1591 William Lambard, a member of Lincoln's Inn, put 'the Court of 
high commission' third in rank beneath the spiritual synods of Canterbury and York (second) 
and beneath Convocation (first), and immediately above the Court of Delegates. 44 In the 
mind of its opponents, however, the commission was seen as the most powerful ecclesiastical 
court in England. This view was strengthened throughout the 1580s and 1590s as the 
commission continued its controversial practice of using ex officio procedure, the centerpiece 
of which was a forced oath which obliged the defendant to answer any questions the judge saw 
fit to ask - even if they caused the defendant to incriminate himself or his friends and 
neighbours. 
41 Athough many of these powers were implied in the previous commissions under Edward VI, here they were declared 
outright and constituted a greatly extended commission from the last one. Usher, RiSt· ilIzd/all, cd. Tyler, 23-5. 
42 Faith Thompson, Magna Car1a: its role in the lilaking of the English con.<titutiol1, 1300-1629 (Minneapolis, 1948), 206; 
Usher, Rise andf/dl, ed. Tyler, 27-8,40. 
43 Helmholz, Roman canon law, 119-20. 
44 William Lambard, Archion, or a collleniary upon the high courts o(justice in England (London, 1(35) (STC2 15143) 11-
3. Lambard dedicated this work to Sir Robert Cecil. 
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The practices of the high commission were stoutly defended in 1593 by Richard Cosin, 
vicar-general of Canterbury and a commissioner himself, in a massive treatise entitled An 
apologie for sttndrie proceedings ecclesiastical. In the Apologie Cosin refuted claims of the 
puritans that ex officio procedure was contrary to the laws of the realm and that the queen 
could not empower the commission to exact the oath. In doing so, he enunciated a theory of 
the royal supremacy that attribured to the queen absolute imperial power to govern her church 
according to her wisdom. The Apologie was met with revulsion by Cosin's puritan adversaries, 
but with the protection of Whitgift Cosin was effectively the voice of the government, 
articulating a new definition of the royal supremacy that was not meant to be debated or 
questioned. 
The significance of Cosin' s recasting of the royal supremacy in imperial language, which 
will be the focus of chapter eight of this thesis, is that it sheds new light on (he historiography 
of the Tudor period. The prevailing view of Elizabeth's reign throughout most of the 
twentieth century has been that she ruled with and through Parliament. Sir Geoffery Elton, 
one of the chief pioneers of this theory, stated that 'the developments of the sixteenth century 
made Parliament (the king-in-Parliament) a supreme legislator' .45 A closer student of 
Elizabeth's parliaments, Sir John Neale, had less excuse to misunderstand the change that 
occurred in the government of the English church towards the end of the century. Though his 
examination of Elizabethan political documents was extensive and admirable, his conclusions 
in no way followed from the research. He failed to recognise that a major coup had occurred 
in the 1580s and 1590s, authorised and allowed by Elizabeth, engineered by Whitgift, and 
articulated by Richard Cosin - a coup which exploited the ambiguities in the original royal 
supremacy, fashioning in turn a newer, stronger vision of the queen's imperium specially 
demanded by the crisis of authority that enveloped the decade. In the cold realities of the 
1590s in which one rival interpretation of the crown's prerogative was bitterly put down by 
another, Neale saw only 'the inflexible determination' of Elizabeth and the 'rigid character' of 
Whitgift who by 'skilful exploitation of propitious circumstances' were able to finagle victory 
45 G.R. Elton, The Parliament ofEI1:;;lal1d: 1559-1581 (Cambridge, 1986) 39. 
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from a feisty Parliament. 46 Like Elton, Neale refused to extricate himself - despite rhe 
evidence of his own research - from the belief that Elizabeth participated only within the 
framework of a mixed polity. Perhaps his obseqious devotion to Elizabeth was partly to blame 
for this, but the evidence (reviewed in chapter eight) is clear that Elizabeth and Whitgift 
imposed their will on the English church entirely without Parliament and against its will. 
While the old Eltonian model of a mixed polity remains valid for the majority of 
Elizabeth's reign, it cannot be seriously maintained in assessing the years 1584-1603. The work 
of revising late Elizabethan political historiography has been begun by Patrick Collinson, John 
Guy, and Peter Lake who, contrary to Neale's view that Elizabeth and Whitgift acted as 
restraining influences on Parliament, have suggested that they were acmally a disruptive force 
in English politics, taking the helm of government in their own hands and steering it on a new 
course. The evidence presented in this essay tends to support this hypothesis, revealing the role 
of Richard Cosin as a key player in the late Elizabethan shift in the government of the church 
from a queen-ill-parliament arrangement to a centralised, imperial monarchy and 
acknowledging the significance of his contribution to the development of the English church. 
46 J.E. Neale, Elizllbeth J and her parliament', 1584-1601 (London, 1957) 436. This ~ssessment comes from Neale's 
concluding remarks on the 1593 parliament - a remarkable piece of historiographical disrortion. Neale glossed over the 
serious fractures in that parliament with a make-believe happy ending well summed up by Christopher Haigh: 'how Peter 
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Richard Cosin was born in the north of England during the reign of Edward VI in 
Newhall, Durham 1548. 1 His father, John, died at about the same time, and the young Cosin 
was raised by his mother, Margery, who was from Bolton, and her new husband, a certain 
Medhope. He was educated at Skipton and later at Trinity College, Cambridge, 
matriculating as a pensioner2 at the age of twelve in Michaelmas Term, 1561. A scholar by 
1563, Cosin took his B.A. in 1566 (becoming a fellow the same year) and his M.A. in 1569. 
His tutor at Cambridge was John Whitgift, soon to become Master of Trinity3 and in 1583, 
Archbishop of Canterbury. 
Cambridge in the 1570s was strongly associated with puritanism and was the site of the 
famous Admonition Controversy, a series of debates on ecclesiastical government between 
Whitgift and the presbyterian Thomas Cartwright, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity. 
After Cartwright's expulsion from Cambridge in 1571, new university statutes were enacted 
that gave the heads of the colleges more power in electing proctors, a duty traditionally held 
by the regents. The proctors themselves were stripped of much of their old powers and were 
made wholly subordinate to the vice-chancellor. This shift away from a representative 
structure to a more authoritarian one was seen as an innovation at Cambridge and was not 
popular. A petition of remonstrance against the new statutes was compiled and one hundred 
and thirty-four members of the university signed it. One would expect the list to include 
mostly men of puritan sympathies, but, ironically, the list contains a sizeable number of future 
conformists in the church of England, among them Richard Bancroft and Cosin himself 4 It 
seems unlikely, however, that under Whitgift's tutelage Cosin ever became too enamoured 
with puritan ideas or strayed far from the conformist tendencies that marked his later career. 
There is little evidence available to us on Cosin's career during the 1570s. He seems to 
have become a minister for some time, receiving letters patent in February of 1578 for a 
1 It is not known whether Cosin was related to the early Stuart bishop John Cosin, but P.W. Hasler suggests it is likely as John 
Cosin was also from Durham. P.J. Hasler, I louse or Commons, 1558-1603 (London, 1981) 1, 660. 
2 The middle of three ranks of matriculation. 
3 Whirgifr's tenureship began 4 July, 1567 and ended 30 May, 1577. Cambridge MS Mm.II.25 (Baker D) #9. 
4 J.B. Mullinger, The Uniz'ersity of Camhrid;;e (row the royal injunctions of 1535 to the accession of Charles the First 
(Cambridge, 1884) II, 230, 235-6. 
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vicarage in Sharnebrook in the diocese of Lincoln.5 But Cos in's talents as an academic rather 
than a minister were confirmed by one further degree, LL.D., from Cambridge in 1580. 
Thereafter Cosin's professional advancement was rapid. In February 1581 he was admitted to 
the Court of Arches and became a practising civil lawyer. 6 Three months later he was given a 
grant for the presentation to the next vacant canonry or prebend in Worcester cathedral where 
Whitgift was bishop.? In January 1583 he became the chancellor of Worcester and 
accompanied Bishop Whitgift on visitations for the reformation of the cathedrals of Lichfield 
and Hereford. 8 But Cosin's new obligations were not without compensation. Whitgift leased 
to him a fine manor with several meadows in Alvechurch, Worcester in summer 1583. 9 
Shortly after Whitgift was translated to the archbishopric in November of the same year, 
he appointed Cosin dean of the Arches and vicar-general of Canterbury, posts which he held 
for the rest of his Iife. 1o As dean of the Arches, Cosin was the most prominent civil and canon 
lawyer in England. 1 I Besides Whitgift and the bishop of London, John Aylmer, Cosin was the 
only person authorised to call the southern high commission to session. 12 Cosin's involvement 
in the commission was constant and assiduous, as a wealth of Tudor historical documents 
testifY. While there were many commissioners at any given time, most of them only sat for 
judicial business by invitation. Cosin, however, was a regular fixture on the court who along 
with Whitgift, Aylmer, Richard Bancroft, and Edward Stanhope, formed the commanding 
inner circle. 13 
5 CPR, VII, 438. This probability is strengthened by Sir Robert Beale's irascible sketch of Cosin in 1593, 'who sometymes was 
a preacher and minister, then a Criminall and bloodyc Iudge, and now an Irregular, a non resident rayler against most of 
the reformed Churches in Christendome.' BL, Lansdowne MS 73, fo. 11 r. 
6 G.D. Squibb, Doctors' Commons: A history orthe Colle:<c orAdz'ocate5 and Doctors o/Ltlu' (Oxford, 1977) 163. 
7 CPR, IX, 280. 
8 LPL, Cartae Miscellaneac II, 79; PRO, SP12/160, doc. 6. 
9 LPL, Cartae Miscdlaneae II, 22. 
10 The destruction of most of the Court of Arches' records by the Great Fire of London, 1666, prevents us from knowing a 
great deal more about Cosin's involvement with that court. 
1 I Although canon law was not taught at English universities after 1535 when Cromwell ended the. practice, a statute of 
Henry VIII (37 Henty VIII c. 7) had authorised civilian faculty to rake on the study and function of canon lawyers. 
Furthermore, since medieval times there had been a good deal of borrowing of principles and procedures one system from 
the other, as eanonists and civilians usually had training in both disciplines regardless of their primary vocation. Professor 
Helmholz remarks, 'the two laws were so interdependent by 1600 they could scarcely be pulled apart.' Collinson, 
Elizabethtlll puritiln 1l![)1't:l7!ent, 39; Dorothy Owen, The mediel'al CflIlOIl ftlw (Cambridge, 1990) 1; James A. Brundage, 
MedieZ'tll canon law (London, 1995) 96-7; Helmholz, Romall Cflllon lilU', 151. 
12 Usher, RiSt,tl17dfall, ed. Tyler, 258. 
13 Usher, Rise and {tIll, ed. Tyler, 71. 
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In October 1585 Cosin became a member of the London-based Doctors' Commons, a 
prominent society of civil lawyers, after Whitgift had requested his admiuance. 14 In 1588 
Cosin became a master in Chancery and was further appointed to the offices of auditor and 
official principal by Whitgift,15 and in 1590 he became presidenr of Doctors' Commons, 
remaining in that office until his death. But Cosin's horizons stretched beyond academic and 
professorial life. He sat in three successive parliamenrs (for Downton in 1584 and 1589, 
Hindon in 1586) the foremost of which furnished him with the subject matter for his first 
published work. 
An answer to the two fJrst and principall treatises of a certaine foctious libell (London, 
1584) 16 was a rather lengthy riposte to a puritan treatise attribured to William Stoughton 
entitled An abstract of certain proceedings of parliament, which had sought in print to give 
force to puritan arguments in the 1584 parliament for the reform of clerical abuses. Cosin's 
Answer was dedicated to confuting Stoughton's claim 1) that a learned ministry was 
commanded by law, and 2) that dispensations for benefices were unlawful. The book was 
marked by a wariness and guarded distrust of those wishing to bring in a presbyterian system 
of church government, though Cosin balked at ourright anti-puritanism. Five years after the 
Answer Cosin first sketched out a curious work that systematically depicted - in flow-chan 
tables - the hierarchical structure of authority in the English church. The chans remained 
unpublished during Cosin's lifetime, bur they were printed by John Norton in 1604 under the 
title Ecclesiae anglicanae politeia (The polity of the Church of England) and dedicated to the 
new king, James 1.17 
Two years after drafting the Polity, Cosin was commissioned by Whitgift to produce a 
response to the puritans who had recently generated a flood of treatises and essays impugning 
the legality of various ecclesiastical procedures. The result was An apologie of and for sundrie 
proceedings ecclesiastical,18 a two-part treatise that aimed not only to discredit the puritans' 
14 Squibb, Doctors' emiliI/O/I.(, 39, II(). 
15 LPL Cartae Miscellaneae 1,25. 
16 STC2 5819.7. 
17 Sec Appendix 3 for an eX3.mination of the Polity. 
18 STC2 5820. For a discussion of the differences between the text of the 1591 and 1593 editions of the Ap%f(ie, see 
Appendix 4. 
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claims but systematically to justifY and defend the entire gamut of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
Aside from being the only late Elizabethan defence of the established church from a legal 
standpoint, the Apologie had the important effect of validating Whitgift's campaign for 
conformity. 
In 1592 Cosin produced his third published book, Conspiracie for pretended 
reformation. 19 This work, easily his most pretentious, was dedicated to exposing a 'plot' by 
three madmen, William Hacker, Edmund Coppinger, and Henry Arthington to reform the 
Church of England along radical puritan lines. Drawing entirely from their letters, writings, 
depositions in court and those of others, Cosin attempted to portray these men as influential 
and seditious puritans who represented a widespread movement that threatened the stability 
of the church. The Conspiracie was a short work (only a hundred pages) and in producing 
such a purely declamatory, non-academic tract, Cosin was clearly out of his element. In the 
following year, 1593, which saw the publication of many important conformist writings, the 
Apologie was revised and expanded to answer two recent puritan tracts, A briefe treatise of 
oathes 20 and 'Notes to proove the proceeding ex officio against the word of god'. 21 The 
second edition of the Apologie was over double the length of the first, conraining a prodigious 
third section devoted to the legality of the ex officio oath which had lately been an issue of 
public debate in the parliament of 1593. 
After the watershed year of 1593,22 Cosin's mam conrribution to late Elizabethan 
conformism was complete. Aside from representing the Arches in a rem dispure in the same 
year, 23 he continued in his various offices, most importantly as an ecclesiastical commissioner, 
without controversy for the last four years of his life. He died unmarried at Doctors' 
Commons in London at the age of forty-eight on 30 November 1597, leaving two recently 
purchased properties in Oxfordshire and a grant of the parsonage at Folkestone. 24 His will 
19 STC 2 5823. 
20 James Morice, A brie{e trt'iltise o(oflthe's (probably Middelburgh, 1592 or 1593) STC 2 18 I 06. Reasons for the uncertainty 
on printing location and date arc explained below on 53-4. 
2 I Sir Robert Beale was the author of this unprinted treatise which is unfortunately lost or not extant. It was written around 
1588 or 1589 but may not have rcached Cosin until after the 1591 ApoloKie was already out. BL, Lansdowne MS 73, fo. 
7v. Sec below, 74 footnote 4, for more information about Beale's writings. 
22 The importance of 1593 in the English church is discussed below in the eighth chapter, 228-56. 
23 BL, Lansdowne MS 77, docs. 11-3. 
24 His death is given in error as '1598' in a biographical memorandum in BL, Lansdowne MS 982, doc. 143. 
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showed a strong sentiment for Trinity College to which he made several bequests, including a 
portrait of Whitgift. 25 In the year after his death a collection of memorial poems by 
Cambridge scholars was compiled by William Barlow,26 the later bishop of Lincoln who had 
funded Cosin's education and who was one of the chroniclers of the Hampton Court 
Conference. 27 
One of the remarkable features of the life and career of Cos in is his long relationship 
with Whitgift. Beginning at Trinity in his teenage years, their friendship led Cosin to 
Worcester, Canterbury, and finally to London. Cosin, more than any other single person 
perhaps, arguably even Bancroft, was Whitgift's most valuable protege. He served his mentor 
in all endeavours and was sometimes the only person who could provide him with the crucial 
resources he needed: by producing treatises that provided a legal justification for his 
governance of the Elizabethan church, by enforcing his policies of conformity through the high 
commission, and by providing the arguments that enabled the government to construct 
charges against religious nonconformists like Cartwright who threatened the peace of the 
church. When Cosin's death in November 1597 finally concluded his industrious and 
distinguished career in the service of the archbishop, his body was borne from Doctors' 
Commons across the Thames to Lambeth Palace where he was buried on 7 December.28 If 
anyone had lived and died at Whitgift's elbow, it was Cosin. 
Like many notable professional relationships, sllch as William Cecil's with Queen 
Elizabeth and William Laud's with Charles 1, Cosin's relationship with Whitgift was both 
reciprocal and complementary. He provided his master with justification and vindication, 
receiving in return protection and preferment. After Lord Burghley complained to the 
archbishop in 1584 about the severity of the articles of subscription which employed the ex 
officio oath, Whitgift (who once confessed that he himself knew nothing about the legality of 
d1e oath), 29 wrote two letters back to Burghley defending the use of the oath. The letters were 
25 Hasler, Commons, I, 661-
26 Vita et obitus orntltissillli celeberrimiq; Firi Richardi Cosin, William Barlow (London, 1598) (STC2 1460). 
27 See also below, 25I. 
28 Hasler, Commons, I, 66l. 
29 When the common lawyer James Morice informed the archbishop in early 1591 that the c.': officio proceeding was 
intolerable, Whitgifr replied that though he had no knowledge of the law himself, he had approved of :ll1d promoted its 
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delivered personally (0 Lord Burghley by Cosin,30 and one can hardly avoid the conclusion 
that Cosin was essentially delivering his own letters. With Whitgift's encouragement and 
perhaps more, Cosin waded into the thick of late Elizabethan politics, ultimately playing a 
central role in the government's campaign against presbyterianism and puritan anticlericalism, 
though this has never been adequately recognised by historians. 
Censorship of the press had been an early concern of the Elizabethan high commission, 
with at least two such requests by the privy council that they do so in 1566 and 1586.31 Cosin 
was thus actively involved in censorship from at least the mid-80s, and in 1589 he was 
recruited by Edmond Tilney, master of the revels, (0 help in the process of censoring the 
theatre.32 The privy council also was wont to can on Cosin for special tasks from time to time, 
employing him to examine witnesses present at a libellous sermon (1586), imprisoned 
recusants (1587), a debtor in need of temporary relief from the pressure of creditors (1590), 
suspects of fraudulent practices (1591), and to help resolve a dispute between the inhabitants 
of Blackfriars of London regarding the reparation of their church (1597)}3 More importantly, 
Cosin was involved in several major cases brought before the high commission and Star 
Chamber, notably Robert Cawdrey's final degradation from the ministry by the high 
commission at Lambeth in 1590 34 and Cartwright's famous high commission and Star 
Chamber cases in 1591-2. After Whitgift shifted Cartwright's torpid high commission case (0 
Star Chamber in hopes of better results, Cosin, probably aided by Bancroft, compiled a brief 
of the high commission case to present to Star Chamber and administered the articles of 
interrogation to Cartwright and his associates while Sergeant John Puckering (lord keeper by 
1592) acted as the queen's counseL35 Apart from Richard Bancroft, Cos in seems to be the 
only person to whom \Xlhitgift ascribed a certain amount of autonomy with regard to 
jurisdictional responsibilities. Records left to us of ecclesiastical disciplinary actions from the 
use, 'being therevnto induced by the opinions of other [note the singular!] who bare him in hand that such procedinge by 
oth W:lS lawfull'. PRO, SPI2/238, fo. 107L 
30 John Strype, The lire and acts lJt10hn WhitKi(t (3 vols.; Oxford, 1822) l, 322. 
31 Usher, Rise and tall, cd. Tyler, 54. 
32 Donna Hamilton, Shakespeare tlnd the politics o(proiestant ErIKlllnd (Lexington, Kentucky; 1992), 12. 
33APC, xiv, 60-1; xv, 122; xx, 10; xxii, 116;xxvi,447-8. 
34 BL, Lansdowne MS 68, doc. 47. Cawdrey's case is reviewed in full at 219-23. 
35 Collinson, Elizabethan purittlll 1Jl1JlJe1l1ent, 417, 419. Cosin's role in Cartwright's C:lse is studied in 1110re detail below at 
164-5. 
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1590s show Cosin's signature regularly appearing at the end of letters, sometImes amongst 
several signatures bur often as only one of three: the other two being \Xlhitgift's and 
Bancroft's.36 
With Cosin's education in canon and civil law and his broad experIence 1I1 the highest 
courtS of the realm, it is not difficult to see why he was employed by Whitgift as a legal 
polemicist. Though it cannot be proven that Cosin was selected by Whitgift to write An 
answer to a certain foctious libel! after the 1584 parliament, in light of Whitgift's strenuous 
opposition to the puritan bills calling for innovations in church government as well as his future 
deployment of Cosin on strategic publishing missions, it seems likely that he was handpicked 
for the task. One sometimes senses a certain reluctance in Cosin's writings - especially in the 
prefaces to the two Apologies - to embark on the project, yet as he himself noted he could 
hardly refuse: 'for owing very much unto you, and therefore not daring to deny you so small a 
matter, I haue ... hazarded rather to haue want of iudgement in me, then by lack of good will 
to be censured by you.' 37 
But why Cosin? Certainly the answer lies not only in his legal expernse but also in his 
skills of argumentative persuasion, plainly in evidence in the Conspiracie and the second 
edition of the Apologie. While Cosin's subject matter and premise in the Conspiracie were 
weak, he nevertheless urilised an important rhetorical device which formed the bedrock of the 
Apologie - that those who spoke or wrote against the established church and its jurisdiction, 
even in the name of reformation, were simply 'innovators' seeking to uproot long-established 
and rightfully instituted authoriry. Unlike in modern usage, the word 'innovation' in the 
Elizabethan age invariably carried a wholly negative association in politics; it was often coupled 
with the idea of sedition or faction. 38 Cosin repeatedly made use of this tactic, on some 
occasions collapsing his opponents' differing (and sometimes truly moderate) views into an 
amalgam of 'innovations', on others exposing the disparity of their views as a sign of disunity 
and confusion, the inevitable by-product of ' innovation'. 
36 Some good examples can be found in Cambridge MS Mm.I.35 (Baker 24) #12, parts hand k. 
37 Cosin, Ap%;;ie (1591 edition), sig. A3r-v. 
38 In 1607 Shakespeare used the word in Coriolanus, IIIfif 175 thus: 'My Selfe Attach thee as a Traitorous Innouator: a foe to 
th' publike weale.' OED, VII, 998. 
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The threat of innovation in the church was a theme to which Cosin returned many times 
in his written works. He considered presbyterianism seditious in its basic aspirations but he 
also found intellectual laziness in the arguments of its adherents. They were single-minded 
about church government, said Cosin, insisting that any evils or corruptions which existed !11 
the English church were proof of the corruption of the system itself. 
Out of this head springs also that errour of some, who doe attribute all disorder and personall 
faultes of men about execution oflawes vnto the lawes themselues, and vnto the verie pollicie of 
the Church: thereupon gathering with themsdues, that the plot of Discipline (if it might come 
in place) will surely serue as a Mithridate and a soueraigne salue, to heale (with short applying) 
all diseases and sores, both of Church & Common wealth. Certaine be so bewitched (in like 
sort) by a kind of admiration of that, which is (in it selfe) most necessarie, as that in the meane 
time they ouer slippe matters of no lesse importance in the life of a Christian, because they 
thinke it sufficient to be occupied ondy about the other. 39 
As a result of this tunnel vision with regard to church government and a hysterical effort to 
avoid the very shadow of popishness, continued Cosin, they no longer revered the sacrament, 
had no respect for feast or fasting days, and were so entranced with learning and hearing 
sermons that they forgot to act on what they heard. 
But this was the extent of Cosin's religious criticism of presbyterianism. Detailed 
confutation of nonconformist theology and liturgy was left to doctrinal experts such as 
Thomas Bilson, Manhew Sutcliffe, Thomas Cooper, John Bridges, and Richard Bancroft. 
Cosin's main goal was to defend the established church on grounds of law, not theology. 
What he offered in his main work, the Apologie, was a step-by-step explanation of the 
elements of the ecclesiastical court system and the laws by which it operated, followed by a 
justification of the same based on scripture, reason, the laws of (he realm, precedent, and the 
royal prerogative. The ecclesiastical law was the established law of the realm and the rightful 
guardians and interpreters of that law were the ecclesiastical judges. 'Conscience', a popular 
argument of the puritans which enabled them to refuse the ex officio oath, was a Pandora's 
box which would only lead to anarchy and confusion if allowed to supplant the court's 
39 eosin, Cnnsp;rac;e, si?;. B 1 r. 
Chapter 1 - Richard Cosin and ]:u11es Morice 
established criminal procedure. Cosin believed that ecclesiastical judges who understood the 
law were to be entrusted with its execution rather than allowing every man to judge the law. 
Such an alteration would 'put a sure buckler into the hands of Iesuites, other traitors, 
murderers, felons, and euery lewde companion, to holde foorth against the lawfull 
examination of Magistrates'. 40 
Cosin's main rhetorical strategy was two-fold: 1) to convince his reader of the inherent 
threat to law and order presented by puritan demands, and 2) to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the establishment. To achieve the latter Cosin adopted a tactic similar to the one Sir Thomas 
More used in the 1530s in his literary battle with Christopher St. German over ex officio 
procedure in heresy trials: tlut the civil and canon law, upon which English ecclesiastical law 
was largely based, was 'the common lawe of all the Ciuill nations of the world saue one' 
(England).41 Trusting this nearly universal authority of the civil law, Cosin expounded its 
guiding principle in criminal prosecution - that kingdoms had a demonstrable interest 111 
punishing crimes and therefore 'all good means' ought to be employed in the detection of 
them.42 
It was precisely the means of detecting crImes that was 111 controversy between Cosin 
and his puritan adversaries. Men such as James Morice and Sir Robert Beale argued that 
ecclesiastical judges were too powerful; in particular that their ability to exact (he ex officio 
oath from defendants was not only a tyrannical advantage that could be used to force 
defendants to commit perjury or else accuse themselves, but that this advantage could, in the 
hands of an unscrupulous judge, be vulnerable to unbridled abuse. Bur Cosin swept aside 
puritan fears of dishonesty and corruption among ecclesiastical judges, defending the clergy as 
a persecuted minority, beset by amiclericalism and jealous, opportunistic common lawyers. In 
league with the presbyterians, puritan common lawyers would undo the jurisdiction of the 
church, resulting in a collapse of aurhority in both church and state. 
Central to Cosin's thesis was the interconnectedness of secular and spiritual authority 
and the common danger posed to them by 'innovation'. As a restorative Cosin proposed an 
40 Cosin, Apolo[<h, Ill, 183. 
41 Cosin, Apolo[<ie, 'Epistle to the Reader', sig. B4v-Clv. 
42 eosin's discussion of the necessity of punishing crime can be found in the Apolo[<ie. II. 4-6. 
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unswervingly authoritarian agenda: submission by both clergy and laity to the laws of the 
realm - including the ecclesiastical laws, which were no popish, superstitious, foreign, or 
ungodly laws but laws justly ordained by the queen and parliament. Without the conscious 
empowerment of ecclesiastical judges to administer the law as they had in times past, he 
argued, the seditious innovations of the age would seduce and undermine the prince's scepter, 
dragging the nation into irretrievable chaos. 
eosin was skillful at turning the terms of the debate around: whereas the puritans, with 
some justification, complained that it was the church that had changed in recent years, 
suddenly embarking on a campaign for conformity that introduced ex officio procedure as its 
main weapon, eosin retold (he recent history of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in language that 
pressed out its inconsistencies and discontinuities, like smoothing wrinkles out of a blanker. 
Puritan opinion by contrast was treated as a novelty, and eosin's narrative was ordered so as to 
introduce and consider puritan claims only at the end of long and lulling citations from 
scripture and canon law, precedents and statutes, each of which served as bricks and mortar in 
the ancient, unchanging edifice of English ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In contrast he exposed the 
'innovations' of the puritans as trees without roots and arches without keystones. Though the 
puritans had an army of classical and early medieval precedents on their side,43 demonstrating 
the antiquity of their position clearly proved beyond the capabilities of men like James Morice 
and Sir Robert Beale. eosin's rhetorical advanrage lay in the fact that he was defending rather 
than attacking the established custom of the day, regardless of its legitimacy. He did not need 
to prove his case compellingly as long as he could mobilise the language of preservation and 
order for his cause. The physical force of the high commission, backed by the queen, was 
sufficient to do the rest. The puritans, unsupported by any auxiliary machine of coercion 
(parliamenr was insufficient) were desperate to win the battle on both fronts, defeating the 
power itself and the mourhpiece which validated it. 
43 The puritans who opposed ex o({leio procedure and particularly the oath were easily in line with the juridical assumptions 
of medieval canon law before the death of Gratian in 1181, and there was plenty of evidence from classical texts to 
bunress the principle that a judge acting as the sole initiator and prosecutor of a suit was no better than an accuser. For a 
fuller discussion of this issue, see below, 45 footnote 8. 
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We have looked at Cosin's rhetorical strategy, but his legal strategy was no less 
important. It revolved completely around his conception of the royal supremacy and the 
assumptions behind the Henrician break with Rome. Like all English lawyers Cosin accepted 
the prince as head of the English church by the laws of God, reason, and statute. He also 
accepted the Submission of the Clergy as a submission of the canon law to the laws of the 
realm - in principle. But the failure of Henry VIII and his successors ever to reform the canon 
law provided Cosin with his thesis: by the very absence of reform, canon law in England had 
been vindicated. Surely if there were any repugnant canons they would be abolished 
straightaway by the queen? Thus to speak against any of the canons or ecclesiastical laws now 
in effect - ex officio procedure, for example - was not only to speak in derogation of 
established law but also to offer injury co [he dignity of the imperial crown which had suffered 
it to continue. To oppose the practices of the church and its courts was to oppose the queen 
herself. Morice strove hard to point up the obvious flaws in this argument, but his best efforts 
were in his second work, 'A just and necessarie defence' which was never published.44 By 
removing the gap between the queen and her lawfully appointed ecclesiastical judges, Cosin 
symbolically grafted the latter onto the former as a sort of infallible extension of the royal 
supremacy. With this scheme he was able co smash Morice's argument that ecclesiastical 
judges who infringed on the common law incurred a praemunire. There was some justification 
for the idea of 'grafting' of authority, but again this was as vague as the original definitions of 
the royal supremacy itself and open co easy attack .. But Cosin's position on the royal 
supremacy, consistent throughout the Apologie, was similar to the strategies being employed 
in the writings of other conformists in the 1590s. 45 
What influence Cosin's ideas and writings had in his own field may readily be seen from 
contemporary sources, though it seems clear he was not universally known outside Whitgift's 
circle of influence. (In extant documents that mention Cosin his surname is often badly 
misspelled and his Christian name is sometimes either given wrongly or else substituted with a 
44 LPL, MS 234. 
45 Sec also Matthew Sutcliffe, Tretltise of ecclesitlstictll discipline, 1590 (STC2 23471); Thomas Bilson, Perpetual gfJllerl1l1lent 
of Christ's church, 1593 (STC2 3(65); and Richard Bancroft, Sunrq 0{ the pretended holy discipline, 1593 (STC2 1352), 
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blank line, indicating that the writer was unsure of it. 46) His influence on ecclesiastical law, 
however, both during and after his lifetime was considerable. 
The single most tangible effect Cosin had on the events of the 1590s was the influence 
the Apologie played in the judges' decision in Cawdrey's Queen's Bench case. The case 
opened in 1591 and was not concluded until early 1595, during which time Cosin's Apologie 
appeared in both its first and second editions. The final verdict of the judges went against 
Cawdrey, declaring in favour of the high commission's authority to deprive him of his 
benefice based on the authority of ecclesiastical law - and that temporal courts ought to 
accept without dispute the judgements given in ecclesiastical courts. In the only section of the 
judge's verdict in which a judicial philosophy was enunciated, there was clear evidence dut 
Cosin's Apologie, with its emphasis on the independent authority of ecclesiastical courts, had 
influenced the judges. The importance of Cawdrey' s case was that it validated once and for all 
the legitimacy of the high commission even in its most controversial aspects of jurisdiction and 
procedure. It established dut the commission was not bound by the terms of the Act of 
Uniformity, the Act of Supremacy, or any other parliamentary statute, but only by the letters 
patent of the queen, whose ancient royal prerogative it was to regulate and govern her church 
through commissions as she saw fir. Thus Cosin's conrribution to the high commission's 
vindication was both tangible and significant. 47 
When the high commission was again under intense assault from the common law 
judges in the early seventeenth century, several debates (for want of a better term) were staged 
by King James between the commissioners and the judges. The arguments of the 
commissioners fell along the very same lines as Cosin had used, invariably insisting that the 
commission was bound only by its letters patent, not by the Act of Supremacy. They further 
denied, as Cosin first did, that secular judges were privileged to interpret ecclesiastical laws -
even if those laws happened to be passed by Parliament. 48 Cosin's Apologie and Polity were 
unique in that no one after him ever atrempted to undertake such thorough, systematic works 
on ecclesiastical law or the hierarchy of authority in the English chutch, and thus it was natural 
46 For examples see APC volumes from 15ROs and 90s, passim; Hasler, Commons, I, 66l. 
47 See also below, 219-23. 
48 Usher covers these debates in detail in Rise and t;,ll, ed. Tyler, chapters 8-10. 
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for commissioners and ecclesiastical lavvyers in the Stuart age to look back to Cosin as an 
authoritative source rather than try to improve on his work. A good example of this is the 
Polity, written in 1589 but first printed seven years after Cosin's death in 1604. The preface, 
addressed to James and written by Cosin's successor as vicar-general Thomas Crompton (who 
was shortly to be knighted), contained nothing original but was merely a piece of sycophantic 
rhetoric claiming (using Cosin's Apologie for its ideas) that ecclesiastical jurisdiction plainly 
belonged to the crown and dignity of the king and was derived from him down to 
archbishops and bishops and finally to ecclesiastical judges. There was most likely a political 
reason for the printing of the Polity: the Hampton Court Conference had reopened the public 
debate over the ecclesiastical polity of England, and the puritans had been allowed to present 
their petitions to the new king formally. Cosin's Polity, the basis for much of the Apologie, set 
out in a visual format a systematic foundation for ecclesiastical authority that the conformists 
wished James to reaffirm. Thirty years later the Polity received a reissue in 1634 by the press 
in Oxford, this time at the instance of the university's new chancellor, Archbishop Laud, who 
was waging a campaign to drive puritanism and 'backwardness in religion' from the colleges.49 
Elsewhere in surviving documents, Cosin's influence in civil and canon law appears 
pervasive. He was cited in an early seventeenth century treatise on judicial practice in the court 
of the chancellor of Oxford. 50 A copy of the Polity was found along with a number of canon 
and civil law texts amongst the papers of Dr. Richard Holdsworth, master of Emmanuel 
College, Cambridge until 1649. 51 James Whirelocke, a judge in King's Bench during the 
reigns of James and Charles and father of the more famous lawyer Bulstrode Whitelocke, 
noted that while he was at Oxford he endeavoured to combine his study of common law with 
that of civil law, 'being encoraged mutche thearunto by a book set out by dr. Cosins, the dean 
of the arches, intituled, "An apologye of the ecclesiastical proceedings", in whiche I saw how 
great use he made of his knoledge of the common law to upholde the authority of his owne 
49 Soon after becoming chancellor of Oxford in Cl fiercely contested election in 1630, Laud turned his attention to beefing up 
the university's press output. By 1633 the university was employing three new printers, each with two presses and two 
apprentices. C.E. Mallet, A history o{the Uniz1ersity o{Ox(ord (London, 1924) II, 303-6, 311. 
50 LPL, MS 2085, 80. 
5! Owen, J\Jedieval 01l10/l law, 53. 
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profession, and to direct others of his place.'52 Whitelocke later wrote a book called The 
sovereign's prerogative, which was published posthumously in 1657. Francis Clerke, a London 
proctor in the last decade of the sixteenth century, compiled a book on ecclesiastical 
procedure in 1596 called Praxis in curiis ecclesiasticis (published in Dublin, 1666), and in one 
of the extant copies of the book there is a marginal gloss referring to Cosin's Apologie, 
attempting to argue that the ex officio oath was legal. 53 Two civil lawyers in the early 
seventeenth century, Thomas Ridley and Calibute Downing, praised Cosin as a pioneering 
civilian who had done much to reinvigorate the study of civil law.54 Finally, there was interest 
in Cosin's Polity as late as the eighteenth century, as a manuscript copy dated 1740 shows. 55 
Cosin's main adversary in the debate over the authority of ecclesiastical law was an Essex 
common lawyer nine years his senior. James Morice is chiefly known to historians as an early 
champion of the cause of constitutional liberty, but his actual impact on English history has 
been overrated. While it cannot be denied that in many ways Morice was a seventeenth 
century man living in the sixteenth century,56 it Blust be remembered that he thoroughly lost 
the public debate with Cosin and ended his career with a dampened reputation. 
Morice was born in 1539, the son of William Morice of Roydon, Hertfordshire and 
Anne Isaac of Kent. Four years later Morice's father purchased land in Chipping Ongar, Essex, 
and Morice lived there for the rest of his life, inheriting the estate upon his father's death)7 
He was admitted in August 1557 at the age of eighteen to the Middle Temple, where he 
would enjoy a lengthy career and a notable reputation. 58 It seems that he was elected to 
Parliament for Wareham in 1563 with the patronage of (he second earl of Bedford, who was 
possibly a relative, 59 though he would not be returned again until the important Parliament of 
1584 in which he took a conspicuous role. I n May 1578 he was chosen by the Middle Temple 
52 Sir James Whitclocke, Liber (tlIJleliCliS o(Sir }!l7Jles V7hiteloeke, cd. ]oh n Bruce, (Camden Society; London, 185R) 13-4. 
53 Helmholz, ROlJ1lll1 CllI1I1/7 law, 131. 
54 Thomas Ridley, A I'ieu' or the cillite lTnd ecelesiastiel!! law (London, 16(7) 108-9; Calibute Downing, A disellurse o( the 
state ecclesiasticall orthis kil1KdolJl (Oxford, 1632) 30-1; sec also below, 256. 
55 BL, Additional MS 28119. 
56 It is my opinion that Morice's views on constitutional rights of individuals were so advanced for their day as to be 
considered radical; yct his ideas would have been welcomed as sdf-evident in the decades following the English Civil War. 
57 Hasler, Commo/7s, III, 98. 
58 Middle Temple records, ed. C.H. Hopwood, I (cd. C.T. Martin), (London, 19(4) 117. 
59 The suggcstion is made by Hasler, C0IJ11J10i1S, III, 9R. 
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to be reader for the following autumn and was chosen again for Lent 1579. During this time 
he composed a subsequently famous lecture on the royal prerogative, the existing copies of 
which provide a valuable resource for comparing his early intellectual views with those he 
expressed in his two major works, A briefe treatise of othes (1592/3) and 'A just and necessarie 
defence' (1594).60 Morice became master of the bench some time before February 1586, when 
his son was admitted to the Middle Temple without fine (usually 20s.).61 And in June 1596 
Morice was chosen treasurer and given a voice in the parliament 'as his two last predecessors 
have had.'62 
Besides his long affiliation with the Middle Temple, Morice was a justice of the peace for 
Essex from 1573 until July 1596, a few months before his death. 63 As a JP he presided 
regularly at assizes, was appointed as a commissioners on various occasions ro inquisitions post 
mortem in Essex,64 and in December 1577 was appointed to a commission to enquire into 
piracy.65 In October 1589 he reached the pinnacle of his law career with his appointment to 
the Court of Wards and Liveries. 66 Beginning with the 1584 Parliament Morice was a regular 
represenrative for Colchester, sitting in 1586, 1589, and 1593. That his legal expertise was 
recognised by each Parliament can be seen in how he was often asked (0 draft or edit bills as 
well as serve on numerous committees. 67 
Morice's first step into wider public debate began during the summer of 1590 between 
assize circuits when he 'scribled' a treatise about oaths on 'a quire of paper'. 68 This essay later 
became A briefe treatise of othes, a book that disturbed Whitgift and urgently prompted the 
need for a revised edition of Cosin's Apologie for sundrie proceedings ecclesiastical!. Morice's 
Treatise was brief but effective, encapsulating many arguments against ecclesiastical court 
procedures into a fifty-eight page tract that was printed anonymously in 1592 or 1593 in 
60 STC 2 18106; LPL, MS 234. 
61 Middle Temple records, cd. Hopwood, I, 283-4. 
62 Middle Temple records, cd. Hopwood, I, 367. 
63 Calendar orllSsize records: Essex indictments. Elizabeth [, ed. ].S. Cockburn (London, 1978). 
64 CPR, V!, 352; VII, 449; VIII, 41. 
65 BL, Lansdowne MS 146, fo. 18. 
66 H.E. Bell, Ali introductioll 10 the history tlJlr] recorris or the COliI'I of Wm·d,. lind Lil'eries, (Cambridge, 1953) 22; PRO, 
SP12/132, doc. 44 wrongly gives the year as '1579'. 
67 Hasler, COlllmons, Ill, 98. 
68 PRO, SP12/238, fo. lOlr-v. 
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Middelburg by Richard Schilders. In the Parliament of 1593 Morice tried to mould the 
principles he expressed in the Treatise into two bills designed to curb the powers of 
ecclesiastical courts. Despite what seemed to be overwhelming support for the bills in the 
Commons, the queen confiscated the bill from the speaker and forbade its discussion and, 
very likely, its passage. Morice was pur under house arrest (though at the comfortable London 
residence of privy councillor Sir John Fortescue) and released after two months. 69 
Thereafter his career suffered unreversed decline. U nsurprisingly, he failed to procure the 
office of mastership of the Wards as well as attorney-general (though he was among those 
nominated for the latter by the earl of Essex). The year after the Parliament he wrote a 
response to Cosin's Apologie bur dared not disseminate it or allow it to be printed. It was 
called 'A just and necessarie defence of a briefe treatise of othes' and was an able if sometimes 
repetitive repartee to the Apologie. Bur no one ever saw it. No one that is except Whitgift who 
personally requested a copy for himself. 70 Reflecting on his failure to advance himself, Morice 
lamented in a letter to Burghley in June 1596, 'J haue not to this daie added one foote of land 
to the little patrymonie left me by my father.'71 He died 2 February 1597, passing his estate 
on to his eldest son, John. The preamble to his will exhibited a distinctly puritan sentiment. 72 
Bur perhaps Morice's career was more successful than he himself realised. All indications 
are that he enjoyed great popularity as a common lawyer, and Lord Burghley was interested in 
his work as early as 1579 when he requested a copy of his Middle Temple lecture on the royal 
prerogative.?3 His friendship with Burghley seems to have begun around this time, and it 
69 Cambridge MS Mm.1.35 (Baker 40) fos. 63r-69r. 
70 BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69. 
71 BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 68. 
72 Hasler, Commons, Ill, 100. There are tvm mistaken theories concerning Morice's later years that need to be eradicated. A 
Cambridge manuscript with some biographical details ahour Morice (supposedly by 'Dr. Heylyn' though there is no 
conclusive evidence that this was Peter Helylen the Restoration historian) stated that Morice was disabled from his 
common law practice as a result of introducing his two bills in 1593 and imprisoned in Tutbuty Castle where he died. 
Second, several historians rdying on J.R. Tanner's Tudor constitutional doculIleFlts (Cambridge, 1940) have swallowed his 
claim that Morice, like Peter Wentworth, was imprisoned in the Tower of London after introducing his bills. The Tutbury 
Castle idea is not only withour substantiating evidence, bur Morice's presence at Essex assize cases until a few months 
before his death as well as his letters to Lord Burghley in 1596 sufficiently disprove the claim. Tanner's assertion is likewise 
disproved by the fact that Morice wrote to Burghley several times from Sir John Fortescue's house during his house arrest, 
which could not well have happened if he were languishing in the Tower. Cambridge MS Mm.I.35 (Baker 40) fo. 69r; 
Tanner, Documents, 557; Cockbum, EsSt'x indictments, passim; BL, Lansdowne MS 82, docs. 68, 69. J.A.I. Champion, 
The pillars of priestcrtlft shaken: the church of England and its enelll ies, 1660-1730 (Cambridge, 1992). 
73 Preceding the manuscript copy of Morice's 1578-9 lecture there is an undated letter to Burghley in which he says, 
'Neverthelesse for that your honour required a sight of my travaile concerning the kingcs prerogatives I humbly offer vnto 
your Lordship some part of that my reading'. BL, Egerton MS 3376, fo. 1 r. 
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lasted for many years. Burghley protected Morice 011 a number of occasions, usually when 
Morice had drawn the ire of Whitgift, as he did in 1590, 1593, and 1596. 74 He did seem to 
have a penchant for entangling himself in political causes. As early as 1584 when he was town 
clerk of Colchester, Morice petitioned the privy council along with several others to oppose the 
deprivation of a preacher of Colchester, George Northey, for nonconformiry.?5 On other 
occasions it was the privy council who solicited Morice, such as in 1586, when he was asked to 
consider the suit of a widow, or in 1588, when he and three others were personally requested 
by the queen to consider what statutes should be established or reformed at the next 
Parliament (1589) and to keep the judges informed of their work until then. 76 By the late 
1580s Morice's political views were clear and settled, and he was beginning to make bold with 
his convictions. As early as 1590 (or perhaps earlier) he became acquainted with Cawdrey's 
high commission case and, with the help of George Croke and Nicholas Fuller, became 
counsellor to Cawdrey in an effort to help restore him to his ministry. Cawdrey finally 
challenged the high commission's ruling in Queen's Bench in 1591, Morice acting as his 
counsel, but lost the decision. This was the most controversial case Morice was involved in, 
unless we are to believe he was consulted in (he Star Chamber trial of Thomas Cartwright in 
the same year, which seems entirely possible.?7 Cosin accused Morice in tlle Apologie of 
seeking to assist Cartwright and his associates, but Morice indignantly denied it. 7R 
It is evident that Archbishop Whitgift feared Morice's ability and influence. They met at 
least twice, both times at \iVhitgift's request, and the atmosphere was tense but respectful. 
Morice was not afraid to debate with anyone, and at their first recorded meeting in London in 
spring 1591 to discuss his verdict in an Essex case in which he had found an archdeacon guilty 
of infringing the common law, Morice wasted no time in defending his action and challenged 
74 The three occ:lsions mentioned are Morice's controversial verdict in an Essex case in which an archdeacon was punished, his 
two bills in the 1593 Parliament, and the writing of his 'Defence'. 
75 Collinson, Elizabethan puritan 1II01lelllent, 257. 
76 APC XIV, 198; XVI, 415-7. 
77 Some of Cartwright's criticisms of the ex officio oath sound similar to Morice's arguments, although others do not. See 
especi:llly :l letter of April, 1592 written to the queen from prison; John Snypc, A nnals of the Rejfmnation and 
establishment ofreligion, and other l'Ilrious occurrences in the Church o/England during Queen Elizabeth's happy reign 
(Oxford, 1824) IV, 121. 
78 eosin, Apoiogie, III, 213; LPL MS 234, fo. 52r. 
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\X!hitgift to justify the validity of proceeding ex officio .79 Again in 1596 when he met the 
archbishop to hear his review of the 'Defence', Morice disagreed with Whitgift on the issue of 
whether the ex officio oath bore any resemblance to oaths administered in Star Chamber. But 
both Whitgift and the high commissioners were strangely interested in Morice's writings, 
contrary though they were, and accorded him a surprising amount of respect. When it became 
known in 1591 that Morice had written A briefe treatise of oathes, copies of it were requested 
by some of the commissioners who had signed the ecclesiastical memorandum defending ex 
officio procedure.8o Whitgift himself requested a copy of the 'Defence' in 1595, and in the 
following year he suggested a conference between Morice and Cosin for the resolution of their 
dispute, even though he disagreed with most of the 'Defence'.81 But this is not to say that 
Whitgift was simply trying to find answers. While he may have wished a private end to the 
dispute between these two men of credit, he was not content to let [he row fester in public. 
Morice was dangerous and potentially subversive, and it was with urgency that Whitgift had 
written to the queen in 1593 to have Morice's bills stopped. 82 
What beliefs did Morice hold which threatened the ecclesiastical establishment? In short, 
he was part of an emerging movemenr in England to elevate the principles of common law 
over all other systems of law. The movement was by no means new in the 1590s; its roots lay 
in the late fifteenth cenrury and had its origins at the Inns of Court. 83 The movemenr's first 
notable spokesman was Christopher Sr. German (d. 1541), a Middle Temple lawyer who 
wrote several treatises in the 1520s and 1530s complaining of the confusion created by the 
conflict between ecclesiastical and common law. 'It is a ryght troublous thynge to the people', 
he wrote, 'to haue two powers within the realme whereby they may be sued for one thynge in 
seuerall courtes and by seuerall aucroriries ... '84 This conflict of laws was thought to be caused 
by an encroachment of ecclesiastical law on the rightful jurisdiction of the common law and 
79 PRO, SP12i238, fo. I07r. 
80 Ibid. 
81 BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69. 
82 BL, Additional MS 28571, fo. 172r. 
83 Guy, 'The Hcnrician Age'; Varietil's, ed. Pocock, 24-5; Helmholz, RlJlllilll (IWO/l Law, 23. 
84 Christopher St. German, A Treatise concemyilge diuen of the constitucyons proaynciLlLJ. llnd Legal/tines (London, 1535?) 
STC2 24236, chapter five. There is no page numbering system in the Comtitatiolls, and since most of the chaptcrs are 
only one pagc I hOlve citcd thc chapter numbers instead. 
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could be remedied by making common law the supreme law of the land, by which all 
disputed judicial principles should be resolved. 
Dispute and disagreement in England between the two law systems dated back to the 
twelfth century. The most spectacular dash between the jurisdictions of church and state 111 
the Middle Ages sprang from the Becket dispute and the attack on ecclesiastical courts Il1 
Henry II's Constitutions of Clarendon (1164), the sixth provision of which required laymen to 
be properly presented by an accuser or witness in the bishop's presence, rather than merely by 
suggestion or denunciation. 85 After the introduction of the ex officio oath into England in 
1236, there was a growing number of complaints against papal provisions and appeals to 
Rome, and over time the principle of praemunire developed in English law.86 An act of 
Richard II in 1392 (15 Richard II c. 5) declared that if the pope were obeyed in all things, the 
statutes of the realm would be void and of no effect. It therefore decreed that if any man 
purchase or pursue lawsuits in the court of Rome or elsewhere which violated the prerogative 
and dignity of the crown, that he should be attainted with praemunire facias and stripped of 
his lands and goods. 87 A firm line began to be drawn between two spheres of jurisdiction, 
spiritual and temporal. But the tension between the laws continued because there was no 
mechanism for resolving precisely which system had cognisance over certain facets oflaw. 
Common lawyers such as St. German pointed to the sophistication and the Englishness 
of common law as proof of its superiority over canon and civil law, which were, in his opinion, 
both foreign and less sophisticated. 88 T ( was true that there was much conh.lsion and 
contradiction in late medieval canon law texts. This was due to the numerous scribal and 
manuscript errors that had accumulated over many centuries. A good example of this can be 
seen in the debate between Henry VIII and the papacy on (he question of Henry's divorce. 
Canonical marriage law was so contradictory and confusing that both sides could present 
legitimate arguments from canon law which were practically opposite. The diverse opinions of 
85 Levy, Fifth Amendlllr!l7t, 45. 
86 See Hdmho[z, Romrll1 Crlnon ltlu', 25-6, [c)f some rdevant comments on pracl7lunirt' in late medieval England; also Select 
Crlses from the ecclesiastical courts o( the diocese or the prol,ince o( Canterbury, c. 1200-1301, cd. Norma Adams and 
Charles Donahue J r. (Selden Society; London, 1981). 
87 SR, II, 85-6. 
88 Fox and Guy, Reassess! ng, 102-4, 165-8. 
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the continental unlverSltles on the divorce question are further evidence of this. 89 English 
common law, constantly evolving and modernising through moots and case study at the inns 
of court, did not have these problems, and St. German was able to exploit this situation to his 
advantage. Drawing attention to the reluctance of canon law to be precise about details, he 
complained that the concept of 'censures of the church' was so vague and ill-defined that it 
was sometimes impossible for men to know how to avoid them. 90 St. German considered 
many recent ecclesiastical constitutions to be violations of the laws of the realm and of the 
king's prerogative, and in hisDoctor and student and New additions he proposed that the 
extent of ecclesiastical law should not reach beyond matters merely liturgical and 
sacramental. 91 
Another contribution St. German made to the movement for common law supremacy 
was his amplification of Sir John Fortescue's opinion that the goal of justice should not merely 
be to punish crime but to protect innocence as well.92 This was an emphasis that had been 
rejected by canon law ever since the early thirteenth century when the proliferation of heresy 
on the continent caused an alteration in canonical criminal procedure, shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant and away from the plaintiff. 93 During his lengthy literary debate with 
Sir Thomas More on the subject of heresy trials, St. German alleged that there was an 
imbalance of justice in English canon law. In the practice of secret denunciation he saw a legal 
principle that unapologetically placed defendants at a disadvantage, leaving the door open for 
innocent men to be falsely accused in secret by malicious adversaries. This overriding concern 
for the legal safeguard of innocence became a preoccupation among common lawyers 
throughout the Tudor period. 
89 Brundage, Medi"Z'll1 Cllnon law, 182. The Corpus juris cllnonici was published in Paris between 1504 and 1506, and this 
brought at least some order to the dishevelled state of canon law. Spalding, Reformation, 19. 
90 Sf. German, Comtitutions, chapter 15. 
91 An example was church property which, not being in any way liturgical or sacramental, ought to be adjudicated by 
Parliament instead of the church. St. German, Doctor mid .,Iudent, cd. T.F.T. Plucknett and J.L. Barron, (Selden Society; 
London, 1974) xi, 323-4. 
92 Christopher St. German, Slliem tlnd Biztlnce (London, 1533), reprinted in More, Works, cd. Guy, Keen, Miller, and 
McGugan, X, 360; Sir John Fortescue, De lillldibus leJ<1I1il lll1J<lie, ed. S.B. Chrimes (Westport, Connecticut; 1979). 
93 Previolls to the outbreak of heresies in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it had heen the other way around - the 
defendant was at a greater advantage since the burden of proof was on the accuser. Brundage, !vledietJilf muon law, 95. 
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In addition to their concern for the protection of innocence, sixteenth century common 
lawyers were keen to reduce the power of ecclesiastical courts - or at least to check it. 
Alarmed at the power of the high commission to imprison offenders at its discretion, Chief 
Justice James Dyer (c.151 0-1582) began to collect precedents of habeas corpus around 1562.94 
By the 1590s common law judges were issuing prohibitions against the high commission in an 
effort to disrupt the commission's expanding jurisdiction and to frustrate its habit of 
imprisoning offenders contrary to common law. Many of these prohibitions were 'frivolous 
and inconsistent'. 95 Though convinced of the supremacy of common law and intent on 
reducing ecclesiastical law to a subordinate system, common law judges were plainly unsure of 
how to do it. Typical of this uncertainty were Sir Edward Coke's conflicting remarks about 
the case of Thomas Leigh. In 1568 Leigh, suspected of attending mass, had refused the ex 
officio oath, was imprisoned in the Fleet by the high commission, and was subsequently 
delivered by the whole Court of Common Pleas by a writ of habeas corpus. The reason? That 
depends on which occasion Coke was writing. In 1607 he said it was because in such a case the 
high commission should not have examined Leigh on oath. In 1615 he said it was because the 
Common Pleas deemed that the principle nemo tenetur seipsttm prodere (no man may be 
compelled to aCCllse himself) was in effect. In the same year Coke said that Leigh was 
delivered by a writ of privilege because he was a lawyer of the court, and in his Fourth institute 
(published 1630) he declared that the high commission in that case had no power to imprison 
him. 96 
Morice's career, ranglllg from the 1570s to 1596, occurred at a time when the 
jurisdiction of the common law was being visibly challenged by ordinaries' courts and 
particularly by the high commission. Morice shared the distrust and disdain of canon law that 
was common at the Inns of Court, believing in the inherent superiority of England's own laws 
to any foreign laws. 
94 J.H. Baker notes that the exi~tence of these collections remained unknown even to John Selden in 1627 though he himself 
was keen to gather precedents on the same subject. Sir j:lmcs Dyer, Reports from the lost notebooks a/Sir James Dyer, 
cd. J .H. Baker (2 vols.; Selden Society; London, 1994) l, lxxviii. 
95 Levy, Fi(th Amendment, 223. 
96 Dyer, Reports, cd. Baker, l, 143-4. 
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The comon lawes of this land are the good and necessarie customes and vsages of the realme 
agreable with the lawe of god and reason, whereby the partes and members of the bodye 
politicke of this kingdome are firmely knitte and vnited together, as the natural! body of man 
by the sinewes thereof: These customes are rearmed the comon lawe not onelie for that they 
serve to the comon profite of the land, speaking with one and the selfe same voice vnto aI!, but 
for that they are also the most publick, vniuersall and general! lawe of the realme, without the 
which this our pol!icye and comon wealthe cannot stand or be contynewed. 97 
He concurred with St. German that any ecclesiastical laws that ran contrary to the common 
law of the realm should be abolished. 98 One could not serve two masters, and the only true 
law in England was the common law. There has been speculation that behind Tudor common 
lawyers' anxiety over ecclesiastical jurisdiction was a professional fear of losing income to 
ecclesiastical courts. Professor Tyler has even suggested that common lawyers' rabid 
opposition to rhe high commission was a reflection of their own failure to infiltrate it.99 These 
considerations are certainly valid, but the simple element of intellectual disagreement should 
not be underrated. 
We now turn to Morice's VIews on the royal supremacy. He accepted the Italian 
renaIssance ideal that monarchy was the best form of government (as opposed to 
republicanism) and adopted the anthropomorphic metaphor that the king was head of the 
body politic, without whom the limbs could not function, yet he rejected quod principi placet 
legis vigorem habet in favour of Theodosius' maxim, nihil tam prOpriZtr1l est imperii quam 
legiblls vivere et manis imperio est legibus sl£bmittere and he congratulated Elizabeth for 
ruling after this enlightened fashion. 100 In a draft of his lecture on the royal prerogative at the 
Middle Temple in 1578-9, Morice wrote that the laws of the realm had 'ordayned and 
enriched (he Royall Throne' with great prerogatives and preeminences, but the word 
97 LPL, MS 234, fo. 124r. 
98 Answering Sir Thomas More, St. German stated, 'And in like wise it were good to repel all such laws spiritual, as be made 
contrary to the king's laws and the custom of the realm.' St. German, Salem and Bizance, reprinted in More, Works, cd. 
Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, 369. 
99 It is important to bear in mind that the commission was composed not only of clergy but common law judges and privy 
councillors as well. The percentage of secular judges on the high commission, however, dropped considerably during the 
latter part of Elizabeth's reign, and anyway most of the secular judges who were commissioners only sat by the invitation 
of Whitgift, who made certain that the commission was firmly controlled by his trusted servants, Cosin, Bancroft, 
Stanhope, and Aylmer. Usher, Rise IlI1d {tTlI, cd. Tyler, xxxi-xxxiii. 
100 BL, Additional MS, 36081 fos. 231 v-232r. 
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'ordayned' was struck out and replaced with 'adorned', which substantially altered the 
implication of the sentence. 101 If the laws of the realm 'ordained' the royal throne, then the 
common law was antecedent to the king's imperium, but if the laws merely 'adorned' the 
throne they were no more than an accoutrement to the king's supremacy. The change of 
language was probably reflexive upon second thought, but the evidence of Morice's career 
shows he truly believed the originaL 
The true locus of the king's prerogative, Morice continued, was 'the High and Stately 
Courte of Parlyament' as well as the 'Lawes, Lybertie, Goodes, or Landes' of his subjects. ]02 
The influence of St. German is dear in the theory of parliamentary omnicompetence, but the 
other locus of the royal prerogative - the laws, liberty, goods, and lands of all Englishmen, 
was more subtle. It was almost a reduction of the royal prerogative from a real, personal power 
to a concept of limited monarchy where true authority was delegated to the bureaucracy of 
government and exercised on behalf of the monarch. Morice's definition was certainly at odds 
with Elizabeth's own idea of her authority, though in 1579 it was not yet politically unsafe to 
express such an opinion. 
The common law and the custom of the realm were the 'rightful Inheritaunce of the 
Subiect' which the king could not take away,103 and Morice openly repudiated any absolutist 
reading of the common law: 
But to say that the kynge is [an] ... emperor over his Lawes and Actes of Parliament (bycawse he 
hath power to make them) as that he is not bounde to governe by the same but at his will and 
pleasure, is an Opinyon altogeather repugnant to the wise and Politicke State of gouernmen t 
established within this Realme ... 104 
Strangely though, he admitted that the king might make law by letters patent (as well as 
through Parliament and by royal commandment), and this was a position he held throughout 
101 BL, Additional MS, 36081 fo. 232v. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Cambrdge MS Mm.1.35 (Baker 40) fo. 58r; BL, Additional MS 36081> fo. 252r. 
104 BL, Additional MS 36081, fo. 243v. 
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his career. 105 When there was a conflict between letters patent and stacute law, however, as was 
the case in the trial of Robert Cawdrey, Morice tended to side with the supreme authority of 
parliamentary stacute, although that may have been his position by default in respect of his 
opposition to the powers of the high commission. 
It will also be useful briefly to examine Morice's view towards the English clergy. There 
is no question that an anticlerical temperament runs through his career from his earliest to his 
latest writings. His Middle Temple lectute, his speeches in Parliament in 1586 and 1593, and 
his controversy with Richard Cosin all bear witness to a deep-seated lack of faith in the 
dergy.l06 Continually irritated by Cosin's pretensions to clerical privilege, Morice echoed a 
sentiment originally expressed by French civil lawyers that clerical privileges were a gratuity 
offered by princes out of liberality, not fundamental rights belonging to the clergy 
themselves,107 a principle also employed by Henry VIII's divorce team in the Collectanea satis 
copiosa in the early 1530s. 108 
What makes Morice historically significant, however, is his opposition to ex officio 
procedure and the ex officio oath. Throughout English history, methods of determining guilt 
or innocence at the common law had always been accusatorial. The two parties were known, 
one accused the other, everything was done in public. There had never been anything 
inquisitorial about criminal proceedings at common law, and judges did not initiate cases. 
Morice thus considered ex officio procedure not only foreign to English custom but clearly 
contrary as well. He was distrustful of (he discretionary powers given to ecclesiastical judges, 
fearful that ex officio procedure provided no safeguards against praetorian judges initiating 
cases against men out of malice, thereby becoming accusers as well as judges. He incredulously 
rejected Cosin's demand that the law presume integrity in its judges, 'Common and daylie 
experience (a most true Insrructer) hauinge shewed and manifested to the worlde the 
intollerable corruptions and insincere practISes of this their noble office.' 109 It is sometimes 
105 In both 1578-9 and 1594 Morice stated thar the king might make law by way of letters patenr and royal commandmenr. 
LPL, MS 234, fo. 312v; BL, Additioml MS 36081, fo. 232v. 
106 For examples see BL, Additioml36081, fos. 229r-274v, BL, Harley MS 7188, and LPL, MS 234, fos. 2l0r-213v where 
there is a remarkably bittCT tirade against the ex olfleio oath and the English clergy who practised it. 
107 Morice, Treatise, 46; Guy, The Henrician A?,e', Varieties, cd. Pocock, 34. 
108 Fox and Guy, RerrssessillJ;, 158-9. 
109 LPL, MS 234, fo. 212r. 
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difficult to sort out Morice's anticlerical ism from his legal objections (0 the unchecked license 
of ordinaries, but one is led (0 conclude that they were mutually supportive. 
The most heinous element of ex officio procedure was, of course, the oath. In his most 
honest and forthright work, the 'Defence', Morice admitted that he detested the oath, calling 
it 'this vnlawfull and baseborne offspringe of Rome'. I 10 It was the means by which a judge 
might sift a man's personal thoughts and pronounce judgement on them. His strenuous 
objection to this invasion of a man's mind was widely shared not only among common 
lawyers but among all men, including ecclesiastical judges. What set eosin and his fellow 
commissioners apart was that they believed there could be an exception to the rule that a 
man's secret thoughts ought not to be judged - when it was in the interest of the state to do 
so. This reasoning was what vexed Morice so much, and it is easy to see how this debate has 
been of immense interest to constitutional historians. 
While in his Treatise Morice did not suggest civil disobedience with regard to the oath, 
by the time of the writing of the 'Defence' three and a half years later, he boldly claimed it 
was the right of every man convented before ecclesiastical judges to 'take excepcion and 
challenge to dle Iurisdiccion of the courte and authoritie of the Iudge without offence.' 111 In 
fact many puritans were refusing the ex officio oath by 1594 on grounds of conscience and 
from a resolute refusal to incriminate themselves. This refusal usually brought high 
commisslOn cases to a screeching halt as canon law forbade the conviction of defendants 
without their confession (which was ordinarily extracted through testimony on oath). It was a 
successful ploy from a psychological standpoint, but the defendant was usually no better off in 
the long run since the high commission could still imprison him indefinitely for contempt. 112 
Finally, what is known of Morice's views on presbyterianism? There is almost nothing of 
Morice's life and character about which we know less than his private religious beliefs, 
particularly regarding presbyterianism. He once referred to a client who was suspended from 
110 Ibid. 
111 LPL, MS 234, fo. 194v. 
112 The commission could not solve this problem until the second decade of the seventeenth centuty when, during Bancroft's 
tenure as archbishop, the court adopted the principle that refusal to take the oath could be considered a tacit admission of 
guilt, allowing defendants to be proceeded against pro confesso if they stood silent. This was the standard practice by 
1611. Usher, Rise flnd (illl, ed. Tyler, 247 footnote 2. 
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his ministry, noting that he was a quiet man, 'not intermedlinge with the troublesom questions 
of discipline and churche gouernement', 113 but other than this there is no mention of the 
subject of presbyterianism in any of his works, nor do we have any helpful evidence on the 
subject from his life. John Strype called him one of the 'counsellors of the Puritans in these 
times' and a 'professed favourer of the Puritan faction'. 114 It is plausible that he may have used 
legal arguments to obscure religious sentiments, but there is no real reason to suggest he was a 
presbyterian. 
Morice's historical importance, like Cosin's, began during his own lifetime and 
continued well after his death. He was more widely known than Cosin, it seems, and there is 
no doubt that he enjoyed popularity both among puritans and his fellow lawyers. Evidence 
shows that his lectures at the Middle Temple must have been widely studied during his life 
time: Sir Edward Coke, who was a vigorous anti-monopolist in the early seventeenth century, 
was deeply influenced by Morice's argument that the king could not erect monoplies of 
trade. 115 Furci1ermore, a bill that intended to reform monopolies was introduced in the 1601 
parliament by a member of the Middle Temple named Laurence Hyde, and the bill enjoyed 
the support of two fellow Middle Templers, John Davies and Henry Montague. 116 James 
Dalton, a prominent lawyer of Lincoln's Inn, criticised Morice's bills against ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction in the 1593 Parliament by mocking the introduction of his Middle Temple lecture 
on the royal prerogative. 117 And in the famous trial of Nicholas Fuller in 1609, considered by 
Professor Usher to be the greatest test of the validity of the high commission's discretionary 
113 This reference, however, is probably not to Robert Cawdrey, for reasom based on Morice's description of the case. LPL, 
MS 234, fo. 222r. 
114 Strype. Whitgi/'t. II, 30. 
115 Dyer, Reports, ed. Baker, I, liii and ibid. footnote 60. Morice was in fact right about this: there was a precedent from 
1573 which determined that monopolies could not be applied to new inventions. 
116 David Harris Sacks, 'Private profit and public good: the problem of the state in Elizabethan theory and practice', IAUt, 
literature, and the settlement o{regimes, ed. Gordon J. Schochet (Washington, 1990) 126, 128, 133. 
117 In the opening paragraph of the lecture Morice had begged the forgiveness of his listeners, hoping that the subject of his 
talk would not make '''ex musca elephantem". A Mountayne of a MolehilL' In the 1593 Parliament, Dalton was the first 
to stand up and oppose Morice's bill, complaining that he was making a mountain out of a molehill, creating a problem 
where none existed. Dalton argued the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions were distinct and different, and that the 
commons should not meddle with the questions raised by Morice's bills. Dalton's sarcastic jab showed a familiarity with 
the text of Morice's lecture, and the reference must have been easily recognised by the other lawyers in the house. BL, 
Additional MS 36081. fo. 229r; BL, Cotton MS, Titus F.II, fo. 31r. 
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powers to fine, imprison, and exact the ex offIcio oath, Morice's arguments were very much 111 
evidence, if not his fighting spirit. 118 
In these first two sections we have investigated the background to the politico-religious 
siwation of the 1590s and sketched out short biographies of Richard Cosin and James Morice. 
Over the next six we will examine in detail the literary debate between Cosin and Morice and 
comment on the wider significance of the controversy which proved two things: first, that by 
the 1590s there were two irreconcilable interpretations of the Henrician royal supremacy; and 
second, that a new definition or constiwtion was needed to preserve the inheritance of the 
reformed English church. In the final two sections we will see how the prescription for order 
and authority envisioned in the Apologie was ultimately triumphant, helped along at the 
rhetorical level by government propagandists such as Cosin and at the practical level by the 
high commission, as well as how the complexion of'conformism' mutated in the final decade 
of Elizabeth's reign from what has been broadly termed a 'Calvinist consensus' or a 'Calvinist 
conformity' into a proto-Laudian outlook marked by a rehabilitation of the prestIge of the 
clergy and the authority of its jurisdiction. 119 
118 This imitation of Morice w::ts true of many other puritans as well, who generally parroted arguments first employed by 
him, such as that no man might be imprisoned but by the b.w of the land, or that the commissioners only had cognis::tnee 
of the matters listed in the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy. Usher, Rise fllldjidl, ed. Tyler, 204. 
In recent years Morice has hecome something of a hero among historian> seeking the humhle hut glorious heginnings 
of constitutional law. Professor Levy, for example, places Morice on an honour roll that includes Henry II f()r his creation 
of the jury system, Willi::tm Thorpe for refusing the oath ::tdministered to him by Archbishop Arundel, and Sir Robert 
Beale for his contribution to the right against self-incrimination. Levy, Fifth Amendment. Levy's whiggism, however, does 
not detract from the value of his thorough research and his coherent vision of the development of the right against self-
incrimination. 
119 Lake, Peter, Anglicllns Ilnd purit.1I1s? (presbyterillniwl Ilnd EI1Klish conformist thouKht (i'0/JI 1,'(fhitKift to Hooker) 
(London, 1988); Peter White, Predestinlltion, poliq, and polemic (Cambridge, 1992); Anthony Milton, Catholic and 
reformed: the roman Ilnd protestllnt churches in English protestllnt thought 1600-1640 (Cambridge, 1995). 
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In medieval Europe criminal procedure was mostly an extension of the old accusatorial 
system of ancient Rome with some recent additions from canon law. To initiate a criminal suit 
a public accuser was necessary, and the cost of prosecuting the case was born entirely by that 
accuser. To prove his case he needed concurring testimony from two witnesses, but if he failed 
in his proofS the accuser himself was liable to pay the defendant damages and was also 
vulnerable to a counter-suit of false accusation. The inadequacies of this system are obvious: a 
vast number of crimes were likely to go unpunished unless an accuser had both the courage 
and the money to prosecute them. In the case of heresy the situation was more complex. 
Finding two witnesses who could substantiate heretical speech or behaviour was immensely 
difficult to achieve since most of the potential witnesses to heresy were likely to be heretics 
themselves. l This was generally true of all crimes of a secret nature, such as concubinage, 
sexual offences, and simony. 2 Between the time of Gratian of Bologna 3 and Thomas Aquinas 
(c. 1225-74), various heresies began to spread throughout Europe. Heretics, who under the 
conventional criminal system were protected from malicious accusation by the restrictions 
which bound accusers, were extremely difficult to prosecute, and in the view of the bishops 
this helped to underpin the spread of the Cathar and Waldensian heresies across much of 
southern Europe. 
Until the end of the twelfth century, obstinate heretics were merely excommunicated 
and deprived of property and rights, but Innocent III (1198-1216) perceived an urgent need 
to roll back the tide of heresy, and he personally empowered judges to use any means possible, 
including imprisonment and torture, to persuade defendants to confess their guilt if the judge 
was convinced they were guilty of heresy. 4 Innocent built upon Gregory VII's (l073-85) 'vicar 
of Christ' theory of the papacy, asserting both spiritual and temporal authority over princes 
1 See More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, 72-4, 218. 
2 Brundage, Medieval canon law, 93-4, 142-3. Brundage suggests that Gratian's abrupt transition in the Decretum from 
simony to proof in criminal cases might have been born out of a direct frustration with existing procedure. See footnote 3 
for information on Gracian. 
3 Gratian was a camaldolese monk of whom very little is known other than his enormous compilation of canon law precedents, 
entitled Concordia discordantium canonum, commonly known as the Decretum, which he completed some time around 
1140. Medieval political thouKht, ed. Burns, 670. 
4 Henry Charles Lea, The inquisition of the Middle AKes. its orKanization and operation (London, 1963) 71, 198, 264. 
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and pioneering the term plenitudo potestatis.5 This kind of papal legislative innovation was 
new. Beginning with the papacy of Alexander III (1159-81) in the generation following the 
death of Gratian, popes began to use decretals (technically called 'rescripts') to create new 
canon law - and they did a lot of creating. 6 
Around the 1180s the papacy began to condone the use of per notorium procedure in an 
effort to make it easier to prosecute certain crimes that historically lacked witnesses. This 
procedure relaxed the rules of proof in cases of 'notorious' crimes when a whole community 
believed someone had committed a crime yet none would prosecute him. The original 
purpose of this new procedure seems to have been to control clerical immorality, concubinage, 
and prostitution, but the procedure turned out to be equally efficient in prosecuting heresy. In 
this manner of proceeding the judge could initiate and prosecute the case himself ex officio -
by virtue of his office, citing suspects on the basis of ill fame. 7 The judge was required to 
produce two witnesses who had to substantiate the rumour. Once the witnesses had verified 
the fame he could proceed to condemn the defendant of the crime. There was some 
opposition to this summary way of proceeding from conservative canonists. 8 Self-accusation 
had been condemned by the early church fathers as wen as by Augustine and Chrysostom. 
Gratian himself opposed torture, instead advocating fining and exile for heresy.9 
Those who supported per notorium procedure did so on the basis that rei publicae 
interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita (it is in the public interest that crimes do not remain 
unpunished).1 0 Professor Brundage suggests that one of the reactions against this new form of 
5 Walter Ullman, Principles of government and politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1%1) 76, 78, and passim; Guy, 'The 
Henrician Age', Varieties, ed. Pocock, 30. 
6 Brundage, Medieval canon law, 160. 
7 The word 'fame' is a derivation of the Latin word lama, which means a public report or widespread rumour. In canon law 
the term was used to describe a well-known rumour concerning the wrongdoing of a certain individual and was considered 
sufficient to authorise a judge to cite the suspect before the court to be examined regarding the supposed crime. See also 
below, 122-3. 
8 Tancred (c. 1185-c. 1236) believed that the defendant should at least be interrogated about the supposed crimes rather than 
simply sentenced. Hostiensis (c. 1195-1271) warned that this form of procedure should only be resorted to cautiously and 
seldomly because it was a dangerous way of proceeding. William Durand (1231-%) only approved of the procedure in 
extremely qualified circumstances, such as the commission of a crime in the physical presence of a judge while he was 
acting in his professional capacity. Even then, he believed that if the defendant denied guilt, ordinary procedure would 
have to be used to convict him. Brundage, Medieval canon law, 144-7. 
9 Levy, Fifth Amendment, 21. 
10 'On its darker side this procedure stripped defendants of nearly all the protections the conventional ordu iudiciarius 
afforded them. This opened the way for abuse of the church's criminal justice system, because proceedings per notorium 
could easily be manipulated or contrived in order to brand as criminals persons whose real crime was to be disagreebale to 
their superiors or unpopular among their neighbours.' Brundage, Medieval canon law, 145-6. 
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procedure was the rise of defence by compurganon, which allowed men to declare their 
innocence finally, in the form of an oath. This oath of purgation was accompanied by the 
oaths of twelve witnesses who vowed they believed the defendant's oath to be true. 11 
In 1184 Lucius III (1181-85) issued the buH Ad abolendam, which forced witnesses to 
take an oath to divulge the existence of heretics if they knew of any. In 1199 Innocent III 
confirmed this bull and made it part of the Roman law as well as issuing a new decretal which 
expanded the authority of judges to deal with notorious crimes per inquisitionem, and to 
confiscate all worldly possessions from those found guilty.12 Innocent's new laws were fully in 
practice by 1215 when the Fourth Lateran Council confirmed their validity. There is no 
evidence that this principle came from anywhere other than Innocent himself 13 Per 
inquisitionem procedure was similar to per notorium in that it permitted ecclesiastical judges 
to initiate cases against suspects ex officio without any accuser or denouncer. But by the 
principles of per inquisitionem, public ill-fame was good enough cause to initiate an enquiry by 
the judge and thus practically served the function of an accusation. 14 
Per inquistionem procedure, which began to solidifY around 1200 and became 
commonplace under Gregory IX (1227-41), was so called because it sought to deal with 
flagrant and notorious criminal acts through a process of inquisition. Under inquisitorial 
procedure the old standards of evidence and proof were weakened. Whereas fun proof had 
been necessary before, only partial proof was necessary for conviction using per inquisitionem, 
assuming that enough indicia or evidences were presented to burden the defendant with 
probable proof of his crime. 15 Furthermore, the Fourth Lateran Council did not require that 
judges prove fames before proceeding against the suspect. 16 With the development of 
11 Brundage, Medieval canon law, 147. 
12 The practical effect of Ad abolendam, which evolved through case study, was that those who abjured were still deprived of 
their legal rights and excluded from public office. Descendants of heretics or their abettors to the second generation 
suffered the same exclusion. Heretics were also denied a proper, Christian burial. Anyone accused of heresy was prevented 
from having any legal representation at all; and since the bishop was the sole adjuticator in the dispute, no appeals were 
allowed. More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; X, xlvii-xlix. 
13 More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; X, xlvii-xlviii; see also Levy, Fifth Amendment, 20; Brundage, Medieval 
canon law, 147-8. Brundage calls these legislative creations of Innocent's 'radical' in their novelty. 
14 'This concentration of functions in the hands of a single investigator! prosecutor/judge obviously placed the defendant at an 
enormous disadvantage and left more than ample room for judicial bias to prejudice the outcome of the case.' The 
defendant in these cases was not allowed counsel. Brundage, Medieval canon law, 148-9. 
15 Brundage, Medieval canon law, 93-5. 
16 Levy, Fifth Amendment, 23. 
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inquisitorial procedure, canon law allowed judges to enquire not only into actions but also into 
men's personal thoughts and opinions. 17 The proliferation of per inquisitionem was further 
encouraged by the Fourth Lateran Council's decree forbidding ecclesiastical officials from 
taking part in trials by ordeal. Since there was little support for trial by ordeal outside the 
church anyway, the practice simply ended and was replaced by inquisition. 18 By the mid-
thirteenth century per inquisitionem was well established. Aquinas accepted the principle of 
self-incrimination and approved of death as a punishment for heresy; Innocent IV (1243-54) 
used torture against heretics in order to expedite confessions. 19 
Growing mainly out of the necessity to check the spread of heresy, the centralisation of 
inquisitorial procedures developed more on tl1e continent than in England, since England did 
not produce any significant heresies before Lollardy. 20 According to the Roman-canon law of 
proof used on the continent, confession of guilt was requisite for conviction, but in England a 
jury system of proof had developed. Juries determined guilt in criminal cases based on factual 
or circumstantial evidence which did not require confession on the part of the defendant. This 
is why judicial torture was so often used on the continent but only occasionally in England. 21 
In early medieval England trial by ordeal was usually reserved for grave crimes, whereas trial 
by oatl1 or compurgation was for lesser crimes. But Henry II disliked the old forms of proof 
(sinking or floating, battling, grasping a red-hot iron out of boiling water and then waiting 
three days to see if the wound had healed 'cleanly' without infection). He expanded the use of 
inquests, which were basically early jury trials, involving tl1e decisions of representatives of a 
whole community on a given case. He also encouraged the development of a jury system 
through two important proclamations, tl1e Assize of Clarendon (1166) and the Assize of 
Northampton (1176). Jury trials existed at first only for civil cases, not becoming a regular 
feature of criminal cases until the thirteenth century. 22 
17 Brundage, Mediez,tIl Ctl11011 ww, 178. 
18 Brundage, Mediez,1ll CtlflOnWW, 94-5,140. 
19 Walter Ullman, A .,hort history or the ptlptlcy in the Middle Ages (London, 1972) 254; Lea,Inquisition, 87-9, 175. 
20 More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; X, xlix-I. 
21 John H. Langbein, Torture tll1d the ww orproo((Chicago, 1976, 1977) 3-12, 61-9; John H. Langbein, ProsecutinJ; crime ill 
the Rel1lzisstl/1CC (Cambridge, Massachusetts; 1974). 
22 Doris M. Stenton, EI1J;lishjustice between the NormllTi Conquest tlnd the Grellt Charter, 1066-1215 (Philadelphia, 1964) 
16-7; Sir Frederick Pollock and F .W. Maitland, The history olEflJ;lish law before the time or Edwm·d I (second edition; 2 
vols.; Cambridge, 1898) 1, 136-42; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 5-6, 9,11-2. 
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Per inquisitionem procedure came (0 England in 1236 VIa the papal legate Otho. He 
convened a synod of bishops and introduced them to the reforms that Innocent III and the 
Fourth Lateran Council had made earlier in the century. One of the constitutions drawn up by 
Otho for the English church provided for an oath de veritate dicenda (to tell the truth) which 
came (0 be known in England as the ex officio oath because it was administered by virtue of 
the judge's office. The article in OdlO's synod establishing the oad1 was very brief. In its early 
Tudor translation it read, 'Evenit et infra. we establysshe that when the prelates and 
ecclesiasticall iudges enq uere the fautes and excesses of theyr subiectes that deserue 
ponyshment the lay be compelled if nede require [sic] by sentences of excommunication to 
gyue an othe (0 saye the trouth. and if any withstond or let this othe to be gyuen, he shall be 
brydeled with d1e sentence of excommunication and interdiction.' 23 The first recorded use of 
the oath was in 1246 by Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln. There were numerous 
complaints and petitions to Henry III against the oath, and the king finally intervened and 
asked that the oath be abandoned. Grosseteste refused Henry's request, but he died a few 
years later, and the oath seems (0 have died out wid1 him. It resurfaced, however, in 1272 
when Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury, not only reinstated it but threatened 
excommunication as a punishment for those who refused. 24 In 1401 the statute de heretico 
comburendo (2 Henry IV c. 15) was enacted for the purpose of containing the spread of 
Lollardy. Though this law did not mention oaths, the vague wording related (0 the powers of 
d1e church to root out false doctrine was taken by ecclesiastical judges implicitly (0 condone 
the use of an oath de veri tate dicenda .25 
The ex officio oath never attained full acceptance in England. By the sixteenth century, 
it was no less controversial than it had been before. William Tyndale spoke out against the 
forced ransacking of men's hearts by judges in The Obedience of a Christian man (1528).26 
Chris(Opher St. German asserted that the oath 'standeth nat with conscience', because it did 
23 William Lyndwood and John of Ayton, Constitutions prol'incialles and ofOtho and Oclhol70l'le; translated in to en:;:,!yshe 
(London, 1534) (STC2 17113) fo. 28r. 
24 Pollock and Maitland, Hist",) of English law, 1, 446-7; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 46-9. 
25 Offenders were to be detained in prison, 'till he or they of the Articles laid to him or them in this Behalf, do canonically 
purge him or themselves, or else such wicked Sect, Preachings, Doctrines, and heretical and erroneous Opinions do abjure, 
according as the lawes of the Church do reguire: SR, II, 127. 
26 STC2 24446; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 63. 
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not take into account that there were things which a man may not in good conSCIence reveal 
under any circumstances. He also doubted the validity of an oath that had been 'brought vp 
by the dergye without assente of the kynge or of the people and where vnto they could nat 
compelle any man before'. 27 Parliament began discussing the issue of the ex officio oath in the 
early 1530s. The common lawyers in the House of Commons were aggrieved over this 
seemingly unfair process against suspected heretics. 'For the Ordinaries woulde sende for men 
and ley Accusacions to them of heresye, and say they were accused, and ley Articles to them 
but no Accuser should be brought furth ... [and] the partie so Assited must either Abjure or be 
burned, for Purgacion he myght make none.' 28 A bill was drafted in 1529 which aimed to end 
the abuses of ex officio procedure and which would have outlawed several heresy trial 
practices: bishops and commissaries would have been prevented from arresting suspects against 
whom they had personal grudges, at least two credible witnesses would be required for a 
conviction, the accused would have the right to know the exact charge laid against him and 
the names of those who accused him, the accused would in some cases be allowed legal 
counsel, the trial would be required to begin no later than three months after the arrest, the 
accused would have been allowed bail, and his execution would be stayed until he was 
formally convicted in a common law court. This bill was never passed. The Supplication 
against tlle Ordinaries, which was in part derived from this draft bill of 1529, was approved by 
the Commons in 1532 but not enacted as law until 1534 when it was refashioned into two 
different statutes, the Act for the Submission of the Clergy (25 Henry VIII c. 19) and the 
Heresy Reform Act (25 Henry VIII c. 14).29 
27 St. German hastened to add that by opposing the oath he did not seek to give encouragement to wrongdoers; he did 
favour 'charyrable corrections' where it was likely the offender might learn from his mistakes, but he claimed the ex officio 
oath did nothing to reform a man. Christopher St. German, Constitutions, chapter 4. 
28 More, Works, ed, Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, lvii; see also Edward Hall, Chronicle, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1809) 
784. 
29 The Heresy Reform Act repealed the heresy act of 1401 (de heretico comburendo) while two other heresy acts of 1382 and 
1414 were upheld except where they contradicted the new act. The new rules included: accusations in heresy cases were to 
be made in common law courts by presentment of grand juries or by two lawful witnesses ro the bishops; after the 
accusation the suspect was to be arrested and brought to trial in an ecclesiastical court openly; convicts were to recant and 
do reasonable penance, but if they refused they were to be turned over to the common law courts; the lay courts were to 
burn repeat offenders but a writ de heretico comburendo must be obtained first from the king; suspects were to be 
allowed bail upon four sufficient sureties by two justices of the peace, unless the bishop could come up with a reason why 
bail ought to be denied, and then he should appeal to the king's council. More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; 
X, lxv-Ixvii. 
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But despite early Tudor parliamentary arrempts to outlaw the oath, it continued to be 
used in non-heresy cases during the reigns of Edward VI and Mary. The recently discovered 
records from the York high commission show that the ex officio oath had been used at least 
since the beginning of tllose records (1561), and it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
southern commission operated the same way, considering that both commissions had almost 
identical lerrers patent.30 Although Elizabeth's early lerrers patent, like Mary's, did nor 
explicitly permit the high commission to proceed ex officio or to administer the oath, they 
empowered the high commission to use its discretion, which in practice otten meant the ex 
officio oath was used (although Bishop Edmund Grindal of London was known to have used 
juries of twelve men).31 
The wording of the oath as it was administered in Elizabethan England was as follows: 
'You shall sweare to aunswere to all such Interrogatories as shall be offred vnto you and declare 
your whole knowledge therein so god you help.' 32 The practical effect of the oath was that 
defendants, once they had taken it, were obliged to answer all questions truthfully, even if it 
meant revealing private matters that concerned family members, friends, or neighbours. It is 
not difficult to see how this inquisitorial procedure was a boon for medieval ecclesiastical 
judges on the continent. The old Roman accusatorial system made prosecution of heretics 
almost impossible to achieve, whereas per inquisitionem, coupled with the ex officio oath, 
empowered the judge to initiate cases personally and to prosecute them to his own 
satisfaction. The value of tlle oath was that the judge was not only in a powerful position to 
work a suspected heretic into a corner where he must either confess his heresy or be perjured, 
but he could compel the defendant to reveal the identities of other heretics, beginning with his 
30 Usher, Rise andfall, ed. Tyler, xxvii, 
31 The commission was not explicitly authorised to use the ex offIcio oath until the letters patent of 1583; Thompson, MLlK"lil 
CariLl, 208. Sir Robert Beale believed that the commission's use of the jury system was the way the queen had always 
expected the commission to operate. He deplored the specific allowance of the ex ofT/cio oath in later Elizabethan 
commissions and insisted that the queen had never intended to create such an innovation; BL, Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, 
fo.9v. 
32 This rendering of the oath is reported to us by an anonymous author who wrote a short tract against the oath which is now 
kept at LPL, MS 445, 438-51. The tract shows ample evidence that the author himsdf was administered the oath, and the 
preponderancy of scriptural (rather than legal) criticisms of the oath, as well as the author's habit of referring in the first 
person to 'we' makes it likely that the piece was written by Cartwright and his associates in the 1590s. Ptofessor Usher 
suggests that the these papers belonged to Morice, but the absence of legal arguments is uncharacteristic of Morice, and 
the generally polite tone is uncharacteristic of Beale. 
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own friends. This would U1 turn lead to further inquisitions and to further convictIOns of 
heretics. 
In the case of sixteenth century England, the ex officio oath provided ordinaries with the 
same inquisitorial powers but for a slightly different use. After Parliament forbade 
prosecutions except by grand jury, presentments, and the evidence of two credible witnesses in 
1534 in cases of heresy,33 the oath continued to be used at visitations of ecclesiastical 
commissions for the purpose of discipline and punishment of ecclesiastical offences. By the 
late sixteenth century, however, the oath once again found its most powerful expression in 
suppressing nonconformity, which had begun to increase considerably in the 1570s and '80s. 
The Heresy Reform Act had been repealed in 1547 by 1 Edward VI c. 12, but even had it not 
been, the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy had made dissenting religious opinions a secular 
offence (treason) rather a religious one (heresy). Hence use of the oath by the high commission 
seemed technically correct since no reform of canon law had been accomplished. By the 
1590s, however, the legality of the oath was very much in question. Puritans disliked it for a 
variety of reasons, mainly because it was aimed against them. They formulated several legal 
and reasonable arguments against it. Two of the most popular criticisms of the oath were that 
scripture forbade swearing a general oath in which the particulars were not known, and that the 
oath was contrary to common law. 
A third argument was drawn from canon law itself. The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere (no one may be forced to accuse himself) derived from the glossa ordinaria of the 
Gregorian decrerals and was a commonly known legal principle among canonists. 34 This 
prohibition against forced self-incrimination was also known to many in Tudor England as 
records of two trials from the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I show. 35 
These criticisms and others were made by James Morice in a fifty-eight-page tract 
entitled A briefe treatise of Gathes exacted by Ordinaries and Ecclesiasticall Iudges, to 
answere generallie to all such Articles or Interrogatories, as pleaseth them to propound. And of 
33 See also 64-5, 129-30, 133, 146, 205-10, and 217for further discussion of the Heresy Reform Act of 1534. 
34 Helmholz, Roman canon £au" 56; Julius Clarus, Practictl criminalis (Lyons, 1(61) book V, question 45, addition 3. 
35 John Lambert, suspected of denying the real presence of the Eucharist in 1532, and Sir Thomas Tresham, on trial in Star 
Chamber in 1581 for harbouring the jesuit Edmund Campion. Both refused to incriminate themselves and specifically 
cited nemo tenetur seipsum prodere as their justification, Guy, Tudor Enzlalld, 183-4; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 62, 64. 
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their forced and constrained oathes ex officio, wherein is proued that the same are vnlawfull. 
Most of what we know about the writing of Morice's Treatise comes from a letter written by 
Vincenr Skinner to Lord Burghley in early 1591.36 Skinner reported 'that in the last sommer 
vacacion [Morice] had made a treatise of a quire of paper touching this proceding ex officio 
and Inquisicion by waie of othe without accuser or witnesse.' 37 Skinner acquired this 
information after having been with Morice 'vppon his return to London' where Morice had 
been 'dealt withalI' by Archbishop Whitgift for handing down a verdict against an archdeacon 
in Essex for violating the common law. 38 
Hoping to see the treatise, Skinner was told it 'was in the counrrie at his howse there' 
(presumably his estate in Chipping Ongar) and was still in 'scribled' form, 'so as there could 
not be vse of it vntill a transcript were made thereof'. The next day Morice sent for the rough 
draft and it soon arrived at his house in Westminster, where he 'pur it to be copied which 
cannot well be but in his own presence for direcr[ion?] & reference of dyvers thinges written 
dispersedly, and in dispersed papers.'39 Skinner added that in his new draft Morice 'will also 
insert somewhat that shall tend to the direct answering of the book sent from my L. 
Archebishop whereof he had sene a copie'. Thus, Morice not only would redraft a fair copy of 
his treatise, but he intended to incorporate an answer to a certain book sent by Whitgift. 
Apparently there were others inrerested in a copy of Morice's treatise besides Skinner, who 
reported that Morice 'had had request made by some of the subscribers for a copie of his 
booke. whereof by some meanes they had had some inclining, bur [he] put them of by reason 
it was not digested in that order bur scribled as a first copie which he wold revise and make a 
newe copie of at his convenienr ieisure.'40 The word 'subscribers' seems it could only refer to 
'the book senr from my L. Archebishop', which would mean there were several aurhors. This 
makes it seems probable that Whitgift's 'book' mentioned by Skinner was the memorandum 
36 Skinner, a puritan who had been acquainted with Cartwright at Cambridge and corresponded with him at least until 1590, 
was one of Burghley's messengers and often reported to him on legal issues. Hasler, Commons, III, 390-1. The letter, 
dated 14 March, 1591 is found in PRO, SPIl/238, doc. 75, fo. 107 r-v. 
37 PRO, SP12/238, doc. 75, fo. 107r-v. 
38 PRO, SPIl/238, doc. 75, fo. 107r. 
39 PRO, SP12/238, doc. 75, fo. 107v. So as of 14 March, 1591 it seems the Treatise was still private and unrevised, which 
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defending oaths in ecclesiastical courts signed by nine high commissioners a month before.41 
Morice specifically answered this memo in his Treatise, which makes it seem unlikely that 
Skinner could be referring to anything else. 42 
Continuing, Skinner reported that Morice 'so told me that if I wold delyver it into your 
L. handes he wold take some peynes and reviewe it, and add such further answeres as this 
other book whereof I delyvered him the co pie shold require.' Skinner thus had a copy of the 
book to give to Morice, so it seems likely (hat it was passed to him by Burghley.43 Finally, 
Skinner noted that Morice promised that the new draft, 'being finished wold wholy referre to 
your L. censure, and then to be vsed further according to your good will and pleasure.' Morice 
had agreed to submit his treatise to Burghley and leave it up to him to decide whether it 
should be published or not. Obviously, Burghley then passed it to Whitgift who not only 
decided it could not be published, bur set Cosin to work drafting a reply. 44 
Beginning around June 159145 the Treatise was disseminated in manuscript form, 
though Morice claimed he distributed only two copies, one to a privy councillor and another 
to a high commissioner.46 Ascertaining the date of printing of the Treatise is difficult, bur late 
1592 seems a logical guess. Cosin was informed while he was reviewing part III of the 
Apologie for publication that Morice's book had appeared in print, and since the third part of 
the Apologie did not appear until spring 1593 after both Parliament and Convocation had 
ended, 47 the Treatise must have been published in late 1592 or early 1593. 48 Although (he 
41 The memorandum, a copy of which is held at Lambeth and bears original signatures of nine commissioners, is only two 
pages long and could hardly be called a book, but it is possible there were other documents affIxed to the commissioners' 
statement or that it was bound into a miniscule volume. LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r-v. Morice drafted a copy of the 
memorandum and placed it in his 'A just and necessarie defence of a briefe treatise of oathes' in 1594; LPL, MS 234, fo. 
100r-v. There are two other copies of the memorandum, one in BL, Cotton MS, Cleopatra FJ fos. 76-7; and the other at 
PRO, SP11/238, doc. 47. Neither of these last two have original signatures, but the latter document is dated 16 February, 
1591, which fIts in well with Skinner's account. 
According to Morice the privy counciL in the wake of a recent quarter sessions case in Norfolk involving an alleged 
misuse of the oath by a resident commissary, ordered an opinion defIning the proper usc and legitimacy of the ex officio 
oath to be issued by the Queen's ecclesiastical commissioners. The February 1591 memoradum held at Lambeth was the 
result. Cosin concurred on these details. LPL, MS 234, fo. 99r-v; Cosin, ApoloKie, 'Epistle to the Reader', sig. B 1 r-v. 
42 Morice, Treatise, 20-1. 
43 PRO, SPI2/238, doc. 75, fo. 107v. 
44 PRO, SPJ2/238, doc. 75, fo. JU7v. Presumably, Morice would have liked to see the Treatise published cum privileKi{) in 
England. We do nor know whether its eventual publication in the Netherlands was with Morice's consent or not. 
45 Cosin reported that the Treatise fIrst appeared in manuscript about four months after the ecclesiastical memorandum was 
written. Cos in, Ap{)/oKie, Ill, sig. Blr-v. 
46 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 55L 
47 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 69r. 
48 This sufficiently disproves Professors Levy's and Thompson's unsupported claims that the Treatise was published abroad in 
1598. Levy, Fifth Amendment, 94; Thompson, MaKna Carta, 218 footnote 61. The date 1590, proposed by the editors of 
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place of publication is not expressed anywhere in the printed edition, Cosin believed it was 
printed in Middelburg or Scotland, and most historians believe it was one of Richard 
Schilder's publications. 49 The printed edition of the Treatise, which varied slightly from the 
manuscript copy from which Cosin worked,50 did not list an author, and it seems that 
authorship was for a time mistakenly attributed by some ro Nicholas Fuller. 51 There are 
numerous copies of the Treatise still in existence, both printed and in manuscript form. 52 
The strategy employed by Morice in the Treatise comprised dlfee stages. He attempted 
to show that general oaths 53 were contrary to reason and scripture, without precedent in 
common law, and unwarranted by statute. Morice clarified that he was not concerned with 
matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction but with the manner of ecclesiastical procedure. 'The state 
of the question which at this present we have in hand is not in what cases those Courts may 
give or impose an oath, but the matter whereof we now entreat is concerning forced and 
constrained oaths ex officio, and especially in dut general manner'. 54 
In the Parliament of 1584 the Commons complained of Whitgift's use of the oath in 
testing ministers' conformity to the articles of subscription. Archbishop Whitgift personally 
appeared on the floor of the House of Lords and responded to the puritans' petitions in the 
lower house, charging that tl1ey had inherited their antipathy rowards the oath from 
catholics.55 Morice, who was present at that parliament, rebutted the claim in the Treatise, 
arguing that 'this kinde of generall oath and examinations ex officio mero, were not first 
misliked by Iesuites and seminarie Priestes, and from them deriued to others that mislike 
the Short title clltalogue, we have already shown to be impossible; and the date 1600, listed on the microfilm copy of the 
Treatise published by the University of Michigan, is also unsustainable. 
49 Short title catalogue, ed. Pollard, Redgrave, and Panzer; II, 162. Schilders was well-known for publishing puritan tracts in 
the late sixteenth century. 
50 Cosin, Apologie, III, 'An Advertisement vnto the Reader'. 
51 The copy of the Treatise at Cambridge bears the words 'Fuller on oaths' on the binding and on the inside. 
52 I have found four complete copies of the Treatise in manuscript. There is a fair copy at LPL, MS 445, 452-505 (probably 
the one from which Cosin worked); Morice incorporated a copy of the Treatise into his 'A just and necessarie defence of a 
briefe treatise of oathes', LPL, MS 234; there is a copy written in several different hands found in the book of an Oxford 
student named Alexander Cooke in 1597, BL, Harley MS 5247; and there is a nearly fair copy (with a few cross-outs) in 
BL, Cotton MS, Cleopatra F.L fos. 50-69. Professor Usher mistakenly thought that fos. I-50 were the Treatise; Usher, 
Ri.l'e and/all, ed. Tyler, 148 footnote. There is also a fragment from the Treati.l'e written in the hand of the high 
commission's clerk at LPL, MS 2004, fos. 72-5. 
53 That the ex officio oath was in fact geneml was constantly assetted by Morice, though Cosin vehemently rejected the 
notion several times, stating that it was specific. Thus, Morice's denigration of general oaths and of the ex officio oath 
were one and the same. SeC' below, 166-7, 180-185. 
54 Morice, Treatise, 45-6. 
55 Neale, Parliaments, 1584-1601,65-6. 
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gouernement and would bring the church to an Anarchie' but by true, godly protestants. 56 But 
there had been pre-protestant opposition to the oath in England, as we have showed. 57 
Catholic opposition, on the other hand, seems not to have been particularly strong. 58 Both 
Morice and Whitgift were partially correct. There had been resistance to the ex officio oath in 
England since the Middle Ages, but it was also true that Elizabethan protestants did not 
conscientiously object to the oath until it was turned against themselves. 
Particularly distressing to Morice was the unbridled power of ecclesiastical 
commissioners and their local counterparts, ordinaries. He maintained that their authority to 
issue general citations in the absence of a public accuser, to initiate cases on the basis of 
unsubstantiated rum our, to admit secret denunciation, to cause men to take a general oath 
promising to answer truthfully any question which might be asked, and the authority to 
imprison without bail those who refused the oath constituted a potentially unlimited source of 
abuse which deprived Englishmen of their common law rights. 
Morice defined a public oath as: 
a calling or takinge to recorde or witnesse of the sacred name of God, or of God him selfe by 
the vse of his holie Name, fi)[ the confirmation of the trueth of such thinges which we speake, 
or for the true performance of our promise. Or more brieflie: An oath is a confirmation of the 
will of man by the testimonie of God. 59 
There were two kinds of oaths, private and public: private oaths were taken between men to 
procure faith and credit in business transactions, agreements, promises, or duties. Public oaths 
were of many different kinds; between monarchs for alliances, between a king and his subjects 
for just rule and faithful obedience, between men and God for the observation of God's laws, 
56 Morice, Treatise, 18. Morice excerpted a passage from The prayer and complaint of the ploliKhma/1 to show there had been 
protestant opposition to the oath apart and aside from catholic opposition. Morice was correct, as is clear from the 
historical evidence presented in this chapter, but Cosin was not convinced. He called Morice's ploy 'an olde dogge trich'; 
Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 204. Cosin may have had in mind the famous Star Chamber case of 1581 in which Lord Vaux, Sir 
Thomas Tresham, and other recusants were accused of harbouring the jesuit, Edmund Campion. Tresham refused to 
incriminate himself, citing the canon law maxim ilOIlO tenetut' seipslIlII prodere in defence of his silence. see Dya, ed. 
Baker 1, lxvi-lxvii; and II, 397; also Levy, Fifth Amendment, 100-5, 182. 
57 See above in this chapter, 48-9. 
58 In the York high commission's 1580 inquisition into recusancy, only one out of 170 Catholics refused the oath. Levy, Fifth 
Amendment, 98-9. 
59 Morice, Treatise, 3. 
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those taken by magistrates to uphold the law, those of soldiers to be obedient to their generals, 
and finally, those taken by defendants in a court to depose the truth in their testimony. 
Morice intended to concern himself only with this last type of oath, which he asserted should 
only be taken for the following purposes: for the glory of God, the confirmation of truth, the 
maintenance of justice, the protection of innocence, or to put an end to strife.6o 
Three conditions were prescribed under which oaths might be justly or properly taken. 
First, oaths ought to be taken truthfully and without falsehood. An oath ought never to be 
taken if it could not be kept, as a broken oath was perhaps the greatest indignity and 
dishonour that could be shown towards God, perjury being a detestable sin. The second 
condition for taking an oath was that a man 'ought to sweare in judgement, that is to saye, 
with good discretion, soberlie, well aduised and assured of that he wil affirme or denie vpon 
his oath, Not ignoraundie, rashlie, vainlie'. The dlird condition of taking an oath required dut 
no man swear to do anything unjust or unlawful, thereby dishonoring the name of God. 61 The 
second of these preconditions formed the basis of Morice's opposition to the ex officio oath 
which constrained the accused convented to answer any interrogatory whatsoever that might 
be required by the judge. This constituted a rash, ill-advised oath, said Morice, since the 
defendant could not thereby be assured (hat he would not be led into sin by his answers, such 
as being forced to reveal dle doings of his own neighbours and family. 62 
Yet not all public oaths, noted Morice, were voluntarily taken; some were initiated by 
judges, and thus it was pertinent to establish conditions for the imposing as well as the taking 
of oaths. Magistrates ought to exercise great caution and prudence in requiring oaths, and 
refrain from imposing them for simple or trifling reasons, said Morice. Oaths should not be 
used unless they could be performed to the glory of God and for the good of the realm. 63 
60 Morice, Treatise, 4, 8, 9. These reasons reflected a synthesis of medieval canon and sixteenth century common law judicial 
philosophies. The glory of God and confirmation of truth were conditions with which Cosin concurred. Likewise, 'to put 
an end to strife' was a biblical injunction (Hebrews 6) which provided the judicial basis for the oath of purgation 
(discussed below at 62, 63). The maintenance of justice, however, and the protection of innocence reflected the influence 
of Sf. German and English common lawyers. St. German, A treatise cOl1ccrnynge the diuisiol1 betwene the spirytualtie and 
temporilltie (London, 1532?) (STC 2 21586), chapter seven; St. German, Salem and Biztll1Ce, 359-60; Cosin, Apologie, III, 
8-9,227. 
61 Morice, Treatise, 5-6. 
62 Morice, Treatise, 6. 
63 'For if it be a Principle De minimis 110n Clmlt lex, by good reason the Magistrates and ministers of !awe should spare to vse 
that whiche is most holie and precious in causes of less price or moment'. Morice, Treatise, 6. 
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Moreover, oaths should not be administered usmg intricate, captIOus, or subtle questions. 
Neither should they be exacted from men of suspect reputation or credit since doing so 
'argueth a lightnes and want of good discretion in the Magistrate, who thereby wittinglie 
doeth minister an occasion of perjurie, whiche if it followe, howe great is (he fault?' 64 
Morice contended that a realistic assessment of human frailty revealed tl1e imprudence 
of administering such oaths. When a man defamed in life and conversation was forced to 
swear an oath to answer matters concerning his own corrupt life, tl1ere could only be two 
results: either he was forced to accuse himself, which Morice believed was abhorrent, or else he 
committed wilful perjury by testifYing dishonestly. In these circumstances, perjury would 
overflow the land, since 'the frailtie of man, for the safetie of life, the preseruation of libertie, 
credite, and estimation would nor spare to prophane even that which is most hoI ie, and by 
committing sinfull perjurie, cast both soule and bodie into eternall perdition.'65 If judges 
compelled defendants thus to incriminate themselves, Morice argued, they shared the blame 
for the perjury that followed. 
Another circumstance under which Morice warned oaths should not be compelled was 
when they were general in nature, without the full particulars of the interrogatories being 
revealed before the oath was taken. When such an oath was exacted by the judge, it forced the 
defendant to violate Morice's first condition for taking an oath, that a man be 'well-advised 
and assured of that he will affirm or deny upon his oath'. Taking such a general oath to answer 
any and all questions thus robbed the defendant of the ability to ensure that his oath would be 
upheld truthfully, since most men would rather lie than accuse themselves or loved ones of 
misdemeanours when pressed to do so in a court of law. Vague, general oaths further took 
from the defendant the power to act justly or lawfully, as he could not know what he would 
be forced to affirm once the interrogatories began.66 General oaths, therefore, violated all 
three of Morice's conditions for taking an oath justly. 
64 Morice, Tretltise, 7. The culpability of the judge in such cases of 'baited' perjuty was a point Morice was keen to illustrate. 
65 Morice, Tretltise, 30. 
66 Morice, Tretltise, 11. The sincerity and imegrity of judges could not be presumed, Morice argued, owing to the historic 
lapses of the English clergy in those virtues. He singled out the examples of Archbishop Arundel and Bishops Longland 
and Bonner to prove his point. 'If any man will say as this Archbishop [Arundel] that a subject ought not to suppose that 
his Prelat will commaund him any vnlawfull thing, but should repose him self in the good discretion & vpright dealing of 
his ordinarie, without further aunswere: Let the subtill practise of this one Prelate, and the cruell and the accursed 
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The practical effect of the ex officio oath, suggested Morice, was to seek for controversy 
rather than put an end to ic He recited the timeless legal maxim that demanded three persons 
in every suit: a judge, a prosecutor, and a defendant, without any of whom justice could not 
be ensured. 67 The ex officio oath, however, necessitated that the judge act as an accuser in 
addition to his capacity as judge since he framed the interrogatories and assumed the office of 
the prosecution. 68 The judge in this manner might probe into the mind of the defendant, 
commanding trutIlful answers upon any subject (even his most secret thoughts) by virtue of 
the oath, consequently forcing the party to accuse himself, his family, friends, or neighbours of 
crimes wholly unrelated to tIle defendant's own suspected misdemeanour and the cause of his 
citation to appear in court. 69 The defendant's role, too, was thus mixed and blurred as he 
might be compelled by his oath to accuse himself while simultaneously defending himself, 
thus violating the separation of the three persons required in any suit. 70 To tIlis point Morice 
had outlined two main grievances against ex officio oaths on the basis of reason and the laws 
of nature: they divided the convented party against himself, resulting either in forced self-
incrimination or perjury; and the judge, by virtue of the general oath administered, became 
the prosecuting party in addition to (he judge. 
Morice's third grievance was that tIle party was forced to take a rash and unadvised oath, 
contrary to discretion and scripture. That general oaths were impugned by scripture, much less 
supported, Morice atrempted to demonstrate through examples. He could find no sanction 
dealinges of that barbarous Bishop Longlande stande at this present for a sufficient caueat to euerie man that shall depose, 
to take heedc how he giue ouer-much credite to such glosinge and decyuable speaches, least too late he finde it rrue, that 
f;zire wordes makefooles faine.' Morice, Treatise, 16. 
67 Morice, Treatise, 9. Though the maxim dated back to Roman times, most English common lawyers would have learned 
the precept from Bracton: 'Judicium est in qualibet acliolle trinus actus triton personarum: Judicis, tlCtoris, & rei, 
secundum quod larKe accipi possunt huiusmodi pt'rsol1Lrt', quod dUlle .I·inl ad minus inter qUtlS verlatur contentio, d-' tertill 
personll lld minu.' qui iudicet, alioquin nOll erit iudicium, cum isftze per.wllae sillt partes principales in iudicio, sille quibus 
iudicium consi.,tere non pote.,t. '. Select pas.,at/J.' olBracton and Azo, ed. F.W. Maitland (London, 1895) 195. Sir Thomas 
Smith also confirmed that there must be three people for any court judgement to be just. Smith, De republica al1Klorum, 
ed. Dewar, 89. 
68 Cosin responded that this was untrue. 'For that which openerh way to the rudges Enquirie is holden (by Lawe) as the 
Accusour, and not the rudge.' Cosin, Apologie, II, 110-1. What Cosin meant by 'that which openeth way' was a fame or 
public report concerning the accused. He asserted that the testimony of a man's evil reputation was equivalent to the 
public accusation of a prosecutor See below, 122. 
69 Morice accused ecclesiastical judges of using the answers of the parry convented to gain intelligence into the crimes of 
others, thus perpetuating a chain of inquisitions. Cosin denied that any such thing happened. See below, 154, 195-6. 
70 Morice admitted it might be alleged that it was necessary for a judge to enquire into suspected faults, to 'trie the euill 
mindes and corrupt consciences of daungerous dissemblers, and so necessarie for the gouernement both of the Church and 
common wealth', bur he maintained there must still be sufficient proof in the form of deposed witnesses rather than bare 
surmise to proceed against such a man. Morice, Treatise, 8. 
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anywhere in scripture for the imposing or taking of such general oaths, and indeed he found in 
the story of Herod's oath a perfect illustration of its injuriousness.?1 The daughter of Herodias 
danced for Herod and pleased him so much that Herod took an oath to give her anything she 
wished up to half his kingdom. The daughter asked Herodias what she should demand and 
her mother replied, 'the head of John the Baptist'. When Herod heard the daughter's demand 
he was exceedingly sorry he had taken the oath but nevertheless commanded that it be done. 
The oath was to be condemned first, said Morice, for that it was taken rashly, 'proceeding of 
vaine pleasure and delight', and secondly because it was taken generally to give the damsel 
anything she wished no matter how just or unjust. 72 By issuing such an open-ended promise, 
Herod had taken an oath which left him powerless to ensure that what would be demanded of 
him was lawful. He was thus left in the wretched position of eidler contravening his oadl 
(perjury) in order to escape the unlawful beheading of John dle Baptist, or carrying through 
with his pledge by committing wilful murder. Morice claimed, therefore, that Herod's rash 
promise was a standing rebuke to the ex officio oadl. 73 
At the start of chapter two 74 Morice admined three possible examples from scripture 
which might be cited to prove the legitimacy of the oath: the law of jealousy, the inquisition 
and expiation of manslaughter, and the oath of Achan. 75 The first of these, the law of jealousy 
(Numbers 5:11-31), was a legal custom of the Israelites in which a man, if he suspected his 
wife of adultery, might bring her before a priest for examination. The priest would first charge 
the woman with an oath to declare whether she had defiled herself. Then he warned her that 
she would be cursed if she had committed perjury (and thus adultery), but she would be free 
from iniquity if she had confessed the truth. There were three important elements in this 
71 Matthew 14.6-9 and Mark 6.22-26. 
72 Morice, Treatise, 11. Cosin agreed that the oath of Herod 'rested on a carnal delight' and was ro be condemned for that, 
bur he would not go further to say that the oath was wrong due to its generality since Jeremiah had taken a similar oath to 
king Zedekiah. Morice effectively showed, however, that Jeremiah's oath was not analogous to Herod's. See below, 157-8; 
181. 
73 'And what difference is theTe r pray you betweenc the oath of Herode and that which nowe we haue in guestion, the one 
being to pcrforme or graunt whatsoeuer should be reguired: and the other, to aunswere to all guestions that shalbe 
demaunded, since there may be as vnlawfull and as vnhonest guestions ministred, as vngodlie reguestes made or desired.' 
Morice, Treatise, 11. 
74 The printed copies of A briefe treLltise of oLlthes at the Bodleian and Cambridge libraries are not marked off into chapters. 
Chapter divisions do appear, however, in the manuscript version of the TreLltise which appears interpersed among the pages 
of the 'Defence' in LPL, MS 234. 
75 This passage leads us to believe that Morice may have had some particular knowledge of the arguments employed by 
defenders of the oath since he attempted to answer their objections here. Morice, TreLltise, 12. 
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example which Morice believed proved a dissimilarity with ex officio oaths. First, there was an 
accuser - the woman's husband, being the informer or preferrer or the indictment, brought 
her personally to the priest. Second, the woman knew (he identity of her accuser, who was not 
a secret denouncer but a public presenter. Third, the crime objected against her was made 
plain and clear from the outset; she was not asked to confess crimes other than the one for 
which she had been convented. 76 
The example of inquisition and expiation for manslaughter was found in Deuteronomy 
21:1-9. If a man were found slain in the open country, the elders of the ciry nearest the place 
of the man's death were to sacrifice a heifer and wash their hands over it, taking an oath that 
they did not shed innocent blood nor knew the identity of the murderer. Presumably, this 
passage in scripture would have been utilised by the oath's defenders to advocate 
administration of the oath to answer to the crime itself (that is, to answer directly whether 
they committed the crime in question), yet Morice found no similarity between expiation for 
manslaughter and the ex officio oath. In fact, the circumstances of the crime described 1I1 
Deuteronomy were reversed from the crimes often prosecuted in ecclesiastical courts. 
we see euidendie, the fact and felonie."to bee publique and apparaunt, th'offendor only Iyeth 
hidden and vnknowne, On the contrarie, those Inquisitors ex officio, haue the man before them 
whom they will examine, but the matter for the most part is secreat and concealed which they 
enquire after, and many tymes there is no matter at all but bare & naked suspition or fame of a 
cryme neuer committed, 77 
In the final example, Achan's oath Qoshua 7:10-22), God informed Joshua that one of 
the number of Israelites had stolen forbidden goods from the city of Ai. Lots were cast to 
determine the offender, and Achan was chosen by lot. Joshua adjured Achan to give glory to 
God and confess the truth of what he had done, and Achan confessed to having stolen treasure 
from the city and placed it in his tent. Morice argued that this example could not be used to 
justify ex officio oaths since, as in the previous two examples, there was little or no comparison 
76 Morice, Treatise, 12-
77 Morice, Treatise, 13. 
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with those oaths. God informed Joshua of a particular offence - stealing from the city against 
His express commandment. Thus when the lot fell to Achan, Joshua was already apprised of 
both offender and offence. When he adjured Achan to confess the truth, therefore, he did so 
in a particular, not seeking to sift Achan's mind with spontaneous and uncertain interrogatories 
but to adjure him with reference to a particular crime. 78 
The ecclesiastical memorandum signed by nine members of the high commISSIOn, which 
we have already mentioned, came next to be considered. 79 The commissioners held that no 
man might be urged to incriminate himself in hidden or secret crimes, and that the defendant 
was not bound to answer upon oath to any articles touching the crime itself unless the case was 
prosecuted by the ordinary ex officio. When secret crimes became publicly suspected, 
dangerous to be suffered, or offensive, 'then are they meete by enquirie and all good meanes 
to bee discouered, to the ende they may bee reformed, & the partie delinquent brought to 
penitencie'.80 Regarding the process by which intelligence of crimes became known to 
ecclesiastical judges, this occurred either through the reports of credible men, called clamosa 
insinuatio, or by means of presentments by inferior officials such as churchwardens or 
sidesmen. 81 The ordinary might then proceed to interview witnesses regarding the fame. Once 
the fame was either proven or considered sufficient by the judge,82 because of the public (rust 
reposed in him he was required to proceed by special enquiry ex officio to prosecute the suit, 
since no wickedness should go unpunished, and the province should be purged of evil men. 83 
When the ordinary proceeded in this fashion, if the party denied the crime alleged against 
78 Morice commented that the words adjuro te could not necessarily be intended as the imposition of an oath anyway. The 
same words were used in the New Testament by the apostles when driving out demons as well as by Jesus in commanding 
the devil not to torment him. Morice, Treatise, 14. 
79 The full text of this memo appears in Appendix 2-
80 LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r; Morice, Treatise,20. 
81 Churchwardens and sidesmen were essentially public prosecutors employed by ecclesiastical courts; their tole corresponded 
to that of the attorney general in Star Chamber. See John Guy, The Court o{Star Chamber and its records to the rei;;n of 
Elizabeth I (London, 1985), 37; Thomas G. Barnes, 'Due process and slow ptocess in the late Elizabethan-Stuart Star 
Chamber' American journal of Le;;al History, 6 (1962) 230; Hudson, 'Star Chamber', Co lleetanea juridica, ed. Hargrave, 
134-7. Morice objected to cwmosa insinuatio since, by Cosin's own admission, these reports of credible persons were given 
without depositions (Cosin, Apolo;;ie, II, 60). In practice, argued Morice, this amounted to bishops sharing rumours and 
gossip for the purpose of citing men ex officio who were otherwise incapable of being cited without due accusation or 
presentment. See discussion of Haselwood's case below, 173-4. 
82 Cosin avouched that judges were not required judicially to prove that a fame existed in order to proceed to examine and 
judge a suspect. For the means of determining proof of fame and exceptions against the necessity of proof, see below, 118 
footnote 46, 122. 
83 Ne mille{zcia remilneanf impul1ita, utque provincia put';;efllt' millis hominibus; LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r. 
61 
Chapter 2 - D: oflrcio procedure :md A bricfi: treatise o(Mth"s 
him, he was by law enjoined to his purgation, at which point he was advised either to clear or 
convict himself of the charges. The witnesses were also to swear (,weighing his fear of God and 
conversation of former times') that his oath was true and honest. If they unanimously affirmed 
the defendant's oath to be good, he was considered cleared of the charges, but if not, he was 
presumed guilty and spiritually reformable. Finally, the commissioners noted that penances 
were not to be taken as poenae but medicinae, or 'tending to the reformation of the 
delinquent.'84 
In assessing the memo, Morice was perplexed by the exception to the rule that no man 
could be compelled to discover his own crime (nemo tenetur seipsum prodere ... ) unless 
discovered by fame ( ... tamen proditus per famam). This exception, said Morice, 'so weakened 
this maxime, that scarcelie will it staude for a minome'.85 He was equally perplexed that two 
different standards for interrogation existed depending on the nature of the suit. In private 
suits between two parties the maxim held without exception; in ex officio cases the maxim was 
overthrown by the exception. Thus in cases moved by an accuser or presenter, a defendant 
could not be questioned touching the crime itself, but when the suit was initiated and 
prosecuted solely by the judge, he was liable (if a fame concerning him existed) to answer to 
the crime itself even if it meant self-accusation. Why were there two different standards? 
Cosin, working from the premise of the judge's inherent sincerity, actually considered ex 
officio proceedings more favourable to the defendant than suits of accusation. The defendant 
had nothing to fear from the sincere judge enquiring of him touching the crime itself for the 
confession of truth and for his soul's health. Such sincerity could not be presumed in a private 
accuser, said Cosin, and at any rate d1e defendant was not bound simply to affirm his 
adversary's accusation. Morice and his puritan contemporaries, distrustful of ecclesiastical 
judges, saw the situation exactly in the reverse. They generally felt that they had nothing to 
fear (especially in their own dioceses) from accusation or presentment - it was the ordinaries, 
appointed by Whitgift, who were the threat, and their power to impose the oath to answer all 
interrogatories gave them an inquisitorial authority not reserved to the common accuser. 
84 LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r-v; Morice, Treatise, 21. 
85 Morice, Treatise, 22. 
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While the memorandum claimed that penances enjoined by ordinaries ought to be taken 
as spiritual medicines rather than punishments, Morice observed litde or no difference between 
the two. 86 He also took exception to the oath of purgation on the same ground that he 
opposed the ex officio oath requiring the defendant to answer any and all interrogatories. The 
oath of purgation, he contended, did nodling more than beg for perjury as d1e defendant, 
who had nearly been proved guilty, was essentially offered to deny the crime! Such a custom 
that imperilled men's souls, said Morice, should be dispensed with in favour of something 
more similar to the justice offered in temporal courts: 
Why rather doe not these Ordinaries, .. free the people from these pernitious oathes and deadlie 
purgations, and proceede to their sentence of condemnation, not by feyned offices and fictions 
of lawe; but by good proofe and lawfull witnesses? And againe. absolue the partie defamed, 
where such sufficient proofe doeth faile them. Why should they thinke much to offer to the 
laitie in their Ecclesisticall Courts, the like good measure, and vpright & sincere justice, that 
they themselues finde & obteine in the courts temporall of this Realme? 87 
This advice was not heeded, he suggested, because of ecclesiastical courts' desire for monetary 
gain, a fee being required for the clearing of a defendant from his purgation. 88 In contrast to 
the 'unjust' oaths used in spiritual courts, oaths urged in common law courts did not cause the 
accused to discover his own crime. Morice noted that suits in temporal courts were enjoined 
between (he prince and subject or between the subjects themselves, witnesses were called, the 
two parties were administered oadls, the parties and witnesses testified to the truth of 
circumstances surrounding the offence, and the truth was made known through the discourse. 
There were several different kinds of oaths imposed in suits at the common law, oaths 
concerning suits for goods, chauels, debts, personal duties, contracts, lands and inheritances, 
the voluntary 'wager of law' oath, actions of accounts, detinue, and others. Bur in none of 
86 Morice, Treatise. 23. Sir Robert Beale agreed with Morice's assessment, noting that the commissioners wanted to convince 
men that their proceeding was milder than accusation and was for the benefit of the offender. But he asked how this could 
be true if men were deprived of their living or imprisoned simply for refusing to take the oath or accept Whitgit's articles 
of subscription? BL, Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, fos, 9v-l Or. 
87 Morice, Treatise, 24. 
88 Morice, Treatise, 25-6, Cosin claimed, though, that ecclesiastical commissioners 'haue no fees at all; no not so much as iiij. 
s, towards their charges, that Iustices of Peace be allowed by Statute' but served 'freely at their owne charges, with losse of 
time and intermitting their owne business, only of dutie and conscience to her Maiestie and to the Common weale.' 
Cosin, Apo[of(ie, II, 94, 
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these cases, noted Morice, were any perilous or unnecessary oaths imposed on witnesses or 
defendants like the general oaths administered in ecclesiastical courts. 89 Moreover, in criminal 
cases where loss oflife, limb, good name, or liberty might ensue, no oath was imposed on the 
defendant touching the crime itself.90 Therefore, in criminal and especially capital cases, the 
common law used neither oaths nor torture, the latter being 'a thing most cruel and 
barbarous', proscribed by the laws of the realm. 91 
While ex officio oaths, in Morice's estimation, could not be justified by common law 
custom, neither could any acts of Parliament be cited which established them. He offered four 
particular statutes for scrutiny that concerned the taking and imposing of oaths: the medieval 
heresy act de heretico comburendo (2 Henry IV c. 15), the Henrician Heresy Reform Act 
which abolished it (25 Henry VIII c. 14), the Act of Six Articles (31 Henry VIII c. 14), and 
the Act for the Submission of the Clergy (25 Henry VIII c. 19). The first of those four, de 
heretico comburendo, gave authority to diocesans to arrest those suspected of Lollardy and 
place them in prison until they canonically purged themselves or else abjured their heresy 
according to the canon law. N otwithstallding this 'bloodie and broyling lawe' which enabled 
the clergy to punish heresy, it did not explicitly empower ordinaries to administer general 
oaths or to compel defendants to become their own accuser.92 If it were to be alleged that 
such privileges were implicit in the statute by the deference to 'canonical decrees', Morice held 
that any decree defending such general and indiscreet oaths would be repugnant to (he word 
of God and thus of no force. 93 
De heretico comburendo was repealed by the Heresy Reform Act of 1534 which 
accomplished several things at once. We are (accurately) informed by Morice that this came 
89 Oaths taken by jurors or oaths of homage and fealty could not rightly be accounted similar to ex officio oaths, argucd 
Morice, sincc these were merely imposed and taken 'for the better administration of Iustice, and assuraunce of dueties'. 
Morice, Treatise, 32. 
90 For a discussion of oaths in Star Chamber and Chancery, see below, 66-7, 148-51, 172, 194. 
91 Morice, Treatise, 31. Here Morice cited the famous judge Sir John Fortescue, who, in assessing French law, took the 
occasion vigorously to denounce the use of judicial torture (see Sir John Fortescue, De laudibu., lq(um Any,lie, ed. 
Chrimes,47-53. 
92 Morice, Treatise, 32. 
93 SR, II, 125-8. 'Yet the same decree being against the laws and decrees of God, as before is proved, that statute was therein 
no binding law, neither gave sufficient warrant ro put in execution any such corrupt course of proceeding, since all laws 
and ordinances of man whatsoever, being repugnant to the laws of God, are merely void and of none effect, as the learned 
Saint German in his book of Doctor and Student hath well observed .. .'. Morice, Treatise, 33. In other words, if Moricc 
disliked a law, he would find a way to discredit it! 
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about as a result of the commons complaining to the king about the injustice of the medieval 
heresy law. In particular, the words 'canonicall sanctions' were found to be so vague that it was 
d10ught even righteous, obedient subjects could be caught within their grasp and tried for 
heresy. Thus de heretico comburendo was repealed, since 'it standeth not widl the right order 
of justice nor good equitie,' dut anyone, having been found guilty of a crime, should lose his 
life, good name, or goods and chattels, 'vnlesse it were by due accusation and witnesse, or by 
presentment, verdict, confession, or processe of oudawrie.'94 Since even cases of treason against 
the prince required accusation or presentment, verdict, or process of oudawry, it was not 
equitable that an ecclesiastical judge should be able to deprive a man of his life, good name, or 
goods unless one of the above-mentioned processes were used to open the case. Otherwise, the 
judge might proceed on 'any suspition conceyued of his owne fantasie'.95 This act went even 
further. The canons of the church were challenged as being merely human laws, assembled by 
popes and foreign authorities, some of them contrary to the royal prerogative. Thus, a citizen 
obeying the laws of the realm and upholding the royal supremacy (and, necessarily, denying 
the authority of the pope) might be in violation of the canonical decrees and hence liable to 
prosecution under de heretico comburendo. To rectifY these miscarriages of justice, the 
Heresy Reform Act instituted a rule requiring due accusation or presentment by at least two 
lawful wimesses.96 
While the Act of Six Articles was eventually repealed because its practical effect was to 
encourage secret and malicious denunciations, Morice held that dlere was nothing in dlat act 
which established or allowed ex officio oaths. I t merely provided for a commission, under the 
authority of the bishop of the diocese, to receive information or accusation regarding crimes 
punishable by ecclesiastical jurisdiction. These commissions wete not to urge defendants to an 
oath, said Morice, bur to require oaths only of witnesses and juries of twelve. The Act of Six 
Articles was amended by a later act, 35 Henry VIII c. 5, which provided for a jury of twelve to 
be appointed to try such cases which concerned offences mentioned in the Act of Six 
94 SR, III, 454. 
95 Morice, Treatise, 34. 
96 For a closer look at the reforms achieved by this stature, sec More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, Ixv-Ixvii. 
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Articles. 97 Neither of these acts, contended Morice, instituted or even mentioned ecclesiastical 
oaths resembling the ex officio oath. 98 Missing entirely from Morice's examination of statutes 
was the most important statute in the controversy: the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy (1 
Elizabeth c. 1). It is difficult to imagine why Morice chose not to discuss this act since it dealt 
directly with the establishment and practical authority of the high commission. In his 
'Defence' four years later, however, Morice spent much ink interpreting this statute, confuting 
the broad conclusions drawn by Cosin. 99 
A very brief sixth chapter was devoted to a comparison of the procedures of ecclesiastical 
courts with those of Star Chamber and Chancery. Morice anticipated that the defenders of ex 
officio procedure would attempt to liken the same to the oaths used in these two courts, but 
he strove to demonstrate that, in fact, a wide disparity existed. Star Chamber and Chancery 
proceeded to their verdicts not by jury (as did the courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas) 
but by the judge himself giving 'definitiue sentence vppon the aunswere and examination of 
the defendent, affirmed by his corporall oathe, and vpon the depositions of witnesses.' 100 But 
what might appear to be an ex officio-like procedure was actually quite different. In these 
courts, Morice stated, defendanrs were first made aware both of tl1eir accuser's identity and 
the charge laid against them - and they were permitted to receive counsel in framing their 
answets to interrogatories to boot. 
Who hath euer seene in these Courtes any subject of this lande, in a cause concerning him scIfe, 
brought forth and compelled to depose or make aunswere vppon his oath, no bill of complainte 
or information formerlie exhibited against him? Nay on the contrarie, these Courtes obseruing 
the due t()rme of Iustice, ent~)rce no man to answcre, but where hee hath a knowne accusor, and 
perfect vnderstandinge of the cause or cryme objected, and therewithall is permitted to haue a 
coppie of the bill of complainte or information (beeing not ore tenus,) And allowed moreouer 
97 SR, voL III, 96 L 
98 Morice mused further that defenders of the oath might suggest that the king, by express words, gave to the commissions 
established by the Act of Six Articles power and authority to use the oath. It was doubtful, he asserted, that the king could 
thus empower a commission, since the oath was contrary to the laws of the realm as well as the laws of God. Morice, 
Treatise, 35-7. This question was the very heart of the controversy between Morice and Cosin. 
99 See below, 190-2, 197. 
100 Morice, Treatise, 38. 
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both tyme conuenient, and counsell learned well to consider and aduise of his oathe and 
aunswere. 101 
Morice claimed that Star Chamber and Chancery did not compel defendanrs ro answer 
inrerrogarories that addressed matter not found in the bill of information 102 and defendanrs 
might refuse to answer such questions without offence ro the court. If the accuser's complainr 
was not provable or if the court dismissed the case on accounr of incompetence, the defendanr 
was awarded costs. 103 Thus, oaths in Star Chamber and Chancery differed from oaths in 
ecclesiastical courts in four material ways: in ecclesiastical courts 1) the accuser and matter for 
prosecution were unknown, 2) the oath was general rather than specific, 3) the inrerrogarories 
to be answered on oath were not fixed or finite but wandered, apparently in search of matter 
upon which to ground some further inquisition, and 4) the defendant was often forced ro 
condemn himself by revealing his (and other's) thoughts, words, and deeds. 104 
Having completed his argumenrs against the oath on the basis of reason, scnpture, 
common law, and statutes, Morice submitted that the oath was foreign and alien to the policy 
of the realm. 105 And because it was foreign, it impugned the royal supremacy and insulted the 
majesty of the prince. Once England had been poisoned by ex officio procedure, he 
suggested, other related abuses surfaced such as the bishops' habit of citing men pro salute 
anime ro appear in their consistories without expressing any special cause or charge agamst 
101 Morice, Treafi"e, 38-9. Cosin later seized on Morice's exception of informations submitted ore lenus, that is, orally, 
arguing that the exception proved that it was not simply unjust to deny the defendant a copy of the articles laid against 
him. The Jacobean Star Chamber judge William Hudson described ore tenus as a 'more short and more expeditious' way 
of proceeding than the normal way of putting in a written bill of complaint and that ore tenus was often used in a case 
'which is like to prove dangerous if it be not nipped in the bud'. But the court could only proceed ore tenus if the 
defendant gave his consent or if he freely acknowledged having committed the offence. It appears that in ore tenus cases 
the defendant was denied counsel. Hudson, 'Star Chamber', ColLecfllnell ;uridim, ed. Hargrave, 126-7. A manuscript 
copy of Hudson's treatise may be found in BL, Harley MS 1226. Professor Baker notes that Star Chamber public 
prosecutions were often conducted Ore tenus with absolutely nothing written down. Even important cases might be 
brought to the court orally. Dyer, Reports, ed. Baker, lxxxvii-Ixxxix. See also below, 148-51, 172, 194. 
102 The bill of information was the formal charge presented to the court by the plaintiff in writing. See also Guy, StIlr 
Chamber, 37-9; BL, Lansdowne MS 639, fos. 1v-2r; Henry Hudson, 'Star Chamber', CollectaneaJuridicll, ed. Francis 
Hargrave (London, 1980), II, 150-7. 
103 For awarding of costs in Star Chamber, see Isaac Cotton's treatise in BL, Lansdowne MS 639, fos. lOr-v, 14r. For 
awarding of costs in Chancery, see W.J. Jones, The Elizabethall court o(Challcery (Oxford, 1967) 212-4, 215 footnote 3, 
217-8. 
104 Morice, Treatise, 39. 
105 Drawing heavily from John Foxe's Acts Ilnd monuments, Morice hastily summarised the history of abuse perpetrated by 
the English clergy, marking Anselm, Becket, Langton, Arundel, and Wolsey for special condemnation and suggesting that 
their aim was to 'maintaine the Romishe hierarchie'. Morice, Treatise, 40-4. 
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them,106 as well as the practlce of imprisoning those who refused to take the oath.I07 
According to Morice, these abuses frequendy violated the principles of Magna Carta and its 
consequent statutes. 108 Chapter 39 of Magna Carta affirmed that no freeman was to be 
imprisoned or deprived of his freehold without due process of law. One of the questions which 
came to dominate the controversy between Morice and eosin was, did ex officio procedure 
impugn the law of the land, or was it part of it? Was the evolution of the oath ancillary to the 
queen's prerogative to appoint commissions for the governance of the church, or was it a clear 
violation of one of the most basic rights granted to all Englishmen by Magna Carta? Morice 
believed it to be the latter. He saw Magna Carta as the guarantor of the rights and liberties of 
each subject and the Submission of the Clergy as a reaffirmation of dle church's subordination 
to parliamentary stature, common law, and (he royal prerogative. 109 
If ex officio procedure was foreign and contrary to the justice of the realm, cominued 
Morice, then its promulgation by ecclesiastical judges was nothing short of praemunire .110 The 
main statute establishing the definition of praemunire was 16 Richard II c. 5 (1392-3) which 
declared that if anyone pursued legal suits or processes in the court of Rome or elsewhere that 
violated the king's prerogative, they 'shalbe put out of the Kings protection, and their landes 
and tenementes, goods and chatelles forfait to the King ... 111 The key phrase in this statute 
which came to be in comroversy between Morice and Cosin was in curia romana vel alibi (in 
106 Morice stated that the statute of Marlborough (52 Henry III c. 23) declared that the king's permission was required to 
compel any freeholder to take an oath against his will. Morice, Treatise, 45. 
107 Morice described the high commission's practice of imprisoning for refusal to swear as peine forte et dure. This law 
French term (meaning 'pain strong and hard') described a procedure which came into practice in England in the thirteenth 
century. Defendants who refused to plead either guilty or not guilry were chained spread-eagle on the prison floor, fed 
stale bread the first day, only water the second day, and then they laid weights on them, one at a time until they either 
died or entered a plea. The legal system believed that the defendant's plea one way or the other was necessary for a trial to 
continue. But, technically speaking, prisoners of the high commission could not be subjected to peine forte et dure, but 
they could be fined and imprisoned. Furthermore, even if prisoners of ecclesiastiClI courts were subjected to p,>ine forte d 
dure, that was not quite the same thing as judicial torture as it was used on the continent. The difference was that penie 
fOrte et dure was not an aid to fact-finding or a device to extract evidence against the suspect to convict him. A fine line 
by modern standards, but the legal distinction is significant. Thus, Morice's claim was merely emotional hyperbole. 
Morice, Treatise, 55; Langbein, Torture, 74-7; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 17-8; Usher, Rise andjall, cd. Tyler, 112. 
108 A statute of 1329 (5 Edward III c. 9) stated that no man should be arrested contrary to the provisions of Magna Carta. 
Another law of 1368 (42 Edward III c. 3) similarly declared 'that no man be put to aunswere, without presentment before 
Iustices, or matter of recorde, or by due processe, or loy writt originall, after the auncient lawe of this Lande.' SR, 1, 388. 
Morice added that Fitzherbert had deemed general citations pro .,alute anime contrary to law. (Fitzherbert further 
declared that if a man was cited by a bishop to appear, the cause must be stated in the citation.) Morice, Treatise, 47; Sir 
Anthony Fitzherbert, De IUltlirti brwium (London, 1677) 9l. 
109 This view of English history was technically inaccurate, particularly Morice's interpetation of the Submission of the 
Clergy. See below, 92-3,100, and 145 for Cosin's rebuttal. 
110 Although it is not clear from the text, Morice later remarked that this assertion was in fact the central premise of the 
Treatise. LPL, MS 234, fo. 315r. 
III SR, II, 85-6; Morice, Treatise, 48. 
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the court of Rome or elsewhere), specifically the signification of the word alibi. Though Cosin 
maintained that it referred to any foreign place (such as Avignon) where the pope's residence 
might be taken up, Morice believed the word could be used to describe bishops' courts in 
England. 112 Morice's position on praemunire had hardened since his Middle Temple lecture in 
the late 1570s, 113 and by the time he wrote the Treatise his opinion regarding praemunire was 
more in line with that of St. German. 114 By the 1590s other puritans, notably Thomas 
Canwright and Nicholas Fuller, were advancing identical arguments. 115 
Morice envisioned the public reaction that would ensue if temporal courts began to 
impose the ex officio oath. He asked what would be thought of a justice of the peace who 
summoned a man to appear before him for no reason in particular, requiring the man to take 
an oath (0 answer any questions he might be asked, the justice framing questions as both judge 
and accuser, and imprisoning the party without bail or mainprise should he refuse to answer or 
refuse (0 swear. 116 The injustice was plain and apparent, said Morice, and praemunire was the 
lawful and appropriate punishment for such an affront (0 the king's laws. 
The example of Wolsey also served well for Morice's purposes. He viewed the fall of 
Wolsey and his legatine court in 1529, and the Submission of the Clergy three years later, as 
part and parcel of each other, two events with one cause. For their flouting of the royal 
prerogative through praemunire, the English clergy were forced to mollify the king in 1531, 
paying him £118,840 and renouncing all authority repugnant to the bng's majesty. 117 Morice 
naturally discovered similarities between the clergy of Henry VIII's day and those of his own: 
the Elizabethan clergy incurred the risk of praemunire in a different way - by means of ex 
112 The word alibi did extend to bishops' courts - or it had at one time. Most Elizabethan civil lawyers argued that 
praemuflire was no longer possible in the way that it had been before 1534. Smith, De republica afly;lorum, ed. Dewar, 
133-4; Cowell, The interpreter, sig. Ddd2r-v; Spelman, Reports, ed. Baker, 66-70. See also below, 102, 103 footnote 132. 
113 'If any Judge hold plee of any cause or matter belonging to the courtes of the common lawe, the king by his writt of 
prohibicion may commaund him to surcease, which commaundement if he continue to disobey he shalbe attached to 
answere this contempt vnto the king.' BL, Egerton MS 3376, fo. 59r. 
114 'If any suche sute be taken in the spirytuall courte for any temporall thyngc that as well the iugc as the partie rene [sic] 
therby into the premunire.' St. German, COIHthutiollS, chapter six. 
115 LPL, MS 2004, fos. 49-59. Morice's fullest exposition on prtlemunire occurred in the 'Defence'. See below, 196-8. 
116 Morice, Treatise, 55. 
117 J .J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 19(8) 274-5; Guy, Tudor England, 127-9. 
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officio procedure with Its forced general oaths which compelled defendants to accuse 
themselves. 1 18 
Even if the oath had been used ll1 the realm for a long time, conrended Morice, there 
was still authority to expel it. The words of the Act of Dispensations (25 Henry VIII c. 21) 
enumerated three conditions which must be met for foreign laws to become legitimate in 
England: toleration by the king, voluntary acceptance of the people (through Parliament), and 
a long custom of usage. None of these, he claimed, legitimised ex officio oaths. 119 Moreover, 
the Act for the Submission of the Clergy of 1534 asserted that no canons, constitutions, or 
ordinances could be made by Convocation which were repugnant to the crown or to the laws 
of the realm. Any jurisdiction, therefore, which affronted the royal prerogative and the laws of 
the realm was a violation of d1e oath of supremacy. 120 It can be readily seen by these 
arguments that Morice rolled the royal supremacy and common and statute law into one unit. 
Ecclesiastical prerogative was a non-entity - or else it was only legitimate as long as it 
operated according to common law procedures. 
Using the Submission of the Clergy as a keystone, Morice's attack was complete. If the 
oath could not be proven to be just or legal by reason, scripture, or common law, then any 
attempt by the clergy to put it into practice would violate the prince's prerogative and incur 
the penalties of praemunire. Morice doubted that the Act of Six Articles could be construed to 
have empowered commissions appointed by the king to examine offenders using the ex officio 
oath, and in any case he supposed it unlikely such an interpretation could be proved. Even if it 
were asserted that the oath were established by the king's special grant, it would still be void 
and illegal if there was no common law precedent in its favour, since the king could not alter 
common or statute law via grants or commissions without the consent of Parliament. 121 
118 Morice, Treatise, 5l. 
119 Morice, Treatise, 53. Cosin dismissed Morice's interpretation of the Act of Dispensations, arguing that under Morice's 
conditions the court of Chancery was not legitimate: its origin was in the civil (a foreign) law and yet no parliament had 
ever voluntarily accepted its jurisdiction, neither had any king. See below, 93, 149. 
120 Morice, Treatise, 54. 
121 Morice, Treatise, 37. That the king was not above the law was a widely shared opinion amongst Tudor humanists and 
lawyers and was essentially the view expressed in Sf. German's Treatise concernin::; the power or the cLer::;y and the laws or 
the realm (London, 1535?) (STC2 21588). While Morice believed that the king could not abrogate or alter the authority 
of common law without Parliament, he seems ro have accepted the political ramifications of the Henrician reformation as 
legal and consistent with English history. What Henry VIII did in affirming himself supreme head of the English church 
was nothing other than to state the way things had always been, or ought to have been. Yet even as supreme head, Henry 
could not give to the church authority that was not warranted by the common law. 
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In conclusion, Morice listed five general grievances against ex officio procedure: 1) that 
both the imposing and the taking of general oaths to answer any and all questions propounded 
by a judge was an abuse offered to God; 2) that (he oath was an indignity to the crown and 
the liberty of all subjects; 3) that the oath was neither necessary nor profitable to the church 
and commonwealth but hurtful to both; 4) that pre-Henrician, popish clergy had instituted 
the oath; and 5) that the oath was never affirmed by the laws or customs of the realm but 
rather 'crept in among manie orher abuses' over time and had been impugned by lawful and 
just authority on many occasions. 122 
Periodically in the Treatise Morice descended into anti-clerical diatribes. 123 He saw 
greed for power and money as the controlling impulse of the English clergy, manifested in his 
own day by the many ecclesiastical courts which seemed always to be in session yet lacked 
sufficient matter for the prosecution of suits. But despite his often disparaging tone 
throughout the Treatise, Morice did propose seven specific reforms which would restore 
justice to ex officio procedure. They were: 1) that proceedings be orderly, with witnesses; 2) 
that judges be grave, honest, not malevolent or partial; 3) that cases be tried in the area the 
suspect resided to ensure that the ordinary would be acquainted with the person's life and 
manner; 4) that witnesses ought to be received judicially (as opposed to secretly); 5) that all 
witnesses be deposed, that is, examined 011 oath; 124 6) tlut witnesses were to 'render a wise 
and sufficient cause of their knowledge of the infamy'; and 7) that the grounds of the 
inquisition should not be wrested or extorted from the party but established by sufficient 
witnesses. 125 
Once Morice had finished the Treatise, he determined that he would fashion out of its 
arguments a bill to present to Parliament which would validate his claims by outlawing the 
122 Morice, Treatise, 57-8. 
123 The tirade on 54-6 is a good example. Cosin took offence at Morice's 'reptoching and wounding of all Ecclesiasticall 
Iudges through the sides of Papists'. Morice meant to make his readers believe 'the same to be now in all bishops present, 
which was blame woorthie in any of their predecessours.' (Cosin, Apoloy,ie, 'Epistle to the Reader', sig. B4r-B4y, Cly-
C2v.) 
124 This would have ended the practice of secret denunciations and clamosa insinuatio in which 'credible' persons were 
allowed to inform the ordinary of a fame without having to depose. See below, 123-4, for a discussion of Clafllosll 
ins; 11 uatto . 
125 Morice, Treatise, 19-20. Although Morice denied it, Cosin accused him of wanting to subject ecclesiastical law to 
common law by forcing spiritual courts to follow the practices of temporal courts. Indeed, the seven principles laid out by 
Morice showed where his sympathies lay. 
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oath and punishing judges who attempted (0 impose it thereafter with the penalties of 
praemunire .126 Ironically, by presenting (he bill for consideration, Morice was in effect 
admitting that his argument did not yet have the force of law. This contradicted the entire 
premise of the Treatise, which asserted over and over that the oath was not legal and never had 
been. But if that was true, why was there any need (0 introduce a bill confirming what was 
already law? 




Apologie for sundrie proceedings ecclesiasticall 
Part I: Matters belonging to ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
Chapter 3 - An apologiefor sundrie proceedings, part I 
Sometime in 1590 or '91 Archbishop Whitgift commissioned Cosin to draft an 
exposition defending the authority of ecclesiastical courts against the detractions of the 
puritans. 1 Since Cosin was Whitgift's foremost canon and civil law expert, he hoped Cosin's 
defence would restore respect for ecclesiastical jurisdiction among the laity and a renewed 
sense of confidence among the clergy. The first edition of the Apologie was not published for 
general sale - only about forty copies were printed. 2 Whitgift would have intended these 
copies for the other high commissioners, privy councillors, and possibly the universities. The 
rift between the archbishop and puritans had been widening ever since 1585, and recently 
there had been a spate of harsh attacks on Whitgift's conformity campaign which had only 
been refuted haphazardly.3 Thomas Cooper and other anonymous writers responded to 
Martin Marprelate and the puritans piecemeal, but Whitgift wanted a full, systematic 
justification of his governance of the English church, and Cosin's Apologie was the result. 
The first edition of the Apologie consisted of two parts, the first setting our which 
matters belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the second addressing criminal procedure in 
ecclesiastical courts, whether by accusation or ex officio. Bur the release of Cosin's Apologie 
was ill-rimed. Morice's Treatise began to circulate in manuscript in (he summer of 1591 as did 
a tract by Sir Robert Beale called 'Notes to prooue the proceeding ex Officio, and the oath 
and subscription which are now required, to be against the word of God, the ancient Fatl1ers, 
and Canons of the Church, and the lawes, liberties, and customes of the real me of England'. 4 
1 Cosin's Apologie was not originally directed against Morice's Treatise since the Treatise did not appear in manuscript until 
the middle of 1591, about the same time as the Apologie appeared in print. 
2 ' ... it was then (in priuate sort) committed to the presse, and fourtie copies, or thereabouts were printed, without any purpose 
offurther publishing.' Cosin, Apologie, I, sig. Blr-v. The book was published anonymously in London by the deputies of 
Christopher Barker. There is no entry for Cosin's book in rhe stationer's register and therefore it is not possible to give the 
exact date of publication. From external and internal references, however, we may justifiably presume that it was near the 
middle of 1591, probably in summer. A transcript of registers of the Company of Stationers of London, ed. Edward 
Arber, (London, 1875). 
3 Oh read ouer D . .fohn Bridges (1588) (STC 2 17453) and Hay any worke for Cooper (1589) by the anonymous Martin 
Marprelate (STC2 17456) were two such works, the latter of which attacked Whitgift as well as Cosin; Marprelate, Hay 
any worke, 13. Sir Robert Beale also wrote at least three or four tracts during the 1580s impugning the high commission, 
the articles of subscription, liturgy, and virtually everything else about the church. Levy, Fifth Amendment, 140-72. 
4 According to Beale, he wrote the 'Notes' around 1588 or 1589. He sent them to Lord Burghley and (like Morice) did not 
undertand how they fell into the hands of Cosin: 'About the same time I also sent vnto your Lordship a summarye 
Colleccion of certeine notes, against the maner of proceadinge ex officio by oathe: which by a booke verye latelie 
published in printe against a treatise of Mr. Morris, I perceaue is also come to their handes, without my priuitie or consent 
ffor then I would haue digested it otherwysc.' This letter also proves that the second edition of the Apologie was in print 
by the date of the letter, 17 March, 1593. BL, Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, fo. 7v. Beale's 'Notes' are unfortunately not 
extant, although there are snippets of printed books on ecclesiastical oaths in LPL, MS 2004, fos. 77r-78v which mayor 
may not be taken from them (there is no evidence that the 'Notes' were ever printed). John Strype claimed that the essay 
written against ecclesiastical jurisdiction that appears in BL, Cotton MS, Cleopatra F.I, fos. 1-49 was Beale's 'Notes', but 
this cannot be right for two reasons: first, the essay is not divided into the sections that Cosin describes as comprising the 
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It was apparent that the Apologie would need to be revised to incorporate a reply to these 
treatises and then printed again - this time with many more copies than before. The issue of 
the ex officio oath was so crucial that Cosin added a voluminous new section to the second 
edition of the Apologie to address the question of the oath's legitimacy. Most of his effort 
here was focused against Morice's pithy, intelligently written Treatise though he also answered 
the criticisms of Beale, Cartwright, and other puritans at various points. The title of the second 
edition of the Apologie declared the work to be 'much enlarged above the first priuate 
project'. 5 In the 'Epistle to (he Reader' which appeared at the beginning of the second edition, 
Cosin stated that he had been directed to publish the 'rawe discourse' of the original edition 
and to adjoin to it his own answer to the Treatise (Beale's 'Notes', it seems, he was intended to 
answer only by the way). He chose to do this by revising his first edition, 'not omitting withall 
to answere the whole matter of the aforesaid Treatise' which seemed pertinent, yet not in the 
same order as it appeared, but working it into the text 'after the method, into which I had first 
plo((ed ir.'6 Despite Cosin's patchwork additions to parts I and II for the March 1593 reprint, 
they remain well-ordered and systematic, in stark contrast to the sprawling, diffuse part III, 
discussed below in chapter five. The second edition of the Apologie appeared in 1593 but 
without part III, which was not finished until after Parliament had ended (thus after 10 
April)) 
The earliest copies of the second edition contained the original two parts from the first 
edition with answers to certain points from the Treatise and 'Notes' interspersed with the 
original material, plus a short section called 'An Epistle to the Reader', which was essentially a 
brief criticism of the whole of (he Treatise and 'Notes' in lieu of (he fuller, more 
comprehensive effort which would be forthcoming. How many copies of this edition were 
'Notes' (see below, note ®); and second, the essay does not venture into canon law, the church fathers, or scripture, 
though the 'Notes' did. Strype, Whitgift, II, 30-1. 
5 Cosin, Apologie, cover page. 
6 Cosin, Apowgie, I, 'An Epistle to the Reader', sig. B2r. 
7 Parts I and II, to which was anached 'An Epistle to the Reader' that summarised the contents of the forthcoming part III, 
appeared in print some time between 1 March and 17 March, 1593. Part III 'came not to publick viewe, tyll the 
Parliament was ended, & the Clergye men dispersed.' Morice noted that many copies of this first instalment of the 
second edition were carried around by clergymen attending Convocation. BL, Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, fo. 7v; 
Cambridge, Baker MS 40,132-3; Neale, Parliaments, 1584-1601,319. 
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printed is not known, but it seems that it was intended for a wide, scholarly audience. 8 This 
chapter will consider part I of the Apologie, in particular the fuller, 1593 edition, which 
contains the original 1591 material plus answers (0 various arguments drawn from Morice's 
Treatise and Beale's 'Notes'.9 eosin's explanation for revising the Apologie was that the 
publication of Morice's Treatise moved 'those who may commaunde me, (0 take some time 
to answere it.'IO On three different occasions in the Apologie, eosin addressed a superior or 
patron, each time using the second person. These references, plus everything that is known 
about eosin's life and career, would seem (0 place no one except Archbishop Whitgift in such 
a role. II 
The Apologie was not a defence of episcopal government. It was a defence of the 
jurisdiction and procedure of ecclesiastical courts. Many of the puritan derogators of 
ecclesiastical proceedings, however, were presbyterians who routinely filled out their 
arguments against ecclesiastical jurisdiction with calls for the new discipline. For this reason 
eosin opened the preface (0 his Apologie by reproving those who impugned the present 
ecclesiastical government. He resisted classifYing Morice, one of the 'queen's counsellors' in 
the court of Wards, and Beale, clerk of the privy council, as presbyterian extremists, yet he 
believed the extremists had led honest men astray. The enemies of the present ecclesiastical 
government, 
By whose frequent clamours, some very graue, wise and learned (no way affected to their other 
fansies) either not being well informed of proceedings EcclesiasticaU, or not weying (for want of 
leisure) certain points seeming to bee doubtfully reported in the bookes of Common lawe, so 
throughly as their great learning therein doeth afford: in a kind of commiseration (for so I 
interprete it) towards some of those who seeme distressed, and to be otherwise well meaning 
men; haue lately called into question diuers proceedings Ecclesiasticall, both for matter, and for 
circumstance or maner; that they are contrary to the lawes of this Realme. 12 
8 The cover page states: 'Respectiulie submitted to the graue iudgements of the reuerend Iudges and other Sages of the 
Common Iawe: of Iudicious Professors of the CiuiII Iawe: and of the right reuerend Prelates and other grounded Diuines 
in this Realme.' Cosin, Apologie, cover page. 
9 For a comparison of the texts of the two editions of the Apologie, see Appendix 4. 
10 Cosin, Apologie, I, sig. A4r-v. 
11 Cosin, Apologie, I, sig. A4r-v; II, 124; III, 241. 
12 Cosin, Apologie, I, sig. A2v. This charitable tone was the zenith of Cosin's courtesy towards Morice and Beale, and he did 
not return to it. 
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Cosin categorised his adversaries' objections into two mam groups: they challenged 
either the matter of jurisdiction or the manner of proceeding. The puritans' objections to 
matter were: 1) 'no Ordinarie may cite any whomesoeuer, but in causes Testamentarie and 
Matrimoniall'; 2) 'no Layman ought to be cited or summoned to appeare before any Iudge 
Ecclesiasticall to take an oath in any other cause then Testamentarie or Matrimoniall'; 3) 'dle 
iudgement ofheresie now Heth rather in the Common law, then in the law Ecclesiastical!'; 4) 
'nothing now can be adiudged heresie, but according to the statute, 1. Eliz. cap. 1'.13 
Their objections concerning manner were as follows: 1) 'The Queene's Maiestie cannot 
giue, nor any man receiue authoritie, to vse any other processe in matters Ecclesiastical!, then 
by citation'; 2) 'an Ecclesiasticall Court may not proceed without accusation or presentment'; 
3) 'Lay men may not be cited ex officio in any cause but Testamentarie or Matrimoniall'; 4) 
(Regarding the handling of the suit itself) 'if a matter be duely presented against a man, he 
may not be examined vpon his oath' (meaning he cannot be made to answer directly whether 
he committed the crime); 5) 'no man is bound to declare any matter against another, except 
some be an accuser'; 6) (Regarding verdicts of the court) 'by none Ecclesiasticall authoritie, a 
man may be depriued of his benefice being his freeholde, being not endited, and no suite of 
partie offered against him'; 7) and the 'Q. Maiestie cannot giue, nor any man may take 
authority of her, to vse any coertion for any matter Ecclesiasticall but excommunications & 
such like: and that therefore a man may not be punished by imprisonment or fine, for or in 
any matter Ecclesiasticall'; 8) 'that a man that standeth aboue fortie dayes excommunicate, 
may no way be punished, but vpon the writ de excommunicato capiendo: and that the said 
writ may not be awarded, but vpon originall cause arising vpon some of the ten crimes 
touched in the stat. 5. El. c. 23'.14 
Cosin often referred to his opponents as the 'innovators', or, on occaSIOn, 'innovating 
Disciplinarians' when addressing a particularly presbyterian argument. The number or identity 
of these puritans is not fully ascertainable, although there are some clues given by Cosin. It is 
13 Cosin, Apologie, I, sig. A3r. 
14 The sources for these opinions were varied, and Cosin never identified the authors of them unless they were the 'Treatisor' 
(Morice) or the 'Nme-gatherer' (Beale). Cosin, Apologie, I, si?;. A3v. 
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certain that some of them were the nine ministers who stood erial with Cartwright in a Star 
Chamber case of 1591.15 The other figures to whom Cosin addressed his arguments may have 
been the anonymous puritans whose tracts are collected at Lambeth Palace Library. 16 Clearly, 
though, Cosin showed more respect for the framer of the Treatise, offering that he was 
'holden wise, & not vnlearned'.17 It is suspected that Cosin was aware of Morice's identity, 
although, speaking of the Treatise, he protested, 'Trudy I neither doe knowe, nor haue heard, 
who were any of the Authors, or who was the Enditer of it.' It would be remarkable if Cosin 
were genuinely ignorant of Morice's authorship. Although their paths are only known to have 
crossed once - in the Parliament of 1586-7 where they sat on the same committee for the 
consideration of a bill for a learned ministry - there were other means by which Morice 
would have been known to Whirgift by 1591, if not to Cosin as well. Morice had been a 
justice of the peace for nearly twenty years and had become acquainted with Lord Burghley. 
Burghley interceded on Morice's behalf after Robert Cawdrey's Queen's Bench appeal in 
1591, for which Morice had acted as counsel - Cosin, in the capacity of ecclesiastical 
commissioner, had been involved in the original proceedings which led to Cawdrey's 
deprivation in 1587. Furthermore, Morice delivered a copy of the Treatise to Burghley around 
1591, and some time later Cosin obtained a copy of the Treatise from 'a right noble 
Counsellour, who had also much adoe, to procure a copie thereof for himselfe'. Finally, 
Archbishop Whitgift's letter to the queen protesting against Morice's bill in the 1593 
Parliament gives the clear impression that Whitgift had long been aware of Morice's views, 
and thus it was likely that Cosin would have known as wdl. 18 
In 'An Epistle to the Reader', Cosin declared that he had been eager to read the Treatise, 
hoping either to be corrected of his opinions or to be confirmed in them. Upon reading it he 
was disappointed to discover that the Treatise left him unpersuaded in the least, remaining 
confident in his former opinions. He was also unmoved by the arguments of the 'Note-
15 This is evident from Cosin's description of the case at III, 212. 
16 LPL, MS 2004. 
17 Cosin, Apolof!,ie, 1, sig. Blv. Throughout the whole of the Apolof!,ie and especially in part III, Cosin spent more time 
confuting Morice's assertions than he spent on his other adversaries' arguments combined. 
18 Hasler, Commons, I, 661; and III, 98; BL, Lansdowne MS 53, 55, 57, 58, 61, 64, 68; BL, Additional MS 28571, fo. 172; 
Cosin, Apolo;:ie, sig. Blv; BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69. 
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gatherer', whose quotations from the church fathers Cosin discovered to be erroneous. 19 The 
declared intention of part I of the Apologie20 was to establish the extent of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, specifically what misdemeanours were determinable in ecclesiastical courts and 
which were not. In this part Cosin set out to answer his opponent's claims and objections 
concerning matter. He began by defining different types of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Bishops, 
who 'onely be immediate Ordinaries vnder her Maiestie' were authorised to carry out the 
queen's decrees. Their jurisdiction was of two types: voluntary, when they dealt in a matter at 
the request of a party or in the absence of objection from the party, and contentious, when the 
bishop dealt with a party against his wilPI Contentious jurisdiction itself was of two sorts, 
dealing either with rights demandable or crimes punishable. The first of these (also called 
litigious jurisdiction demandable and determinable) comprised matters related to testaments 
and matrimony.22 Matters that concerned rights demandable might arise by contentious 
jurisdiction from the statt or else 'vpon exercise of voluntarie Iurisdiction, and yet by deniall 
made litigious.' 23 The second type of contentious or litigious jurisdiction, crimes punishable, 
might be divided into three classes: crimes against piety toward God (impietas) , crimes 
against justice towards one's neighbours (focinus) , and crimes against sobriety towards one's 
self (jlagellitum) , 'albeit the two last be orren confounded'.24 
19 Cosin, Apologie, D2v-D3r. For some reason Cosin listed here the eleven sections into which the 'Notes' were divided: 1) 
testimonies from the ancient fathers against ex ofi,cio procedure, 2) similar testimonies from the English martyrs, 3) the 
proceeding against English heretics without using the oath, 4) the canon law teaching on inquisition and proceeding e.y 
ofilcio by oath, 5) 'another order of proceeding, but yet in C£lUS£lfldei, and not otherwise', 6) 'the bishops proceedings 
contrarie', 7) the laws of England, 8) the revocation of ex officio procedure during Henry VIII, 9) the way this issue was 
debated in those days, 10) Sir Thomas More's defence of the e.,' officio proceeding, 11) ways in which ex officio 
procedure violates the common law. Cosin, Apologie, l, sig. D2r. This is the best guide we have ro the structure of the 
'Notes'. 
20 Part I is 130 pages in length, preceded by a preface, 'An Epistle to the Reader', and a table of contents listing the titles of 
eighteen chapters. 
21 As examples of voluntary jurisdiction Cosin listed institutions, probate of wills, committing of administrations, visitatiOn>, 
certificates of bishops into the queen's courts, and ordaining of real compositions in ecclesiastical matters. Cosin, Apologie, 
1,6, 17. 
22 Cosin added last wills, which, although not technically testamentary, were closely related, as well as codicils, legacies, 
administrations, and sequestrations of the dead's goods (commonly called letters £ld colligendum). To matrimonial 
matters he joined divorces, jactitation of matrimony, questions of legitimation and bastardy, restitution of a man's wife, 
and suits for goods or chattels made part of a marriage contract. All of these things came under the general name of 
reliqudjur£l ecclesi£lstiC£l. Cosin, Apologie, 1, 18. 
23 As examples of originally litigious cases Cosin listed 1) actions initiated by the judge himself, as in fees of citations or fees 
of sentences; 2) actions initiated by other attendants in a court, such as fees of advocates, proctors, registers, apparitors, 
etc.; or 3) actions initiated on behalf of a minister's rights, such as wages for a curate or clerk, or in helping him artain or 
defend a tirle and interest in a benefice. Examples of such cases becoming litigious after refusal of voluntary jurisdiction 
were listed by Cosin as real compositions 'sought by some partie to be disanulled', procurations, pensions, synodals, 
pentecostals, indemnities, fees for probates, etc. Cosin, Apologie, 1, 18-9. 
24 Lengthy examples of these types of sins are supplied by Cosin at I, 19-20. 
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Regarding matters commonly thought to be related to testaments and matnmony, 
eosin believed some clarification was necessary. Last wills were not to be classified under 
testaments because there was no executor who handled the legacy. Administrations and lerrers 
ad colligendum should not be counted as testamentary matters, 'because they are committed 
when a man dieth intestate'. Divorce, while often classified with matrimony because it 
dissolves marriage, was not really a matrimonial matter. 25 Likewise, goods and chattels 
promised to a woman as part of a marriage contract were not related to matrimony itself. 
Despite these exceptions, eosin doubted anyone would deny that all of these flutters properly 
belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 26 
As for marrers that were truly testamentary and matrimonial, eosin asserted that these 
too were under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, although the jurisdiction of some these matters was 
mitigated by the temporal law. For example, canon law forbade ecclesiastical persons from 
willing away property they had secured through church promotions. Such property was 
required to remain with the church when they died. The temporal law, however, professed 
that clerks 'may make their willes as liberally and freely as any Lay man may'. In the face of 
this contradiction, 'such canons are here of no force, nor in practice.' 27 In some cases common 
law defined what came under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, such as cases of legacies and devices 
which might only be brought in a spiritual court. Likewise, many common law books affirmed 
divorce to be of spiritual jurisdiction. The second statute of Westminster (13 Edward I c. 34) 
declared that if a man was living apart from his wife, he might be compelled by ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction to receive her again and cohabit with her. 28 If wardships or chattels real (such as a 
lease, but not 'lands deuised') were bequeathed by a will, these could also be recovered in a 
spiritual court. Should a man die intestate, the ordinary would determine who, being nearest 
25 Cosin noted that the Act of Appeals (24 Henry VIII c. 12) considered divorce a separate rype of suit. Cosin, Ap,,/ogie, I, 
21. 
26 Cosin, Apologie, I, 22. Christopher St. German, who addressed the issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Doctor and 
student and the New additions, believed that the church should only have jurisdiction over marters which were 
demonstrably related to matters of faith or the sacraments. See below, 84. 
27 In support of this Cosin cited St. German's Constitutions, chapter 13. Similar exceptions where the common law mitigated 
ecclesiastical cognisance existed in cases of women assigning their husbands to be executors of their wills, executors suing 
for the goods of their testators, or trespasses on property sequestered by an ordinary from an intestate with the intention 
to give the property to another man. Cosin, Apologie, I, 22-4. 
28 Cosin, Apologie, I, 25-6. 
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of kin, should administer the goods of the deceased man. 29 And if a man instructed the 
executor of his last will that a grammar school be built and the executor did not not perform 
this, the suit would be actionable in a spiritual court. 30 Concerning money promised in 
marriage: if in return for marrying a man's daughter, the man agreed (0 pay the husband ten 
pounds (an informal agreement without a deed), that money would be recoverable in the 
king's court, but if the money was promised along with the daughter in marriage (with deed), 
it would be demandable in an ecclesiastical court. 31 If the father- or mother-in-law who 
promised the money to the husband as part of the marriage contract died, the husband could 
sue the execu(Ors for the money in an ecclesiastical court. 32 
Cosin's rehearsal of proofs that testamentary and matrimonial nutters belonged (0 
ecclesiastical cognisance were unnecessary as no one denied the fact,33 yet it was symp(Omaric 
of his methodical, orderly approach (0 ecclesiastical jurisdiction. What was in debate, on the 
other hand, was the rightful jurisdiction of certain matters not related (0 testaments or 
matrimony. In chapters four through ten Cosin attempted (0 prove, by the laws and statures 
of the realm, 'that sundrie other causes besides Testamentarie or Matrimonial are of 
Ecclesiastical con usance. , 34 
Reviewing a stature from the time of Edward I (24 Edward I c. 1, De consultatione) 
Cosin noted that in cases when an ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction was erroneously challenged 
by a temporal judge, the lord chancellor or chief justice (0 the king was (0 instruct the 
ecclesiastical judge under whom the case was originated (0 proceed, notwithstanding any 
prohibition,35 unless the case could be redressed by a writ out of the Chancery,36 Therefore 'if 
29 Cosin noted that this law was brought in by statute, 31 Edward III, c. 11. Cosin, ApoLoKie, 1, 24. 
30 Cosin, ApoLoKie. I, 23-4. 
31 Cosin, ApoLoKie. I, 26-7. 
32 Cosin, ApoloKie. I, 27-8. 
33 Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over wills and testaments was completely uncontested by common law courts in England, though 
this was not necessarily the case in the rest of Europe where they were often mixed in jurisdiction. In England only matters 
of debt arising from wills or testaments were claimed by the secular courts. Brundage, Medier/aL canon Law, 89; see also 70-
97 for a good discussion of testamentary and matrimonial legal issues in canon law. 
34 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 28. 
35 Prohibitions were orders sent from Chancery (usually on behalf of common law courts) to ecclesiastical or other courts 
ordering them to cease their examination of a case that rightfully belonged to the temporal jurisdiction. For a full 
discussion of prohibitions, see below, 100-2. 
36 For examples of writs issued by Chancery, see Jones, Chancery, 378, 383, 392, 397, 398. Chancery also issued what was 
called a 'common injunction'. This was simlar to a prohibition in that it contained a command to surcease hut the 
common injunction, rather than being directed at a court was directed to litigants or their attorney. Jones, Chancery, 462-
3,471. 
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no Writ lie thereupon in Chancerie, they [the ecclesiastical judges] may still holde plea, and 
take conusance.' 37 Moreover, another statute adduced by Cosin, 15 Edward III c 6, stated 
that ministers of the church might not be impeached, arrested, or forced to make answer 
before the king's JPs for money taken for redemption of corporal penance, for proof or 
account of testaments, for the solemnity of marriage, or for any other things regarding the 
jurisdiction of the church, and that they might have writs from the Chancery if they so 
demand. 38 In addition, 18 Edward III c 6 (Pro clero) declared that ministers of the church 
should not be investigated by commissions concerning the justness of their processes in 
matters that notoriously belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The statute 1 Richard II c. 3 
decreed that the pursuit of tithes was a matter for spiritual cognisance. In 1533 the Act of 
Appeals had reaffirmed the medieval injunction that the two jurisdictions, temporal and 
spiritual, were expected to aid each other. 39 Cosin contended that the central purpose of the 
temporal law was to protect property, lands, and goods and to preserve the people in unity 
and peace. The church's duty was to have jurisdiction in matters of divorces, right of tithes, 
oblations, and obventions (besides testamentary and matrimonial marrers), because: 'the 
knowledge of these causes by the goodnesse of the Princes of this Realme, and by the Lawes 
and customes of the same, appertaineth to the spiritual jurisdiction of this Realme .'40 In 1534 
the act confirming the Submission of the Clergy (25 Henry VIII c. 19) proved this, by 
restraining all appeals outside of England in any appealable cases belonging to ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction.41 The statute 1 Edward VI c 2 established that collations, presentations, 
institutions, inductions, letters of order, dismissories, as well as matters of testament, 
administration, or account upon them were determinable in ecclesiastical courts. And finally, 
in the reign of Elizabeth the statute De excommunicato capiendo (5 Elizabeth c. 23) declared 
the crimes of heresy, refusal to have a child baptised, receive communion, absence from divine 
37 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 28-9. 
38 Cosin, Apologie, I, 29. 
39 The heresy acts of 1382 (5 Richard II st. 2 c. 5), 1401 (2 Henry IV c. 15), and 1414 (2 Henry V st. 1 c. 7) established this 
cooperation. More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, li-liii; see also SR, II, 25-6, 125-8, 182-4. 
40 24 Henry VIII c. 12. Cos in' s quotation is from the act itself. Cosin, Apologie , I, 29-30. 
41 Cosin, ApoloY.ie, 1, 30. 
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services, error in religion, incontinence, usury, simony, perjury 111 an ecclesiastical court, and 
idolatry to belong to spiritual jurisdiction. 42 
Ecclesiastical courts also had jurisdiction over spoliations of benefices, pursuit of tithes, 
oblations, obventions, mortuaries, pensions, portions, corrodies, procurations, indemnities, and 
voidance of benefices (in some cases).43 The right of patronage of a benefice, however, 
belonged to temporal jurisdiction. Though the rights of tithes were held by eosin to belong to 
ecclesiastical cognisance both by statutes and precedents, he conceded there were a few cases 
pertaining to tithes where the king's prohibition was upheld. 44 The issue of parish boundaries 
was somewhat in dispute by judges, but eosin maintained that the matter belonged to 
ecclesiastical courts. 45 Pensions, both by statute and common law were determinable by 
ecclesiastical courts, likewise for mortuaries, oblations, and maintenance of places of burial and 
churchyards, since the land belonged to the church. Trespass on a parson's property, though, 
was considered actionable at the common law, because his property was accounted a 'francke 
tenement' rather than consecrated to God. 46 The right to have curates was defensible by 
ecclesiastical courts, and if a church were denied its right to have a curate read divine service, 
the matter would be actionable in a spiritual court. Reparations of a church (or contributions 
towards the same) by parisioners was another matter cited by eosin for ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. Similarly, if a man withheld goods belonging to a church and he instructed his 
executor to dispense (he goods accordingly, the church-wardens might sue the executor for 
the goods in an ecclesiastical court. Finally, if a church had defects in it, 'money it selfe may 
lawfully be sued for, in a court ecclesiastical' in order to fix the defect. 47 
Up to this point many of the matters claimed by eosin to belong to ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction strike a definite contrast with the jurisdictional claims of St. German in Doctor 
42 Cosin, Apofogie. 1, 30-l. 
43 Cosin explained that the common law (specifically St. German's Constitutions, chapter 9) mentioned five causes of 
voidance: death, resignation, deprivation, creation, or cession. The common law had jurisdiction only if the voidance 
occurred in the case of death, the other four all being determinable by the ecclesiastical law. Cosin, Apologie, I, 31-3. 
44 There is a very long discussion (36-9) of tithes and a distinction made between tithable and non-tithable items such as coal-
pits, hay in pastures, corn lying fallow for a year, etc. One case mentioned by Cosin in which the king's prohibition would 
be upheld would be for tithes of great trees over twenty years old. 
45 An example of such a matter was when two parsons were in dispute over which parish owned some sheaves of corn. Because 
the root of the matter was tithes, Cosin asserted that the spiritual courts should have jurisdiction. Cosin, Apologie, I, 39-
40; see also Helmholz, Romal1 CilnOI1 law, 91-100 for the issue of tithes; and 155-6, 177-9 for disputes over jurisdiction. 
46 Cosin, Apologie, I, 43-4. 
47 Cosin, Apolof!.ie, l, 44-5. 
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and student and the New additions. St. German asserted that all issues involving property 
belonged to the jurisdiction of temporal courts; spiritual courts could only claim authority 
over matters relating directly to faith. Thus St. German would have challenged Cosin's 
asseverations regarding disupted parish boundaries, goods or chattels promised to a woman as 
part of a marriage contract, reparations or maintenance of church property, wardships and 
chattels real that were bequeathed by will, and other property-related issues, even if the 
matters themselves were generally contained with context of testaments, matrimony, or some 
other heading that was handled by ecclesiastical courts. 48 
Thus far Cosin had dealt mainly with matters of a non-criminal nature, but III chapter 
eight he turned to issues of offence in order to examille which of these matters were 
determinable by ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Ordinaries, he asserted, were empowered not only 
(0 enquire 'of the foundation, erection, and gouernance' of all hospitals except those founded 
by the king, but also (0 'make thereof correction and reformation after the lawes of holy 
Church, as to them belongeth.'49 In fact, 'causes of correction' were reckoned to be 
ecclesiastical by statute. 50 Furthermore, ecclesiastical courts enjoyed the prerogative of 
jurisdiction in causes ad correctionem animae where the sin in question was not punishable in a 
temporal court)l 
In more serious cases, however, when the S1I1S were offences against God, one's 
neighbour, or one's self, and where punishment (either corporal or pecuniary) was due, there 
were many matters over which ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction. Regarding sins of 
impietas; heresy, idolatry, and error in religion were enquirable and punishable by ecclesiastical 
authority as was laid out in De excommunicato capiendo,52 Despite the claims of some of the 
48 St. German, Doctor and student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, 19,33,35. 
49 Cosin, Apolor/e, 1,46. 
50 This statute was admittedly repealed, but only (according to Cosin) because cenain names were not to be used anymore on 
the ordinaries' seals in citations and processes. Cosin, Apologie, l, 46. 
51 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 46-7. 
52 This act of 1563 complained that the writ de exc{)I)J7IluniCtl/o capiendo, which was issued was not being duly executed, 
which only encouraged criminous persons to continue in their ways 'to the greate Contempte of the Ecclesiastical! Lawes 
of this Real me' . The statute warned that sheriffs would be fined if the writ was not returned ro the King's Bench in the 
term following its issue from Chancery. The ten offences for which the writ might be issued were listed in article vn as 1) 
heresy, 2) refusal to have a child baptised, 3) refusal to receive holy communion, 4) refusal to attend divine service, 5) error 
in matters of religion, 6) incontinence, 7) usury, 8) simony, 9) perjury in an ecclesiastical court, 10) idolatry. SR, N, part 
1, 451. 
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pumans w the contrary, eosin maintained this had always been the case. 53 Furthermore, 
perjury (in spiritual matters) and breach of oath had always belonged to ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, even though temporal courts had occasionally tal<en coglllsance in such cases. 54 
Blasphemy, while being mixti fori (enquirable and punishable at both the temporal and 
spiritual law) on the continent, was not punishable by the temporal law in England, but only 
by ecclesiastical law. The same was true of apostasy, which was the highest form of heresy. 55 
Furthermore, violating or profaning the sabbath, bod1 by custom and by the statute 
Circumspecte agatis were punishable by d1e spiritual power. 56 Disturbance of divine servICe 
was also punishable by ecclesiastical jurisdiction as eosin showed from statutes. 57 
eosin contended that ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction as well over cranes and 
offences in the category of facinus, or sms against one's neighbour. Simony, usury, 58 
defamation, 59 and slander were all of ecclesiastical cognisance, as were beating of clerks, 60 
sacrilege, brawling or fighting on church property, 61 diiapidations or waste of ecclesiastical 
53 De eXClJmmunicato cllpiendo was not the first statute to declare heresy, etc. to be of ecclesiastical cognisance, said Cosin. 
The medieval heresy statutes of 1382 and 140 I as well as the Heresy Reform Act of 1534, laid the foundation upon which 
the Elizabethan statute had been built. Cosin, Apologie , I, 47. 
54 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 47-9. See also Michael D. Gordon, 'The invention of a common law crime: perjuty and the Elizabethan 
COUrts', American journal of Legal History, 24 (J 980) 149-51. 
55 See also Sf. German, Doctor and student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, 242-3. 
56 13 Edward III; Cosin, Apologie, 1, 64. Among the puritans and others there was some doubt that Circumspecte agatis was 
truly a statute. Sf. Gern13.n argued against its validity in chapter 8 of the Constitutions, but according to Statutes oj'the 
retJLIIl it does seem to be valid, although there is disagreement as to whether it is one statute or two separate ones. In 
Stlltules of the realm it is printed as one, united text (this view is supported by BL, Harley MS 667, but other sources BL, 
Harley MS 395, for example, list the first 23 lines of the Law French original as one statute and the last part as a separate 
statute of an uncertain date. Tottel's 1556 publication of Magna Carta (STC2 9277.5) suggests that the second part of this 
statute belongs with the statute 9 Edward II c. 12 (Articuli det·i). Thus the statute seems to be plagued by historical 
confusion regarding both its validity and contents. SR, l, 101 and notes. 
57 1 Philip & Maty c. 3 and 1 Elizabeth c. 2 (Act of Uniformity). Cosin, Apologic, 1,52. 
58 Simony was addressed by De excomlilunicato capiendo and usury by 'diuers Parliaments' but especially 15 Edward c. 5, 
11 Henty VII c. 8, and De excolilmuniClllo capiendo. There was an exception with regard ro contracts, however. An 
ecclesiastical court was authorised to determine whether a contract was usurious, but only a temporal court could declare 
such a contract void. Cosin, Apologie. I, 53-4. 
59 Defamation was of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, both in the determining and punishing of it, by 13 Edward III (Circlllllspecle 
aglltis), 9 Edward II c. 4 (Articuli clen), and the preamble to 12 Henty VIII c. 9 (Statute of Citations). Cosin noted one 
general exception to the rule of ecclesiastical cognisance for defamation. If the defamation 'ariseth vpon a Temporall 
matter, [it] is not of ecclesiasticall conisance.' For example, if a man sued another at the common law for trespass and 
spoke ill of him in public, and then the defendant sued the first man in a spiritual court for defamation, a prohibition 
should be served, since the original matter (trespass) was of temporal jurisdiction. Cosin, ApoLogie, I, 55. 
60 For laying violent hands on a clerk, a man waS always punishable by ecclesiastical jurisdiction according to Circumspecte 
agatis. Cosin, Apologie, I, 58. The matter of beating clerks was not professed by Cosin in all cases to be of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. If a clerk was arrested at the common law, he could not sue for laying on of violent hands at the ecclesiastical 
law. Also, if the offender was excommunicated by an ecclesiastical court for beating the clerk, the clerk must recover 
damages for the battety in a common law court. On the other hand, if the clerk was suing only for punishment of the 
offender and not for damages, the suit was of ecclesiastical cognisance. Cos in, Apologie, 1,59. 
61 These offences were punishable by ecclesiastical courts whether the brawlers were lay or clerical. The punishments might 
differ, though, as a layman would be suspended Ilb ingressu ecclesiae while a clerk would be suspended ftom ministering 
his office. It was also possible, said Cos in, that either type could be excommunicated. Cosin, Apolo:;;ie, l, 60. 
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livings. 62 Moreover, offences of jlagellitum, or sins against one's own self belonged to the 
jurisdiction of the spiritual courts. The disputed statute CirClimspecte agatis proclaimed that 
the clergy had jurisdiction in matters of 'penance enioyned for deadlie sinne, as fornication, 
adulterie, and such like' which Cosin suggested might be incest, stuprum, or polygamy. To 
this list he added the suggestions of Lyndwood: star-gazers, fantastical persons, wizards, 
fortune-tellers, drunkards, and idolaters. Cosin considered all of these to fall under the general 
tide of 'incontinencie'. 63 Not every mortal sin, however, was of ecclesiastical cognisance, 
Lyndwood had noted, yet the sins listed in Circumspecte agatis and other such statutes were 
understood not to belong to the temporal courts but to (he ecclesiasticaL 64 
So far Cosin's Apologie had been distinctly pedestrian. His long inventory of matters 
falling within ecclesiastical jurisdiction was tedious to the reader and, as Morice and Beale 
conceived the issue, irrelevant to the controversy. Both Morice and Beale vented their 
frustration at parts I and II of the Apologie in manuscript comments. In reporting that many 
of the clergy attending Convocation in 1593 were seen carrying the first two parts of Cosin's 
Apologie with them, Morice remarked, 'But lokinge thereunto, they founde a wearisome labor 
by a confused sort of cases drawne out of the Register & Mr Fitzherbertes Booke of Natura 
Brevium, not answeringe the matters they expected'. Beale likewise complained, 'manye 
Leaues are friuoloslye spent, to proue thinges that apperteyne nothinge to the matter'. 65 
Morice and Beale may not have been interested in the Apologie up to this point, but 
neither did they contest Cosin's asseverations regarding the extent of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
At this stage in part I Cosin turned towards more controversial aspects of that jurisdiction. In 
chapters eleven, twelve, fourteen, and sixteen, he digressed from the stated intention of part I 
and addressed the manner of proceeding in ecclesiastical courts with special attention to the 
issues of citation, the punishment of excommunicates, and whether tl1e queen could empower 
62 Both 13 Elizabeth c. 10 and St. German's Treatise col7cernil7g the power of the clergJe (STC 2 21588) showed tbis. Cosin, 
A po logie, 1, 60-I. 
63 The statute De excoJJlIllUnicalo capiendo used this generalisation. Cosin also mentioned that St. German, in his Answer 10 
a letter (STC2 21588.5), had affirmed that the clergy had jurisdiction over these things (fornication, 'auoutrie', simony, 
usury, matrimony, tithes, oblations, perjury, etc.), but only because of the 'custome and sufference of princes.' Cosin, 
Apologie, 1, 61-2. 
64 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 64. There were other church-related matters belonging to ecclesiastical jurisdiction that did not fall 
under any of the categories mentioned above, such as fees for curates and clerks and citing men out of their diocese, 
affirmed by 23 Henry VIII c. 9. Cosin, Apologie, 1, 66-7. 
65 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, 133; Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, fo. 8f. 
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ecclesiastical courts to use processes other than citation or punishments other than 
excommunication. 
Whether men might be cited to appear in ecclesiastical courts formed the basis of 
chapters eleven and twelve. 66 One of the grievances of the puritans mentioned by Cosin in his 
preface to part I was that ecclesiastical courts were not empowered to cite anyone ex officio 
and put dlem to an oath except in testamentary or matrimonial matters. Following rnis line of 
reasoning, Cosin submitted that if no one might be cited but in rnose two cases, no witnesses 
could be had but in those cases either. And 'if witnesses might not be vrged to testifie vpon 
orne, in any causes but Testamentarie or Matrimoniall; then could no Plea be holden in any 
orner cause, when the chiefest and most vsuall meanes of proofe in recent facts, be taken 
away.'67 In the previous chapters Cosin had shown how ecclesiastical courts had power to hold 
plea in many cases besides those two. Could it be possible that spiritual courts should have 
power to enquire of and punish those things and yet not have dle means to hold plea 
concerning them? What use then was there in having jurisdiction over certain misdemeanours 
or crimes?68 If men could not be ordered by ordinaries to appear and testifY upon oath, the 
only witnesses who could be procured would be those who volunteered! No man would offer 
himself to be a witness unless he were either an enemy to born parties or else a friend to one 
and an enemy or stranger to the other, and neither of these two would make indifferent or 
impartial witnesses. 69 
Cosin's opponents maintained dut witnesses might be cited and deposed on oath in 
comparatively insignificant causes such as legacies and wills of goods or marriage contracts 
while prohibiting citation in the weightier matters of heresy or idolatry, but Cosin challenged 
them to produce any such legal maxim from statutes or case books. 7o Widl few exceptions, 
66 Although the title of chapter ten included the words 'proofes that any subicct laie or other, may be cited in any cause 
ecclesiastical!', Cosin did not in fact begin his discussion of citation until the start of chapter eleven. Cosin, Apologie, 1, 62. 
67 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 70. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 71. 
70 'If the law had bin so, could no man hit of it from the Conquest vntill our fathers time, when Fitzherbert writ his noua 
natura breuium? was none of skil in Edw. the 1. time, to put it into the statute of Circum.,pecte agatis: or in Ed. the 2. 
times, to mention it in the statute of Articuli CIeri?' Cosin wished that the ecclesiastical law were allowed the same means 
as the temporal law, as the puritans always claimed to favour. If at the common law subpoenas were served to force 
witnesses to testify, why could not ecclesiastical courts use the same system? Cosin, Apologie, L 72-4. 
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stated Cosin, both the canon and civil law had affirmed it legal to urge witnesses to give 
testimony in any and all cases whether they were civilly or criminally moved. 71 Cosin pointed 
to 9 Edward II c. 12 (Articuli cleri) which asserted that the king's tenants might be cited by 
their ordinary, yet it did not specify whether they were to be cited as a party or as a witness, so 
it could be either. That statute also declared that tenants were liable to be excommunicated 
for manifest contumacy, such as refusing to be sworn or examined. Other statutes showed that 
ordinaries were empowered to cite men for failure to pay tithes, to commit them for 
contumacy, and to call witnesses for the purpose of deposition.72 Lastly, oaths had been 
administered both to parties and witnesses by ordinaries according to the Statute of 
Uniformity (1 Elizabeth c. 2).73 
The source of the disagreement over whether ecclesiastical courts were empowered to 
cite men in cases other than those related to testaments and matrimony was a controversial 
writ of prohibition and attachment mentioned in William RasteU's Abridgement.74 A certain 
writ of dubious originality appearing in the Abridgement seemed to indicate that laymen were 
nor allowed to be cited and forced to take oaths or depose under oath as witnesses except in 
testamentary and matrimonial matters. The phrase contra consuetudinem regni nostri was 
found in the writ and supposed by the puritans to refer to ecclesiastical courts' procedure of 
compelling men to take oaths and testify. Cosin vigorously denied the validity of the writ 
with three main arguments. First, the writ could not be law since it did not appear in any 
parliamentary rolls or printed books of statutes, nor were there any ancient copies of the writ. 
Second, a comment in the margin of Cosin's copy of the writ seemed to indicate that the writ 
was 'newly deuised to meete with a new mischiefe.' Third, if the writ were a valid law, it ran 
against the grain of long-accepted customs of English ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 75 Therefore, 
71 Privileged people, such as old men over seventy, were exempt from this rule according to the civil law, though the canon 
law waived this restriction 'in want and defect of other proofes; that the trueth may be found our.' A later canon declared 
that clerks could not be compelled to testify in 'causes of blood'. Cosin, ApoLoKie, I, 74-5. 
72 Those statutes were 27 Henry VIII c. 8, 32 Henry VIII c. 7, and 2&3 Edward VI c. 13. Cosin, ApoLoKie, 1, 76. Again, 
since none of these issues related to articles of faith or things. necessary for salvation, Cosin's expansive view of 
ecclesuastical would have been entirely at odds wirh St. German's. Sf. German, Doctor and student, ed. Plucknett and 
Barron, 243, 253, 309; Guy, St. German, 20-1. 
73 Cosin, ApoLoKie, I,77. 
74 STC2 20730 (1566) or STC2 20731 (574). 
75 Cosin confessed that Fitzherbert was in agreement with the puritans in believing the writ to be valid, yet Cosin nevertheless 
maintained that the writ had been misunderstood by both Fitzherberr and those against whom Cosin wrote. Cosin, 
Ap%Kie, 1, 80-1. 
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the writ ought to have been unders[Ood either as a pnvate suggestlon or as having been 
misconstrued entirely our its original context.76 
Cosin's thorough attempt to establish the church's authority to CIte men 111to 
ecclesiastical courts and to compel them to take oaths in matter:; others than testaments and 
matrimony was fundamental [0 his overall strategy. It was not simply enough [0 assert the 
high commission's prerogative to regulate and order the church according to its discretion, or 
for the queen to delegate the day-to-day governance of the church to her clergy. These were 
issues already deeply controversial with the puritans, and Cosin was best served by preceding 
his most debatable arguments with a building-block approach to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
laying foundations that would buttress later claims that were bound to require strong 
justification. 
Another P0111t of controversy between Cosin and his adversaries was the issue of 
punishment of excommunicates. Cosin's aim in chapter sixteen was to disprove the puritans' 
claim that a writ de excommunicato capiendo was necessary for the punishment of men 
remaining excommunicate over forty days and that the same writ could only be issued for 
crimes corresponding to the ten offences listed in the statme De excommunicato capiendo.77 
Cosin noted the first opinion was easily refmed, since a man might be fined £20 per month 
for absence from church, despite his excommunicate status.78 Besides, being excommunicate 
was considered a 'great contempt' and therefore fell under the jurisdiction of the high 
commission 'vpon the expresse wordes vsed in that Act which doeth establish that 
Commission.'79 This was entirely justified, said Cosin, since many bailifs and under-sheriffs 
were slack in their dmies and needed reinforcement, and in many dioceses their yearly 
budgets were not enough to bring all offenders to justice by means of the writ de 
excommunicato capiendo. Again the hands of ecclesiastical authority were tied by the 
76 Cosin, Apologie, I, 88-94. 
77 For a list of these ten crimes, see above, note 52 of this chapter. 
78 Cosin, Apologie, I, 116. Morice laughed at this reasoning, saying that the £20 penalty for missing church was not levied 
because the person was excommunicate, but because he was absent from church. LPL, MS 234, fo. 168v. 
79 Cosin, Apologie, I, 116-7. This statement by Cosin was an example of the Elizabethan misunderstanding of the 
foundations of the high commission. See also Usher, Rise and fall, cd. Tyler, xxi-xxiii, 34-7. 
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puritans: 'A decree or iudgement is of no effect, where execution of such sentence can not be 
had.'80 
Regarding the punishment of crimes not listed in that statute, Cosin asked how the high 
commissioners could be expected to function if they could not sustain a writ because cerrain 
'great contempts' that needed to be punished were not listed in the statute De 
excommunicato capiendo? Although that statute was general in its beginning, argued Cosin, it 
neverrheless stated [hat if someone was originally punished and excommunicated for one of 
[hose ten crimes, then their writ de excommunicato capiendo might only be issued to punish 
those ten crimes. If, however, a man had been excommunicated because of an offence not 
listed in that statute, this could not could not be understood to take away execution of the 
writ in all cases except in those ten crimes. 81 
The establishment of Cosin's views concerning the writ de excommunicato capiendo and 
the jurisdiction of the high commission over the terms of that writ begs [he question of the 
authority of the queen's letters patent empowering the commission. Cosin's opponents had 
insisted that the queen was not empowered to authorise by her letters patent the use of any 
ecclesiastical process other than by citation,82 or to authorise punishments other than 
excommunication, such as fines or imprisonment. This opinion, based on the Elizabethan Act 
of Supremacy, was supposed by [he puritans to be a restraining force on the prerogative of the 
queen, 'else might she also giue them authoritie to hang men.' Cosin angrily retorred, 'What? 
is there no more difference with these men, betwixt attaching, fining or imprisoning, and 
plaine hanging? What will they then say of the Starre Chamber, which may impose all those 
three, and yet cannot put any man to lose of limme or of life?' 83 But Cosin had dodged the 
issue, perhaps deliberately. Star Chamber had never been authorised to impose capital 
punishment on defendants, nor could any defence of such a prerogative be constructed. The 
80 Cosin, Apolo:;;ie, l, 117. 
81 Cosin added that the clause' Sauin:;; and reseruin:;; to all persol15 hauin:;; authoritie to certifie excommunicate persons' put 
the matter beyond all doubt that the writ might still be issued even for crimes not appearing in the statute. Cosin, 
Apolo:;;ie, I, 119. 
82 Citations were ordinarily accomplished by one of twO methods: by letters missive, which were a judicial command, 
summoning a suspect to trial; or by attachment if the suspect was fleeing. See also below, 126. 
83 Cosin, Apolo:;;ie, 1, 106-7. Cosin did not cite the puritan author of the quotation 'else might she also giue them authority 
to hang men'. 
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queen's prerogative over the church, on the other hand, was so loosely defined in the Act of 
Supremacy that the puritans feared the imperial words of the statute might be taken to an 
extreme if political necessity dictated it. This worry still occupied the minds of puritans in the 
reign of Charles I, as the testimony of an anonymous tract on the power of the high 
commission written around 1628 reveals. The essayist first posed the argument of the bishops, 
that the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy authorised the commissioners ro execute all the 
premises according to the tenor and effect of the letters patent, any matter or cause to the 
contrary notwithstanding, and therefore the commission was within its rights to fine and 
imprison by virtue of the letters patent which were grounded on that statute. In the following 
paragraph the writer opposed this interpretation of the act, 'for then the kinge by vertue of this 
Statute might make all ecclesiasticall offences by his letters patentes capitaH'.84 The question 
was as valid and as disturbing in 1628 as it was in 1593. 
While the question of whether the queen could designate certain offences as capital in 
her letters patent was never discussed by Elizabethan judges, Sir James Dyer, chief justice of 
the Common Pleas from 1557-82, concurred with the other judges of the Common Pleas that 
ecclesiastical judges were well within their rights to impose fines, since not only did the Act of 
Supremacy annex all ecclesiastical authority to the queen to delegate as she wished, but the 
fining of recusants was previously well established under ecclesiastical law. 85 The issue of the 
commission's power to imprison, on the other hand, was apparently not a settled issue. 
Professor Baker describes imprisonment by extrajudicial authority as 'the main controversy 
relating to the liberty of the subject' in Elizabethan England, despite the fact that it was a 
common occurrence. 86 There were many instances of common law courtS challenging the high 
commission's prerogative (0 imprison, the first of these occurring in 1565. It involved a 
prisoner of the commission who was delivered from prison by the Queen's Bench by a writ of 
habeas corpus but ~ho was rearrested shortly thereafter, the commission declaring that it had 
the right of discretionary imprisonment withour bail. The result of this test was, ironically, 
84 Inner Temple, Pet}" MS 518, fo. 70r. The entire sentence is underlined in the original. 
85 Dyer, Reports, ed. Baker, Ixxiv. 
86 Dyer, Reports, ed. Baker, Ixxvi and footnote 36. 
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inconclusive. Dyer noted that the issue was debated but no solution was declared. 87 The whole 
question of the high commission's discretionary powers of discipline was technically moot, 
since the words of the letters patent of 1559 and those in later times were undeniably broad, 
and even the narrowest interpretation of them still gave the commission extensive power. 
There was no qualifYing language that restrained the commission's authority to correct 
'misbehaviours', and more importantly, the letters patent contained powerful non obstante 
clauses sweeping away all other laws, statutes, proclamations, privileges, etc. to give the 
commissioners wide discretion in matters of ecclesiastical cognisance. 88 
Cosin held that the puritans' arguments which abridged tl1e queen's authority were not 
well grounded in law and concerned 'her Maiesties prerogatiue roiall, and supreme 
gouernment (that was yeelded vnto her highnesse by statute) very deeplie; whosoeuer be 
Author of them.' 89 The authors (or at least the maintainers) of that opinion were Beale and 
Morice, who had grounded their opinions not only on the Act of Supremacy but on the words 
of chapter 39 of Magna Carta: 'No free man shall be apprehended, imprisoned, distrained or 
impeached but by the law of the land ... ' Cosin held that this reading of Magna Carta was 
mistaken . 
... the end why this law was made, and the time when it was made, are needful! to be 
considered. The ende was this, that the Kings of this realme should not chalenge an infinite and 
an absolute power to themselues, (as some kings elsewhere did, & yet do) without iudgement 
& lawful proceeding, to take away any mans libertie, life, countrey, goods or lands.90 
And it was at such time when the kings themselues thought, that Iurisdiction 
ecclesiasticall, was not (in right) no more then it was in fact at that time belonging to the 
crowne: therefore in that it is here sayd, Wee will not passe llpon him, nor condemne him, but 
by lawful! iudgement ofhis peeres, or b.y the lawe of the land; it is manifest, that the wordes 
haue no relation to Iurisdiction ecclesiasticall: for that which was done by that iurisdiction 
87 In 1568 the Common Pleas also freed a man imprisoned by the high commission for refusing the ex officio oath. The man 
was an attorney, however, and was thus technically delivered by privilege, so the question of whether the commission 
could imprison anyone without bail was still not resolved. Dyer, Reports, ed. Baker, Ixxix. 
88 Usher, Rise tlndftlll, ed. Tyler, 93-5. The issue of the queen's prerogative to empower the high commission is discussed and 
resolved below, 216-27. 
89 Cosin, Apolof!.ie, I, 102. 
90 Ironically, this statement by Cosin begs the question of why he would disapprove of kings who 'chalenge an infinite and an 
absolute power to themselues' in secular matters and yet approve of the same prerogatives for the governance of the 
church. 
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[ecclesiastical], was not (at that time) taken to be done by the King or by his authoritie: and the 
lawes that ecclesiastical! Iudges practised; were not then holden to be the lawes of the land, or 
the Kings lawes ... 91 
Cosin did not believe chapter 39 of Magna Carta addressed spiritual jurisdiction at all since at 
that rime (1215) ecclesiastical law was handled completely separately from the king's power, 
as it was (thought to be) under Roman jurisdiction. Instead, he insisted Magna Carta had been 
written to curb only the lay powers of the king. To Morice and Beale, the resort to processes 
other than citation or to punishments other than excommunication were direct violations of 
Magna Carta.92 By contrast Cosin did not see Elizabeth's use of the high commission as an 
instrument oflay power bur one of ecclesiastical power, which was lett untouched by Magna 
Carta. The relative merits of Cosin's and Morice's interpretations of Magna Carta will be 
further debated in chapter seven. 
As for the ecclesiastical laws which the puritans, especially Morice, so vehemently spoke 
against as being 'foreign', Cosin recited the main part of the preamble to the Act of 
Dispensations (25 Henry VIII c. 21) to show that Parliament might dispense with the 
'humane' laws of the realm. Cosin explained that (he humane laws spoken of in the preamble 
were 'those Canon lawes; which by such sufferance, vse, and custome are (now) as the 
accustomed and ancient lawes of this Realme, originally established as lawes of the same: 
howbeit by the meanes aforesaid, bur induced into the Realme, and not here at first made nor 
ordeined.'93 This was Cosin's first major historical distortion. Although canon law in England 
had never been reformed,94 the act confirming the Submission of the Clergy made it clear 
that a large portion of the canon law was repugnant to the laws of the realm, incorrigibly papal 
in nature, or otherwise incompatible with the royal supremacy.95 Bur Cosin argued further 
91 Cosin, Apolof(ie, I, 102-3. . 
92 Morice's high regard for Magna Carta as an important document in the history of individualliberry seems not to have been 
formed as a result of the political exigencies of the 1590s. He expressed almost identical sentiments in 1579: Magna Carta 
contained 'veary excellent Lawes towchinge the Liberties of the subiectes and the righteous Government of the Kynge.' 
BL, Additional MS 36081, fo. 2451'. 
93 Cosin, Apolof(ie, I, 103. The italics are Cosin's quotation from the preamble to the Act of Dispensations. 
94 See the above discussion on the failure of the Reformatio ICf(um ecclesiasticarum, 7-8. 
95 See Logan, 'The Henrician canons', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 47 (1974) 99-103; Guy, 'The Henrician 
Age', Varieties, ed. Pocock, 29; Guy, Tudor Enf(land, 135; Fox and Guy, Reassessinf(, 128-9; Elton, Constitution, 218. 
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that the preamble to the statute De excommunicato capiendo referred to these laws as the 
'ecclesiastical laws of the realm', and rhus they could not be the strange and foreign laws to 
which Morice referred, but were thoroughly legitimate and not contrary to the queen's 
prerogative or to the laws, statutes, or customs of the land. 96 
Turning his attention to the authority invested in the high commlSSlOn (which he 
remarked his adversaries seemed intent on whittling down to nothing), eosin examined the 
Elizabethan Act of Supremacy. By this act, he noted, the queen empowered the high 
commission by her letters patent, be they general or specific directives for attachment, fines, or 
imprisonment. 97 By contrast, the puritans held that the high commission ought to be 
circumscribed by the same procedures and prerogatives as the ordinary ecclesiastical courts. 
eosin's point was that high commission was not ordinary; it was extraordinary, and thus was 
invested with a greater degree of power than ordinary church couns.98 This distinction 
implied that the commission was not empowered by the queen's 'ordinary' prerogative bur by 
her 'absolute' prerogative. English law differentiated between these two types of royal 
prerogative to delineate the sovereign's regular authority to pardon individuals, mitigate the 
terms of statutes, or exercise other preeminences that were mainly feudal in origin (ordinary) 
from emergency powers such as billeting troops on houseowners, taxing subjects without the 
approval of Parliament, and temporarily suspending the ordinary course of law which could be 
exercised in dire circumstances (extraordinary).99 eosin's assertion that the high commission 
possessed extraordinary jurisdiction from the queen suggested that Elizabeth had exercised 
something resembling emergency powers in authorising it. 
96 Cosin, Ap%gie, 1, 1 03. 
97 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 107-8. 
98 Cosin, Ap%gie, I, 108-9. Though true in the 1590s, times had changed by the second decade of the seventeenth century, 
and the high commission slowly evolved into a court of equity, handling an ever-increasing number of cases between 
parties. By 1611 Chief Justice Coke was arguing with Archbishop Abbot that the commission, being an extraordinary 
court, could only claim jurisdiction over 'enormious' crimes; otherwise it would intrude on the regular business that rightly 
belonged to ordinaries' courts. What small evidence is left: to us of the high commission's work load in the later Jacobean 
and Caroline years shows that it was a popular court with suitors - only about 5% of its cases were initiated ex officio, 
the rest being promoted by a private party. The vast number of petitions it received to handle cases for the relief of 
hardship and the records showing a hundred cases decided in a single day make the claims of the Long Parliament in 
1640 that the court had never been legal seem unconvincing. Usher, Rise andfn1l, ed. Tyler, 215-6, 323-4; Cambridge, 
Ely MS F.5.45. 
99 Glenn Burgess, The politics of the ancient constitution (London, 1992) 139-43; John Guy, 'The "imperial crown" and the 
liberty of the subject', Court, country, and culture: essays on early modern British History in honor of Perez Zagorin 
(Rochester, N.Y.; 1992) 65-7. 
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Morice had reasoned III the Treatise that the Act of Supremacy had only united 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the crown, that is, brought ecclesiastical jurisdiction under the 
queen's final authority, and that no jurisdiction would or could have been annexed to the 
crown by that act which was 'repugnant or offensiue to the Common or Guill Policie of this 
Kingdome.' 100 Cosin's answer was typically exacting but elusive: although it was only 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction that was united to the crown, 'yet the maner of conuenting or 
punishing [exercised by ecclesiastical courts} is not in that Acte so restrained, but that such 
other courses may be vsed, as to her Maiesties wised orne shall seeme most fiue.' 101 In essence, 
Cosin was saying that even though the Act of Supremacy only restored ordinary ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction to the crown and that by ordinary ecclesiastical jurisdiction courts could not 
imprison,102 the queen was empowered by that act to supersede ordinary ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction (via letters patent) and authorise whatever processes or punishments she desired. 
Cosin pressed his interpretation of the Act of Supremacy on the basis of its vagueness. Because 
it did not list precise powers for the commission but only 'visiting, reforming, redressing, 
ordering' etc., the queen was quite within her rights to direct the commission more specifically 
through letters patent. 103 
While Beale seemed wholly to dismiss the high commISSIOn as illegal from the start, 
Morice accepted its legality but disputed its precise authority, dissenting wholeheartedly from 
Cosin's liberal interpretation of the words of the Act of Supremacy. But he also disapproved of 
the commission's practice of compelling lay authorities to assist the commission in its 
disciplinary forays, an issue which hit closer to home. Morice himself was a JP 104 which 
naturally placed him within the context of the statutory provisions of De exommunicato 
capiendo, which required lay assistance to be offered to the queen's commissioners in arresting 
persons for violations against that act. His objection to what he perceived as the high 
100 Quoted by Cosin at Apologie, L 109 but not appearing in the primed version of the Treatise. 
101 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 109. 
102 'It is true', Cosin had stated on 108, 'that by Ordinary authoritie ecclesiastical!, no man may be imprisoned.' 
103 Cosin compared this makeshift practice to how Elizabeth from time to time authorised the president and Council of 
Wales to use torture (among other procedures) in an atrempt to fill in the gaps left by the statute 38 Henry VIn c. 28 
which originally assigned vague powers to that council. Cosin, Apologie, 110-1. This interesting comparison will be taken 
up again in chapter seven. 
104 In the 'Defence', Morice stated he had been a JP for nearly twenry years. LPL, MS 234, fo. 168r. 
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commission's heavy-handed procedures naturally led him to oppose the warrant quorum 
nomina, which was a command from the high commissioners to secular magistrates 'to assist 
in Attaching, or to attache any' who were sought by the commission to be brought to justice 
- similar in effect to the writ de excommunicato capiendo. Cosin registered Morice's three 
grievances against the procedure. First, Morice considered it absurd that JPs should be 
commanded to attach and imprison offenders until they had given bond for appearance. 
Second, the cause of the attaching or imprisoning was often not declared in the warrant. And 
third, he had claimed that' the names o/such persons to be Attached be not set downe by the 
Commissioners, but are refirred ouer vnto others to set them downe .'105 
Concerning Morice's first complaint, Cosin asked if JPs and sheriffs might not also be 
commanded by judges of the Common Pleas or King's B~nch, [he Exchequer, justices of 
Assize, the lord treasurer, lord chancellor, lord keeper, or the whole privy council? If JPs could 
be commanded by these, then why not by ecclesiastical commissioners whose power was 
immediately from the queen? As for Morice's second reason, Cosin denied that warrants of 
quorum nomina were routinely issued with no cause or matter declared in them. But what if 
they were? Other types of warrants often lacked this information as well. Moreover, what law 
of the realm was against such a practice? If Morice were to receive a message from the privy 
council to attach someone but omitted the cause, would he protest that it was against the law? 
Why then resist a quorum nomina from the commissioners, who bore their authority 'by 
express warrant of her Maiesties letter Patems'? 106 Morice's third reason for disliking these 
warrants, because the names of the offenders were not expressly written by the commissioners 
but by their underlings, was not denied by Cosin. The 'Warram of quorum nomina, is very 
rarely vsed by the Commission, and the rarer, the better', he replied, adding that the names of 
those to be attached were agreed upon ahead of time by the commissioners, then given to 
subordinates to fill in. In any case, eosin was anxious to see how Morice could show this to be 
105 Cosin, Apologie, I, 112-3. This passage does not appear in the printed version of the Treatise, though Morice repeated 
these points in the 'Defence'. LPL, MS 234, fos. 172r-174r. 
106 Cosin, Apologic, 113. Morice replied that he had never known the privy council, which he held grave and wise, to hand 
down such a ludicrous order - in effect, implying that he would not obey such a request. LPL, MS 234, fos. 172r-173v. 
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contrary to law. Perplexed at Morice's interest in the warrant and possibly unaware that he was 
a JP, Cosin mused, 'Belike himselfe is some Iustice of peace'. 107 
Morice was clearly uncomfortable with (he way the commISSIOn was usmg De 
excommunicato capiendo and warrants of quorum nomina to involve puritan lay authorities in 
Essex to assist in rooting out puritanism. As a JP, Morice was essentially being called upon to 
became a local accessory of the conformist clergy in arresting men who had drawn the ire of 
ecclesiastical authorities. Essex as well as Norfolk had been a religious battleground ever since 
the mid-l 570s, and factions commonly sprang up between the bishops and the puritan gentry. 
John Aylmer, in particular, had numerous run-ins with the Essex clergy during his tenure as 
bishop of London. There were also bitter feelings towards the inferior ecclesiastical officers in 
Essex: the chancellor, commissary, and archdeacons. l08 In fact, one of Morice's main 
complaints against the commission's use of quorum nomina warrants was that these warrants 
were directed to JPs for the arrest of certain men, 'noe cause or matter of arreste expressed, 
yea and that which is worse no names of the persons so to be arrested sett downe in the 
warrant but that referred to an Archdeacon or other Inferior Iudge, whoe againe may tymes 
putteth it over to those hunting spanyells their apparators.' 109 On one particular occasion 
Morice recalled receiving one of these warrants and not only was there no reason for the arrest 
described on the warrant, there were no names of anyone to arrest! Morice mused that for all 
he knew, he was supposed to arrest the three commissioners whose signatures were on the 
warrant. He finally found the names of those to be arrested on the back of the paper, scribbled 
by the apparator or someone of his rank. 'Is not this a sound and legall ecclesiasticall 
proceedinge trowe ye? Is not the greate truste and confidence reposed in them by her maiestie 
well discharged?' Morice refused to believe - despite Cosin's assurances that only the 
commissioners themselves decided who was to be arrested - that in many cases wide latitude 
was not given to inferior ecclesiastical officers to arrest whomever they chose. 110 
107 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 112. 
108 Collinson, Elizabethan puritan movement, 203, 212, 271-
109 LPL, MS 234, fo. 172r. 
110 LPL, MS 234, fos. 173v-174r. 
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In this chapter thus far we have examined Cosin's explication of the matters belonging to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, both matters penaining to testaments and matrimony and others, as 
well as the manner of ecclesiastial procedure, including the issue of citation, the punishment of 
excommunicates, and dle authority of the queen to authorise ecclesiastical processes other dun 
citation, or punishments other than excommunication. What remains to be explored in pan I 
of the Apologie are four relatively less controversial issues in debate between Cosin and his 
opponents: 1) whether a direct royal assent was necessary for the enacting of each canon, 2) 
whether clerks might be deprived without indictment or presentment by a parry, 3) whether 
after the Act of Supremacy the judgement of heresy belonged to the common law, and 4) 
whether ecclesiastical judges were guilty of praemunire by overreaching their jurisdiction. 
The opening chapter of pan I was dedicated to refuting the puritan argument 'That a 
seueraU royall assent is ... required to the executing or euery panicular Canon.' 111 Cosin began 
by stating that if no canon or ecclesiastical constitution could be put into practice without the 
queen's direct approval, nothing could ever get done. The business of government would grind 
to a halt, and furthermore aU present canons would have been void, since in practice royal 
assent to each and every canon had never been thought necessary.il2 According to Cosin 
numerous statutes supponed the idea of explicit enactment of canons without the queen's 
consent,113 and he correctly considered opposing views on this subject to be radical and 
diversionary. He believed that the Act for the Submission of the Clergy had brought dlis 
controversy about in the first place, and yet that law had only established that, 
111 Cosin, Apolof(ie, I, 2. 
112 If testamentary and matrimonial marters (which everyone agreed were ecclesiastical issues) and right of tithes, etc. could 
not be handled by ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately without the queen's consent but yet could not be handled by any 
other authoriry in the realm, there was 'a maine imperfection in the policie of this Common wea!e.' Cosin, Ap%f(ie, J, 2. 
113 The Act for the Submission of the Clergy (25 Henry VIII c. 19) 'doth argue that ordinaries might (without further leaue 
obteined, as in former times they did) execute their jurisdiction ecclesiastical\.' Two other laws also gave power to 
'jurisdiction ordinary' for the speedy recovery of tithes in ecclesiastical coutts (27 Henry VIII c. 20 and 32 Henry VIII c. 
7) and another for recovery of pensions, procurations, etc. (34 & 35 Henry VIII c. 19). In addition, the Act of Uniformity 
empowered ordinaries, as did the statute De excommunicato capiendo-, 'which were hindered much from punishment 
that apperreined, for want of due execution of that wrine ... and therefore prouideth remedie therein.' In the same year a 
law was passed against perjury wherein, 'it is prouided that [jurisdiction] should not extend to Courts Ecclesiasticall: but 
that offenders in periurie, or subornation in a Court EcclesiasticaL shall and maybe punished by such usual and ordinarie 
lawes, as heretofore haue bene, and yet are used and.(requented, in the saide Ecclesiastical! Courts' which prooueth the 
vsuall practise of iurisdiction Ecclesiastical hitherto vsed (without any special! assent) to be lawfull: Cosin also mentioned 
special laws against usury (13 Elizabeth c. 4) and dilapidations (13 Elizabeth c. 10). None of these laws, according to 
Cosin, mentioned that royal assent was needed to carry out the terms of the statute. Cosin, Ap%Kie, 1, 2-3. 
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all Canons which be not contrariant nor repugnant to the Lawes, Statutes or customes of this 
Realme nor to the dammage or hurt of the Kings prerogatiue Royall, that they shall now still be 
vsed and executed as they were afore the making of that acte ... 114 
That act only prevented new and unauthorised canons from being introduced without the 
royal assent, notwithstanding the puritans' claims. Cosin wondered what these canons needed 
to be made legitimate in the eyes of his adversaries, 'a Commission vnder the great Seale (to 
warrant the execution of it) vnto him, that is to exercise it'? If that were the case, every steward 
of a leet court, every constable, and other lay officials ought to be required to procure warrants 
to ensure that the authority dley exercised on behalf of lay jurisdiction was united to the 
crownP15 Cosin's frustration with this argument seems entirely justified. He had set himself 
the task of defending the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts from its puritan detractors and 
sometimes this required attending to the time-wasting pedantry of puritan common lawyers. 
This particular argument was not advanced by Morice, though it may have been put forth by 
Beale, but at any rate it did not go unrefuted by Cosin, no matter how feeble it seemed. 
Simply by publishing an answer to such puritan claims, Cosin was showing that the established 
church had found its voice and could use it. 
Chapter thirteen addressed another precisionist argument, that the judgment of heresy 
now belonged to the common law rather than the ecclesiastical law. Part and parcel of this 
argument was an adjoining claim that nothing could be deemed heresy but by the terms of 
the statute De excommunicato capiendo. eosin quoted extensively from the statute De 
heretico comburendo and the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy to argue that both of those laws 
empowered the clergy to take cognisance of heresy. 'What other may conceiue, I know not;' 
he said, but 'for my part, I must take it (till I be better informed) to be so simple a conceit, as 
is worthie rather to be dismissed with laughter then to be confuted with further reason.' 116 
The puritans' tack in this argument was more subversive. They used the legal distinction 
between dle punishment of heresy, which did belong to the common law, to obscure the well-
114 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 4. 
115 Cosin, Apologie, 1,4-5. 
116 Cosin, Apologie, 1,99-101. 
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established rule that heresy was determined by ecclesiastical judges, who then turned heretics 
over to the temporal authorities to be punished. 117 
Another issue dealt with briefly by Cosin in chapter fifteen was the puritan claim that 
mmlsters might not be deprived of their benefices without indictment or prosecution of a 
party.118 Of the possible grounds for dlis opmlOn Cosin admitted to have no idea. He 
proposed the ever-popular chapter 39 of Magna Carta, cited consrandy by the puritans, but if 
this was the case, as he had already explained, it was a fruidess endeavour since, in his opinion, 
Magna Carta had nothing to do with ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 'And moreouer, that chapter in 
Magna Charta requireth no suite of partie to preferre the enditement; so that it may be done 
by the Iudges of Office well enough.' 119 But suppose, offered Cosin, that a minister defended 
atheism or apostasy? Suppose that he protested to his bishop that he never believed he had 
been called to the ministry and had forged his testimonials of orders (documents certifying 
his ecclesiastical status) or else committed simony, incest, adultery, or bigamy? Was a bishop 
expected to delay while waiting for an accuser to appear or should he cite the minister ex 
officio? Cosin stated that the Act of Uniformity openly licensed bishops to enquire (which 
could only be done ex officio) and to deprive according to the queen's ecclesiastical laws. 120 
The final issue to be discussed in this chapter is the question of praemunire. Cosin 
devoted chapters seventeen and eighteen to the subject, defining and describing the uses of 
prohibitions, consultations, and the writ of indicavit in the former chapter, exhibiting doubts 
against the puritans' claims in the latter. Cosin defined the terms dlUS: 
When any Court goeth beyond his bounds, and dealeth in other matter or sort then 
the lawes of the land will warrant; there lieth in some cases writs at the common lawe, which are 
117 This cooperation between ecclesiastical and lay authorities was established in the medieval heresy acts of 1382, 1401, and 
1414 and continued in the Heresy Reform Act of 1534, but determination of heresy had always been the province of the 
church. The fact that the Act of Uniformity laid out punishments for offenders against the established religion did not 
mean that Parliament was suddenly competent to make doctrinal judgements on suspected heretics. 
118 Casin presumed that the holder of this opinion meant to specify that such an indictment must be at the common law and 
not done by the judge ex officio. 
119 He suggested that the writer of this opinion might have meant that a bishop could deprive a minister but not ex officio, 
since it was well known the bishops had always had power to institute and deprive ministers within their jurisdictions. If 
this was the case, it was no favour done to the minister being deprived, said Casin, as deprivation by a prosecuting party 
would submit him to the malice of an accuser and perhaps subornation of proofs rather than to the sincerity and duty of 
the judge. Casin, Apologie, 1, 115. 
120 Casin, ApoloKie, I, 116. In fact, the Act of Uniformity did not actually use the word 'enquire', though it did give 
authority to bishops 'to reform, correct, and punish by censures of the church.' Elton, Constitution, 407. 
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of Prohibition or Indicauit: and in other cases, a writ brought in by statute, called Prouision and 
Premunire: and the Prohibition and Praemunire doe lie as well against temporall, as against 
ecclesiasticall Courts. 
The Prohibition is a charge by the kings writ, to forbeare to hold Plea, either in some 
matter or maner, which it is supposed a man dealeth in, beyond his iurisdiction, or otherwise 
then lawe will warrant. Euery Prohibition is either Prohibitio iuris by the very lawe it selfe; or 
Prohibitio hominis, where the ministerie of the competent iudges (in that behalfe) is vsed. 121 
The statute 18 Edward III c. 5 (Pro clero) had stated that no prohibition should be issued 
from Chancery unless the temporal courts had rightful cognisance, in which case the 
ecclesiastical court should grant a consultation. (A consultation was a writ directed to 
ecclesiastical judges empowering them to continue the examination of a case which had been 
previously halted by a prohibition.) 122 If the matter truly belonged to spiritual jurisdiction, 
however, the prohibition was not valid and the case could continue. Prohibitions might be 
granted either to a parry in the suir or to a judge who recognised that the suit exceeded his 
jurisdiction. A prohibition would also be in order if the matter were temporal and there were a 
possibility of redress for it in Chancery,123 or if a case evolved enough so that it became clear 
that while the original issue was right of tithes (which belonged to ecclesiastical courts), the 
actual issue was right of patronage (which belonged to temporal courts). The reverse of this 
could also happen, so that a temporal court holding plea might be forced to surcease if the 
issue became one of ecclesiastical jurisdicrion.124 Finally, a prohibition would lie if by custom 
ecclesiastical courts never had cognisance of a certain matter, despite the fact that the matter 
was not actionable in a temporal court either. 125 
121 Cosin, Apologie, 1, 120. 
122 Jones, Chancery, 500; Cosin, Apologie, I, 121. 
123 There were two exceptions to this as well, since the prohibition would not be upheld if the spiritual court were holding 
plea for a different end from the temporal, such as if a case concerning the beating of a clerk was being prosecuted both in 
a temporal and spiritual court, but while the temporal court was detem1ining damages, the spiritual was determining 
excommunication. Moreover, a prohibition would not lie if one clerk sued another for the goods of his house. Cosin, 
Apologie, I, 121-2. 
124 The issue of prohibitions became a serious quarrel in the seventeenth century between the temporal and ecelesiastical 
judges, as the temporal courts sought to restrict the expansion of the church courts' jurisdiction. See Louis A. Knafla, LnUI 
and politics in jacobean EnKland: the tracts o(Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (Cambridge, 1977) 115-6, 119-21; Usher, Rise 
and foIl, ed. Tyler, 167-79, 182-3,188-93,198-201,202,215-21,317 and footnote 1, 318, 322. 
125 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 122. 
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A prohibition ceased when a consultation was granted. If the consultation yielded that 
the issue in question in fact belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the judge was permitted to 
proceed despite any prohibitions from the king. 126 Writs of indicavit were essentially 
prohibitions of a sort, except they dealt specifically with suits of tithes which amounted to at 
least one quarter of the value of a benefice. Like prohibitions, writs of indicavit could only be 
issued after the libel had been delivered to Chancery and only before the sentence was handed 
down by the judge. Writs issued after sentence was given were void, thus denying them the 
status of an appeaI.I27 
Having summarised the nature of prohibitions, consultations, and writs of indicavit, 
Cosin next addressed his opponents' protestations that ecclesiastical judges were guilry of 
praemunire by over-reaching their rightful jurisdiction. There were two statutes of praemunire, 
said Cosin, the first one being 27 Edward III c. 1 (De provisor) , which declared that no cases 
which belonged to the king and his courts should be prosecuted out of the realm. 128 The 
second and more important praemunire stature was 16 Richard II c. 5 which stated that no 
one shall pursue or purchase translations, processes, sentences of excommunication, bulls, 
instruments, or other matters contrary to the king's prerogative and authority ourside the 
realm or bring (hem into the realm, or, being brought in by someone else, receive them. 129 By 
the same stature it was deemed praemunire to sue in another court for the purpose of 
defeating judgements rendered in the king's courts. While Fitzherbert believed that 'the 
opinion of the court was ... that [the word] Alibi 130 in the said statute was vnderstood of 
bishops courts: so that if a man sue there, for a thing that belongeth to the Common law, he 
shall be in the Praemunire', sometimes a prohibition lay where a praemunire did not, for 
example in cases when the jurisdiction of a certain matter (such as tithes of great trees) 
belonged generally to ecclesiastical courts and yet the jurisdiction for a particular facet of that 
126 Cosin, ApollJgie, l, 123. 
127 Cosin, Apolof(ie, l, 123-4. 
128 Cosin, Apolof(ie, I, 124-5. 
129 Cosin added that the phrase 'a Plea in the kings court' had often been recognised to extend to ecclesiastical jurisdiction as 
well as temporal. Cosin, Apologie, J, 125-6. 
130 Meaning 'elsewhere'. For Morice's interpretation of the meaning of alibi, see also 69, 196-7. 
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matter belonged to temporal courts. 131 But the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy, argued Cosin, 
having grafted all ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the crown, altered the equation. 
But these notwithstanding, sundry doubts are made in this behalf, because at this day all 
iurisdiction Ecclesiastical is now trudy acknowledged, and is indeed (as it was alwayes in law) 
in the Souereigne prince, and from her prerogatiue royall deriued downe to others, no lesse 
then the Admirall court is, or the court of the Constable of England in times past was, when it 
was vsed. 132 
Thus praemunire by an ecclesiastical court in Elizabethan England was not possible since every 
exercise of authority was itself an extension of the queen's prerogative. For the puritans ro 
maintain that certain decisions of ecclesiastical courts established by the queen herself were 
repugnant to her royal supremacy suggested 'an incompatibilitie betwixt the Crowne and 
Ecdesiasticall iurisdiction', the implication of which was that the puritans 'denie her iust royaH 
prerogatiue ouer all persons, and in all causes aswell Ecclesiasticall as Temporall; as if these 
could not both flow from the Crowne, nor stand toegether and meet in one person; which is 
most erroneous to thinke, and traiterous to affirme.' 133 If, however, an ecclesiastical judge 
dealt in a matter actually belonging to a temporal court, 
... yet for some neerenesse and coherence, by him probably supposed to be an ecclesiasticall 
cause; [such] could not at this day be a Praemunire; but subiect ondy to a Prohibition, and 
punishable as a contempt, as it was at the Common law, vpon an attachment after 
Prohibition.' 134 
Cosin assessed Morice's view that 'to deale in any cause not belonging to their iurisdiction, is 
Praemunire' as being 'very hard and rigorous' that every mistaking of jurisdiction by a judge 
131 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 127. 
132 Cosin, ApoloKie, 127. Cosin, like John Cowell after him, was undoubtedly informed on this issue by his civilian 
predecessor, Sir Thomas Smith, who argued that in times past the curia christianitatis, or ecclesiastical courts were taken to 
be a foreign court, but 'at this present this court as well as others hath her force, power, authoritie, rule and jurisdiction, 
from the royall majestie and crowne of England and from no other forren potentate or power under God, which being 
granted (as it is true) it may appeare by some reason that the first stamte of praemunire whereof I have spoken, hath nowe 
no place in England, for there is no pleading alibi quam in curia reKis ac reKinae.' Smith, De republica anKlorum, ed. 
Dewar, 143-4; see also Daniel R. Coquillette, The civilian writers of Doctors' Commons, London (Berlin, 1988) 87. 
133 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 128-9. (Pages misprinted '126' and '127'.) 
134 Cosin, ApoloKie, 1, 128. (Page misprinted '126'.) 
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should result in a praemunire .135 This would imply that a praemunire should be served m 
every case that a prohibition might, which Cosin believed was certainly erroneous. 
Cosin accordingly issued ten doubts that every overextension by an ecclesiastical court 
was a praemunire. He doubted: 1) that there was no difference between simply mistaking a 
temporal matter for an ecclesiastical one and willfully attempting to usurp temporal 
jurisdiction, 2) that a judge could be in danger of praemunire before he was even aware of the 
matter, (since Cosin believed that 'in no Court temporall or ecclesiasticall, the Iudges peruse 
the writs, declarations &c. when they are first put in'), 3) that it was as great an offence simply 
to hold plea in such a matter of mistaken jurisdiction as it was to give sentence, 4) that it was 
as great an offence for an ecclesiastical court to execute a temporal matter by censures of the 
church as it was to execute the same by ordinary temporal punishment such as fine or 
imprisonment, 5) that it was a great offence to persist in prosecuting in a spiritual coun a case 
which had revealed itself to be essentially a temporal matter, 6) that it was praemunire to hold 
plea in a matter that had never been handled in either a temporal or ecclesiastical coun 'nor 
whereof any remedie lieth at the Common law', 7) that it was an offence to make temporal or 
ecclesiastical laws without the consent of the prince,136 8) 'what it was to deale in temporaU 
causes or courts, without commission? and what in ecclesiasticall?', 137 9) what kind of offence 
it was if a temporal court held plea in a case that belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and 
10) what kind of offence it was for one temporal court to determine a matter in which it was 
not competent, 'as for example, if the court of Common Pleas or the Eschequer should deale 
in pleas of the Crowne that be capital!? with such like a great number'. 138 
The listing of these doubts, which seem to be something of an academic digression for 
the personal satisfaction of Whit gift rather than a direct response to Morice's claims regarding 
praemunire, was how Cosin chose to end part I of the Apologie, providing for a somewhat 
135 See also Cosin, Apologie, III, 89-90. This exact quote does not appear in the printed version of the Treatise, and it is not 
quite an accurate paraphrase either since Morice's main contention was that it was the imposition of the ex officio oath, not 
simply the occasional overextension of authority, that was the sole cause of praemunire. See Morice, Treatise, 47-58. 
Nevertheless, this opinion was held by other puritans. 
136 The Parliament of 1604 tried to pass a bill prohibiting Convocation from passing new canons without Parliament's 
consent, but they were stopped by James. Levy, Fifth Amendment, 214. 
137 The meaning of this doubt is obscure. 
138 Cosin, ApoloK.ie, 1,130. 
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anti-climactic ending. Indeed, the vast maJonty of part I was not openly polemical or 
controversial, consisting of lengthy lists of matters belonging to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
bolstered by citations of statutes, canon and civil law maxims, scripture, and common law 
precedents. But although on the surface part I seemed unpolemical, Cosin was laying the basis 
for parts II and III in which he would defend the high commission's manner of conducting 
criminal prosecutions and its use of the ex officio oath, respectively. To establish the extent of 
spiritual jurisdiction was a necessary first task, only after which could he articulate the latter 
two arguments effectively. As the Apologie progressed, therefore, it became more narrowly 
focused, finally culminating in a full validation of the high commission's prerogative to exact 
the oath, deprive nonconformist ministers, and to fine or imprison those who refused the oath. 
With the extent of church courts' authority thus established in part I, Cosin turned his 
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Part II: The two ways of prosecuting suits in 
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While the first part of the Apologie was dedicated to examllung the extent of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the second part was devoted to an examination of the manner of 
prosecuting criminal suits, whether by accusation or ex officio,l The most controversial aspects 
of the high commission involved its criminal procedures. Opponents of the commission found 
fault with the court's ex officio style of prosecution, where the judge or judges ordered 
suspects to appear in court and be interrogated on various articles. The absence of an accuser to 
initiate and prosecute tIle case particularly rankled puritan common lawyers who believed that 
this procedure placed the ordinary in the role of prosecutor as well as judge. The high 
commission's style of interrogating defendants, based on the continental inquisitorial method, 
placed the accused at both a psychological and a real disadvantage compared with common 
law criminal procedure. They were often not told what charges were being laid against them 
until well after the interrogatories had begun, they were not shown a copy of the questions 
they would be compelled to answer, they were usually denied counsel, they were made to take 
a general oath to answer all questions truthfully (even if they caused the defendant to 
incriminate himself), and they were sometimes asked directly on oath whether they had 
committed the crime. 
With a few circumstantial exceptIons, none of these procedures originated in or were 
used by common law. Criminal defendants in temporal coutts enjoyed certain liberties that 
protected them from false accusation. Standards of proof required for conviction in temporal 
courts were stronger than in ecclesiastical courts, rules of evidence were more stringent, and 
the use of juries contrasted sharply with the judgement of the bishop or ordinary.2 The main 
reason why the high commission's criminal procedures were attacked so vociferously by the 
puritans was because they were effective. Ecclesiastical judges were not reliant on local accusers 
to bring nonconformists to trial nor on local juries to produce a desirable verdicr. In the 
popular religious turmoil of the late sixteenth century the centralised, authoritarian style of the 
high commission's ex officio procedure allowed Archbishop Whitgift to control the spread of 
nonconformity to a greater extent than would have been possible using common law criminal 
1 Part II consisted of 140 pages divided into sixteen chapters. 
2 W.S. Holdsworth, A history ofEny.lish law (12 vols.; London, 1906-1972) vol. IV; Hdrnhoiz, Roman canon /.aU!. 
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procedures. Because of the high commission's efficiency, the puritans took exception to many 
of its procedural details as being contrary to the laws of the realm, and they trumpeted their 
views in print and in Parliament between 1584 and 1593) 
Part II of eosin's Apologie addressed these puritan outcries, smartly following on part 
1's establishment of what matters rightly belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In the preface 
to part II eosin observed four particular opinions of his adversaries that regarded the 'maner 
of entrance into some suites.' The first opinion, that an ecclesiastical court could not proceed 
without accusation or presentment, was rejected by eosin as being so narrow at to exclude 
even matrimonial and testamentary matters, since 'accusation or presentment hath none vse, 
but in matters of crime or offence incident vnto that iurisdiction to punish.'4 The second 
opinion, that no lay person could be cited ex officio in any cases but testamentary or 
matrimonial, eosin perceived as an attempt to eradicate completely the practice of ex officio 
procedure; for if it were true, then a man being duly presented for any crime could not be 
cited for lack of an accuser to prosecute him. The primary use of ex officio procedure, 
maintained eosin, was to prosecute criminals, not wills and marriages. In effect, these first two 
opinions crippled ecclesiastical judicial authority by preventing judges from proceeding with 
criminal cases in the absence of an accuser, or from initiating cases in testamentary or 
matrimonial matters without a presentment. 5 
The 'innovators" third opinion concerned oaths: they asserted that even if a man were 
properly accused or presented, he could not be examined on oath touching the actual crime, 
'whereby (1 thinke) is meant, that hee may not be so examined of any criminall and penall 
matter.'6 The fourth opinion contended that no man was bound to declare any matter against 
another unless there were an accuser. In other words, no witness might be forced to testifY in 
ex officio cases, inferring that only voluntary witnesses were eligible for testimony in such 
3 Collinson, Elizabethan essays (London, 1994) 59-86; Collinson, Elizabethan puritaFl mOllement; Hamilton, Shllkespellre, 4-
11; Guy, 'The establishment and the ecclesiastical polity', Reign or Elizabeth 1, ed. Guy, 129-32, 141; Neale, Parliament.', 
1584-1601,22,232,242,267-78. See also PRO, SP121176 doc. 72, fos. 223r-224v; and PRO, SP12/176 doc. 75, fo. 
228r-v for good examples of puritan opposition to eX officio procedure in 1584. 
4 Cosin, Apologie, IT, sig. A2v. 
5 Cosin, Apologie, II, sig. A3r. 
6 Cosin, Apolof!,ie, II, sig. A3r. The phrase 'examined on oath touching the crime itself meant the defendant was asked 
directly by the judge whether he committed the crime in question. Cosin chose not to confute this opinion until part III of 
the Apolozie. See below, 140. 
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cases. According to eosin the effect of this last opinion was (0 empower accusers acting out of 
malice to coerce witnesses to testifY, whereas a judge proceeding 'for sarisfaction of his dutie 
only' might not? As eosin argued in part I, witnesses testifYing voluntarily 'vpon some pique 
or humor of enmitie' were not to be trusted. s Thus these four opinions of the puritans 
restricted either the manner of entering into an ecclesiastical suit or of proceeding in the suit 
once it was begun. 9 
eosin began his confutation of the four opinions by defining the categories of actionable 
faults, ways of denying charges, and the merits of both accusation and ex officio as procedutes 
in criminal cases. There were two kinds of faults or sins, said eosin, those of commission 
(peccatum) and those of omission (delictum a delinquendo). Of these offences crimina 
ordinaria (also called crimina legitima) were ordinary, familiar crimes, well defined in law 
through legal precedent. Crimina extraordinaria were either uncertainly committed crimes or 
else crimes not well defined by law, occasionally even lacking a precise name. Admonitions 
and chastisements for these faults were either given by word or deed, that is, by rebuke or 
punishment. IO Punishments themselves fell into three categories: 1) those tempered with 
mercy, where a man might be subjected to some form of chastisement, 'yet the rigour of the 
penaltie is spared', 2) those that were exacted for the satisfaction of a party grieved, and 3) 
those that were imposed for the instruction of others or as a reaction against an abhorrent 
crime. 1 1 
eosin affirmed it was a judge's duty and interest to punish cnme. In fact, a judge 
himself became an offender by his own refusal to punish offences, thereby encouragmg 
wickedness to proliferate in default of authoritative correction. 
7 Cosin, Apologie, II, sig. A3v. 
8 Cosin, Apologie, II, sig. A3r; Apofogie, 1, 7i. 
9 There were other convictions held by Cosin's opponents concerning smaller matters, which he mentioned briefly at the close 
of the preface. They were: opposition to the tendering of an oath to answer to all questions when the defendant was nor 
apprised of the particular questions he vvas to be asked ahead of time) and rejection of the process of further enquiry'" after 
answer had been given on oath. These objections were taken up by Cosin in part III. Cosin. Apo/.ogie. II, sig. A4r-v. 
10 Those admonitions, which were verbal only, tended 'to the reformation & amendment of him, vpon whom they are vsed, 
by making him sorowfull for it, & more circumspect & careful! how he carieth himselfe in the like afterward, and thereby 
is a man said to be won by another.' Cosin, Ap%gie, II, 1-3. 
11 Cosin, Ap%Kie, II, 3-4. 
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Quicke punishment of sinne giues a remedie against sinne. For all crimes and offences be (in 
truth) but as so many maladies and distemperatures in the body of the Church and Common 
we-ale: which if they be tolerated to grow (without restraint & coercion of lawes) will quickly 
spread like a cancker, either to the destrucrion, or to the great and apparant danger ofboth. 12 
How should offences be brought to the attention of the judge? There were two ways, 
suggested Cosin: at the instance of a party or ex officio, by the judge himself The way these 
suits were initiated in temporal courts in England depended on the type of jurisdiction 
granted to that court. Again there were two types: some temporal courts acted upon the 
immediate or direct aurhority of the queen, such as those at Westminster, while others 
operated by her mediate or indirect aurhority, 'yet by her Graunt made (in some sort) their 
owne, as deriued downe thereby vnto them'. For although all authority ultimately flowed 
from the queen, the processes in courts bearing indirect authority did not run in the queen's 
name and her seal was not used. Examples of courts which exercised their authority indirectly 
were the constables' courts, the earl marshal's court, the courts of counties palatine, the courts 
of incorporated cities and towns, sheriffs toums, courts-Ieet, views of frank-pledge, and courts 
for maritime causes such as the Court of Admiralty. 13 The common law was followed at most 
of these courts, according to Cosin, with only a few exceptions. London and some other 
incorporated cities and towns, for example, adhered to local customs which sometimes 
differed from (and were deferred to by) (he common law. In (he courts of Admiralty, civil 
law procedure was usually followed because, said Cosin, it was the common law of most 
nations. 14 Those courts which exercised their authority directly from [he queen were of 
differing sorts. Some did not operate by leners patent - Parliament for example - which 
met only by the queen's express writ. Chancery operated similarly, the chancellor and lord 
keeper bearing no commission of letters patent, but who nevertheless 'receiue their authority 
by deliuery vnto them of the great Seale.' Star Chamber, which consisted of the privy council 
and the chief justices of common law cOUrts, was established 'pardy by praescriprion and 
12 Cosin, Apologie, II,4. 
13 Cosin, Apologie, II, 7. 
14 Cosin, Apoiogie, II, 7-8. 
110 
Chapter 4- AI1 apologie for stll1dri,' proceedillgs, part II 
partly by Statute'. The Council of Wales was authorised by act of Parliament (38 Henry YIlT 
c. 28) with periodic refinements in its authority by means of special writs from the queen. 
Included in those courts which exercised their authority directly from the queen by 
commission and letters patent were the courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, the 
Exchequer, and the Court of Wards and Liveries. These leading courts were based at 
Westminster, but there were other courts established by commission or letters patent in the 
realm: assizes, nisi prius, gaol delivery, sessions of the peace, the Council of the North, the 
courts of Stannery in Devonshire and Cornwall, and the Court for Trial of Life and Death at 
Halifax. Cosin noted that these courts, not merely the ancient courts at Westminster, were 
referred to as 'courts of common law', though this was not to imply that other courts were 
contrary to the common law. IS 
Cosin argued that when an action was moved in one of the queen's courts, whether by 
indictment, by the judge himself, by the queen's attorney-general, or by a private person, the 
suit was essentially ex officio iudicllm since all suits in these courts were on behalf of the 
queen, whose COUrts they were. 16 As evidence that suits moved in these courts belonged to the 
queen, Cosin observed that those preferring indictments in these courts were not required to 
pay costs if the defendant were acquitted. Likewise, defendants convicted and punished by 
fine paid their fines strictly to the queen. However, if in Star Chamber the judges were 
persuaded that a prosecutor was acting calumniously or maliciously, he was condemned in 
costs and damages for molesting the defendant. 17 Cosin's claim that all actions in the queen's 
courts were technically ex officio iudicum was tendentious. He was endeavouring to draw a 
link with the high commission's practice of prosecuting suits ex officio, but as we will see, 
15 Cosin, Apologie, II, 8, Morice resented this exercise of categorization, suggesting that Cosin 'maketh no difference 
betwene the common !awe, actes of parleament, and other her maiesties temporalllawes, confoundels] by like error the 
diuersitie of her highnes courtes and giuef s] them new names at his owne pleasure.' He disliked Cosin's terming of 
Parliament a 'court' (being one of the courts which exercised direct authoriry from the queen). Cosin noted that 
Parliament sat only by the queen's writ and that it might hear appeals from the King's Bench, but Morice thought it was 
too much to say that Parliament acted as a 'delegate power to heare and determine cawses either ciuill or criminall'. LPL, 
MS 234, fos. 200v-20Ir. 
16 Cosin, Apologie, II, 9. In chapter eleven of part II Cosin cited several statutes to show that proceedings by the temporal 
judges were technically on behalf of the sovereign. Those statutes were 18 Edward III c. 2 (Pro clero), 42 Edward III c. 4, 
8 Henry VI c. 16, 11 Henry VII c. 25, and 1 Henry VIII c. 12. Cosin, Apologie, II, 96. 
17 Cosin, Apoloy.ie, II, 11-2. 
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there were substantive differences between temporal and ecclesiastical prosecutions that 
weakened his assertion. IS 
Criminal procedures that did not make use of juries came next to be considered by 
Cosin. Parliament did not usually try offences unless such offences were committed by 
members of the house itself, 1') and in those cases Parliament could proceed without an accuser. 
In Cosin's view this constituted proceeding of office. Star Chamber only enquired of 
extraordinary crimes, demanding special judicial consideration in the deficiency of legal 
precedent. Suits in dut court were initiated either by bill of information (by the queen's 
attorney-general or an aggrieved private accuser) or ore tenus. 20 Despite the presence of a 
prosecuting party, however, this did not constitute an accusation, Cosin argued, since the 
attorney-general's duty was 'partly to stirre vp and partly to ease the office of that Court by 
furnishing it with proofes.'21 Star Chamber was not permitted to punish by loss of life or limb 
but only by 'open shame and infamie', fines, imprisonment, 'nayling or cutting of eares, or 
deforming the face', banishment, or condemnation to the gallies. 22 Chancery and the Court 
of Requests were courts of equity. Suits in these courts, moved wholly privately and never ex 
officio, arose where, although there might be criminal matter contained in the bill, the party 
prosecuting sought only amends and redress of damages, not punishment of the defendant. 
The defendant was required to answer the bill (even its criminal components) upon his oath, 
but he was not to answer the plaintiffs interrogatories on oath unless 'the plaintife will be 
concluded by the defendants answere vnto them, and seeke to make no further proofes.' 23 In 
each of these temporal courts mentioned so far, noted Cosin, both those which proceeded by 
juries and those which proceeded by judges enquired of the party upon their corporal oaths 
'when any lewde practice, abuse, or contempt (not capitall, nor tending to mutilation) is 
supposed to be done against [he Court.'24 
18 See below, 133. 
19 The Lords acted as a court of appeal if they agreed to accept a writ of error sent from a litigant in King's Bench or 
Common Pleas who felt his case had been misjudged. Spelman, Reports, ed. Baker, II, 119-23. 
20 For discussion of ore tenus procedure see 67, footnote 101; and 195, footnote 111. 
21 Cosin, Apologie, II, 1 L 
22 Cosin added that that the Council of Wales and the Council of the North carried similar disciplinary powers to Star 
Chamber. Cosin, Apologie, II, 12. 
23 Cosin, Apolouie, II, 12. 
24 Ibid. " 
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Turning his attention to processes in ecclesiastical courts, Cosin revealed that these same 
two methods of prosecuting offences (by party or ex officio) used in temporal courts were also 
used in ecclesiastical courts. Concerning proceedings by party there were four types, two of 
which Cosin labelled as commendable, two as uncommendable. Exception might be taken 
against a witness brought forth to testifY on the grounds that he was 'lewde or affectionate' 
and deserved no credit from the court for his testimony. This objection against a witness, said 
Cosin, did not have the force of an accusation, unless the defendant then proceeded to set 
down the time, manner, and place of the witness's crime, in which event the suit formally 
became a case of recrimination or cross-acCllsation by the defendant. Exception was 
considered a commendable way of proceeding by Cosin. The other commendable sort of 
prosecution by party was complaint (or per qllerelam), which of itself was of two sorts. One 
was extrajudicial and called querimonia. This process was defined as a complaint made by a 
citizen to someone in authority regarding a wrong done to him, seeking only that reason and 
justice might be done. The other judicial sort was termed double querele, which was in essence 
an appeal to a higher court or to the prince to delay or review a lower court's decision against 
the defendant. 25 
This recital of legal mlI1utIae might seem pointless to the reader, but it should be 
remembered that Cosin was not simply expounding ecclesiastical court procedure, he was 
defending it from attack. One of the most virulent attack strategies used by the puritans 
against ecclesiastical law was that it was illogical, unsophisticated, and clumsy. Following in 
the tradition of St. German, Elizabethan common lawyers glorified English common law as 
harmonious with the laws of God and nature.26 Cos in's task was ro explain not only the 
function of canon and civil law - which had never been done before in English - but to 
demonstrate its competence. Sir Thomas More and Sir Thomas Smith, though at least as 
qualified for this project as Cosin, never attempted anything of the kind. 
Of those methods of prosecution by party named by Cosin as uncommendable, the first 
was delatio, which was of two kinds. The first kind of delatio was a secret accusation made 
25 Tnere was no appeai from the double querele . Cosin, Apologie, II, i 4. 
26 Prest, Barristers, 257-60, 319; Guy, St. Germlln, 19-20; lves, Commol1lllwyers, 207-8. 
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known to a judge by someone with no material interest in (he matter. The second type of 
prosecutor was a more public and open accuser and was also divided into two sub-types. The 
first sub-type of accuser preferred the information publicly but under the name of another. 
The second sub-type preferred the information 'for gaine or reward' under his own name. This 
second kind, remarked eosin, sometimes informed for the purpose of securing what someone 
else would soon be losing, and therefore these people were odious and hated by other men. 
These people were called informers or promoters.27 
The fourth way of prosecuting and the second uncommendable way, according to 
eosin, was accusation. Public accusations were either moved civilly for redress of grievances or 
criminally for punishment of wrongdoing. 28 Accusations might be submitted ore tenus ('by 
bare wordes without writing') or, more often, in writing by bill. The civil law required formal 
accusers to submit three things before their suit could be processed: 1) dle name of the 
accused, 2) the accuser's name, 3) an agreement by the accuser that he be 'committed vnto the 
like custodie and ward, dut the Accused (in regard of the qualitie of the fault, and dignitie of 
the Accusour) is to susteine, vntill the suite be finished.' This process bound (he accuser to 
prosecute the suit to its conclusion. The reason for this was so that a man might not accuse 
lighdy, knowing that ifhe failed in his proofs or was shown to have troubled the court and the 
defendant needlessly, he would face the same penalties as d1e defendant would have, had he 
been convicted. This was called poena talionis or retaliation. eosin confessed that many people 
in England would have found this law quite stringent, yet this was the requirement for accusers 
in ancient Rome. Those who prosecuted suits in the name of the sovereign, however, were 
exempt from this rule, as they did not prosecute out of malice, desire for revenge, or in an 
attempt to gain honor or wealth. 29 
The practice of accusation, eosin remarked, had become either forbidden or obsolete in 
many countries, often replaced by ex officio or by a mixed way of proceeding, partly ex 
27 Cosin added that in ancient times such men were also sometimes called dupilltores or triplatores because a half or a third of 
the penalty was awarded to them. Cosin, Apofogic, II, 15. 
28 There are several other minor types of private accusation discu,"ed by Cosin at II, 16. 
29 Cosin, Apologie, II, 19-20,25. 
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officio and pardy by party.3o The reasons for the decline of accusation as a method of criminal 
prosecution were ascribed by eosin to be two: the trouble involved, and 'because it is and hath 
bene so odious and abhorred of most men in all ages.' Men tended not to prosecute for four 
reasons: cost, trouble, common obloquy (discredit or dishonor), and offence taken by the 
accused. Because of these things, eosin asserted, criminals ought to be proceeded with either 
by appointed promoters and prosecutors, or by the judge himself. 31 The drift of eosin's 
argument is now dear. To establish ex officio procedure as the preferred method of dealing in 
criminal cases, it was first necessary to desecrate the sacred cow of common lawyers: the 
accusatory method. eosin proposed that ex officio procedure was desirable because it was the 
only way to ensure dut offences would be punished. Otherwise very few men 'will be found 
voluntarily to become an Accuser, and to prosecute at his owne costs and charges'. Men who 
were simply aware of offences would not be likely to report them, 'For who are commonly 
made priuie to such sinnes, but men of like humour and affection? In whom we may not 
presuppose such sinceritie of conscience, that for reformation of the partie delinquent, rhey 
will abandon all friendship, and aduenture any displeasure; euen but to take a trial! (with their 
great charge and trouble) howe they shall be able to make proofe of such matters against 
them.' 32 Were it not for ex officio proceedings, submitted eosin, criminal offences would 
have multiplied beyond the control of the law. 33 
eosin's defence for an activist judiciary was unquestionably derived from the medieval 
justification of inquisitorial procedure against heresy. The overriding concern for the discovery 
and punishment of offences and the consequent weakening of defendants' traditional 
protection linked the rationale between per inquisitionem on the continent and ex officio in 
England. eosin feared that complete reliance on accusation as the only means to initiate 
30 Cosin noted that the usc of accusation was prohibited in Flanders, in Naples its use was restricted to civil cases only, in 
Venice private citizcns might not prosecutc but only magistrates, in France only the three attorney-generals were 
permitted to prosecute (and even then they were not technically accusers, since they acted ex offIcio promoto). Cosin, 
Ap 0 logie, II, 22-3, 112. 
31 C-Osin, Ap%Ki(', II,84. 
32 Cosi~ Apo!oJ;ie, II, 83, 86. For further discussion of the obstacles to justice posed by the medieval accusatorial system, see 
Brundage, Medielldl canon law. 142-3. 
33 Cosin proposed several other minor reasons for the inferiority of accusation by a private party. One of them was that if 
there were only rwo witnesses to a crime, and one of them were required to become the accusing party, 'then the full 
proofes ... were thereby cleare taken away', since two wirnesses were needed to convict someone of the charges brought by 
an accuser. In such a case the criminal would eSC-'lpe unpunished. Cosin, ApoloKie, II,85-7. 
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criminal cases would mean that many senous cnmes would never be punished for lack of 
accusers, and the history of the medieval church showed that Cosin's fears were justified. 34 
Scripture itself, asserted Cosin, neither appointed nor commanded criminal matters to be 
prosecuted by a party, as was evidenced by the scarcity of such eX:lI11ples in the Bible. Indeed 
the evidence of scripture seemed to Cosin to vindicate his own predisposition towards 
proceeding of office. 35 
Thus Cosin found a paradox inherent in the very concept of accusation, that all accusers 
were 'reuengefull' by their nature and yet were constrained not to be vengeful when they made 
their accusations. In dosing his discussion of accusation, he cautioned that if accusers might 
remember to refrain from a malicious and vengeful spirit, seeking to do the other party harm, 
and not to prosecute for 'gaine and lucres sake', accusation 'might still haue a tollerable and 
profitable vse in Christian Common weales. '36 But (his did not mean that Cosin wished better 
health to the cause of accusation. The success of his elevation of ex officio procedure over 
accusation rested on the moral repugnancy of achieving justice by way of private revenge or 
malice. 
Having catalogued the undesirabiliry of accusation, Cosin recommended other methods 
of punishing criminous behaviour and suggested that these had actually grown into favour. He 
devoted chapters five, six, and seven to defending the superioriry of proceeding ex officio by 
enquiry over that of accusation, the nature and practice of denunciation, the grounds of special 
enquiry, and the procedure and jurisdiction of the high commission. 
The 'hatefulness' of accusation, suggested Cosin, had made it necessary for judges to 
resort to a process of enquiry to discover crimes as well as to redress civil grievances, and this 
34 See above, 44, for evaluation of the ineffectiveness of accusation in serious ecclesiastical crimes. See also Brundage, Mediez!tll 
LuJlOli law, 147-9; Levy, F!fth A'ilciid,ncnt) 40. 
35 Some of the examples cired by Cosin to prove h is point did not really prove his point: Leviticus 19: 16 said, 'Thou shalt not 
stand tlKainst the Moud o(thy neighbour '; verse 18, 'thou shalt not az'enKe, nor be mindefuLL olwronK aKainst the children 
of thy pmpl~, hut (holt I01!~ thy l1~iKhbour 'I< th)! s~lfr" and Matth"w 5:38, 39: ' ... But I (flY l/1ttO you, r(s;st not Fuilfo· hut 
whosoeuer shall smite thee 011 they right cheeke, tume to him the other also. ' But none of these verses seem to speak to the 
issue of judicial prosecution of offences. Only 1 Corinthians 6:7 appears to bolster Cosin's case: 'There is l'tter/y Il fault 
among yo II, bectluse ye Koe to law one with tlnother. l,'(1hy mther suffer ye /lot wrollK? why rather susteine ye not Losse?' 
Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 28. 
36 Cosin, ApoloKie, II,29. 
116 
Ch3pttr 4- All apologic f{1J- wlldrie proceedings, part II 
enquiry was conducted by the judge's office or officium, which signfied among other things, 
'that power, whereby he [the judge] may deale of himselfe, without the petition or instance of 
a partie'.3! To enquire into offences was 'to search into a matter deepely and carefully, that is 
kept close, to bring it to triall of iudgement, which it deserueth.' 38 Cosin contended that ex 
officio procedure was both freer from the corruption of calumniation and less inconvenient 
than was accusation initiated by a private prosecutor. In fact, ex officio procedure was safer for 
both prosecutor and defendant, argued Cosin, because the fear of subornation of witnesses was 
taken away on both sides. 39 
There were two types of enquiry. The first, general enquiry, was 'a preparatone course 
proceeding of meere Office, purposed to enqUlre and finde out criminous persons, within 
some certain territorie or compasse.' There were three kinds of general enquiry, 1) that which 
was general in respect of persons yet specific in respect of the fault (such as a coroner enquiring 
into a murder when the offence was known to have been committed and yet the offender was 
not known), 2) specific in respect of persons yet general in respect of the fault (when the 
offender was known but crime was not), and 3) general in respect of both (such as at general 
visitations of dioceses or enquiries made by a grand jury at the assizes or session of the 
peace). 40 Morice believed the second and third types of general enquiries were violations of the 
laws of the realm. In such enquiries, he suggested, the bishop or ordinary 'wandered' in his 
interrogatories in search of matter upon which to ground an accusation. 41 The second type of 
enquiry was called special enquiry and this described an investigation which was specific both 
in respect of persons and in respect of the fault, and the end of this son of enquiry was to 
bring the suspect to trial. Such cases might be prosecuted by the judge only or by a prosecutor 
(although the proceeding was still ex officio, said Cosin, since it was initiated by the judge's 
37 Cosin, Apologie, II, 30. Cosin's asseveration that ex officio procedure came about as a result of the hatefulness of 
accusation is umrue. As we have already established, ex officio was a descendam of per inquisitiol1ern which was a papal 
legislative innovation pioneered by Innocem III and the popes of the late twelfth and early thirteemh cemury in an 
attempt to discover and punish hetesy. See above, 44-7. 
38 The old term for enquiry was quaestio which on occasions signified both enquiry and examination (sometimes by torture). 
The word inquisitio was also used for this purpose. Cosin, Apologie, II,31. 
39 Cosin, Apologie, II, 34. 
40 Cosin, Apologie, II, 35. 
41 Morice, Treatise, 39. 
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office).42 If no party would prosecute the matter, then the proceeding was simply called 
officium or officium merum, and the judge himself processed the suit. That was the canon law 
term; officium nobile was the equivalent phrase in the civil law, 'as of more woorth and 
dignitie, then the other course which is by a Partie, and at his petition and instance.' The civil 
law described such a proceeding at the instance of a party officium mercenarium, 'that is, 
when the Office of the Iudge is (as it were) hired and employed, but at another mans becke, 
to serue his turne.'43 Cosin's low opinion of the accusatory method, with which Morice found 
much to disagree, is thus a result of his civilian training. His methodical denigration of the 
criminal procedure so fundamental to common law was a bold manoeuver, and he buttressed 
his case with a host of ancient and medieval authorities, scripture, and reason. The purpose of 
all this was to elevate the integrity of the judge's office in an effort to justifY the inquisitorial 
procedure necessary for the efficient functioning of the high commission. 
In summarising the nature of ex officio procedure, Cosin maintained that it was 
privileged over suits at the petition of a party in six ways: 1) the judge did not run the risk of 
being repirmanded or punished as an accuser would if he failed in his proofs (propter 
praesumptam calumniam) because the law did not presume calumniation in a judge as it did 
in a private accuser; 2) the judge was permitted to tender an oath to the defendant which was 
a privilege not enjoyed by an accuser suing in his own behalf'because the defendant ought not 
to bee driuen to furnish vp his aduersaries inrention';44 3) a judge proceeding ex officio was 
not required to prove the fame surrounding a defendant;45 4) in accusatory proceedings 
contrary proofs to exonerate the defendant's good name were admitted, whereas they need 
not be admitted in ex officio cases; 5) in accusatory proceedings a criminal trial comprised a 
contestation between the parties, whereas in ex officio cases (even in those prosecuted by an 
42 Such prosecutors either prosecuted throughout the whole suit (officium promotulIl) or for only part of the suit, such as for 
tbe furnisbing of proofs (officium Illixttllll). This second type of prosecutor was termed a rdlter. OfflCiuff! promoiufII 
occurred under Ol1e of two circumsto.l1ces: when a mo.11 prosecuted voluntarily (promotor l'olunttlriw ofJIcii); or when J. 
man was assigned to prosecute (necessaritts promotor ofJrcii) 'because hee may not refuse this emploimcnt.' Cosin, 
Apologie, II, 35-6. 
43 Cosin, Apologie, II, 36. 
44 Or as Morice put it, 'The partie is not by oath to supplic his adversaries want of profe'. LPL MS 234, fo. 102v. 
45 The exception to this was that if an appeal were made by the guilty party to a higher court after the verdict, proof of the 
fame must be made by the judge to his superior. Cases of appeal in the high commission were of course impossible since it 
was the highest ecclesiastical c~urt in England. Cosin, Ap 0 logie, II, 37. For a full explanation of whether fames must be 
proved, see below, 123. 
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appointed promoter or relater) only a contradiction was said to eXist between the public 
rumour or fame that concerned the defendant and his denial of the charges; and 6) in ex 
officio procedure more witnesses might be received after publication of testimony because 
there was no fear of subornation of witnesses in this case.46 This catalogue of 'privileges' of ex 
officio procedure over accusation shows the remarkable prerogative ascribed by eosin to 
ecclesiastical judges. In the adversarial system of common law, judges were trained to arbitrate 
between two balanced, equally-corruptible litigants, but eosin viewed ecclesiastical judges in 
an entirely different light. He imputed an inherent dignity and prerogative to their office that 
invested them with extraordinary power in conducting criminal prosecutions. The view of 
common lawyers such as Morice and Beale, which was in part nurrured by anticlericalism, was 
that ecclesiastical judges were as free to depart from ethical behaviour as any private accuser 
who was unshackled from the ordinary restraints and qualifications placed on prosecutors 111 
temporal courts. 
eosin next considered the manner of initating criminal suits. Since a judge could not be 
expected to have complete and perfect knowledge of all crimes that fell under his jurisdiction, 
laws had been evolved to bring knowledge of crimes to him. The initial receiving of 
information from witnesses or denouncers was termed by the civil law the process informative, 
and all proceeding which occurred after the defendant's first appearance in or willful absence 
from court was termed the process punitive ,47 The most common of these means was 
denunciation. 4R eosin defined denunciation as information of a crime related to an 
ecclesiastical judge for the purpose of reformation or punishment of the offender 'yet without 
that solemne inscription by the Denouncer, which the law requires in an Accusation.'49 There 
were two types of denouncers, said eosin, those who denounced of their own ftee will (not 
always for commendable reasons), and these were called delators; and those who denounced 
46 Depositions by witnesses were always published to the judge, but in accusation cases no new witnesses might be received 
after the original witnesses gave testimony, 'for feare of suborning them in the pointes, where he [the accuser] findes the 
former depositions come too short of his purpose.' Cosin, Apologie, II,36-7. 
47 It was not commonly thought necessary, said Cos in, for the defendant to be present for the process informative. Cosin, 
Apnlngie, IT, 56. 
48 While some writers claimed denunciation ro be a third way of proceeding besides accusation and enquiry, Cosin 
considered it rather 'a special! meanes or insrrumenL..[forJ drawing the ludges power and Office into action by Enquirie.' 
Cos in, Apologie, II, 38. 
49 Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 38. 
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as a course of public duty. This second kind were termed publica solicitudinis cura (the care or 
regard of public watchfulness). Of this second kind there were two sorrs in ancient Rome: 
those who possessed authority simply to enquire and denounce, and those who also were given 
authority to examine suspects after denouncing them. Cosin compared these ancient offices to 
wardmote enquests in contemporary London, and in the ecclesiastical law, churchwardens and 
sidesmen (or questmen), who discharged duties similar to public denouncers. 50 
In temporal courrs there were three kinds of denunciation, said eosin: querela,51 when 
the denouncing party harboured a parricular interest in the suit; delatio, when the parry was 
disinterested; and denunciatio, when the denouncer was a professional acting in public service, 
such as the attorney-general. 52 In ecclesiastical courts there were four types of denunciation: 
evangelical, judicial, canonical, and regular. Evangelical denunciation was carried out by a 
disinterested party simply for the offender's reformation rather than for his punishment. The 
judge's handling of this type of denunciation was 'summarilie and not Iudiciallie: and as a 
spirituall Father, rather then a Iudge.'53 Judicial denunciation was the refuge of someone either 
grieved or hurt by the offence of another, and the judge in this case proceeded by special 
enquiry to clear the suspect should he be innocent, or punish him if he were guilty. Canonical 
denunciation (which originated from canon law) was for the purpose of removing an 
ecclesiastical person from his office for some type of offence or sin. And finally, regular 
denunciation was a private complaint or warning against some citizen to amend his life and 
was not intended to make any particular offences punished, redressed, or even public. 54 
In the event of uncertainty on the parr of a public denouncer whether a crime had been 
committed (as in adultery or defamation), or if the commission of (he crime was certain but 
the offender unknown (as in murder or forgery), if a fame existed concerning suspected 
wrongdoers the denouncer was bound (0 present such fame or knowledge of the crime to the 
50 In later Elizabethan England churchwardens were not only expected to present offenders, they were sometimes disciplined 
for failing to do so. Helmholz, Roman canon law, 105-9; Brundage, /vfedit:l!al Ctuwn law, 143. See also the ecclesiastical 
memorandum issued by the high commissioners in 1591; LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r-v. 
51 This term is not to be confused with double qUe/'e/e or queremonia, which correspond to the milder :lction of complaint, 
discussed above at 113. 
52 Brundage, Medieval cdnonIaw, 143; Guy, Star Chamber, 37. 
53 Cosin, Ap%gie, II 43. 
54 Cosin, Apologie, II,43-4. 
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judge. 55 If a private denouncer (someone who denounced of his own free will) failed in his 
proofs, it would be assumed that he acted calumniously and would be condemned in charges 
and punished, though not as harshly as an accuser would have been. 56 If, however, a public 
denouncer failed in his proofs, he was not condemned or punished for the obvious reason that 
he was acting on his public charge. eosin insisted that because it was in the public interest of 
the realm to punish offences, there was a tangible need for both private and public denouncers 
to bring knowledge of crimes to the attention of judges, without whose informations a great 
many offences would go unpunished. 57 
Public denunciation by officers especially assigned for that purpose was called 
presentment. eosin believed that this definition was what his adversaries had in mind in 
framing their opinion 'that an ecclesiastical! Court may not proceede against any crime, 
without an Accusation or presentment.' 58 eosin imended, however, to show that there were 
indeed some ways of proceeding in ecclesiastical courts that used neither accusation nor 
presentment. 59 He argued that since presentmenr 'hath none vse in an Accusation, but onely 
openeth a way to the Iudges Office for speciaU enquirie against him that is presenred 60 ... then 
all presentments, which be preparatories to proceeding of Office, must wholy cease.' This was 
a tricky argument. eosin was endeavouring to trap his opponents in a cartesian circle, to 
persuade them that presentment (of which they approved) in ecclesiastical law was necessarily 
an instrument and component of ex officio procedure (of which they disapproved) and that 
the former could not be had without the latter. The argument rested on a misunderstanding 
of the term 'presentment', which was used by the puritans to mean something quite different. 
55 See also Gordon, 'Perjury and the Elizabethan courts', Americtlll Journal of Legal History, 24 (1980), 145-70. 
56 There were numerous exceptions to this penalry for private denouncers, though.: 1) if the private denouncer had initiated 
the case by way of necessiry, such as 'when the heire prosecuteth the death of him to whom he is heire'; 2) if the case 
resulted from 'extreme griefe' such as suspected adultery; 3) if the crime was 'enormious' such as coining or treason; 4) if 
'a great eui! fame did runne thereupon'; 5) if the denouncer could prove that the infamy was substantiated by men of 
worth and good credit; 6) if his witnesses falsely insisted they could prove the crime; 7) if 'he maketh halfe a good proofe, 
as by one witnes without exception'. Cosin, Apologie, 11,47. 
57 Cosin, Apologie, II, 46. 
58 Cosin, Apologie, 11,52-3. 
59 For example, he had mentioned earlier that accusers must agree by way of an inscription to endure poena talionis if they 
failed in their prook But in the case of an exception repuL,ive only (when a defendant took exception to the accuser's 
accusation) or both exception repul,it'e and exaptiol1 recriminitiz'e C .. and sought legal recrimination against him) 
accusation might be done without such an inscription, and so might be said to be done without either accusation or 
presentment. Cosin, Apologie. II, 53. 
60 Cosin also made this claim in chapter 12: 'presentment is a preparatorie course peculiar onely to proceeding by speciall 
enquirie of office.' Cos in, Apologie, II, 109. 
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By applying common law. terms (0 civil law procedures that lacked an obvious English 
equivalent to the Latin original, Cosin was able to twist the common law meanings of these 
terms to fit his agenda. Thus 'accusation', which at the common law was the ordinary method 
of pleading for redress of grievances, was transmogrified by Cosin into the civil law concept of 
the spiteful, calumnious individual universally disparaged by ancient authorities. Likewise, a 
temporal judge arbitrating a case between two parties became at the civil law a 'mercenary' 
hired (0 dispense his judicial services. 
There were other means to open the way to special enquiry besides presentment, noted 
Cosin, eleven in particular. The first of these was the existence of a fome. Cosin defined fame 
as simply the testimony of the multitude. Fames were of two degrees, only the stronger of 
which could become the basis of a proof. 61 Bur what was the practical difference between fame 
and an ordinary rumour? A rumour became a fame when it was 'blowen abroad ... when the 
greater part of the whole neighbourhood or towne doe speake thereof, or, if it were an issue 
which only a select circle of people would know, when the majority of that circle was talking 
abour the issue. If the fame was not this well blown abroad, asserted Cosin, then it was not a 
fame bur simply a rumour. 62 A fame was counted in canon law as equivalent to public 
detection of an offence committed. Consequently, once a fame existed, the judge was both 
empowered and required (0 begin his special enquiry. Should an appeal by the defendant be 
brought on the grounds that the judge proceeded on a fame withour presennnem, inferior 
judges were required (0 prove that a fame did exist. The queen or such judges over whom 
there could be no successful appeals were not constrained to prove fames in cases where there 
was 110 presentment, however, since 'the law presumeth more stronglie for their integrities, and 
freedome from Calumniation, conspiracie, and wilfull vniust vexation; then of euerie inferiour 
ordinarie Iudge.'63 Thus, high commissioners, who recognised no superior ecclesiastical judge, 
were not constrained (0 prove fames at all. 
61 The lesser kind of fame manifested itself'vpon suspicion ondy, and from an vncerteine authour'. This kind of fame was 
strong enough only to create a presumption against the suspect and could only, at its worst, lead to purgation not 
conviction. The second kind of fame 'is when it sprung vp and had his original! from a certein and likely presumption, and 
from probable matter.' This kind could be made into a full proof or at leasr a presumptive proof (as in adulrery, which left 
no trace behind, in which case the ordinary penalty for the crime could not be inflicted). Cosin, Apoloy,ie, II, 56-8. 
62 Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 58. 
63 Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 59. 
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This was an extremely important point with respect to the powers of the Elizabethan 
high commission. If an ecclesiastical judge could proceed against a suspect on the basis of a 
fame he was not required to prove judicially, ex officio proceedings could move at a rapid, 
efficient pace controlled by the judge himself. This would have been especially useful when 
enquiring into areas that were thickly nonconformist. Should the judge be required to prove 
the fame, this would have to be done by the testimony of witnesses who would almost 
certainly be local citizens - probably neighbours or relatives of the accused. Hence, it was the 
same problem that was encountered by medieval continental judges seeking to suppress 
heresy. Neighbours and relatives of the suspect would refuse to substantiate the fame, thereby 
bringing the judge's enquiry to a standstilL By relieving superior judges of the need to prove 
fames, canon law empowered ex officio prosecution of offenders against the church but at the 
same time gave free rein to partial or malicious judges. 
Cosin qualified the rule concerning proof of fames by citing the canon law principle that 
actually required proof of the fame, but which listed four importanr exceptions. 64 The 
practical effect of these exceptions was that the commissionents were free from the rule. Even 
if the exemptions menrioned by Cosin were the exception to the rule, there is no guarantee 
that the rule was followed when it should have been. Many canonists and civilians complained 
in their writings of the disparity between theory and practice. For example, the sixteenth 
century Italian canonist Julius Clarus affirmed that a fame must be proved to exist before 
witnesses for the plaintiff could be examined, but he added that this was completely ignored 
in practice, and in fact the opposite was done. 65 
Clamosa insinuatio was a second means of opening the way to special enquiry. Similar 
but not identical to a fame, a clamosa insinuatio or 'clamorous insinuation' was a report of 
crimes or offences delivered to a judge by a 'credible person' but without a deposition. 66 The 
64 The four exceptions were: 1) in cases of heresy, regarding which most writers agreed that a 'vehement suspicion (grounded 
vpon any credible relation)' wa.s .sufficient to proceed with a special enquiry; 2) in ca.se.s w-hen the sovereign either 
commanded or had knowledge of the speciol enquiry and when the commission was obtained motu proprio for his or her 
own service, but not in suits moved by a private palTy with an interest in the matter; 3) when the purpose of the enquiry 
was for reformation of soul's hcalth rather than corporal punishment; 4) when the enquiry was for ncither pcrsonol 
reformation nor corporal punishment but to determine the fitness of someone for an ecclesiastical function, Cosin, 
ApoIogie, II, 59, 
65 Helmholz, Roman caltOIl law, 17-8, 
66 Cos in, Apologie, II, 60. Morice rejected cltlllllJSIZ insillllatio outright, since it could not be guaranteed that 'credible persons' 
were entirely free from malice or calumniation, LPL, MS 234, fos. 97r-v, 102v, 
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third means of grounding a special enqUlry besides presentment was by complaint, which 
might be done by a private citizen either through judicial or canonical denunciation. This was 
not counted as actual judicial or canonical denunciation, though, as the complainer did not 
subsequently prosecute the suit to its conclusion as a denouncer would, but left it with the 
judge to proceed ex of/teio .67 A fourth means besides presentment was indicia, that is, 
evidences, inducements, or presumptions. There were three kinds of indicia: levia indicia (light 
suspicions), indicia probabilia (moderate presumptions), and indicia indubitata (violent 
presumptions). Levia indicia were too weak to convict a suspect circumstantially. Indicia 
probabilia, if there were enough of such evidences, might amount to a proof, though a man 
convicted in such a case might well be given a pecuniary punishment rather than a corporal 
one. The strongest type of evidences, indicia indubitata, might result from secret treaties, 
hidden crimes, etc., and for these suspected crimes the punishment was certain (0 be stronger. 
It was the prerogative of the judge to resolve into which of the three categories any particular 
indicia fell. 68 
A fifth way of opening the process punitive besides presentment was termed deprehensio 
in flagranti aimine, commonly known as being caught red-handed or in the act of the crime 
itself. Deprehensio in flagranti aimine occurred if the judge or someone in authority actually 
witnessed a crime. 69 A sixth way to ground a special enquiry was notorietas facti vel evidentia 
sceleris, or the notoriety of the fact. Before a criminal could be convicted in this case, however, 
the fact of the notoriety was required to be expressed to the judge judicially, and he must 
make an interlocutory decree that the act was notorious. A seventh means was incidens 
cognitio, 'when vpon examination of one offendour, it falleth out another of his complices to 
be discouered.' But in this case the defendant's revelation of another offender was not to be 
67 Any private person as well as public officers were permitted to employ this kind of denunciation. Cosin remarked that 
some would object to any special enquiry not preceded by fame since many writers seemed to affirm the necessity of such 
2. course. But their \vritings ought not to be understood:ls precluding the use of other meaDS of initiating special enquiry 
such as clamosa insinuiltio or complaint when those options were available, whereby Casin concluded that these two means 
mitigated the strict need for a fame. Casin, Apologie, II, 6l. 
68 This was not necessarily the case, however, if the sovereign or a chief counsel of state were prosecuting, although even then 
the punishment would likely be lighter than if the defendant had been convicted by the testimony of witnesses or by his 
own confession. Cosin, Apologie, II, 62-3. See also Lyndwode, Prol'incillle (London, 1534) (STC 2 17113). 
69 Cosin, Apoiof(ie, II, 64. 
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treated as the testimony of a witness bur merely as the report of a relater. 70 An eighth means 
was enormitas criminis, 'the great heinousnesse of some crime.' In such cases of enormity, a 
judge need not have fame or indicia to proceed. 71 The issue of enormity was pertinent to the 
Elizabethan Act of Supremacy (1 Elizabeth c. 1), which declared that the queen was authorised 
to order and govern the English church by means of ecclesiastical commissions. Since the high 
commission was the only body empowered to determine what constitured an enormity, this 
was an extremely powerful disciplinary tool at Whitgift's disposal.72 A ninth means of 
initiating special enquiry was by suspicion on the part of the judge that an accuser and accused 
were in collusion. A tenth way besides presentment was when a defendant allowed or was 
unable to prevent enough time from elapsing to erase all indicia of the crime. The eleventh and 
final means to open way to special enquiry was when the judge's intention in proceeding was 
merely to dispense 'fatherly and spirituall correction for the soules health onely: and not vnto 
any publike, corporall, and exemplarie punishment.'73 Cosin denied the puritans' charge that 
ordinaries manufactured and spread abroad their own fames for the purpose of initiating suits. 
Why should they do this, he asked, when there were so many other means at their disposal for 
the initiation of such suits?74 We cannot measure how accurate the puritans' claim was, bur 
Cosin's reply does not stand up well under scrutiny. Though there were technically ten other 
means available to ecclesiastical judges to initiate a special enquiry besides presenrment and 
fame, many of them (being caught red-handed, notoriety of the fact, heinous crimes, 
suspicion of collusion between defendant and plaintiff, and erasure of evidence) were 
extremely rare. Of the remaining five, fatherly correction was not a criminal process at all since 
the offender was admonished rather than punished, and clamosa insinttatio and complaint 
were both closely related to fame, possibly indistinguishable in some cases. Incidens cognitio, 
or the discovery of a man's offence through the testimony of another, we have already noted 
was believed by Morice to be an illegal method upon which to ground further enquiry, which 
70 In combination with the ex officio oath, this means of initiating a special enquiry could lead to a chain of ex offIcio 
prosecutions since the incriminating answers of one defendant might reveal the wrongdoings of another. Morice actually 
accused Cosin and the high commission using this technique to perpetuate unlawful prosecutions. Morice, Treatise,20, 
71 Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 65-6. 
72 SR, IV, part 1, 350; Usher, Rise alldfall, ed. Tyler, xxii, 27-8, 188-93. 
73 Cosin. Apologie, II, 66. 
74 Cosin, Apologie, II, 60. 
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leaves us with only the fourth means mentioned by eosin, indicia or evidences. eosin's claim, 
therefore, that judges had ten other means available to them to initiate special enquiry besides 
fame must be seriously qualified. 
Having set out eleven other methods to initiate special enqUlry besides presentment, 
eosin defended the involvement of the high commission in such enquires. In theory, 
The matters handled in the Commission Ecclesiasticall are such Crimes EcclesiasticalL.being 
aggrauated (aboue the ordinarie course of them) by some circumstance of moment...[andl 
when (either by reason of the power of the delinquents, or through some material! 
circumstance) they be not so readily and easily reformable, by ordinarie jurisdiction. 75 
In practice, the commission was empowered to spring into action to rectifY the negligence of 
local officials, if the delinquents had moved elsewhere, if the queen or privy council specifically 
requested them to intervene, if a whole parish complained, if several credible persons were 
grieved, if there was a pressing need to aid and assist local officials, or even in cases of 
notorietas foeti. Once the commission had decided to act, articles containing the place, time, 
and perpetrators of the crime (if known) were drawn up, including the people who would 
testifY and all other evidences known. These articles opened the way to proceed by special 
enquiry ex officio, which might be done by one, two, or three commissioners. Next the party 
was convented either by citation (also called 'letters missive') or by attachment if the party was 
fleeing or fugitive or if the crimes were scandalous. 76 When the ordinary himself proceeded 
against the crime from the outset, the proceeding must be grounded either on the 
presentment of a fame, proof by witnesses' testimony, notoriety of the fact, clamosa 
insinuatio, or any of the other eleven courses allowed by law discussed above. When the party 
appeared before the judge, he was required to take an oath on behalf of the queen's majesty, 
to answere the Articles or Interrogatories truely, (being matters of his owne facte and 
knowledge, so farre foorth as by lawe he is bound) before euery particular thereof be made 
75 Cosin, Apolof(ie, II, 48-9. 
76 See also above, 87-8, 90, 93, 98. 
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knowen vnto him; least after perusall (afore his oath taken) he be drawen by counsell to answere 
cautdously, indirectly, or wholly to refuse to make answer. 77 
But after he had taken his oath, the accused was permitted as much time to deliberate and 
plan his answer as he wished. If the defendam did not readily confess to having committed a 
crime, the judge would appoim a party to prosecute the case by attempting to prove the 
defendam's guilt through the testimony of wimesses. At this poim the proceeding was no 
longer strictly ex officio but mixed, ex o.fficio mero et promoto,78 The issue of whether the 
judge was authorised to examine the defendam on oath touching the crime itself, added 
Cosin, was resolved according to the manner in which the suit was originated. If the case were 
initiated ex officio promoto 7') by a public prosecutor such as a churchwarden, the defendam, 
though he was required to answer upon oath was not required to answer directly to the crime 
itself, even if a fame existed concerning him. When the ordinaty himself, however, proceeded 
against the crime, the proceeding must be grounded either on the presemmem of a fame, 
proof by wi messes' testimony, notoriety of the fact, clamosa insinuatio, or one of the other 
eleven courses allowed by law. If, however, a 'perfect' presemmem of the crime or fame was 
made (a presemmem that constituted at least a strong presumption against the defendam if 
not proof), the judge could proceed ex officio against the party and put him to an oath to 
answer directly whether he committed rhe crime. 8o If the case were opened by denunciation, 
comended Cosin, and the crime was not thought notorious or scandalous, the judge might, 
with the defendam's permission, proceed to examine the party touching rhe crime itself. 81 If 
the defendam was pronounced guilty of the crime, he was punished either by penance for his 
personal reformation and the satisfacrion of the church, or by imprisonmem, fine, or censures 
77 Cosin, Apologie, II, 49-50. 
78 Cosin, Ap 0 logie, II, 50. 
79 Cosin described this promoter as one 'that will voluntarily stirre vp and sollicite the Iudge vnto his duetie'. Cosin, 
Apoiogie, II, 50-1. 
80 A clamosa insinuatio was not sufficient to proceed in this manner. In this event Cosin stated that the judge ought to 
proceed to the examination of witnesses to verify the fame. Should the fame prove true, he was then entitled to examine 
the party touching the crime itself. eosin. Apologie, II, 50-I. 
81 Examining the defendant on oath touching the crime itself in this case was 'not warranted by hw', said Cosin, though the 
jud"e mi"ht do it if the parrv raised no ohiection. Should the defendant demur, the iud"e was r<'(Juired 'hefore the Tudge 
of :he a;peale' to prove th; fame, notori~ty of the fact, scandalous nature of the ~rir:::e, etc. Of course, none of these 
restrictions applied to the high commission, over which there was no appeal. Cos in, ApoloKie, II, 51-2. 
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of the church. If on appeal of the sentence the judge was found to have wronged the party, he 
was required to pay him charges.82 
In the course of this lengthy exposition of ecclesiastical court procedure, eosin had 
spelled out (though not always boldly) the prerogatives of the high commlSSlOn. Being the 
highest ecclesiastical court in the land it could initiate cases ex officio based on 
unsubstantiated fames, compel defendants to answer an unlimited number of interrogatories 
on oath, examine defendants touching the crime itself, and withhold the charge laid against 
the defendant until after he had answered the interrogatories. These powers of prosecution 
were vastly superior to those of temporal courts as well as those of inferior ecclesiastical courts. 
The high commission was competent to conduct ex officio prosecution and to fine and 
imprison offenders even if tlle convictions enjoyed neither recognition nor standing elsewhere. 
The powers of the commission were in fact anti-popular, with power descending from the 
commission themselves and ultimately from the queen, since she authorised their jurisdiction 
via letters patent. 
Thus far we have mainly studied the first half of part II, which concerns Cosin's 
explication of the methods of initiating and prosecuting ex officio suits in spiritual couns. The 
second half was devoted to an examination and criticism of puritan arguments employed 
against ex officio procedure. The question of the legality of the ex officio oath, however, was 
not taken up until part III. The debate in the second half of part II centred mostly on the 
validity of ex officio as a method of judicial procedure as opposed to accusation and 
presentment. In chapter eight Cosin reiterated his opponents' claim that no ecclesiastical court 
could proceed without accusation or presentment, implying (albeit implicitly, said Cosin) that 
such was the established custom of common law. But Cosin rejected even this implication; 'for 
infinite other offences and crimes not Capital!, the Common Law hath vse of Bils in the 
Starre-Chamber, and of Informations in the other Courts at Westminster.' 83 These instances 
could not be considered presentment, argued Cosin, because he who initiated the suit was not 
required to presenr upon his oath as were grand jurors. Neither could such an instance be 
82 Cosin, Apologie, II, 52. 
83 Cosin, Apoioy.ie, II, 69. 
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rightly termed 'accusation' since those bills and informations were put up ex officio promoto, 
and also because those who presented those bills were not themselves the accusing party, but 
merely agents for the promotion of the king's suit.84 Furthermore, it was known to Cosin that 
JPs sometimes, upon their own suspicion or by way of secret relation, sent out warrants for 
men to be apprehended or took information against suspects after hearing the depositions of 
witnesses but before the defendant had appeared in court. They had even, asserted Cosin, 
thrown men in prison according to their own discretion. In fact, on several counts there were 
remarkable similarities between the common law and ecclesiastical law. 85 If one JP was 
allowed to conduct criminal investigations based on his own private suspicion, Cosin asked 
why three commissioners could not be allowed the same privilege?86 If it were argued that 
ecclesiastical courts should not hold the same rights as temporal courts, Cosin would invoke 
Magna Carta chapter 1, which guaranteed the freedoms and liberties of the English church 
even at a time when it was believed the church courts were not under the king's authority. And 
now that ecclesiastical courts were by law united to the crown, maintained Cosin, it was 
doubly certain that the church's traditional rights should be maintained, especially as there was 
no great diversity between them and the common law.s7 
Morice had cited the preamble to the repealed Heresy Reform Act of 1534 (25 Henry 
VIII c. 14) to prove that ex officio procedure had been determined vexatious and unlawful, 
since a conviction which deprived men of their life, good name, or goods, could be based on 
the bare suspicion of the judge only. S8 Cosin responded first by stating that no man could ever 
be convicted in an ecclesiastical court by presentment without witnesses either before or after 
the Henrician Heresy Reform Act. Secondly, he contended that what was deemed illegal in 
that act was the conviction of men without accusation (or presentment) and witnesses. What 
84 Cosin was referring to the attorney-general, whose duty it was to prosecute in Star Chamber. This position of public 
prosecutor corresponded to churchwardens or sidesmen in ecclesiastical courts. See also Guy, Star Ch,zmber; 37,40-1, 45; 
BL, L:1nsdo\vne MS 639, fos. lv-6v; Hudson, 'St3.f Ch3.fl1ber" C"ol!ectanea.iuridica, ed. Hargrave, 134-7. 
85 Several of these similarities are listed by Cosin at II, 72~4. 
86 l\..1ost cases heard by the commission during Elizabeth's time vYcrc conducted by at least three or four comn1issl0ners, often 
five or six. Examination of witnesses and minor enquiries, howevcr) were sometimes conducted by only one or two 
commissioners. Usher, Rise andfall, ed. Tyler, 55. 
87 Cosin. ApoloKie. II. 73-4. The issue of whether the English church was bound by the sections of Magna Carta which did 
not specifically mention it will be taken up again in chapters six and seven. See 192-3, 212-4. 
88 Cosin, ApoloKit', II, 76-7; Morice, Treatise, 34. 
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was not condemned in that act was the process of entering into SUIts by way of enquiry ex 
officio. Thirdly, the statute in question spoke only of heresy, which sin was accompanied by 
specific and grievous punishments. Hence, Cosin favoured a stricter interpretation of the 
statute, since its provisions did not apply broadly to other types of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 89 
Cosin's three rebuttals were sharp and effective. The Heresy Reform Act of 1534 had spoken 
exclusively of heresy proceedings. Furthermore, the statute had itself been repealed. 90 
In the 'Notes', Sir Robert Beale had offered d1ree inconveniences brought about by ex 
officio procedure, the first being that ecclesiastical courts did not allow defendants to take 
exception against and challenge prosecutors or witnesses. Cosin objected to this alleged 
untruth, affirming that exceptions were fully allowed in ex officio proceedings. But had they 
not been, how would such a criticism impugn the entire procedure? To Beale's second claim 
that bishops sometimes acted as informers, witnesses, and judges all in the same case, Cosin 
replied first that a bishop's own suspicion was not enough to open the proceeding, and 
secondly that he had never heard nor could possibly conceive of a bishop being a witness in a 
case in which he was also judge. There was no hint of justification for such a practice anywhere 
in the law unless d1e judge himself had been a witness to the crime.91 A third inconvenience of 
proceeding ex officio menrioned by Beale was that ex officio procedure had the effect of 
siphoning cases from the common law into ecclesiastical courts, and that by not declaring in 
the citation the nature of the charge, the ordinary could deny the defendant his right to sue a 
prohibition at the common law. This was nothing less than a 'bold assertion', complained 
Cosin. The citations or attachments most certainly expressed the nature of the misdemeanour 
but might not express details and particulars. Cosin was curious to know why the serving of 
writs of subpoena out of Star Chamber should not bother Beale, since they 'conteine not so 
89 Illustrating the supposed illogic of Morice's argument, eosin stated Morice's position for him. 'Without accusation or 
presentment ofheresie; none shalbe put in perill of losse of life, losse of name, and goods: therefore without the one of 
these two, an Ordinarie may not proceede to the punishment of any other lesse offence ecclesiastical!. Yea though no one 
of these three, and mueh lesse all of them be any way thereby hazarded, or brought into peril!.' Cos in, Apoloy:ie, II, 78. 
Cosin's rebuttal was more rhetorical than effective, however, since the Heresy Reform Act also required presentments by 
grand jury, which essentially removed the possibiliry of a suspect being subjected to ex officio procedure. 
90 See More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; X, lxii-Ixvii. The heresy statute of 1534 was repealed in 1547 by 1 
Edward VI c. 12. See SR, IV, part l, 18. For further discussion of the issue of the 1534 Heresy Reform Act, see 51, 64-5, 
133,146,205-10, and 217. 
91 Cosin, Apologie, II, 87-8. This rule, however, was little more than a loophole and would have been easy for the Elizabethan 
high commission to circumvent. One bishop or commissioner (a 'credible person') might suspect an offender and report 
his knowledge to another (CMIllOSIl insiIlUllt;O), thereby justifying a special enquiry. 
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much particularitie of the matters objected, as those Citations in ecclesiastical! Courtes?")2 
Despite Beale's clumsy arguments, Cosin's rebuttal was not valid. Ecclesiastical judges were 
known to have cited men with vague charges expressed in the citation as well as ordering them 
to appear pro salute anime with absolutely no cause of citation expressed. In this respect there 
was no comparison with either Star Chamber or Chancery which, though not always 
expressing particulars in their writs of subpoena, at least expressed a general cause for 
citation.93 
One of the puritans' preferred tactics in vilifYing ex officio procedure was to compare it 
to the Spanish Inquisition. Even Lord Burghley had complained of a certain inquisitorial 
nature in the Whitgift's twenry-four articles of 1584.94 Cosin attempted to defuse this charge 
by clarifYing that the inquisition in Spain went far beyond even its own commission from the 
pope, and that the commission itself was 'in many points exorbitant from all Lawe and 
reason.'95 There was no rationale, said Cosin, for likening the high commission to the Spanish 
Inquisition which dealt mainly on the basis of light suspicions and almost always against 
wealthy men, since the inquisitors themselves took possession of a convicted man's goods. By 
contrast high commissioners in England 'haue no fees at all', protested Cosin, 'no not so much 
as iiij.s. towards their charges, that Iustices of Peace be allowed by Statute' but rather served 
'freely at their owne charges, with losse of time and intermitting their owne businesse, only of 
dutie and conscience to her Maiestie and to cile Common weale.'96 As for Morice's claim that 
ordinaries kept their courts in session too often for the purpose of raising revenue, Cosin 
remarked that he knew 'some of the greatest of them in England, that haue not two matters 
ex Officio mero prosecuted in them, in three yeeres space.' 97 
92 Cosin, Apologie, II, 89-90. 
93 Jones, Chancery, 190-6; Hudson, 'Star Chamber', CollectLlFleajuridicLl, ed. Hargrave, 150-7; LPL, MS 234, fo. 235r. 
94 There is an often-quoted letter from Lord Burghley to Archbishop Whitgift from 1584 in which he expresses this 
sentiment. James lv10rice also made this comparison on several occasions in both the Treatise and the 'Defence' as well as 
in a letter to Lord Burghley in 1596. PRO, SP121172, doc. 1; BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69, fo. 150r-v. For a good 
discussion of the articles, see Collinson, Eliztlbethill1 puritlZll mOl'ement, 244-60, 263-72. 
95 Cosin, Apologie, II, 93. 
96 Cosin reported that commissioners earned roughly threepence for a citation and sixpence for the examination of a witness, 
the dividends being no different whether the proceedings were of office or by parry. Cosin, Apologie, II, 94-5. 
97 Cosin, Apolof(ie, II, 94. 
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The puritans' purpose of comparing ex officio procedure in English ecclesiastical courts 
with the Spanish Inquisition was primarily rhetorical and emotional, probably based on 
ignorance. The central features of the inquisition - a liberal use of judicial torture and 
sequestration of the convicted man's goods and property - had nothing in common with the 
high commission's ex officio procedure. ':)8 High commissioners made almost nothing in fees 
by comparison. Cosin's figures were accurate, and the disparity between them and the fees of 
common lawyers was a sore point with Whitgifi:, who complained that common lawyers, 
'whose learning is no learning anywhere but at home', made outrageous sums of money. ':)':) 
Puritan attempts to invalidate ex officio procedure through inconveniences, complaints 
of avarice, and imperfections seemed not only indefensible to Cosin but foolish as welL He 
maintained that the laws of the realm allowed ex officio procedure under the name of office 
del court, which was simply a common law version of ex officio procedure. The statute 3 
Edward I c. 13 showed that the king could allow someone else to be the prosecuting party in 
any misdemeanour, but if forty days passed without an accuser, the king himself would take 
up the case, ex officio. 'Which suite being in his owne Court and before himselfe, must needs 
be of office.' 100 Besides this, argued Cosin, proceedings by temporal judges were truly on 
behalf of the sovereign anyway, whether by direct or indirect authority.lol Although one of 
the Henrician statutes against heresy was now repealed (27 Henry VIII c. 10), its wording 
showed 'that course ex officio to be as warrantable as the other, made at the suite of a partie'. 
Also, the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity empowered ordinaries to enquire and punish ex 
officio any infringements against the same act 'as heretofore hath bene vsed in like, by the 
Queenes ecclesiasticall lawes.' There were even cases, he declared, when the common law 
privileged the proceeding of office. 102 
98 For scholarly rrearments of the Spanish inquisition, see Henry Charles Lea, A history of the inquisition of Spain (4 vols.; 
New York, 1906-7); Henry Kan1en, InquisitioJl lInd society JJI Spain iii thc.~ :;;i.\:ft.~Oith dud 5eveilt(c.~ilth cOlturic.'s 
(Bloomington, Minnesota; 1985); William Monter, Frontiers of heresy: the Sptlnish inquisition from the Btlsque [,mds to 
Sicily (Cambridge, 1990). 
99 Th'Te'" i, no <'"xi<rin" e'"vide'"nc<'" rn ,how rh'r rh<'" cnmmi"jnner< ('v<'"n in Willi'nl 1.'lld's rim .. m,d .. "nV ITInn,·v from 
exercising ·their office, and Laud's accusers did not· even a~empt to construct s~ch - a case at his trial. P:est, Ris: oi the 
bllrristers, 225; Usher, Rise tll7dfall, ed. Tyler, 249. 
100 Cosin, Apologie, II, 95-6. 
101 Cosin, Apologie, II, 96. 
102 Examples of these were consultations granted to proceed ex officio in cases involving the laying of violent hands on a 
clerk, failure to find a chaplain or curate, or for the withholding of tithes, etc. Cosin, Apologie, II, 98-101. 
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Using a barrage of examples, Cosin hoped to weary his opponents into believing that 
temporal courts utilised ex officio procedure in a similar fashion to ecclesiastical courts. This 
strategy necessarily relied on subterfuge and obfuscation since temporal courts did not 
regularly employ procedures that resembled the high commission's inquisitorial methods of 
criminal prosecution. As we have established in this chapter and the previous two, the high 
commission's ex officio procedure was a derivative of the medieval procedure per 
inquisitionem, developed on the continent in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries to 
combat heresy by relaxing the rules of proof and relieving the need for private accusers. 
Common law criminal procedure in England utilised private accusers, circumstantial evidence, 
probable proof, and juries. There were some ex officio prerogatives allowed to temporal 
judges, which Cosin mentioned, but overall, criminal procedure in temporal and spiritual 
courts were based on differing juridical precepts and traditions. lO3 Though Star Chamber, the 
Court of Requests, and the provincial councils in Wales and the North employed what Cosin 
termed ex officio promoto, where a public officer such as the attorney-general prosecuted a 
suit on behalf of the crown, this still constituted a major contrast with ex officio procedure in 
ecclesiastical courts where the offices of public prosecutor and judge could be combined in the 
same person. The fundamental difference was that canon law imputed a sincerity and integrity 
to the ecclesiastical judge that secular law did not assign to his temporal counterpart. 
According to Beale, the Heresy Reform Act of 1534 repealed ex officio procedure. 
Cosin corrected Beale's liberal interpretation by suggesting that what was repealed was merely 
the ordinaries' abuse of the medieval heresy statute of 1401 (2 Henry IV c. 15, De heretico 
comburendo) in citing men for heresy without accusation or presentment. He continued, 
adding that the Act of Six Articles (31 Henry VIII c. 14) did not impugn ex officio procedure 
either but merely added the requirement of information by two witnesses and allowed for 
enquiry, which was by definition ex officio.1 04 Cosin further hacked away at Beale's assertions 
by questioning his use of sources, namely St. German. 105 Beale had also made five particular 
103 See Brundage, Mediel'fll ta 110 11 law; Helmholz, Cfll10nlaw; Helmholz, Roman cflllon law; More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, 
Miller, McGugan; X. 
104 Cosin, Apologie, II, 107. 
105 In support of his arguments, Beale had cited these sources: St. German's Dillision, Salem flnd Bizlll1U, and COl1cernil1K the 
power of the cleal'n (London, 1535?) (STC2 21588); John Goodale's Of the liberties of the cl0y.y (London, 1554?) 
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claims regarding temporal courts which eosin endeavoured to answer. They were: 1) that 
temporal courts signified to defendants what they were charged with before they were 
arraigned or required to answer; 2) that indictments given at the common law always declared 
certain, particular matters; 3) that those who give such indictments were not (0 be the judges 
of him who was indicted; 4) that judges in such cases should 'proceed circumspecdie'; 5) that 
unless the party willingly confessed, two witnesses ought (0 be presem at the arraignment. 106 
eosin affirmed all of Beale's five poims as accurate descriptions of proceedings in 
ecclesiastical courts as well.l 07 Regarding the first point, eosin admitted (0 agreeing with Sir 
Thomas More that a man need not know who gave or preferred the evidence which led to an 
indictment. Beale had confuted More's statement' that a man may be at that law arrested and 
imprisoned, onely vpon suspicion' by declaring that at the common law the suspicion must be 
based upon demonstrable fact, without which such a man was wronged by false imprisonment. 
But eosin comended that some crimes left behind no visible trace, but dut it was still lawful 
(0 imprison a man in this case if he were connected to other suspicious evidence such as 
speeches, treaties of conspiracy, or treason. lOS And whereas a JP might in fact imprison a man 
only on suspicion, added eosin, an ecclesiastical judge needed stronger grounds. As for 
Beale's second point, eosin rejected it outright, stating that defendants convented in 
ecclesiastical courts 'know by their examination the matter objected' - in essence, that the 
accused would at least know the particular charges before he defended hmself. lo ') Beale's third 
and fourth points, respecting a judge acting simultaneously as an accuser, was echoed by 
Morice in the Treatise:' heereby the same man is fudge and Accuser: which is contrary to the 
policy of this Realme, that suffereth not an Accusor to be a witnesse, nor an Enditour to be a 
(STC2 12006); and Marsilius of Padua's The defence o(peace (London, 1535) (STC2 17817). Cosin: 'Truely, sauing in 
the first of them, there is not a word mentioned against proceeding o( Office.' He was misinformed in this, however. In 
Salem and BizLll1ce, chapter 15, Sr. German compared ex otJlcio procedure for heresy unfavourably with the writ de gestu 
et (Llmll (imprisonment for suspected felony). But Cosin was justified in saying that the fault St. German found with ex 
officio proceedings (see the Dh,ision, chapter 7) was not the procedure itself, but that secret denunciation was accepted 
and used in cases of heresy, a capital offence. Yet St. German was not 'challenging the very proceeding thereby for 
vnlawfull, but as being (with such circumstances) some C-.'luse of diuision betweene the two states ... the soundesse of which 
iudgement I minde not here to examine.' Cosin, Ap 0 logie, II, 108; St. German, Stllem LInd BizLll7ce, reprinted in More, 
Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; X; St. German, Division, chapter 7. 
106 Cosin, Apologie, II, 104. 
107 Cosin, Apologie, II, 104-5. 
lOS Cosin, Apologie, II, 105. 
10') Cosin, Apologie, II, 106. 
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iuror for triall of the jact.'110 eosin denied the validity of these claims. A correct 
understanding of ex officio procedure, he noted, showed that he who opened the way to 
special enquiry, that is, the denouncer or indicter, was the legal equivalent of the accuser, not 
the judge. Ill eosin's brief rebuttal suggests he feared that spending a great deal of time 
confuting Morice and Beale on this point might have actually drawn too much attention to the 
issue. What made eosin's assertion that the judge was nor also an accuser a hard sell was that 
in circumstances when special enquiry was opened by means of a fame, clamosa insinuatio, or 
indicia (the degree of which was defined at the judge's discretion) the judge himself opened 
the case. After aU, 'credible persons' who reported crimes to the judge were neither deposed 
on oath for confirmation of the truth of their report, nor required to prosecute the suit to its 
conclusion. 
eosin devoted the final three chapters of part II to proving the validity of ex officio 
procedure (in both temporal and spiritual courts) from canon and civil law, and from 
scripture. Drawing three main citations from canon law, eosin argued that ex officio 
procedure was acceptable 'for the common benefice' without fame if it were only for the 
purpose of correction rather than punishment in cases of suspected crimes against the majesty 
of God. The civil law, said eosin, which referred to the proceeding of office as per nobile 
iudicis officium, was fraught with mentions of the practice. Il2 In fact, the civil law condoned 
the use of ex officio where 'the common interest is the Accusour', in cases of private offences 
as well as of public misdemeanours. II3 One difference eosin noted between ex officio 
procedure in canon and civil law was that the procedure was used as an extraordinary remedy 
in civil law, while it was an ordinary remedy in canon law. 114 The puritans' complaint that 'bad 
and infamous persons suggestions haue bene accepted' as a result of ex officio procedure was 
turned around by eosin who admitted it was true, but by the same token such people had also 
110 This quotation by Cosin does not appear in the printed version of the TreatiIe but is consistent with its arguments. Cosin, 
ApoloKie, II, 110-I. 
111 Cosin. Apologie, II, 110-I. 
112 For example, Cosin writes, This proceeding was so well knowen to all in those times, that Tertullian an auncient father of 
the Church doth put the Emperours to whom he writes, in minde of their owne lawes, where he there urgeth execution.' 
Cosin, Apologie, II, 111-3. 
113 Cosin explained that civil law considered 'fame precedent to be a kinde of Accuser. And where fame wanteth, other 
presumptions, and Inidicia or euidences are (in this behalfe) equiualent Vnto a fame.' Cosin, Apologie, II, 113-4. 
114 Brundage, Medieval canon law, 139-53; Helmholz, Roman canon law, 104-20; Levack, Civilian writers, 150-1. 
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been admitted as witnesses in temporal courts. 115 Morice had charged in the Treatise that ex 
officio procedure was strange and foreign and had 'corruptlie crept in among manie other 
abuses'.116 Cosin replied that, on the contrary, ex officio procedure and indeed all customary 
English laws springing from canon and civil law should be accounted 'our owne homebred 
English lawes, and her Majesties lawes ecclesiastical, as they be often termed in actes of 
Parliament'. 1 17 Here Cosin returned to his interpretation of the Act for the Submission of the 
Clergy, 1534.118 
Cosin finally attempted to prove that both enqUlry and ex officio procedure were 
shown, in 'diuers nor obscure' places of scripture, to be justifiable 11';) as well as that the use of 
the word 'accuser' in many places of scripture was dissimilar from its present usage and 
meaning. 120 
In first part of the Apologie Cosin had delineated the boundaries of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. Proving that ex officio procedure was a valid legal process formed the second 
major hurdle in Cosin's endeavour to justifY the Elizabethan high commission and its 
jurisdiction. This second category was highly contentious as ex officio procedure was clearly 
foreign in origin and had never been popular with lawyers and judges of the common law. 
Cosin's repeated efforts to draw the judicial procedures of ecclesiastical courts within the 
mainstream of the royal supremacy was an indispensible strategy and, ultimately, a winning 
strategy. In the final part of the Apologie eosin narrowed his focus again, singling out the ex 
officio oath for a prodigious justifiation and defence that spanned the length of parts I and II 
combined. The oath was the high commission's most powerful weapon in suppressing diverse 
opinions in religion, and without the license to impose it the commission's ability to order and 
correct the church in the last decade of Elizabeth's reign would be quickly nullified. 
115 Cosin, Apalagie, II, 114. 
116 Morice, Treatise, 58. 
117 Cos in, Apologie, II, 116. 
118 See above, 93, 98-9. 
119 Cosin listed several exmples at II, 122-6, 128-9. 
120 For example, when scripture says that Jesus was accused by the chief priests and elders, Cosin maintained that J ,sus had in 
fact already been condemned by the Sanhedrin and these post-judicial accusations were simply an attempt to secure a 
decree for crucifixion; those accusing Jesus were not, properly speaking, accusers, and there was no third party brought in 
to accuse. Cosin claimed that his argument that 'accusers' were actually witnesses was bolstered by Deuteronomy 19.15-
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Part III: The lawfulness of ex officio oaths 
Chapter 5 - All ap{)logie for sl/fldri" pmceedings, part III 
Part III of Richard Cosin's Apologie, published in mid-1593, originally appeared 
separately from parts I and II, but in later printings all three parts were bound together. 1 Part 
III was almost as long as parts I and II combined, (241 pages in length, divided into sixteen 
chapters). Roughly a third to half was a direct response to Morice's Treatise, the remaining 
parts being directed against Beale and other, unnamed puritan writers. The declared purpose 
of part III was to address the lawfulness of imposing oaths in general and of the ex officio oath 
in particular. This oath was the heart of ex officio procedure and was the most powerful tool in 
the Elizabethan high commission's arsenal. By this process defendants were required to take an 
oath to answer any questions put to them by the judge. Once they had taken the oath, they 
were obliged to reveal their knowledge on any subject the judge considered pertinent to the 
case, such as the defendant's past behaviour, conversation, or beliefs, or those of his family and 
friends. In this way, the high commission was able to expose the religious nonconformity of 
ministers and laymen. The only way for the accused to frustrate the process was to refuse to 
take the oath in the first place. This course was being advocated more boldly in the early 
1590s than before,2 but puritan writers such as Morice and Beale were still determined to 
prove the oath's illegality and abolish it forever. A strong conformist response was needed to 
defend the oath, and Cosin proved worthy of the task. 
Like Morice, Cosin had his own definitions of oaths. His short definition was that an 
oath was 'a confirmation of that whereof we sweare.'3 In fact, every time a man declared 
something to be true, said Cosin, he was in a sense taking an oath. 4 He explained that a true 
oath was both a service and worship yielded to God in two regards: it was service in that one 
fulfilled or performed what he promised, and it was worship in dut by swearing, one 
acknowledged that God sees and knows all and will punish those who swear falsely. Morice's 
1 Morice's journal from 1593 notes that partS I and II of the Apologie were published together with 'An Epistle ro the Reader' 
in March or April, 1593, but readers 'were forced with patience to expect the Civilians Third part of his Apologye, wi ch 
came not to publick viewe, tyll the Parliament was ended'. (Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 69v.) There are only two extant 
copies of part III published separately, all other copies containing all three parts. There is no complete manuscript copy of 
the Apologie in existence, but there is a short, near-verbatim manuscript of pages 113-7 of part III in LPL, MS 2004, fo. 
8lr-v. 
2 This opinion was held by several puritans. See the many treatises written against oaths in LPL, MS 2004, fos. 72-8, 83-7. 
3 Giles Jacob's law dictionary defined an oath as 'an Affirmation or Denial of any Thing, before one or more who have 
authority to administer the same, for the Discovery and Advancement of Truth and Right, calling God to witness that the 
Testimony is true'. Jacob, LflWdictionmy, sig. Uuulr. 
4 Cosin, Apologie, III, 8. 
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definition of an oath, 'a calling or takinge to recorde or witnesse of the sacred name of 
God ... for the confirmation of the trueth of such thinges which we speak'5 was quite similar to 
Cosin's, but the requisite conditions Morice and Cosin prescribed for the giving or taking of 
oaths differed. Cosin was not persuaded that all of Morice's conditions for the taking of an 
oath could be met in every case. For example, Morice had affirmed that one of the central 
purposes of an oath was to protect innocence. 6 Cosin pointed our that if a guilty defendant 
took an oath, 'it is most deare that (by such oathes) none Innocencie is protected, bur nocencie 
eid1er more heaped vp vpon d1e partie himselfe; or else discouered by the witnesses.'7 He 
declared that the same point was valid in a different context: what innocence was protected by 
swearing allegiance to the queen's supremacy? The alleged defects and omissions in Morice's 
conditions for the giving and taking of oaths prompted Cosin to enumerate his own 
conditions. 
Cosin affirmed that an oath must always be kept unless 1) what was promised was evil, 
regardless of whether the evil was known to the party at the time of swearing; 2) the oath 
would prevent a great good from occurring, such as a man of sound doctrine and good 
education refusing to become a minister of God; and 3) it were discovered after making the 
oath that the keeping of it were impossible or wrong. For example, once Herod realised his 
oath had bound him to order the death of J ohl1 the Baptist, he should have retracted his oath. 
Similarly, if person B was expecting payment from person A and B consequently promised to 
pay person C the same amount, if the money from A never arrived, B should be excused from 
having to keep his oath to pay C. These were the only conditions for negating an oath, said 
Cosin.s 
There were also different kinds of oaths. As Morice had divided oaths into public and 
private, Cosin divided them into assertory and promissory. An assertory oath was a promise to 
5 Morice, Treatise, 3. See also above, 56, for lviorice's conditions. 
6 This was hardiy more: than an invention by Morice. There is no evidence in English history that the need to protect 
innocence was located in the oath ibdf. Holdsworth, EnyJisb law, III and N. In Sa/em and Bizaflce, St. Gelman 
complained that it was the duty of judges presiding over heresy cases to protect innocent men from the taint or ignominy 
of heresy, bur he did not draw a link betwt't'n innoct'nce and the /'X offiirio oath. Rt'printt'd in Mort', Wm-ks, t'd. Guy, 
Keen, Miller, McGugan; X; 359-60. 
7 Cosin, Apologie. III. 161. To protect innocence was only one of Morice's several reasons for taking an oath. Cosin 
presumably agreed with the others which were: to glorify God, to confirm the truth, to maintain justice, and to put an end 
to strife. See above, 56. 
S Cos in, Apologie, III,14-5. 
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affirm the truth regarding some act or event, past or present. These oaths could not be 
dispensed by human authority. Promissory oaths validated a promise to perform some action 
in the future. Some promissory oaths might be dispensed with, said eosin, if they met the 
three conditions listed above.'} It can readily be seen how eosin used these definitions to break 
the ground for his own arguments which were to follow. The ex officio oath fell into the 
categoty of assertory oaths, since it was a promise to confirm the truth of past or present facts. 
By forbidding assertory oaths to be dispensed by any human authority, eosin had already 
negated the puritan claim that a man was not compelled to honour his oath if he were forced 
to reveal his own or others' offences. 10 
One of the central challenges brought by Morice, Beale, and other puritans against the 
oath was that it was contrary to justice to administer any oath which allowed the judge to 
examine the defendant touching the crime itself. 11 eosin spent the bulk of part III of the 
Apologie answering this daim. I2 eosin's defence of the oath embraced five main fronts: oaths 
administered to defendants in criminal matters were legal on the grounds that 1) they 
accorded with the laws of the realm; 2) similar oaths were routinely administered in temporal 
courts (thereby disproving a repugnance); 3) they accorded with canon and civil law; 4) they 
accorded with scripture and the primitive and modern churches; and 5) they accorded with 
reason. eosin maintained that oaths were neither administered in all ex officio cases nor might 
be justified in all circumstances. The most obvious case in which an oath might not be 
tendered was in capital cases, endangering the life or limb of the defendant. The laws of 
England forbade such an oath to be tendered as it was supposed a man would value his life 
and limbs above an honest oath and certain punishment. 13 Yet forbearing to administer an 
oath in matters touching liberty or good name was another matter. eosin believed that if the 
9 Cosin, Apologie, III, 16. 
10 This argument of the puritans is discussed below in this chapter at 159-60. 
11 The phrase 'examine the defendant touching the crime itsdf' referred to the judge's authority to ask defendants directly 
whether they committed the crime in question. 
12 Of the sixteen chapters in part III, nine deal specifically with a defence of administering oaths that force defendants to 
answer to the crime itself, while three deal sporadically with the same subject. 
13 The one exception to this rule wa:> in caseS of Climes agaimt the person of the prince, where not only should an oath bc 
imposed at the very least, but torture if necessary. Cosin, Apologie, III, 38, 42. For a discussion of perjury as a crime of 
part-ecclesiastical, part-temporal nature, see Michael 0_ Gordon's essays, 'The perjury statute of 1563: 3 case history of 
confusion', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 104 (1980) 434-54; and 'The invention of a common law 
crime: perjury and the Elizabethan courts', American journal of LeJ?:tZi History, 24 (1980) 145-70. 
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imposing of oaths were prohibited under these conditions, there might as well be no oaths at 
all, for even small actions such as debt and detinue carried with them the possibility of 
perjured testimony from men seeking to secure their goods and property against loss. 14 
Likewise, all legal actions questioned a man's good name to a certain degree in that each suit 
originated in an irreconcilable disagreement between two parties. This view, however, was 
mitigated by the notion that an oath ought not to be offered to a defendant if the judge was 
certain he would swear falsely.15 
The puritans' concern that defendants would sooner perJure themselves than accuse 
themselves was largely dismissed by eosin regarding cases not capital. Simply to forbear 
imposing an oath on a defendant touching the crime itself for fear of perjury was tantamount 
to admitting that a man suspected of a crime ought not to confess it. 16 Similarly, eosin found 
nothing amiss in tendering an oath to men of suspected faith and credit, although Morice was 
strictly opposed to the practice on the grounds that perjury was extremely probable. 17 Again, 
the difference between canon law and common law traditions was brought into sharp contrast, 
this time by the issue of perjury. At the heart of many of eosin's arguments was [he goal of 
involving the defendant in the court's verdict by confessing his own crime. Though his 
insistence on it in all cases was not as strong as that of his medieval counterparts (for example, 
he accepted that confession in most capital cases was not to be extorted by oath), confession of 
the crime was still a higher priority in general than fear of perjury. Morice, on the other hand 
reflected the assumptions of the common law, which placed no importance on confession since 
circumstantial proof was sufficient for conviction by a jury. For this reason, Morice tended to 
reject convoluted schemes designed to force confession of crimes at the risk of perjury. 18 
To allay his opponents' fears that the high commission was intent on ransacking men's 
consciences, eosin devoted some attention to describing instances when ex officio oaths could 
14 Cosin, Apologie, III, 77-9. (Pages are misprinted '79', 'SO', and 'SI'.) 
15 Cosin, Apologie, III, 3S-9. Morice argued that the ex officio oath was a case in point. 
16 Cosin, Apologie. III,4S-9. 
17 Cosin responded that he knew no law or divine who had ever required such a prohihition. Besides, ' ... 01 man may he 
suspected, yea and diffamed also for conuersation of life, and yet without iust cause: yea, and though there bee cause of 
the fame and suspicion; yet is it not (in charitie) to be presumed that euery one, who (through frailtie) hath offended; will 
therefore forsweare himselfe, when he shall bee put to an oathe.' Cosin, Apologie, III, 138. 
18 See also below, 183. 
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not be imposed by ecclesiastical judges. If a criminal suit was moved by a prosecutor rather 
than by the judge ex officio and the crime was completely hidden, Cosin accepted that the 
defendanr was not bound by oath to answer to the crime itself. The justification for this was 
the ancient canon law maxim that 'meere secrete sinnes neede not be published, but are to be 
left vmo God alone: De occultis Ecclesia non iudicat.' For this reason, at visitations and other 
general enquiries the oaths taken by denouncers and presenters included a declaration that 
they were only reporting what they actually knew or believed to have taken place. 19 A judge, 
therefore, might not query a defendant respecting his hidden thoughts or secret deeds. 'For 
before they be (at least) so manifested, it is not of any possibilitie, to make enquirie or 
question after particular crimes, when they bee not so much as supposed to be done.'2o It 
would seem by this statement that Cosin, like the puritans, disapproved of ecclesiastical judges 
enquiring of the private thoughts or actions of defendams. The operative issue, however, was 
the distinction between purely secret sins, and sins which, though in a sense secret, had become 
suspected or in evidence, and a credible report of them brought to the judge. 
Another case in which a judge might not administer an oath in criminal matters was in 
special enquiries when a defendant refused to rake a preliminary oath to affirm or deny the 
existence of a fame concerning his own supposed misbehaviour. If the party refused to swear 
either to affirm or deny the existence of such a fame, he incurred contumacy for, in effect, 
accusing the judge of attempting to establish something which, in itself, was not illegal. 
Should a defendant refuse to take this preliminary oath, the judge was prohibited from 
proceeding to administer an oath touching the crime itself, until witnesses could be produced 
who might substantiate the fame. 21 
While utterly hidden faults were beyond the cognisance of ecclesiastical courts, fames of 
crimes committed might be taken up by a judge, whether by 'mere office' or by way of 
information. 
19 Cosin, Ap%gie, III, 113-4; see also Camhridge, Ely MS F/5/45, 98-9. 
20 Cosin, Apoloff,ie, III, 180-1. In another place Cosin said, 'There is none equitie to enquire of faultes that are absolutely 
secrete and hidden.' (III, 114). Again, 'The Magistrate ... cannot possibly in special! or particular manner interrogate him of 
that whereof he neuer heard, nor once dreamed.' (III, 79-80, pages misprinted '81' and '82'). There was no doubt in 
Morice's mind, however, that ecclesiastical courts engaged in this very practice. See also the quotation of Morice on 184. 
21 Cosin, Apologie, Ill, 117. 
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But if a man be once discouered thereof by Presentment, denunciation, Fame, or such like, 
according to Iawe: then is not the fault simply secret, but reuealed (in some sort) abroade, or to 
the Magistrate, who for auoyding scandal! to Christian religion, and for reformation of the 
partie, may thus enquire of the offence, to see it redressed, and punished. 22 
This passage underscored a major quarrel between eosin and his adversaries. While his most 
radical opponents asserted that an ordinary could not cite any man without a formal accuser 
and judicially received witnesses, eosin extended the frontier of the ordinary's authority to 
the realm of public report and the 'common voyce'.23 
Whether a defendant was required on oath to answer simply to the circumstances of the 
crime or to the crime itself as well depended on whether the suit was moved by accusation or 
ex officio. eosin affirmed that in accusation cases the defendant was not required to answer to 
the crime itself but only to the circumstances unless 'greatly to be holden suspected' by the 
judge, that is, unless probable evidence was deduced against the defendant. 24 In cases moved 
by the judge ex officio, however, he was required to answer to both the circumstances and the 
crime itself. Why was ex officio procedure privileged in this respect, asked eosin? It was 
essentially a matter of integrity and efficiency: 
... when the Iudge proceedeth by enqulfle; before hee offer the oath to the partie, the 
presumptions against the partie are knowen vnto the Iudge: but when by way of accusation, till 
the accuser haue brought in such proofes as hee can, they are not knowen vnto him. Besides, the 
Accuser doeth it of malice, or for reuenge, or for other satisfaction of his owne priuate humour, 
for the most part: But the Iudge (by common entendement) doeth it of sinceritie of minde, 
and for the good of the common weale. 25 
22 Cosin, Apologie, Ill, 79-80 (pages misprinted '81' and '82'). Fames were not simply rumours but rampant, notorious 
rumours. A defendant was permitted to appeal his sentence if he had been driven to his purgation by a fame - in which 
case inferior judges were required to prove the existence of the fame (but not the high commissioners). See also above, 
122-3. 
23 Cosin, Apologie, Ill, 179. 
24 Cosin, Apologie, III,45. 
25 Cosin, Apologie, III, 45-6. Cosin pressed a very similar argument at III, 116, concluding that in accusations a man was not 
to be put to oath regarding the crime itself, since 'no man is bound (simply) to furnish vp his aduersaries intention, who (at 
his owne perill) ought to come (otherwise) sufficiently prepared.', If the accuser, however, made 'an halfe proofe', 'then 
may the Iudge tender to the defendant an oath (which he cannot refuse) ... '. 
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To a common lawyer of the sixteenth century, nothing could have sounded more outrageous! 
The idea of an institutionalized 'sincerity' which precluded the possibility that a judge might 
be vulnerable to human affections such as malice or partiality must have angered and 
bewildered the Apologie 's readers at the Inns of Court. For his own part Morice was fuming. 
'Shall we imagine' he protested, 'that spirituall I udges are allwaies free from euill and corrupt 
affections? yf they ... had not to apparantlie bewrayed their iniquitie within the memorie of 
man, I might perhappes be brought to thinck that their proceadinges coulde be none other 
then vpright and sincere.' 26 According to Cosin, however, the judge was untainted by tile 
'priuate humour' or 'malice' of an accuser and was fully apprised of the presumptions against 
the defendant before the trial (through fame, denunciation, ete.) and therefore was in an ideal 
position to conduct both fair and speedy criminal prosecutions. 
To summarise, Cosin's conditions under which an oath touching the cnme itself in 
criminal matters could not be imposed were the following: 1) in capital matters (except in 
crimes against the person of the prince); 2) in matters where the crime was simply hidden or 
secret; 3) in matters when the judge was certain that perjury would ensue, but not generally in 
cases involving only loss of liberty or good name; 4) in cases moved by an accuser, unless the 
accuser greatly burdened the defendant with probable proof; and 5) when the defendanr 
refused a preliminary oath to affirm or deny the existence of a rumour concerning his own 
suspected misbehaviour. Stated in the positive, an oath could be imposed in non-capital, 
criminal matters moved ex officio by way of fames or denunciation regarding some crime, 
providing the accused agreed to affirm or deny that the fame existed; and also in cases of 
treason, heresy, or in accusation cases when the prosecutor burdened the defendant with 
probable proof. 
In the Treatise Morice had contended that the laws of the realm stated that defendants 
should not be forced under any circumstances to answer to the crime itself, and that any such 
forced oaths by any court were repugnant to the laws of England.27 Cosin confuted this claim 
in chapters seven and eight of part III. Although Morice had taken up the issue of Magna 
26 LPL, MS 234, fo. 43r. 
27 Morice, Treatise, 30. 
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Carta at the end of his discussion of statutes, Cosin was keen to begin with it. His 
interpretation of Magna Carta was radically different from Morice's and equally advantageous 
to his own cause. Cosin stated that Chapter 39, which declared that no man could be 
apprehended, imprisoned, or deprived but by the law of the land, neither addressed 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction nor related to it in any way. For that nlatter, said Cosin, neither did 
any part of Magna Carta relate to ecclesiastical courts except where it was plainly expressed. 
He explained that dlis was because at the time of Magna Carta's composition the English 
church and its courts were considered an estate separate from the temporal courts, and 
therefore the king might not alter the laws governing church courts 'without [the] disanuUing 
and reuoking of that which immediately afore (euen by the same Acte) hee had first of all 
confirmed vnto them.'28 eosin applied the same criteria to the statute of Marlborough (52 
Henry III), which declared that no free-holder could be compelled to take an oath against his 
wilP9 Morice's claim that by the statute 42 Edward III c. 3 no man might be 'put to aunswere 
without presentment before Iustices, or matter of recorde, or by due processe, or by writt 
originall after the auncient lawe of this Lande' was also rejected by eosin as applying only to 
temporal courts.30 Cosin was vexed by Morice's implied assertion: that pre-Reformation 
statutes passed in Parliament ought to apply fully and equally to ecclesiastical courts as well as 
temporal. 'Woulde hee haue them to proceede in the selfe same maner that common lawe 
courts doe? hee might aswell exact of them Indictments, and afterward tryals by Iuries of 
twelue.'31 
The issue in debate was whether pre-Henrician parliamentary statutes that used absolute 
language such as 'no freeman' or 'the law of the land' included ecclesiastical as well as 
temporal courts and their litigants. eosin's contention was that since ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
was at that time thought to be under the power of Rome, all pre-Reformation statutes only 
28 Cosin, Ajlologie, lIT, 70. Cosin was referring to chapter one of Magna Carra in which the Church of England was declared 
free and its rights and privileges inviolable. 
29 Cosin, Ajlologie. III, 71-2. Morice argued that this statute was furrher confirmation of the illegality of forced generaloaths 
in ecclesiastical courrs. Morice, Treatise. 45. 
30 Morice had wrongly cited this statute as 43 Edward III c. 9 and Cosin remarked that the parliament of that year 'hath not 
so many chapters'. but he asserred that if such a law did exist it would not furrher Morice's case. Cosin, Apologie, III 72-3 
(pages misprinted '74' and '75'). 
31 Cosin. ApoloJ(ie. Ill. 73 (page misprinted '75'). 
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addressed temporal jurisdiction, otherwise they would have clearly encroached on the liberties 
of the church. Morice's argument was that what was or was not believed at the time about the 
independence of the ecclesiastical courts was immateriaL At the present time, he argued, all 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was united to the crown, and since no statutes remaining in force 
were contrary to the royal supremacy, all pre-Reformation statutes ought to be understood as 
embracing the whole of the queen's realm, all of her courts. 32 
eosin also disagreed with Morice's handling of the preamble to the Heresy Reform Act 
of 1534 (25 Henry VIII c. 14) which repealed the act de heretico comburendo of 1401 (2 
Henry IV c. 15), because eosin found nothing in that preamble which in any way mentioned 
the administering of oaths, which, presumably, had been Morice's reason for citing it in the 
first place. 33 Likewise, the Act of Six Articles (31 Henry VIII c. 14), which Morice had 
claimed 'rejected and disallowed whollie as vnjust' ex officio oaths, did not address oaths 
either. 34 'Why Sir, it speaketh not of [oaths] at all: and can you therefore gather, that it doth 
not allowe, but rather disallowe them'? At any rate, eosin noted, since the Act of Six Articles 
was repealed, what good could this argument do for Morice's cause? 35 This final point was the 
most effective one. Morice had cited the Heresy Act mainly to demonstrate the alleged 
illegality of ex officio procedure, thereby attempting to disallow all processes contained with 
that procedure, including the oath . .% If his contention that [he preamble to the Heresy Act 
and the Act of Six Articles had forever banished ex officio procedure was true, he would have 
outwitted eosin on this issue, but both statutes had been repealed in the first year of Edward's 
reign by 1 Edward VI c. 12 as eosin incisively pointed out. Furcilermore, the context of both 
of the Henrician acts was heresy trials, not ecclesiastical court trials in general. 37 
32 See also 192-3. 
33 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 73-4 (pages misprinted 75' and 76'). The act did not specifically address oaths but it did establish 
the injustice of sentencing heretics without due accusation or presentment. SR, II, 125-8. See also 51, 64-5, 129-30, 133, 
205-10, and 217 for further discussion ofrhe Heresy Reform Act of 1534. 
34 Morice, Treatise, 35. 
35 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 74 (page misprinted 76'). Here, as in other places of the ApoloKie, Cosin's quotations of Morice as 
taken from Cosin's manuscript version of the Treatise differ substantially from the same passage in the printed copy of the 
Treatise. 
36 Morice, Treatise, 34-5. 
37 For the statute which repealed the Heresy Act and the Act of Six Articles, see SR, IV, part I, 18, the preamble to which 
explains the causes of repeal. See also Diarmaid MacCulloch, 'Henry VIII and the reform of the church', Henry VIII, ed. 
MacCulloch, 174-5, 177-8; Guy, Tudor Eny:/and, 203-5; Elton, Constitution, 64-7. 
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Morice's review of statutes was calculated (0 show that the laws of the realm proscribed 
the imposing of ex officio oaths on defendants in criminal matters. From this premise he drew 
the conclusion that ecclesiastical judges had superseded their authority and that such an 
offence constituted praemunire, an affront to the queen's regality and laws. Cosin admitted 
the conclusion flowed from (he premises, but he rejected the premise. Morice had cited the 
statute which established the prohibition against praemunire, 16 Richard II c. 5, but Cosin 
pointed out that that law was made 'in such corrupt times' when it was believed that the 
ecclesiastical laws of the realm were not united to the prince's sceptre and throne: 
For the Bishops then did not claime their Iurisdictions Ecclesiasticall next and immediately 
vnder God, from the Crowne as now they doe. But seeing this parte of Regall power is nowe no 
lesse trudy and fully vested in the crowne then is the T emporall; so as the Lawes allowed for 
the gouernement Ecclesiasticall are termed by sundry Parliaments, The Queenes Ecclesiastical 
lawes, and Lawes of the Realme; as well as those which were first and originally made heere. 
And the Bishops are proued to haue their authoritie and lurisdiction Ecclesiastical!, deriued 
downe vnto them from the Queenes Highnes, vnder the great Seale of England, as vpon 
sundrie incident occasions hath beene shewed afore. 38 
It was the same argument Cosin had used with Magna Carta. The pre-Henrician statutes must 
be understood within their context. Like Magna Carta, the statute of praemunire operated 
under the assumption of two separate estates, the temporal and the spiritual, which were not 
understood at the time to be united under the crown. Therefore, because the two estates were 
now recognised to be fused together under the crown and ecclesiastical judges received their 
power directly from the queen's authority, the church's laws were also the queen's ecclesiastical 
laws and therefore the laws of the realm. Praemunire was an obsolete issue. 39 This view, 
together with Cosin's interpretation of the Submission of the Clergy, 40 constituted a 
reinvention of the context of the 1530s. Cosin saw the clergy as a separate estate not only 
before the Reformation but after. The only difference was that in the post-Reformation 
38 Cos in, Apologie, III, 85-6. This was essentially the same argument (but stated more boldly) that Cosin had advanced in 
part I. Praemunire, according to Cosin, was not possible as it had been before the Reformation. See above, 100-4. 
39 Cosin, Apologie, III, 89-90. 
40 See above, 93-4, 98-9. 
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church the two estates met in the person of the queen, to whom (hey owed a common 
allegiance.41 Cosin's conception of the clergy as a separate societas had more in common with 
the old catholic view than with the views of most late Elizabethan conformists. The 
significance of this peculiar philosophy will be considered again in chapter eight. 42 
Later in chapter seven Cosin confuted his adversaries' attempts to demonstrate an 
intolerable disparity between the criminal procedures in temporal and ecclesiastical courts. 
They had employed this line of attack for the purpose of showing that ecclesiastical courts 
were repugnant to the laws of the realm. Cosin agreed that ecclesiastical judges were bound to 
practise only those laws that were neither 'contrary nor repugnant to the Queenes prerogatiue 
royal!, nor to the Lawes, Statutes and Customes of this Realme', but he denied any such 
contrariety existed. 43 He first assailed Morice's views on oaths touching criminal matters in 
Star Chamber and Chancery. Morice had stated that even though those courts examined 
defendants on their oaths, 'it would not followe that the same might be practized in the 
Courtes and Consistories Ecclesiasticall, vnlesse the like allowance thereto and consent of the 
whole Realme might be prooued also.'44 Cosin noted that Parliament embodied the consent 
of the realm, yet Parliament had never made any laws establishing oaths in Star Chamber or 
Chancery. Why should the consent of the realm be necessary for oaths in ecclesiastical courts, 
he asked, 'which haue reteined the practise of such oath beyond all memorie of man, and 
beyond most Records nowe extant?'45 This was a typical example of Morice's frequent 
attempts to subjugate ecclesiastical courts either to common law procedures or to popular 
ratification. Cosin was correct about the foundations of Star Chamber and Chancery. 
Although both courts had been acknowledged and their procedures sometimes regulated by 
Parliament in small details, neither had been originally established or 'authorised' by statute, 
41 Cosin's view was plainly dissimilar to opinions of the royal supremacy during Henry VIII's reign. In the 1540s Lord 
Chancellor Thomas Audley cautioned Bishop Stephen Gardiner of Winchester to 'look at the Act of Supremacy [25 
Henry VIII c. 1], and there the king's doings be restrained to spiritual jurisdiction; and in another act [25 Henry VIII c. 
19] it is provided, that no spiritual law shall have place contrary to a common law or act of parliament.' The clergy's 
authority had not been made automatically derivative from the king, Audley argued, otherwise, 'you bishops would enter 
in with the king, and, by means of his supremacy, order the laity as ye listed.' John Foxe, Acts ilnd 1Il0nUI1leT1ts, cd. G. 
Townsend (8 vols.; London, 1843-9) VI, 43. See also Guy, Tudor England, 371-2; Guy, The "imperial crown" and the 
liberty of the subject', Court, country, and culture, ed. Kunze and Brautigam, 72-3. 
42 See below, chapter 8, especially 254-5. 
43 Cosin, Apologie, III,56-7. 
44 Morice, Treatise, 38. 
45 Cosin, Apolof(ie, III, 93. 
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and neither was a common law court except in the narrowest sense that common law was the 
benchmark for equitable intervention and relief in Chancery cases. 46 
Morice's rendering of procedure in Star Chamber also came under scrunny. He had 
asserted in the Treatise that defendants in Star Chamber were shown the bill of information 
against them and allowed counsel before they were required to answer upon oath, except in 
ore tenus cases. 47 Cosin believed that the exception of ore tenus proved there were occasions 
when oaths might be administered without the defendant having the benefit of seeing the 
articles or receiving counsel. 48 In fact, he claimed that ore tenus proceedings in Star Chamber 
closely resembled criminal proceedings in ecclesiastical courts, where defendants were shown 
the articles only after they had answered them. Cosin omitted several important derails about 
ore tenus proceedings, though. First of all, ore tenus was generally used by Star Chamber in 
extraordinary cases, and often the defendant was trapped into confessing by the use of 
intricate and captious questioning. Second, ore tenus could only be used after confession by 
the party or else by his consent. 49 Furthermore, Elizabethan and Jacobean writings on Star 
Chamber procedure reflected confusion and doubt among jurists regarding the validity of 
proceeding ore tenus. Some believed it was an unjust way of proceeding which violated Magna 
Carta, while others hinted it was not as sure a method as proceeding by bilJ.5° Overall, Cosin's 
comparison between ore tenus procedure and ex officio procedure was not accurate. 
Cosin also argued that defendants in ecclesiastical courts held the same privilege as their 
counterparts in Star Chamber to refuse to answer questions impertinent to the charge against 
them. But he qualified his claim by adding, 'But who shall then iudge, whether they be 
impertinent, or not? shall the partie himselfe? no verily, but (as it is in the Starre-chamber) the 
court i[ selfe: or else some of them [hat are skilfull in lawe; being thereunto required by the 
46 Wilkinson, The Chancery under Edward III, 1-10; Guy, Star Chamber, 2-7. 
47 Morice, Treatise, 39. Ore tenus cases are also discussed at 66-7, footnote 101; and 195, footnote Ill. 
48 Interrogatories in Star Chamber were administered in private, and the defendant was not allowed to see the articles ahead 
of time or have the help of counsel while he was answering interrogatories. 'The examiner readeth an interrogatory, and 
requireth an answer to the same, and then readeth another'. The defendant's verbal answers, however, could be amended 
before he put them down in writing at the end of the examination, at which point his answers were made final. Hudson, 
'Star Chamber', CoIlecttlneajuridictl, ed. Hargrave, 170. 
49 Hudson, 'Star Chamber', Collectaneafuridica, ed. Hargrave, 127; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 183-4. 
50 Lambard, Archiol1, 209-11; Hudson, 'Star Chamber', Collectanea juridica, ed. Hargrave, 127. 
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rest.' 51 We can imagine that Cosin's assessment of what constituted 'pertinent' questions 
differed markedly from the assessment of a common law judge. As Cosin demonstrated 
earlier, ecclesiastical judges were concerned with a very wide range of words, thoughts, and 
deeds, and their ex officio interrogations often touched on matters relating to defendants' 
private conversations with friends or the religious opinions of his family. Again, the 
comparison with interrogatories in Star Chamber was weak. 52 
Although Morice had claimed that common law courts did not impose oaths in cases 
where liberty or good name were at stake, Cosin noted that Star Chamber tendered oaths to 
defendants where infamy might result from a conviction and where liberty was restrained by 
imprisonment or in rare cases, banishment. 53 In general, said Cosin, defendants in 
ecclesiastical courts were treared more favourably than in Star Chamber, where punishments 
were more grievous and defendants were often at the mercy of their adversaries. 54 He 
compared the treatment of defendants in accusation cases in both courts. In Star Chamber 
when suits were moved by a private accuser, 'who (as the law intendeth) doeth it for malice, 
reuenge, or some other particular respect', (he accused was liable to be examined on oath 
regarding his alleged crime, yet in equivalent suits in ecclesiastical courts the defendant was 
never to be examined on oath rouching the crime itself. There he might only be questioned on 
oath touching the crime itself if the suit were ex officio, at the instance of the judge, who, 
'euen for his duties sake, and for the publike commoditie of (he common weale, doeth make 
the Inquirie.'55 
51 Cosin, Apologie, III, 95. 
52 A perfect example of Star Chamber interrogation is a case in which Cosin himself administered the interrogatories: 
CartWright's trial in 1591, discussed in more detail below at 164-5. By Cosin's own report, CartWright refused to answer 
questions that were impertient to the charge expressed in the bill, many of which he would have been forced to answer in 
the high commission on oath. See also Collinson, Elizabethan puritan movement, 417-9; Hudson, 'Star Chamber', 
Collectanea juridica, ed. Hargrave, 164; Barnes, 'Due process and slow process', American Journal of Legal History, 6 
(1962) 221-49. 
53 Cos in, Apologie, III, 68. But neither Star Chamber nor Chancery were common law courts, according to Morice. They 
were special COUrts which, though they sometimes borrowed common law practices, could not be classified as such. See 
below, 185. 
54 Cosin, Apologie, III, 55. 
55 Cosin, Apologie, III, 54-5. This was inaccurate in two ways. First, by Cosin's own previous admission, defendants in 
ecclesiastical courts could be made to answer to the crime itself in accusation cases if the accuser made a probable proof 
(see above, 127, 143). Second, Star Chamber judges could only force defendants to answer on oath to the crime itself in 
non-capital cases. Hudson, 'Star Chamber', Collecttlneajuridictl, ed. Hargrave, 164; BL, Lansdowne MS 639, fo. 5r. See 
also the Star Chamber case of Lord Vaux and Sir Thomas Tresham, BL, Harley MS 859, fos. 50r-51 r. 
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Cosin went to great lengths to illustrate (he similitude between criminal procedure in 
ecclesiastical courts and Star Chamber, bur he was mistaken on the crucial points. It was true 
that defendants in Star Chamber were required to answer interrogatories on oath and that 
those who refused this oath were usuaUy imprisoned for contempt,56 bur they were not 
compelled to answer any interrogatories until after declaration of the charges against them had 
been made. 57 In contrast, high commission often required answers on oath before the charges 
had been read to the defendant. 
Commenting briefly on Chancery procedure, Cosin explained that although for the 
most part Chancery was a court of equity involving civil rather than criminal cases, it 
nevertheless witnessed 'many bils of complaintes ... pur vp against defendants, wherein sundry 
their lewd practises and misdemeanors criminall bee deduced and set foorth; and yet must the 
defendant make perfite and particular answer thereto, vpon his oath.' This was significant since 
Chancery, the oldest court in England, originated all writs and commissions 'wherupon the 
other courts do ground all their proceedings.' Bur again Cosin's attempt to liken Chancery's 
oaths to those of the high commission was not fully convincing. 58 
Of the five separate defences Cosin devised for ex officio oaths, we have already looked 
at two: first, that ex officio oaths were permitted by the laws of the realm; and second, [hat 
since such oaths were often administered in temporal courts as well, there was no repugnance 
between the two jurisdictions. We now come to his third line of defence, that ex officio oaths 
accorded with civil and canon law. Cosin mustered for this defence the opinions of civilians 
and canonists both in England and on the continent, modern and ancient. Here his training as 
a canon and civil lawyer served him best, as the endless and cluttered notes in the margins 
56 If the defendant refused to answer interrogatories he was imprisoned for contempt until he complied. He could not be 
proceeded against pro confesso (as ifhe had confessed guilt), because refusal to answer interrogatories was not equivalent 
to refusing to answer the charges ,contained in the bill. Thus, refusal to answer the interrogatories did not imply guilt. In 
this case, therefore, men could and did remain in prison indefinitely. If, however, the defendant refused even to answer 
the charge contained in the bill, he was imprisoned and given a second hearing at a later date. If he still refused after this, 
he was assigned another hearing date and proceeded against pro confesso. Hudson, 'Star Chamber', CoLIectanea juridicil, 
ed. Hargrave, 167-8, 171-2; Barnes, 'Due process and slow process', American Journal of LeKal Hi.<tory, 6 (1962) 221-49; 
BL, Lansdowne MS 639, fos. 2v-5r. 
57 BL, Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, fo. llr. 
58 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 50-1. A defendant in Chancery 'was required not merely to meet the points of the plaintiff's bill with 
a negative or affirmative, but to answer as to the general truth of the matter. He did not always have to reveal any precise 
or specific details, save in so far as the plaintiff had attempted to set up discovery.' Jones, Chancery, 214. 
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testifY. 59 He first defended the memorandum on oaths in ecclesiastical courts produced by 
the high commissioners in 1591 60 from the attacks of Morice, who had thrown doubt on its 
assertions. He asserted that 'A Iudge may not interrogate iudicially: but where he is ledde 
thereunto by good equitie. But there is none equitie to enquire of faulres that are absolutely 
secrete and hidden.'61 Yet once a crime was 'but blowen abroad' by means of rumours, fame, 
or notoriety of the fact, the judge was empowered by canon law to enquire of the offence ex 
officio and, if necessary, to administer an oath to the suspect. Thereafter he might examine 
the defendant indefinitely upon his oath, as he saw fit, even before witnesses were produced. 62 
'Yet to prooue further, that by these lawes, an oath is appointed and may be ministred in 
some cases touching a cause criminal!', Cosin compiled a prodigious list of quotations and 
references from the Code ofJustinian, the ancient Fathers, and the Councils. 63 While most of 
his citations were taken from the customs of Italy, Hungary, France, Germany, and even 
ancient Sparta and Greece, he intended to show how it had been the custom of both pagan 
and Christian nations to urge and require oaths in criminal matters. But in the Treatise Morice 
had complained that the high commissioners were unfaithful to their own law. He had cited 
the canon law maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, adding that the commissioners 
themselves had cited this maxim in their memorandum on oaths, apparently for no reason 
since they ignored it in practice.64 Cosin argued that this maxim only applied in cases when 
the crime was completely hidden and secret. 65 He maintained that Morice had deliberately 
misconstrued the text of the memorandum which clearly stated, 'nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere, tamen proditus per famam tenetur seipsum ostendere vtrum possit suam innocentiam 
ostendere & seipsum purgare.' Thus, he concluded (hat a man might not be forced to discover 
his own crime unless he was accused by fame (tamen proditus per famam). This qualifYing 
phrase was 'as a gloase confoundinge the text', objected Morice, which 'wholie and alrogither 
59 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, chapter 9, passim. 
60 LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r-v. 
61 Cosin, ApoloKie, III,114. 
62 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 116, 148; Levack, Civillawyer.i, 150-1, 154, 156; Brundage, MedieIJal canon law, 144-53. 
63 The references begin with the civil laws in the times of the Roman emperors before Christianity, followed by the civil and 
canon laws of early Chrisitian emperors and finally, the nations of Europe. Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 118-24. 
64 See above, 62. 
65 Cosin, Apolof(ie, III, 113-4. 
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destroy[s] that rule or principle'. Cosin rejoined, 'yet is it not any glosse, but aswell warranted 
by lawe as the rule it selfe. neither doth it confound, but shewe howe that rule is (truely) to bee 
vnderstoode'.66 
Part of the problem was that the definition of self-accusation was itself a particularly 
divisive issue, made more difficult by Cosin's muddying of the waters. Morice had cited the 
civil law principle that the purpose of enquiry was not (0 'make the partie by oath or 
examination (0 be his owne accuser; but (0 receiue information, and witnesses against him.' 67 
Cosin agreed that no man was compelled (0 become his own accuser, but was rather 'by 
discouery of the whole trueth, (0 cleare himselfe of the crime after he be (as it were) accused, 
and brought into question by some of those lawfull meanes, which open a way vnto speciall 
Enquirie.'68 He disliked his opponents' use of the word 'accuser' because it was too easily 
confused with one who formally prosecuted a suit for a private grievance, and of course no 
man was expected (0 prosecute himself. If, however, a guilty party answered truthfully upon 
oath, Cosin held that he had faithfully discovered (he whole truth of the matter, not accused 
himself. 69 Cosin thus redefined acceptable self-incrimination as 'discovery of the whole truth', 
and it is now evident that his explanation of assertory oaths at the beginning of part III was 
carefully articulated to fit into this concept. As we will recall, Cosin defined an assertory oath 
(which could not be dispensed with by any human authority) as a promise (0 affirm the (ruth 
of past or present facts. 7o Thus, defendants who were compelled by ecclesiastical judges (0 
answer on oath to the crime itself merely 'discovered the whole truth concerning their own or 
other men's past or present facts, thereby honourably performing the conditions of an 
assertory oath. Cosin's strategy was a masterful reassembly of the components of the ex officio 
oath into a statement aimed at extolling the cooperative defendant as an honest man and 
good Christian.71 
66 Morice, Treatise, 22; Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 129. Some historians disagree about the spirit of the nemo tenetur maxim. Levy 
argues that the common lawyers misconstrued the meaning of the maxim by citing it out of context, but Helmholz 
suggests that common lawyers were merely trying to get civilians to abide by their own law. Levy, Fifth Amendment, 96-
7; Helmholz, Roman canon filw, 157-9. 
67 Morice, Treatise, 18-9. 
68 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 128. 
69 Cosin, Ap%Kie, III, 62. 
70 See also above, 139-40. 
71 Cosin, Apo1of!.ie, III, 62. 
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In assessing the high commissioners' memorandum, Morice had also complained of 'the 
extortinge by oath of the ground and foundation of the inquisicion from the partie 
conuented', which was made manifest 'by the resolution of these learned men'. 72 Cosin flatly 
denied any such conclusion could be reached from the memorandum, or that the grounds of 
inquisition were ever extorted from the parry, 'seeing no such practise is either allowed, or (I 
thinke) in this Realme heard of.73 But by Cosin's own exposition of ex officio procedute he 
had already given credibility to Morice's suspicion. The question was whether ecclesiastical 
judges cited troublesome individuals with the intent to examine them indefinitely on oath 
until they produced incriminating evidence against themselves, thereby enabling the judge to 
construct a formal charge where none originally existed. We know that the testimony of 
defendants could provide evidence upon which to base a new enquiry into the crimes of 
others,74 but Morice's claim seems impossible to substantiate one way or the otl1er. 75 
The final issue involving canon and civil law that Cosin endeavoured to address was what 
he called the 'two statutes' for the Submission of the Clergy.76 Cosin reported that Morice 
had claimed that those two statutes 'doe take away canon lawe.'77 He then argued that those 
statutes only restricted what future canons could be made by ensuring that they were not 
repugnant to the prerogatives of the crown or to the laws of the realm. The reference to the 
Submission of the Clergy, however, was thought by Cosin to be yet another diversion, since 
the oaths in question were, in his opinion, neither contrary to the laws of the realm nor in need 
72 Morice, Treatise, 22. 
73 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 128. 
74 The ex officio oath was used to examine defendants on issues pertinent to the charge against them, and as we have 
established, this consituted a wide range of private thoughts, words, and deeds. In part II Cosin enumerated eleven ways 
of initiating special enquiries besides presentment, and one of these methods was called incidens cOKnitio. This particular 
means of opening way to special enquiry occurred (in Cos in' s words) 'when vpon examination of one offendour, it falleth 
out, another of his accomplices to be discouered.' Such incriminating testimony was not considered, however, to be the 
testimony of a witness but rather that of a relater. Nevertheless, this relation or report of a crime to the judge was 
sufficient to begin a new special enquiry into the suspected crime of the accomplice. Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 65; see above, 
124-5. 
75 There is presently no evidence to validate Morice's charge, but neither is there enough data to discredit it. See also Peter 
Clark, 'The ecclesiastical commission at Canterbury', ArchaeoloKim Ctlntillna, 89 (1974) 183-97; Cambridge, Ely MS 
F/5/45; Canterbury, Z.3.25; and Usher, Rise andfall, ed Tyler. 
76 Cosin cited these in the margin as 25 Henry VIII c. 19 and 27 Henry VIII, the latter of which was probably 27 Hemy VIII 
c. 15, one of the statutes in which Henry sought aid from Parliament in setting up a commission to review the canon law. 
Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 129-30; Elton, Constitution, 340 footnote 33. 
77 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 130. In fact, Morice had said no such a thing, at least in the published version of the Treatise. On 
pages 53 and 54 he did discuss the Submission of the Clergy, commenting only that by that act, any canons contradictory 
to the royal prerogative were void and of no effect. Possibly Cosin accidentally attributed the claim to Morice when the 
author was actually Beale or another of the puritans. 
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of any special dispensation to make them 'English lawes', seeing that they had been used ll1 
England time our of mindJ8 
Let him therefore vnderstand; that all those things there required (viz. sufferance, consent, and 
custome) to make the Canons establishing such oathes to be accounted the customed, and 
ancient lawes of this Realme, originally established as lawes of the same; doe in these oathes so 
aptly concurre (as hath beene prooued) that none of his confident denials thereof, can or shall 
bee able any more to empeach them from so being then the burning of canon lawe at 
Wittenberge by Luther (when the Pope had burnt his bookes at Rome) either did, was meant, 
or yet could abrogate the continuall vse of a great part thereof in Germanie, euen vntill this day; 
or then it coulde, or ought to haue any force to disanull it here in EngiandJ9 
The puritan opinion that canon law was 'taken away' by the Henrician break with Rome was 
unsustainable. As eosin noted, the words of the act confirming the Submission of the Clergy 
was proof of that. 8o But eosin's own interpretation of that act was not entirely accurate 
either. 81 He did, however, successfully fend off the claim, especially in part I, that canon law 
no longer had any place in England. The multiple failures of the Reformatio legum 
ecclesiasticarum, discussed in the introduction, proved that there was ambivalence on the part 
of Tudor parliaments to do away completely with the ancient law of the church. 82 
In the years before the appearance of Richard Hooker's Of the laws of ecclesiastical 
polity both puritans and conformists alike relied on the use of biblical exegesis to prove the 
validity of their own view of church government. The problem was that there was no dear 
agreement on what the Bible said, even though aU English protestants held that the Bible was 
self-interpreting as well as self-authenticating. 83 Though eosin was one of the first conformists 
to articulate a defence of the established church based on legal rather than scriptural 
78 Cosin, ApoIogie, III, 13l. 
79 Ibid. 
80 The preamble stated only that 'dyverse constitucions ordynance and canons' were 'muche prejudicial!' to the royal 
supremacy and laws of the realm, which ought to be reformed. There was no suggestion of total abolition. SR, III, 460. 
81 For Cosin's interpretation see above, 93-4, 98-9. 
82 See the introduction for this discussion, 7-9. 
83 Lake, Any/ieans and puritans, 80-139, 154. 
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arguments, he was also one of the laSt to engage in the hair-splitting scriptural interpretations 
that characterised Elizabethan polemic over church government. 84 
Predictably, eosin enlisted the help of Romans chapter thirteen: 'euery soule must be 
subiect vnto the higher powers, for there is no power but of God, & the powers that be are 
ordeined of God'. Those who resisted the authorities, said eosin, resisted God himself by 
refusing to obey his chosen rulers. When God's law and man's law conflicted, men must 
naturally follow the law of God, since God's word established laws and nations rather than 
abolished them. For this reason, eosin warned that unless a man could show how scripture 
specifically and directly condemned oaths administered ex officio, they ought not to be 
resisted since they were the established law of England. 85 He rejected his opponents' claims 
that because the Bible did not expressly condone the ex officio oath that it was illegal to 
impose it. It was 'a grosse error in Diuinitie', thought eosin, 'to affirme that a man may not 
holde any humane matter with a certaine perswasion ... but onely such as we haue a positiue, or 
affirmatiue warrant for, in the word of God.'86 The oath was legitimate, eosin claimed, 
because it was not expressly condemned. But eosin also attempted to show that scripture 
aVowed oaths that were similar to ex officio oaths, even in criminal and penal causes. Ezra 
tendered an oath to the chief priests and the people of Israel 'to sweare; that they would doe 
according to this worde.' 87 Likewise, Joshua required of Achan an oath to divulge his sin 
against the Lord.88 Here again, eosin's account of the story differed considerably from 
Morice's. Morice had reasoned that Joshua administered a particular interrogatory for a 
particular crime, and although Achan answered truthfully, he did not take an oath.89 eosin 
held that Achan did take an oath because the Hebrew text indicated that he was adjured by 
Joshua, yet eosin also saw in the story an illustration of general and special enquiry: the 
84 Perhaps Cosin's argumentative strategy in the Apologie was in some sense illustrative of the sense among conformists that 
biblical exegesis was becoming a fruitless exercise in the debate over ecclesiastical discipline, since he only spent two 
chapters in part III (less than 20%) defending the ex officio oath from scripture. 
85 Cosin, Apologie, 132-3. The 'civil authorities' argument was sensible but also forced since Cosin was unable to find any 
examples in scripture which specifically endorsed the ex officio oath. 
86 'For if this were a true position; then a man might beleeue no historic to be true, which is not in the Bible; nor common 
principles, left knowne vnto vs by the light of nature (as that two and two make foure) nor that there is any such countrey 
as America, &c'. Cosin, Apologie, III, 134. 
87 Cosin, Ap%gie, III, 137; Ezra 10. 
88 Cosin, Apologie, III, 142; Joshua 7. 
89 See above, 60-1. 
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general enquiry being Joshua's sifting of me tribes and casting oflots in search of the offender, 
the special enquiry being the oam given to Achan to confess the truth of his crime for the glory 
ofGod. 90 
eosin drew omer examples from scripture to prove the legality of administering oaths in 
criminal cases: the oam imposed upon a whole city in Deuteronomy 21 to discover the 
idenrity of a murderer,91 the Jews compelled in Leviticus to discover each other's crimes for 
the good of the people ofIsrad, and Jeremiah's willing oath to answer the king on any matter 
as long as his life might be spared.92 Finally, eosin disagreed with Morice's reason for 
condemning the oath taken by Herod, in which Herod promised to give the daughter of 
Herodias anyming she wished up to half his kingdom. 93 Morice had argued me oam was 
wrong because it was undeniably rash and general, and because Herod would not be able to 
ensure that Herodias' daughter would demand something just or lawfuL Yet in eosin's 
estimation, 
... it was not the generalitie of Herods othe which was condemned. For the prophet Ieremie 
made vnto the king [Zedekiah] as generall a promise of answering what he would demaunde of 
him; as Herod made of giuing, vnto the dauncing damselL But it was the rashe vnaduisednes of 
it, rising vpon a carnall delight: and when he had made it, a more vnlawfull performance, of a 
thing simply wicked: which are the things therein to be condemned. 94 
eosin's logic seemed to be that since Zedekiah did not take advanrage of the generality of 
Jeremiall's oam to demand something unjust or wicked, that there was nothing dangerous 
about me vagueness of the oath. It was difficult to deny that Herod, by his general oath, was 
not bound to give the daughter of Herodias something unlawful should she ask for it, and she 
90 Cosin's quotation of Morice on this topic at the bottom of III, 143, either indicates a substanstial discrepancy between 
Cosin's manuscript copy of the Treatise and the printed copy, or else it is an erroneous citation. There is a similar passage 
in the printed version on page 14, but the main difference is that here Morice did not specifically state that Achan's answer 
'is none oath', as Cosin suggested. 
91 Morice had described a complete dissimilarity between this example (known offence, unknown offender) and ex offIcio 
procedure (unknown offence, known offender), to which Cosin remarked that the difference between the two neither 
spoke anything to the question of validity nor demonstrated the latter to be wrong. Morice, Treatise, 13; Cosin, ApoloKie, 
III, 146. 
92 These and other minor examples, mostly from Exodus, Leviticus, and Jeremiah may be found at III, 149-50, 154-6. 
93 See above, 59. 
94 Cosin, Apo1o:t.ie, III, 164. 
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did - the head of John the Baptist on a platter. Cosin might have more convincingly 
condemned the generality of Herod's oath yet denied its similarity to ex officio oaths since 
canon law presumed a certain sincerity in the judge which could nor be presumed of the 
daughter ofHerodias. This strategy would have been consistent with Cosin's past arguments, 
but instead he chose a transparently poor argument that merely highlighted the moral danger 
of taking a general oath to someone of dubious integrity. 
Cosin concluded that 'by the equitie of Gods owne Iudiciall Lawe', it was manifest that 
men might be examined on their oaths even in criminal matters. If they refused to swear, they 
should be held guilty, even in cases moved by an accuser. And 'where a common good to an 
whole Christian state is sought', a judge was competent by virtue of his office to administer 
oaths according to rhe laws of the realm. 95 Cosin's rhetoric of authority becomes steadily 
more apparent throughout part III of the Apologie. Underpinning this rhetoric were two 
crucial principles: the need for commonwealths to punish crimes, and the institutional 
integrity of ecclesiastical judges. 
Cosin devoted chapter thirteen to refuting the puritans' allegations that the ex officio 
oath was contrary to reason. The four sorts of 'Innovators' he set out to discredit were the 
following: 1) those who called for rheir accuser to be presented, and when told rheir accuser 
was the public voice96 or a denouncer, would ask for witnesses to step forth; 2) those who 
agreed at first to take the oath, but then presented as a condition that they not be forced to 
accuse themselves or their brethren; 3) those who agreed to take the oath and, if need be, to 
reveal both their own and their brother's crimes for the purposes of removing evil from the 
land, yet disagreed in the particulars of what constituted 'evil in the land'; 4) those who 
believed that they should nor be examined on oath if witnesses could be produced. 97 
The first of these opinions Cosin held to be the most dangerous and unreasonable, 
because it undermined the judicial process. Once a crime manifested itself abroad in the form 
of a fame, said Cosin, it was proper for the ordinary to enquire and correct or clear the party 
95 Cosin, ApoloKie. III, 151. 
96 This term was sometimes used by Cosin interchangeably with '£~me'. 
97 Cosin, ApoloKie. III, 179-83. From this roster it is interesting to see the dilatory methods employed by the puritans around 
1593 to resist the oath. They had not yet come to embrace the maxim that private thoughts were property and thus 
protected by the precepts of Magna Carta, chapter 39. Hamilton, Shakespel1re, 7-8. 
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of the crime. The puritans' insistence on the need for witnesses was a denial of the judge's 
sufficient authority. 98 This was something of a euphemistic reference on eosin's part. It was 
not exactly the judge's authority that was doubted by his opponents but his judicially-
declared sincerity and integrity. The puritans wished for witnesses to substantiate fames to 
verifY that they were (fue, but their motives for desiring this were partly self-serving, since they 
must have known that local witnesses might consider their allegiance to the defendant stronger 
than their sense of duty to the judicial process, especially in matters of religion. This was 
certainly the case in East Anglia where puritanism and anticlerical sentiment were widespread 
during Elizabeth's reign.99 
The second group, those who took the oath only with a guarantee against self-accusation, 
believed that the judge acting ex officio was also a prosecutor or accuser. If no men were to 
discover either their own or other men's offences, said eosin, crimes would never be punished, 
unless the offenders themselves 'shal wilfully come in and desire (for Gods sake) to be hanged 
vp'.100 eosin answered the third group, those who agreed to reveal theirs and other's offences 
yet disagreed on what constituted 'evil in the land', by maintaining that they were not content 
to be overruled by men who understood the law and were reliable judges of right and wrong. 
It was a problem of conscience. The puritans in this third group believed that their conscience 
convicted them of the rightness or wrongness of an action, so that if they felt a certain act to 
be right, (hey would forbear to reveal it in court. 'But who shall iudge whether such matters as 
they be enquired of ought to be accounted for faults and offenses,' asked eosin? 101 He had 
reached the crux of the matter, not just regarding the controversy over ecclesiastical courtS, 
but for the whole battle between the rigour of the law and the mitigating influence of equity: 
'For it commeth to this point, that euery man shalbe his owne Iudge, how farre he neede to 
98 Cos in, ApoloKie, III, 179, 18I. 
99 Collinson, Elizabethtln esstlys, 84-5; Collinson, Elizabethtln puritan movement; LPL, MS 234, fos. 99r-101r, 103r-104v. 
100 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 182. Again, Cosin's view in this matter reflected the late medieval principle ~f r~spublica, which 
placed the mystical body of the commonwealth within the body of the church. The power to pUnlsh Sin was therefore 
believed to be inherent in the commonwealth, which justified the inquisitional privileges given to spiritual judges. 
Brundage, Medieval canoniaw, 104, 145-6. 
101 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 183. 
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obeye lawes and Magistrates that require him to deliuer his knowledge touching his owne or 
other mens factes; so he himselfe will account them lawfully done.'102 
Cosin perceived two fatal errors in this opinion. First, if every man were to decide 
according to his conscience whether to take oaths or how far to answer them, each man would 
become a law unto himself, and the error of Anabaprism would soon envelop and destroy all 
aurhority.103 Men who refused the oath because they deemed their brethren's or their own 
causes to be just had already, in Cosin's estimation, judged the law itself to be unjust and 
assumed to themselves the roles of judges. These men were their own sentencers: 'their blood 
is vpon their owne heads', and no one was guilty of 'the punishment inflicted vpon them but 
themselves; for standing obstinately mute without direct answering ... as they ought.' 104 
Second, the truth ought always to be told. He had returned to assertory oaths. The defendant, 
said Cosin, was not invited to assess the propriety of his or other men's actions but simply to 
reveal them. He found it odd that 'these Innovators' did not consider it part of their discipline 
to tell the truth. 105 Besides, men convented would have nothing to fear from revealing their 
deeds to ecclesiastical judges if their deeds were upright and lawful. 
Cosin's twist of rhetoric was adept. As he did in the Conspiracie, here he took advantage 
of the puritan notion of conscience and cast it in a seditious, anti-authoritarian light. He did, 
in fact, have a valid point, and he utilised the puritan understanding of 'conscience' to show its 
destablising effects when applied to criminal procedure. But this was not a substitute for 
proving that all judges were free from calumnious inclinations, which he never did in the 
Apologie. Nevertheless, his language was clear: those who refused the oath on the basis of 
conscience were neither law-abiding citizens nor obedient Christians. They were an 
impediment to justice. 
The fourth and last group held that an oath ought not to be exacted if witnesses could 
be produced, (so that a minister might not be examined by ex officio oath for a sermon he 
102 Ibid. 
103 Cosin, Apologie, III, 165. 
104 Cosin, Apologie, III, 203. 
105 He continued: why should they not merely tell the truth and 'stand assured they haue done but well, what punishment 
soeuer should light vpon them for it ... and reioyce with the Apostles that they are found woorThie to suffer punishment for 
the Disciplinarian part of the Gospel!)' Cosin, Apologie, III, 184. 
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had preached in public). What was at stake in this last opinion of the puritans was the entire 
disciplinary apparatus of Whit gift's subscription campaign. One of the most effective methods 
of suppressing nonconformist preachers was to isolate them and drive them on oath to 
'discover the truth' of their own nonconformity. Though it seems at times that Cosin and his 
opponents were quibbling over legal niceties, the stakes were in reality very high. Cosin 
granted the validity of this opinion only in cases of accusation, since ecclesiastical law forbade 
a man to be put on oath touching the crime itself in such cases. He stated, however, that where 
witnesses might be called, ecclesiastical courts did proceed to condemnation by witnesses (in 
accusation cases), and if proofs failed they proceeded to absolution. 106 
In the final three chapters Cosin addressed the legality of further enquiry after initial 
answers were made on oath, the validity of forcing defendants to discover the crimes of other 
men, and the legality of a judge's refusal to reveal the particulars of interrogatories to 
defendants before they took the oath. He spent the concluding chapter of the Apologie 
answering the first of these arguments. The puritans commonly cited Hebrews 6 which stated 
that 'an oath for confirmation is amongst men an en de of all strife.' 107 Cosin brought two 
reasons for disagreeing that this verse was a universal condemnation of trying men by further 
enquiry on their oaths. He explained that the oath spoken of in that passage was most 
applicable to a promissory oath, not an assertory oath.l08 Secondly, all criminal law expressed 
the need for two witnesses (dictum unius, dictum nullius) to render an account judicially 
acceptable as truth. 109 Since this rule held for witnesses, suggested Cosin, it was also applicable 
to defendants. If further enquiry was not made against a suspected offender, how could proof 
of his guilt ever be deduced? 'For when a defendant hath denyed a crime obiected, or refused 
to answere yea or nay ... what criminous person could, or were likely to bee euer directly 
conuicted?'110 Furthermore, continued Cosin, it was the common practice of both Chancery 
106 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 236. Cosin had asserted earlier that men should not be put to an oath to answer to the crime itself in 
accusation cases since defendants were not bound simply to furnish up the contention of their adversary. See above, 118. 
107 Cosin, ApoloKie, 227. 
108 A promissory oath was a promise to perform some future action. See also above, 139-40. 
109 Cosin, ApoloKie, III,227-8. 
110 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 200. This was why Morice suggested that defendants be pronounced guilty on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence, that is, on the determination of the judge in light of the testimony of informers, witnesses, and 
the defendant himself. See above, 63. 
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and Star Chamber to make further trial of defendants through interrogatories, 111 and recent 
statutes validated the practice of hmher enquiry.112 Hence, Cosin concluded that reason, 
equity, and practice showed that a judge need not be content only with a man's testimony 
upon oath and might proceed to offer him a second oath, 'partly of Purgation and partly of 
Enquirie'.113 
In chapter fourteen Cosin argued that to discover the offences of others in court was not 
a sin but was supported by scripture and church history. His opponents brought the example 
of Rahab from Joshua 2 who refused to tell the authorities where the spies of Israel were 
hiding, but Cosin deflected their argument on the grounds that 1) Rahab was not 
commanded to tell where the spies were but was simply asked to bring them out, and 2) 
Rahab was no longer technically under the allegiance of the king of Jericho but was discharged 
of that duty by God, who was about to give the city over to the Israelites. 114 The puritans held 
it to be a sin for a defendant to reveal a man's actions to the judge if he believed those actions 
to be unimpeachable. Cosin, however, contended that if a man's brother had truly not sinned, 
the revealing of his actions was no sin either. Deposition and testimony were not synonymous 
with slander - if they were, the practice could never have become part of the law. 115 Proverbs 
29 affirmed that a partner to a thief who refused to reveal the thiefs crime hated his own 
souL 116 And the words of 2 Timothy, 'Euill men and seducers will goe forward from worse to 
worse, both continuing in error themselues, and leading others into it' provided more proof 
for Cosin that their crimes were 'meete to be discouered' for the prevention of sin and eviL He 
111 Especially in Chancery, 'if plaintifes should alwayes rest, and might proceede to no further proofes after the defendant 
hath answered vpon his oathe: they should (for the most parte) haue very colde suites, and small reliefe or remedie could 
bee giuen by that high Court.' Cosin, ApoLogie, III, 231; Jones, Chancery, 246 footnote 1, 246-8; Hudson, 'Star 
Chamber', Collectaneajuridica, ed. Hargrave, 161-72; BL, Lansdowne MS 639, fo. Sr. 
112 34 Henry VIII c. 4 and 13 Elizabeth c. 7, eosin, Apologie, III, 231-2. 
113 Cos in, ApoLogie, III, 132. This hybrid oath was described earlier by eosin as being 'giuen to the defendant vpon criminal! 
matter obiected and vpon the circumstances thereof: yea (oftentimes) with purpose to make further proofe, in case the 
defendant shall not confesse it, or nO( so fully in material! circumstances as the Iudge hath cause to thinke may by 
witnesses or otherwise be prooued. yet if he shall confesse so farre as is thought may bee prooued; then (according to the 
qualitie of such his answere) hee is presently either proceeded with thereupon vnto a iudgement, or else dismissed as 
cleared thereof, by his oath: Cosin, Apologir:, III, 27. 
114 eosin, ApoLogie, III, 208. 
115 Cos in, ApoLogie, III,111. 
116 Cosin, ApoLogie, III, 140-1. 
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remarked that heresy in particular had for centuries been sought out by spiritual aurhorities in 
an effort to discover offenders and punish them. 117 
The punishment of crime was so crucial, Cosin argued, that even judicial torture was 
defensible in cases of heresy and treason, even to be used on children against their fathers. lIS 
He suspected that this opinion 'may perhaps be thought of very hard', but he noted the 
legality of torture for suspected capital offenders in military camps, Wales, and the Tower of 
London was 'wen warranted by her Maiesties instructions and by Act of parliament'. 119 
eosin's mention of torture was by no means incidental. There were more cases of judicial 
torture in the 1590s than in any other decade between 1540 and 1640. 120 The purpose of 
torture was to extract a confession from a defendant, confession being a central facet of 
ecclesiastical criminal prosecution in the Middle Ages when the practice began. 121 Torture was 
exceptional in England because it was contrary to common law jurisprudence. l22 Cosin's 
reference to the legality of torture in Wales was significant because it proved that the queen 
could authorise criminal procedures via letters patent that ran counter to common law 
principles. The authority of the Council of Wales to use torture in cases of suspected treason, 
murder, or felony was established by the statute 34&35 Henry VIII c. 26, article 4, but the 
council also applied for a special commission from the queen. It never received a commission, 
but Elizabeth did issue letters patent periodically to authorise the council to continue 
exercising these disciplinary powers. 123 This lent credence to Cosin's assertions in part I that 
the queen's letters patent were not bound by (he restraints of common law or statutes as well 
as bolstering his arguments in favour of the authority of ecclesiastical courts. The high 
commission operated by letters patent, and it could thus be argued that the commission was 
117 Cosin, Apologie, III, 197-9. 
118 Cosin, Apologie. III, 213-4. 
119 Cosin, Apologie, III, 68. 
120 After the 1590s torture was most frequent in the 1550s (19 cases), the 1580s (16 cases), and in the 1570s (II cases). 
Cosin does not seem to have been commissioned to oversee any judicial torture, however. His name does not appear on 
any of the torture warrants. Langbein, Torture, 94-123, 128. 
121 The bull ad extirpanrhl, issued by Innocent IV in 1252, marked the beginning of judicial torture. Brundage, Jvlediel'tl! 
ctlllonlaur, 95-6; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 27-34. 
122 More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan; X, xlviii-I. 
123 See Penry Williams, The Council in the lvltlrchcs of Wales under Elizabeth [, (Cardiff, 1958),24-7,47-53. 
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not constrained by common law procedures any more than was Elizabeth as supreme governor 
of the church. 124 
But what were the justifications for enquiring so far inro a man's life as to discover his 
private conversations and inrimate discussions? 
If such priuate talke or asking of counsell haue bene concerning some platte or practise laid or 
to be laide, that shall (in discretion) be adiudged by the Magistrate expedient (for the common 
wealths sake) to bee knowen and discouered; and therefore if they shall enquire directly of it: I 
can not see, how it may stand with any mans dutie to God, vnto the Prince, vnto Lawes, & to 
the Common wealth to conceale it, being charged to the contrary. 125 
There was now almost no limit to the range of inrerrogatories an ecclesiastical judge might 
consider 'pertinenr' with regard to the examination of a defendanr. To the puritans' charges of 
unfettered tyranny Cosin replied, 'Here (we see) that the law of their loue and felowship, and 
ius hospitale, towards such their priuate friends as haue received them; is by them more 
esteemed & accounred of then either the publike lawes and statutes of the realme, or then 
their duetie to the Christian Magistrate and to their counrrey'. 126 
He recalled Thomas Cartwright's Star Chamber case (though not by name) in which he 
noted the defendants stubbornly refused to answer any inrerrogatories which would reveal the 
names of their associates or the house at which they held their synods. 127 To persist thus in 
refusing to answer was a gross sin against the laws and the word of God, said Cosin, and such 
men 'shall beare their owne iniquity indistinctly; whether the matters to be vttered be 
commendable in their brethren or not'. 128 Cartwright was tried in Star Chamber after he 
refused to take the ex officio oath before the high commission in 1591. The move to Star 
Chamber was engineered by Archbishop Whitgift, who then assigned Cosin to prepare 
124 See above, 90-2 and 216-27, for discussion of the queen's prerogative to authorise processes contrary to common law and 
statutes. See below, 224, footnote 105; for a comment on the queen's prerogative to authorise torture in Wales. 
125 Cosin, ApoLoKie, III, 210. 
126 Cosin, ApoLoKie, III, 211. 
127 Cosin, ApoLoKie, III, 212. On trial with Cartwright were eight other ministers, Edmund Snape, Humphrey Fenn, Edward 
Lord, Daniel Wight, Andrew King, William Proudlove, Melancthon Jewel, and John Payne. Snape and Fen had drafted 
treatises against ecclesiastical oaths and were undoubtedly two of the 'innovarors' against whom Cosin wrote. Fen's treatise 
is at LPL, MS 2004, fo. 83r-v, Snape's is at fos. 85-7. 
128 Cos in, ApoLoKie. III, 214. 
164 
Chapter 5 - An ap%Kie{or sundrie proceedinKs, part III 
imerrogatories against the defendams. 129 The charge against Cartwright and his associates was 
conspiracy and sedition for allegedly plotting to establish a presbyterian system of church 
governmem. They were also charged with attempting to persuade other men to refuse the ex 
officio oath, bur the ministers denied all of these charges. 
They defended their refusal to take the oath in the high commission on four grounds: 1) 
because the oath was infinite; 2) because sufficiem time to deliberate and answer were not 
allowed despite the fact that the matters of which they were asked to answer happened long 
ago; 3) there were no accusers, and because the defendams were ministers, there should have 
been at least two or three accusers; 4) because those of the defendams who were imprisoned 
for refusing the oath sat in prison for almost six momhs before the articles were shown to 
them; 5) there was no precedem for using ex officio procedure in matters of religion in general 
bur only for heresy, and that precedem had been ended by the Heresy Act of 1534 (25 Henry 
VIII c. 14).130 Attorney-general Popham was unable to prove criminal imem against the 
defendams, mainly because they refused to answer any of the substamive imerrogatories, 
asserting that they were impertinem to the matter comained in the bill. The ministers were 
imprisoned for comempt 131 and asked to sign a declaration affirming that the established 
governmem of the church was lawful and godly, which they refused. They were kept in prison 
for only a short time, bur after their release none of them ever became politically involved in 
the presbyterian cause again. 
The final issue to be examined in this chapter is the puritans' claim that all defendams 
should be apprised of the particular imerrogatories upon which they would be examined 
before taking the ex officio oath. Cosin remarked that the reason these men wished to know 
the particulars before swearing was so that they could deny the charges if they thought them 
too weak to be proved, or else because they were confidem they could 'easily wade through 
129 Strype reports that Attorney-General Popham was assigned two clerics, one a doctor of diviniry and the other a civil 
lawyer, to help him construct the charges against Cartwright. These two men were most likely Bancroft and Cosin, who 
had already had experience with Cartwright in the high commission trial. Strype, WhitKift, II, 84; see also Collinson, 
Elizabethan puritan movement, 417-9. 
130 Levy, Fifth Amendment, 181, 184-8; Strype, WhitKift, Ill, 257; Usher, Rise andfall, ed. Tyler, 135-6. The ministers were 
undboutedly informed in some of these opinions by their lawyer, the puritan Nicholas Fuller. 
131 The defendants could not be proceeded against pro confesso in this case, because they did take the oath to answer all 
pertinent interrogatories. See above, 151 ,footnote 56 of this chapter. 
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with them.'132 There were two reasons why particulars were not offered to the party, explained 
Cosin. First, it was not always possible to reveal interrogatories beforehand since 'one 
Interrogatorie often riseth of an other', especially if a defendant answered in the affirmative. In 
other words, the interrogations often took a course of their own based on the responses of the 
party. Second, the defendant might use the information of the charge to inform his associates 
how to disguise the truth or dilly-dally. 133 Aside from these reasons, said Cosin, there was no 
law of which he was aware that required particular articles to be shown to the party before 
swearing. But he admitted it was likely that if a defendant would but agree to take the oath 
after perusing the articles, there was no reason why he might not be shown (hem 
beforehand. 134 
The second reason brought by the puritan writers for refusing an oath when particulars 
were not revealed was that a man ought to be certain beforehand that his oath would nor cause 
him to violare God's laws. Morice himself expressed a similar concern. 135 Cosin affirmed that 
every honest man should be bound in conscience to obey the laws of the land which required 
him to take the oath as long as it was not against God's commandment. The general heads of 
the interrogatories could be revealed to the accused beforehand, he should be assured the 
questions endangered neither life nor limb, and he was advised that he might challenge any 
question as not being binding on him to answer. These conditions, said Cosin, should be 
enough to allay the fears of the puritans. 136 The third reason for refusing the oath, that it was 
infinite and therefore 'a snare to a mans conscience', was also confuted by Cosin. He 
maintained that the oath was neither infinite nor general, as his disputants claimed, since it was 
grounded on articles that laid out the specifics of an actual misdemeanour such as time, 
manner, and place. 137 Cosin also denied the fourth and lasr objection, thar the defendant's 
132 Cosin, Apologie, III, 215. 
133 Cosin, Apologie, III, 215-6. 
134 Cosin, Apologie, III, 216; see also the high commission procedural manual at Cambridge, Ely MS F/5/45, 20. Reviewing 
this passage in the 'Defence', Morice grumbled, 'Wee were troubled but with one othe before, nowe another is 
required ... What good shall the sight of the Interrogatories doe him,yf therevpon he maie not refuse any of them?' LPL, 
MS 234, fo. 3Sr-v. 
135 See above, 56. 
136 Cosin, Apologie, III, 216-7. 
137 Cosin, Apologie, III, 217. Morice denied that such specifics were always present in the articles, and even when they were, 
the interrogatories were prone to wander and might seek to establish the defendant's position on such matters as the 
authority of bishops. Morice related such an occasion: 'I my selfe not manie yeares sins became a suitor for a godlie 
preacher, a man quiet not intermedlinge with the rroublesom questions of discipline and churche gouernement yet 
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judgement was taken away if he did not know all the particulars. 'A promise doth neither 
affirme nor deny the trueth of a matter: but is to be made a true vowe and promise, by the 
due performance of it' .138 It was true enough, he declared, that canon law required judges to 
provide the party with a copy of the indicia (evidences) against him, though it did not specifY 
exactly when this should take place. 139 Cosin asserted that this procedure of administering 
oaths before the defendant had perused the articles was also used by Star Chamber and 
Chancery as well as in other criminal examinations before magistrates. 140 If anything, 
remarked Cosin, his adversaries ought to be thankful to be living in England: the common 
practice on the continent was to call in the witnesses even before the defendant was made 
aware of the evidences and presumptions against him. 141 
In conclusion, Cosin defended in part III the justness and legality of the ex officio oath 
from the temporal, canon, and civil laws as well as from scripture and reason. He also 
answered the objections of the various detractors of ecclesiastical oaths, atrempting to expose 
their strategies as misguided, logically inconsistent, legally baseless, deceitful, or subversive. 
Cosin based his defence of the oath on his previous arguments formulated in parts I and II, 
relying heavily on his interpretation of the royal supremacy and annexation of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction to the crown. Part III contained a greater degree of rhetorical language than parts I 
and II, which read more like academic manuals, while the third part had more strident 
political tones. In justifYing the high commission's use of the oath, Cosin revealed his view of 
the opinions of his adversaries as tending to the overthrow of sound judicial process and, 
ultimately, the peace and stability of the realm. 
suspended from his function by the ordinarie and the same a commissioner ecclesiastical!, the cawse I vnderstood euen 
from the Bisshoppes owne mourhe to be, for that this preacher refused to answeare what he thought of the place and 
cal!inge of a Bisshopp in the Churche of Englande, whether it were lawful! or vnlawfull.' LPL, MS 234, fo. 222r. 
138 Cosin, Apologie. III,218. 
139 Cosin accepted that the charges might be given to the parry before the interrogatories began, bur it was only necessary 
that they be given before witnesses were called, enabling the accused to defend himself against the charges. Cosin, 
Apologie. III, 223. 
140 Cosin, Apologie. III, 224; Jones, ChaFlcery, 213-63; Hudson, 'Star Chamber', CollectLllleajuridicll, ed. Hargrave, 170. 
Having sight of the interrogatories before taking the ex officio oath was particularly important to defendants in the high 
commission because they were not yet aware of the charge laid against them. In Star Chamber and Chancery, on the other 
hand, defendants were at least apprised of the charge against them before being required to take their oath to answer, 
which must have taken some of the fear our of not knowing the particular iterrogatories ahead of time. 
141 Cosin, Apologie, III, 221-2. 
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Morice's counter-arrack the following year, 'A just and necessane defence', was never 
published, and eosin's Apologie became the last word heard in the public controversy over 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the 1590s. The significance of Morice's 'Defence' is not in its 
direct impact on events, but in its capacity as both a corrective (0 the Apologie's weaker 
assertions and a confirmation of its most powerful arguments. 
Chapter 6 
James Morice's 
'A just and necessarie defence' 
Chapter 6 - 'A just and necessarie defence' 
Morice was surprised and annoyed thar a manuscript copy of A briefe treatise of oathes 
found its way into eosin's hands. In a letter written to Burghley in 1596 he indirectly laid the 
blame for this at the lord treasurer's door. I eosin's Apologie had been completely unexpected 
by the puritans, and none of them dared publish a response to it, though they complained 
bitterly in private. 2 Morice considered many of eosin's asseverations in the Apologie insults 
which questioned his honour, and he felt compelled to frame a reply that would defend his 
fonner work from eosin's attacks. 'A just and necessarie defence of a briefe treatise'3 was 
completed in 1594, the year after the second edition of the Apologie was published. This time 
Morice kept the manuscript private, offering it to no one. But word that he had penned a reply 
to the Apologie eventually reached the ears of Archbishop Whitgift, who requested a copy for 
himself On tile condition that no harm would come to him, Morice drafted a copy of the 
'Defence' expressly for the archbishop. Whitgift's is the only known copy of the 'Defence' to 
exist today, and its value is enhanced by marginal comments inserted by Whitgift himself. 4 
Though framed as a vindication of the Treati:;e, the 'Defence' also contained new and valuable 
data on the ex officio oath controversy from the years 1590 to 1594 as well as answering 
eosin's claims in the Apologie. 5 
The element of ex officio procedure around which Morice's criticisms revolved was the 
amalgamation of the offices of prosecutor and judge in the same person. In Morice's 
estimation, a judge should only hear and receive the public complaints and suits of others, 
never himself to prosecute. Prosecution, he maintained, could not occur until a lawful 
I Morice had given a copy of the Treatise to Burghley and 'Sone after I knowe not howe, Mr doctor Cowsyn obteyneth a 
copie therof (as he saieth by the meanes of a right noble counsellor)'. BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69, fo. 150r. 
2 Beale's response may be found in a letter to Burghleyat BL, Lansdowne MS 73, doc. 2, fos. 8r-Ilr. For Morice's reaction see 
BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69. 
3 Its full title was 'A iust and necessarie defence of a briefe treatise made ageinst generall oathes exacted by Ordinaries and 
rudges Ecclesiasticall to aunswer to all such articles as pleaseth them to propounde, and against their forced oathes, ex 
offIcio mero, and consequently a iustification of the lawes, liberties, and Iustice of England impugned by Richard Cosyn, 
doctor of the ciuililawe in his Appologie for sondrie procedings by Iurisdiction Eclesiasticall'. Fixed underneath this title 
was, 'By James Morice, Esqvier, Her Maiesties attorney of the COVrt of Wardes & liueries Anno domini 1594 Anno Reg: 
Regine Eliz: 36'. LPL, MS 234, fo. Ir. This title page was probably constructed especially for Whitgift's benefit, seeing 
that it was to be his personal copy. 
4 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 69v; BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 69, fo. 150r-v. This copy of the 'Defence' is at Lambeth 
Palace Library, MS 234. 
5 The 'Defence' was roughly equal to the Apologie in length (327 folio pages) and was sorted into eight chapters, each 
corresponding to the original eight chapters in the Treatise and framed as individual defences of them with Cosin's 
relevant arguments juxtaposed and confuted along the way. 
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presentment had been received by the judge from a third parry.6 He balked at Cosin's theory 
that fame or the 'public voice' was technically the prosecution in ex officio criminal cases.? 
Instead, he focused on the well-established judicial principle that a judge must not also be an 
accuser,8 but there was no controversy over that point. What was in dispute was whether a 
judge acting ex officio was free to conduct criminal proceedings with the intent to prove the 
defendant guilty. Common law discountenanced the notion that fame or clamorous 
insinuation could take the place of public accusers or presenters, and Morice took this to 
indicate that proceeding ex officio on this basis was naturally unjust. This argument, therefore, 
was contained within his larger belief system that common law was the supreme law of the 
land and that canon and civil law were subordinate to it. 
Secret denunciation, another facet of ex officio procedure, came under Morice's censure 
for two reasons. He had previously complained in the Treatise that denunciation tended to 
protect malicious and cowardly men, but in the 'Defence' he added another reservation. 
Denunciation, he suggested, was also injurious to the defendant by way of a procedural rule: 
the accused was cheated out of being able to take exception to the oath since the proceeding 
was done ex officio, 'to the intent he maie not be priuiledged to saie that he is not bound to 
aunswere, as perhappes by lawe he might yf it weare at first preferred and prosecuted by a 
parrie.' Thus, according to Morice, secret denunciation tended to thwarr justice on two 
froI1ts.9 Cosin had allowed that men could not be forced to take the oath in cases initiated by 
accusation, so as not to force defendants to supply their adversary's lack of proof, but in cases 
initiated ex officio he maintained that defendants were required to take the oath, since the 
judge prosecuted the case out of duty and sincerity.10 But Morice pointed out that under 
these rules a man could still be forced to answer upon oath if his accuser chose to denounce 
secretly rather than accuse publicly. Denunciation was entirely canonical in origin and English 
6 LPL, MS 234, fos. 31 r-32v. 
7 See above, 122-3. 
8 See also Bracton quote above at 58, footnote 67; Smith, De republica anglorum, ed. Dewar, 89; Baker, 'Criminal courts', 
Crime in England, ed. Cockburn, 15-22; Jones, Chancery, 247. 
9 One who secretly denounced was, said Morice, 'like an Adder lurkinge in the grasse, his name suppressed and his practise 
protected by the Iudges office ... who maie goe salf or free from trouble and daunger, calumniators beinge allwaies ready 
and forward, enflamed by malice'. LPL, MS 234, fos. 33r-34v. 
10 See above, 133, 144, 158-9. 
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common lawyers had never accepted its validity. As Morice illustrated, denunciation was 
simply a no-risk method of accusation that protected a denouncer's identity, enabled him to 
inform the court without being deposed as an accuser would, and authorised the judge to cite 
the defendant ex officio and cause him to take an oath to answer all questions, even d10ugh 
the original information had been submitted by a private individual. II 
Morice also took issue wid1 Cosin's claim that the behaviour of ecclesiastical judges was 
courteous and favourable towards defendants. He noted that defendants cited ex officio were 
told that after they had sworn to answer all interrogatories they might peruse the articles of 
interrogation (that is, the main headings but not every particular one) at their leisure. 'Is not 
here a wonderfull great fauor, trowe ye?' commented Morice. 12 If the defendant could not 
refuse to answer any of d1e interrogatories, he argued, there was litde point in seeing them 
beforehand. Even though the party was advised that the interrogatories threatened neither life 
nor limb and that he was only required to answer according to facts of his own knowledge, 
Morice complained, 'what is the knowledge of all this to the purpose? For since the chef est 
poinctes and those that most nerelie touche and concerne him are conceled, his oathe can not 
be but blinde and vndiscreet.' 13 Morice was, in effect, requesting a privilege for defendants in 
ecclesiastical courts that was not enjoyed by defendants in other courts. Allowing defendants 
to peruse the articles of interrogation before taking an oath to answer was not allowed in Star 
Chamber, Chancery, or the common law courts, but the oath in those courts was also different 
- defendants were not compelled to incriminate themselves or others by their answers. If 
Morice could not abolish the ex officio oath, he sought to give high commission defendants an 
escape avenue by way of refusing the oath if d1ey thought the interrogatories would bind them 
to accuse themselves. 
In response to Cosin's defence of the integrity of ecclesiastical judges, Morice remarked, 
'Yes marry sayth our Civilian there is maUice in the Accusor, mildenes in the Iudge, the one is 
an adversarie or enemy: the other a father yea a spirituall father whoe chari tab lie seekerh the 
11 See also Holdsworth, History of EI1Klish law, IV, 620-2; Brundage, Medieval Ctl11011 law, 143, 148; Baker, 'Criminal courts', 
Crime i17 E17Kla17d, ed. Cockburn, 18-21. 
12 LPL, MS 234, fo. 35r-v. 
13 LPL, MS 234, fos. 37v-38r. 
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parties good, his reformacion, his amendement of lief, the remOVll1ge of scandall, and 
discharge of his owne dutie.'14 But Morice held that some accusers accused justly, and some 
judges proceeded out of malice. 
As an example of the vindictiveness that could be exhibited by ecclesiastical judges, 
Morice recalled an event 'not yet one yeare paste' when he was in Colchester 'about the 
deliuery of the gaole there The daie before the Sessions beeinge Sonday'.15 The bishop 
suffragan was in town and, unbeknownst (0 the magistrates, preached in the morning, despite 
the fact that the pulpit had previously been appointed to 'a graue and learned man', one 
Knewstubbs. In the afternoon Knewstubbs rose to preach, thinking it was permissible for him 
now (0 do so without offence. While he was preaching the suffragan came in, sat down in his 
pew, and beckoned to one of the bailiffs. The bailiff, whose name was Haselwood, sent one of 
his servants of the mace to find out what the suffragan wanted. The servant was (Old (0 tell d1e 
bailiff to order Knewstubbs to step down since the suffragan had already appointed someone 
else (0 preach. The bailiff, however, refused to order Knewstubbs to come down, and so he 
continued, 'to the good likinge and edificacion of the people there assembled.' After the 
service was over, Morice was going out of the church along with the suffragan and heard him 
give 'some fewe wordes of commendacion both of the sermon and of the preacher himself.' 
But then later the suffragan cited the bailiff, Haselwood, (0 appear before him to be 
proceeded against ex officio for refusing his episcopal command. 16 Haselwood appeared and 
he was offered an oath to answer (0 whatever interrogatories were put to him. Haselwood 
complained that the suffragan was not dealing charitably with him for his soul's health but out 
of malice, 'apparendie shewed to be true for that after this sermon of Mr. Newstubbes his 
Lordship beeinge in place where this bailiffe was would not soe much as once speake vnto 
him.' So Haselwood refused the suffragan as an incompetent judge 17 and would not take the 
oath 'for that it was both vngodlie and againsre d1e lawe.' 18 
14 LPL, MS 234, fo. 102v. 
15 LPL, MS 234, fo. 103r. 
16 LPL, MS 234, fo. 103r-v. 
17 This was apparently done in writing. LPL, MS 234, fo. 103v, line 17. 
18 LPL, MS 234, fo. 103r. 
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Morice noted that then the suffragan became a secret denouncer and a whisperer in the 
ears of Bishop Aylmer of London, and Aylmer's chancellor, regarding this matter. These two 
commissioners and a third summoned Haselwood by letters missive to appear before them at 
St. Paul's in London. Thus Aylmer, in Morice's estimation, became a suffragan for the 
suffragan and bailed him out. When Haselwood appeared, he was charged with the same oath 
as before, to answer any and all questions. Haselwood refused again and was thrown into the 
Fleet, 'there to remain as a gage for the other which they could not apprehende', presumably 
meaning his conscience. 19 
After some time Haselwood was set free, bur no more so than 'the beare that is ledd 
about by the nose.' The commissioners, exacting bail from him, ordered him to return from 
London to Colchester. By this measure, they assured that he would return to court as he did 
again and again, each time refusing the oath and being threatened with penalties or fines. He 
finally submitred and accepted the oath, not fearing any question they could ask him. He was 
then told he would quickly know his purgatory and a few days later he was exhibited twenty 
articles, said Morice, not a dozen or half a dozen, as Cosin had claimed was standard. 20 One 
of the articles called Knewstubbs a man publicly known to oppose the ecclesiastical 
government. The chancellor's name appeared in seven of the twenty articles, said Morice, 
which left the strong impression that he was a judge in his own case. 21 
After Aylmer's last triennial visitation was over, Morice continued, the chancellor, 
'descendinge from powles to Colchester to gather in not any Peter pence bur powle money of 
such persons as stood vndischardged in his bookes', was sitting in St. Mary's Church. He 
demanded fee money from a man named Isaac Shelberry. Shelberry would not pay, so the 
chancellor sent a warrant, signed by some ecclesiastical commissioners, to Haselwood (who 
was then the bailiff) to have Shelberry committed to ward. Haselwood refused, so the 
chancellor ordered some high constables to do it; they refused. This angered the chancellor, 
who left town. 22 These illuminating anecdotes give some insight into Morice's personal 
19 LPL, MS 234, fo. 103v. 
20 Cosin, Apologie, III, 223. 
21 LPL, MS 234, fo. 104r. 
22 LPL, MS 234, fos. 1 03r-1 04v. 
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experience with church officials in Essex and seem to show a widespread reSIstance amongst 
the laity to ecclesiastical disciplinary measures, consistent with Professor Collinson's and 
others' claims that East Anglia was a hotbed of religious discontent in the later Elizabethan 
years. 23 
If the ex officio oath was refused, said Morice, it was done so either justly or unjustly. If 
justly, the defendant was wronged in having it forced on him. Ifhis refusal was unjust, Morice 
proposed another common law procedure: the defendant could be proceeded against pro 
confesso .24 Of course, in a common law court a defendant would have been notified of the 
charge laid against him at the beginning of his trial, whereas his counterpart 111 the high 
commission might not. Thus, Morice's suggestion of pro confesso was rhetorical, Sll1ce 'no 
man is to be condemned as confessing the fault that neuer vnderstood perfectlie what he was 
charged with.'25 This was why ecclesiastical judges insisted so strongly that the party take the 
oath, explained Morice, since a defendant, having refused to swear to answer any 
interrogatories, could not possibly be apprised of the charge against him and thus remained 
ignorant of the cause of his trial. Under such circumstances a man could not be convicted. 
Morice contended, therefore, that the oath was in parr a strategy employed by the 
commissioners to validate proceeding pro confesso as a secondary course of prosecution 
should the defendant refuse to answer interrogatories after he had promised on oath to do 
SO.26 
By this reasoning Morice established that the ex officio oath was the linchpin which held 
together the massive powers of the high commission. If defendants could be made to take the 
oath, they were either forced to incriminate themselves through their answers or else were 
proceeded against pro confesso if they refused to answer. The best alternative left to 
recalcitrant defendants was thus to refuse the ex officio oath in the first instance, which 
23 Collinson, 'Puritanism and the Modern World', EI7Klish puritanism, ed. Collinson, 22, 26, 28-9; see also Whitgift's 
conference with Moriee in 1591, PRO, SP12/238, doc. 75; Emmison, Morals & the church courts. 
24 Defendants who were proceeded against pro confesso were prosecuted as if they had confessed the crime. This procedure 
occurred when defendants engaged in some obstruction (such as refusing ro answer ro the charges laid against them) 
which implied guilt. See above, 151, foomote 56; and Hudson, 'Star Chamber', Collectanea juridici", cd. Hargrave, 168, 
171-2-
25 LPL, MS 234, fo. 36v. 
26 As for the defendant's prerogative to challenge any of the questions put to him if the law did not bind him to answer, 
Morice asked who would judge the challenge. Naturally, the judge himself would decide, and what judge would give 
sentence against his own interrogation? LPL, MS 234, fo. 36v. 
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saddled them only with contempt of court rather than implied guilt.27 The high 
commissioners could not proceed any further against defendants who stood in conrempt by 
refusing the oath, so they generally resorted to imprisonment for an indefinite period of time 
until the defendant agreed to take the oath. 
Encapsulating Cosin's explication of ex officio procedure into a single example, Morice 
sought to illustrate its alleged injustice more dramatically by setting [he reader before an 
imaginary trial. The scene is an ecclesiastical consistory. In the role of a lone commissioner 
Morice chose to cast Cosin, 'beinge a man in respect of his profession enabled by lawe to 
exercise ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction'. 28 Cosin is placed in his seat and on either side of him are 
set 'flienge fame; set forthe in hir monstrous and hideous shape' and 'priuie information, with 
his face couered like a masker.'29 Also present is a scribe or register for the court, and an 
apparator who brings in two suspects, a man and a woman who have been cited to appear. 
Morice himself assumes the role of chorus or prologue: 'The court thus fournished, let vs 
imagine the speeche of this ludge to be accordinge to his owne rules, and the aunswers of the 
seuerall parties cOl1vented agreable to the exceptions by him remembred.' 30 
The judge asks the man to swear to answer all questions pur to him. The man replies he 
does not know why he should swear when he has not been informed of the charge against him; 
he asks his accuser to come forth. The judge clarifies that no individual accuses him but that 
Fame stands in place of an accuser, 'who by lawe maketh waie vnto inquisition of crimes'. 31 It 
is she who has reported the defendant's misdemeanours to the judge. The man protests that 
Fame is a horrible monster, not lawful or sufficient to take the place of an accuser, but the 
judge contends she is the 'testimony of the multitude, the voice of the people' and of a certain 
divine nature,32 as well as lawful. The man complains further that she is false and deceitful, 
often the work of malicious enemies, but the judge replies that such people might also be 
27 This was precisely the strategy used by Thomas Carrwright in Star Chamber. See above, 164-5. 
28 LPL, MS 234, fo. 39r. 
29 LPL, MS 234, fo. 39v. These two figures were intended to embody the canon law concepts of fame and clamorous 
insinuation as explained by Cosin in the Apologie (see above, 122-3). Morice's description of fame suggested the uncertain 
nature of rumour while his picture of clamorous insinuation illustrated the clandestine, deceitful nature of gossip. 
30 LPL, MS 234, fo. 39v. 
31 Ibid. 
32 This strange comment ('of a certain divine nature') Morice apparently attributes to Cosin, but the meaning is obscure. LPL, 
MS 234, fo. 39v. 
176 
Chapter 6 - 'A just and nccessarie defence' 
speaking truth, so he sees ht to hear her out. Doubting whether Fame has ever spoken evil of 
him, the man asks for proof that he has been denounced; is there a presentment or judicially 
received testimony against him? He suspects the fame might have been caused by the judge 
himself. 33 The judge responds that even though nothing has been proved, he may affirm by 
his judicial prerogative that the fame exists and is therefore meet to be investigated. 
The man argues that according to ecclesiastical law, if there is no presentment a fame 
must be proved before the judge proceeds to examine the defendant. This rule has many 
exceptions, answers the judge, one of which is that if the judge intends merely to 'reform 
spiritually' as opposed to 'punish corporally' he may proceed without proving the fame. 34 
Labouring to protect his good name, the man declares that Fame speaks well of him, and he 
offers to prove it with witnesses. The judge answers that by law he need not grant this request, 
since the proceeding is ex officio and the law does not 'entend and presume ageinst my 
sinceritie. '35 He charges the man to take the oath. 
But the man continues to resist. He claims that canon law states that if anyone is accused 
or prosecuted by another, the defendant should not be compelled to answer or be examined 
on oath so as not to play into the hands of his adversary. The judge argues in response that he 
has a prerogative 'beside the common course of lawe' to compel a defamed man to take an 
oath when proceeding ex officio. That is one of the reasons, the judge notes, the office is 
called noble and excellent. 36 The man asks to know with what he is charged and wishes to see 
the interrogatories, otherwise he fears his oath will be indiscreet, but the judge knows no law 
which binds him to grant this request. It is dangerous, he says, to let the defendant see the 
questions first, in which case he might answer deceptively, indirectly, or not at all. Besides, not 
all the judge's questions are framed yet. If the man will first take an oath to answer all 
interrogatories, the judge promises he will then be allowed to read them at his leisure. The 
33 This detail may have been a reference to a certain case before the high commission during Mary's reign, discussed by 
Morice later in chapter 1. No proof could be brought against one Shetterden to prove him guilty of heresy, but when he 
pressed the commissioners for evidence of his guilt, one of them who was a bishop said that he himself suspected 
Shetterden of being a heretic. This caused Shetterden (in Morice's words) to remark that 'it was a thinge vnreasonable for 
one man to be both his accusor and Iudge.' LPL, MS 234, fo. 43v. Foxe, Acts and monuments, ed. Townsend, vii, 308-9. 
34 LPL, MS 234, fo. 40r. 
35 LPL, MS 234, fo. 40v. 
36 Cosin did not draw a connection between the title ex officio nobile and the judge's prerogative to administer the oath. The 
judge's boast here was merely creative scriptwriting by Morice. See above, 118. 
177 
Chapter 6 - 'A jusr and necessouie defence' 
man asks to see the principal parts so he knows what crime he is alleged to have commined, 
but the judge orders him to swear ro answer first, for canon law does not distinguish at what 
time the heads or principal parts of the questions must be opened ro the party, stating only 
that it be done so that he can defend himself, which he does not commonly do until after 
witnesses have testified and he speaks up to refute them. 37 
The man then turns to the civil law, protesting that it requires copies of evidences against 
the defendant to be shown to him and asks why the canon law does not recognise the same 
principle. The rule requiring evidences has many exceptions, the judges explains, one of which 
is that it is invalidated when ex officio procedure is used, 'soe highe and extraordinarie .. .is this 
function of a Iudge ecclesiastical!. '38 The judge agrees to show him the interrogatories, 
however, if he will first swear that he will take an oath afterwards to answer them. The man 
responds that he would not dare to entangle himself in an oath when he does not know what 
that oath will force him to affirm or deny. Of courtesy the judge says he will reveal that a 
fame is abroad which charges the man with incontinent living. He asks if this will suffice and 
charges the man to swear to answer directly. The man, however, desires a fuller explanation of 
this charge, saying that every bill of complaint or information ought to contain particulars of 
persons, time, and place regarding the crime. The judge concludes that if he is at this point, 
the censures of the church will proceed against him, adding that if this case had been before 
the ecclesiastical commissioners, the man would have been imprisoned without bailor 
mainprise for his contumacy and contempt. 39 
The judge now turns ro the woman and asks her ro swear ro answer the articles. The 
woman asks why she should swear to answer when no one accuses her. The judge replies that 
there need not be an accuser in this court since he is proceeding ex officio, which means he 
may conduct the case without the suit of a party, and his integrity is sure. The woman 
confesses ro know very little about the law, but she believes it is the cusrom of England that no 
one should be forced to answer in criminal cases unless there is a private suit, accusation, 
indictment, or presentment and asks if there is any. The judge marvels that she mentions 
37 LPL, MS 234, fo. 41 r. 
38 Ibid. 
39 LPL, MS 234, fo. 41 v. 
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indictment and warns her to leave that to the common law; this proceeding is by canon law. 
Bur since she desires to know her accuser, he notes that Privy Information has informed 
against her and stands here in place of an accuser. The woman asks to see his face or know his 
name, bur she is denied by the judge, who responds that all she is entided to know is that he is 
a,man of credit. He adds that since a judge proceeding ex officio is not likely to have personal 
knowledge of crimes committed, canon law provides that he may receive secret information in 
order to reform or punish the offender. Although Privy Information is not on oath, says the 
judge, his information is lawful in the court, and the judge may therefore compel her to an 
oath to answer interrogatories.40 
The woman complains that by this rule people might be defamed unjustly by malicious 
or deceitful people, bur the judge explains that honest men are not likely to become public 
accusers, since formal accusation is generally odious and perilous. Therefore it is provided in 
most parts of the world that judges may operate by enquiry to compensate for the lack of 
accusers. The woman rejoins that it is berter to accuse openly than secretly. She adds that she 
is told it is against canon law to receive information from men who will not identify 
themselves in court. The judge says that she has another party against her besides Privy 
Information, and that is the public interest. This is a 'fetched accusor', says the woman, and 
she refuses the oath again.41 The judge asks her one final time if she will swear. The woman 
asks what she is charged with and what is contained in the articles. The judge notes that she is 
charged with defamation but he will not reveal the contelUs of the articles. The woman 
protests that she is the one defamed by this baseless charge. She will not swear until she has 
seen the questions and agreed whether to answer them. Refusing her request, the judge 
proceeds to pass sentence of excommunicarion against her. 42 
This imagined consistory trial, part Lucianic dialogue, part expose, was generally 
accurate in representing Cosin's positions, except where I have noted otherwise. Morice chose 
two interesting cases for study, probably based on his own experience or knowledge. In these 
examples he singled out fame and clamorous insinuation as being particularly contrary to 
40 LPL, MS 234, fos, 41 v-42r. 
41 LPL, Ms 234, fo, 42v, 
42 Ibid, 
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JustiCe, because they violated common law principles of judicially received testimony. Also, 
the charges against the two defendants ought not to go unnoticed. Incontinence and 
defamation were likely to be crimes commonly imputed to troublesome puritan ministers, 
especially defamation. 43 
At the conclusion of his mock erial, Morice suggested that the high commlSSlOn be 
dissolved as it was 'subiect to no ordinary course of Iustice' .44 He listed seven alleged 
procedural and theoretical illegalities in support of his proposal: 1) the high commission 
deprived defendants of the right to take exception against the ex officio oath; 2) the judge 
combined his office with that of an accuser; 3) men were dishonoured by the court, often 
without just cause or recompense for their trouble and costs; 4) defendants were forced to take 
an oad1 even when fames were not proved; 5) criminal examinations were conducted without 
lawful accusation, presentment, or proof; 6) defendants were forced to accuse themselves; 7) 
men were required to take general oaths to answer unknown articles and this entrapment of 
men's consciences was done under the pretence of punishing sin. 45 
Morice argued that the glory of the commission could not exist without the extortion of 
ex officio oaths which formed its ceneral machinery of power.46 The inquisitors had exceeded 
their commission, he concluded, and professional corruption was not occasional. There was 
money to be made from visitations, especially in Essex where Morice had been informed that 
hundreds of pounds could be raised from the small sums of individual cases. Summoners 
'waxe wealthie and purchase Landes, beinge as I said the huntinge spaniells to springe and 
retrieue plentie of game for the courtes and Consistories of hungry Commissaries and 
officialls.'47 Proceeding ex officio was an expedient for accumulating wealth, he claimed, 
'fillinge the pollinge purse' in the countryside 'whatsoeuer it be with the doctor in the Citie' .48 
43 Helmholz, Cmum bTU', 9-11; Collinson, Elizabethall Pllritfll7 IIllll'emr:nt; see also Cawdrey's case at BL, Lansdowne MS 68, 
doc. 54. 
44 LPL, MS 234, fo. 43r. 
45 Ibid. 
46 LPL, MS 234, fos. 30v, 39r. There was a loftiness to the commission as well that Morice disliked. For example, he objected 
to the self-glorifying language used in the statement of Cawdrey's case which described John Aylmer, the bishop of 
London, as 'not onelie an highe but one of the supreme that is of the higheste or greateste Comissioners of all others .. .' He 
was not convinced that titles such as 'high commission' were warranted by law. LPL, MS 234, fo. 195r; see also BL, 
Lansdowne MS 53, doc. 72. 
47 Morice used the phrase 'huntinge spaniells' in the Treatise, to which Cosin took exception in his Epistle to the Reader, 
(Cosin, Apolor,ie, sig. B4v-Clv). Here Morice defiantly repeated his former affront. LPL, MS 234, fo. 45v. 
48 LPL, MS 234, fo. 45r-v. 
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eosin had endeavoured in the Apologie to defend a precept which he termed 'the 
discovery of the whole truth' against oneself.49 He had cited Ecclesiasticus 4, 'Be not ashamed 
to tell truth for the good of thie soule; for there is a shame that bringeth sinne and there is a 
shame that rurneth a man to honor and grace.'50 But Morice failed to comprehend how (his 
verse should incite a man to betray his family and neighbours. Several times Morice confuted 
eosin's allegations that every scriptural adjuration to confess sin be interpreted as 
corresponding to public testimony rather than to private morality. This was particularly dle 
case in chapter 12 of part III of the Apologie, 'wheare, confounding omes, he maketh no 
difference betwene such as are Iudiciall, of which we entreate, and othes which we deale not 
widl but will referr to the wise and learned reader to consider'. Morice suggested that the 
same reasoning could have been used by eosin to prove the legality of the catholic practice of 
auricular confession. 51 
Morice offered six responses to eosin's six 'privileges' enjoyed by ecclesiastical judges. 52 
First, he submitted that judges should not be relieved of the necessity to prove their own 
integrity and sincerity. Radler than proclaiming their good faith by virtue of their office, they 
should earn the same by demonstrating the burden of proof against a defendant before 
declaring him guilty; and it was not necessary, he added to pur the accused on oath to 
demonstrate their guilt. Second, he maintained dut God was not glorified by this oath but 
dishonoured. Third, a lawful accuser or presenter must prosecute the case. Fourth, there would 
be no end of controversy if denunciations were allowed to be considered by judges. Fifth, 
Morice claimed the oath was indiscreetly taken. Lastly, the oath was 'as generall as the oathe 
ofkinge hero de, and in respect of the generalitie to be condemned.' 53 
In rhe second chapter Morice challenged eosin's supposition that scnprure provided 
justification for ex officio oaths. eosin had pointed to three particular Old Testament 
passages as examples or justifications of oaths that were general in nature. 54 The first of these 
49 See above, 153. 
50 Cosin, Apolor,ie, III, 48. 
51 LPL, MS 234, fo. 34r. 
52 These were discussed above at 118-9. 
53 LPL, MS 234, fo. 34r-v. There seems to be no difference between Morice's fifth and sixth reasons. 
54 For all three of these example's see Cosin, Apo[of(ie, III, 154 and III, 226 for further mention of Jeremiah's oath. 
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concerned the oath administered to Abimelech by Abraham in Genesis 21. Abimelech, king of 
Gerar, caused Abraham to swear that he would deal loyally with him and his descendants. In 
eosin's estimation, this oath was more general than the ex officio oath, but Morice countered 
that eosin had missed the point. The true question was whether general oaths could be 
exacted judicially by magistrates in criminal cases. Abraham's oath to Abimelech was an 
agreement between a prince and a foreigner, said Morice, not one of the king's subjects. 
Abimelech and Abraham swore as equals, and volumarily. 55 Morice contended that Abimelech 
wanted to be assured of Abraham's friendship since he saw that God's favour was upon him, 
but he failed to comprehend how this example justified compulsory ex officio oaths in 
criminal cases. 
eosin likewise had pointed [0 the story of Esau (Genesis 25) as evidence of an oath lI1 
scripture that exceeded the generality of any oath administered by the high commission. 
Again Morice asked how this example proved eosin's assertion that obligatory, general oaths 
could be administered by ecclesiastical judges. Though eosin had stated that Esau's oath was 
approved and ratified, Morice argued that Hebrews 12 clearly condemned Esau for the 
profanity of his act. 56 eosin's third example that ex officio oaths were approved by scripture 
was the oath sworn by Jeremiah [0 Zedekial1, king of Judal1 Qeremial1 38.14-16) in which the 
king promised not to put Jeremiah to death if Jeremiah would answer the king's question 
truly. This was not even an oath, asserted Morice, but simply a man promising to speak 
truthfully to a king. Morice's examination of the passage showed that Jeremiah bargained with 
Zedekial1 to spare his life and did not simply promise to answer any uncertain interrogatories 
that might cause him to be convicted. 
Behould I beseech you whether nowe at the length this good man hath brought us from 
iudicyall oathes in causes cryminall. We were before this drawne to oath<:'S made for 
confirmacion of leagues ... and from them to an oath made for ratificacion of a bargaine and 
55 The text seems to bear out Morice's assertion: after Abimelech offered the terms of the oath, Abraham responds, 'I will 
swear', agreeing to take the oath but under no compulsion to do so (verse 24). LPL, MS 234, fos. 59r·60r. 
56 LPL, MS 234, fos. 60v·61 r. ' .. .lest there be any fornicator or profane person as Esau, who for one morsel of meat sold his 
birthright. For ye know how that afterward, when he would have inherited the blessing, he was rejected: for he found no 
place of repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears.' Hebrews 12.16, 17. 
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sale. Lastly altogether from oathes to bare speeches, thereby to prove a general oathe hy an 
equity yet very properlie he harpeth somewhat uppon the stringe .. 57 
Morice's interpretation of Achan's expiation Qoshua 7.16-21) in the Treatise had been 
confuted by eosin, who maintained that Achan's expiation was a good example from 
scripture of both special enquiry and the ex officio oath. Joshua had gathered all of Israel 
together to ascertain which man had committed a grievous sin, the knowledge of which crime 
had been previously made known to him by God. Lots were taken to discover who had 
committed the sin and the lor fell to a man named Achan. Joshua ordered Achan to confess 
what he had done and Achan did so. Morice had argued that this did not constitute an oath, 
but eosin asserted that it did and that the falling of the lot to Achan was a presumption upon 
which to ground a special enquiry. In rhe 'Defence' Morice maintained that the falling of the 
lot to Achan was a full and sufficient conviction of Achan by divine providence - it signified 
guilt itself, not a presumption of guilt into which enquiry should be made. Since God had 
made dear to Joshua that a crime had been committed and had detailed what the crime was, 
when the lot subsequently fell to Achan all that remained was to pass the sentence of guilt on 
him.58 This case also reinforced Morice's plea for the speedy conviction of offenders. If a 
judge had sufficient evidence to convict a criminal, he ought to proceed to the sentence rather 
than waste time encouraging perjury by enforcing an oath to confess the crime. 59 
Another example brought by Morice in his Treatise and confuted by eosin was the case 
of murder when the offender was unknown (Deuteronomy 21.1-9). In such a case the elders 
of the city nearest the site of the murder were to swear that they were not guilty and to offer a 
heifer as a plea of their innocence. Morice stated that the word 'oath' was not even used in this 
passage but the relevant words were 'protest' and 'answeare'.60 He felt compelled in many 
circumstances to bring eosin back to the main point: 
57 LPL, MS 234, fo. 61 r. 
58 'This was noe doubt a most graue and wise proceadinge of the Iudge Iosua. But what if Hacan had refused to harken to 
this good counsell and to manifest the particulers of the thinges stolne [sic], had not Iosua neuerthelesse suffitient matter 
whereuppon to proceede to iudgment of death agcinst him?' LPL, MS 234, fo. 70v. 
59 LPL, MS 234, fo. 73r-v. 
60 LPL, MS 234, fos. 65v, 74v-75r. 
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The question and pOinte In controuersie (which I am forced in respecte of his greate 
forgdfulnes often to remember) is that these generall and officious othes arL' vnlawfull amonge 
other causes, for that the deponent is sworne to make aunswere to Interrogatories to he 
propounded conteyninge vnknowne, secret, or bardie suspected matter neuer committed, so 
that the othe becometh in respect of the matters vnknowne, as to the taker indiscreate and 
without Iudgment in respect of the seacrecie or bare suspicion, wrongfull and iniurious. 61 
Morice concluded that all of eosin's arguments from scripture ro prove that the ex 
officio oath was consistent with the word of God had failed. They were either irrelevant ro the 
issue of forced, general oaths in ecclesiastical courts or else they operated on faulty logic. He 
conceded that no man with sound judgment would deny that magistrates might exact oaths 
lawfully from subjects under their jurisdiction, but the issue was not whether men might 
voluntarily take general oaths (as many of the examples eosin cited from scripture illustrated), 
but whether they might be compelled by law to take oaths in criminal matters. 62 
There was one simple reason why the ex officio oath was indiscreet and unjust, said 
Morice: not every truth that a man possessed in his head ought ro be rold. There were some 
things that a man ought ro be permitted ro retain privately in his mind. 63 For example, it 
would not be discreet to reveal that a certain man and woman committed adultery many 
years ago, though they had long ago mended themselves and lived in the fear of God. To 
force a man to reveal such an indignity from the distant past, argued Morice, would be to 
open an old wound afresh (and very likely a lot of trouble) after it had, in time, been healed. 
To counter eosin's charge that he had played the part of an anabaptist by justifYing a denial 
of the oath on grounds that it was not safe for a man's conscience, Morice denied any 
sympathy with the doctrine of conscience as the heretical, 'fantasticall' anabaptists understood 
it. But he maintained that there were some canons in England that flouted the laws of the 
realm and the royal prerogative of the prince. He even went so far as ro counsel the refusal of 
the oath: 'I stand in no doubt but am fullie assured (whatsoeuer he dreame) that those generall 
61 Morice's use of the word 'committed' in the above quotation does not mean that an offence had not been committed but 
that the unknown, secret, or bardy suspected evidence against a defendant had not been judicially received (committed) 
to the court beforehand. LPL, MS 234, fo. 76v. 
62 Morice remarked that Cosin had entirely skirted this issue in part III, chapter 11 of the Apolof!.ie. LPL, MS 234, fos. 64v-
65r. 
63 Hamilton, Shakespeare, 7-8,37; St. German, Salem and Bizance, reprinted in More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, 
McGugan, X, 355. 
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and officious oathes maie iustlie be refused, both by the Lawes of god and of this Kingdome, 
and if my reasons and proffes made to that end maie instrucre men to retaine a good 
conscience I shalbe right glad thereof.'64 
Cosin's lengthy enquiry inro the legal customs of foreign counrnes, how their princes 
and judges handled oaths, what kind of oaths were and had been used,65 did not inrerest 
Morice nor did he consider it pertinent to the controversy, which concerned (he claimed) 
England and its laws only. He defined the common law of England as 'the good and 
necessarie customes and vsages of the realme agreable with the lawe of god and reason' which 
bound aU subjects together inro a body politic.66 The common law, while being jus non 
scriptum, was validated by tradition and prescription, and upon it the life and conrinuance of 
the nation rested. The sovereign was a 'principall parte and porcion' of common law and ruled 
to protect the same. 67 Courts which observed the common law were called common law 
courts, the primary and foremost among these being the King's Bench, Exchequer, and 
Common Pleas. Chancery was, according to Morice, a common law court only in so far as it 
was a court of record, but otherwise it was unique. 68 
In answer to Cosin's examples of bailiffs, sheriffs, accountants, and other officers 
tendering oaths to their inferiors, Morice responded that the issue, once again, was not 
whether the oath could be voluntarily taken but whether it could be forced. 69 To Cosin's 
charge that the oath of the grand jury at sessions and assizes was at least as general if not more 
so than that in ecclesiastical courts, Morice complained that Cosin was merely dallying with 
words, pretending not to understand Morice's use of the word 'general'. The oaths of jurors, 
64 LPL, MS 234, fo. 89r. 
65 Cosin, Apo[ogie, II, 22-9. 
66 LPL, MS 234, fo. 124r. 
67 Morice mentioned that Fortescue had affirmed the ancient nature of Britain's monarchy. It had been accepted by the five 
nations which ruled Britain (the Britons, Romans, Saxons, Danes, and Normans). In fact, the king's coronation oath 
included a pledge to uphold the laws of the land, 'so that he may not, thoughe hedd of the bodye politicke of this 
kingdome, But by consent and allowance of his peopk alter or abolishe anye parte thereof. LPL, MS 234, fo. 124r-v; 
Fortescue, De laudibus, ed. Ch rimes, 39-41. 
68 There were other laws in England, too, such as maritime law, martial law, ecclesiastical law, and merchant law, but none of 
these systems of bw nor all of them together, s:lid Morice, could properly be termed the common law or even a part 
thereof. In this he was at odds with Cosin who viewed all bw systems in England as egual under the gueen. LPL, MS 234, 
fos. 124v-125r. 
69 Cosin had argued that oaths were regularly administered by offlce'rs to their underlings. Morice was skeptica\' however. 'It 
is vsually donne saith he, It is abusedlie donne saye I, yf it be so donne. Greate Lordes & lesse then Lordes may reguire an 
orhe of their accomptant yet is yt at the will of the other to accept or reiecte yt.' LPL, MS 234, fos. 127v-128r. 
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he maintained, could not be said to be general or indiscreet since the common law, both in 
custom and usage and in laws expressed in Parliament, was publicly known. What jurors 
would be given in charge at any session was already printed in books. Any recitation of the 
particulars of their charge, therefore, would serve merely as a reminder of them. But oaths in 
ecclesiastical courts, said Morice, were blind since defendants could not possibly imagine what 
questions they might be forced to answer. If ecclesiastical judges would only reveal to the 
party beforehand what particular crime the defendant was suspected of having committed, 
Morice supposed no one would find fault with their proceedings. 70 
eosin's attempt to show that common law was consonant with civil and canon law with 
regard to ex officio oaths was dismissed as a failure by Morice who concluded that the two 
laws were in open disagreement. 
The comon Lawe forbiddeth the ministring of an othe to any defendant in cawses crymynall & 
penall whereby losse of libertie or good name may ensue. The Cannon lawe presseth oathes 
vpon defendantes in such cases, and shall not these !awes be accompted not so much as dyvers? 
Naye they are altogether repugnant yea, at open warre, striving and contending strongly as 
vtter enymyes the one against the other, never to be reconsiled, how much soever The apologer 
laboreth to bring them to agreement. 71 
As a further demonstration of the repugnance between common Jaw and civil law, Morice 
turned briefly to the subject of torture. He remarked that eosin had maintained that 
common law forbade tonure for the revealing of crimes or accomplices in crime.72 But eosin 
later revealed that torture was acceptable in the Marches of Wales, in the Tower of London for 
treason, and in military camps. 73 Morice did not deny the legality of torture in those areas of 
jurisdiction, but he reiterated that it was illegal according to common law. That the civil law 
acknowledged tonure in certain cases showed the disparity between the two laws. eosin 
believed, like his predecessor Sir Thomas More, that if a man could be tortured in cases of 
treason, he might also be tortured in heresy cases, since heresy was no less than treason against 
70 LPL, MS 234, fo. 135r-v. 
71 LPL, MS 234, 141v. 
72 Cosin, ApoloKie, 1, 110-1. 
73 See above, 163. 
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the divine majesty.74 But Morice countered that there was no torture in England in cases of 
heresy, nor were defendants compelled to take oaths to answer to [he crime itself in capital 
cases. Citing the authority of the civilian Sir Thomas Smith, he noted that torture was heinous 
because it ran the risk of tormenring an innocent man needlessly and was no guarantee of true 
testimony. 75 
In dle Apologie Cosin had cited several statutes which he claimed allowed self-
incrimination,76 but Morice rejected Cosin's examples for various reasons. The first example, 
concerning oaths administered to coroners,77 was no comparison with the ex officio oath, said 
Morice. Although coroners were charged to speak truly, they were not required to do so 
concerning any hidden matter. He further declared that these articles were in fact set down in 
print and available to dle public view.?8 The second example was the statute 13 Richard II st. 1 
c. 7 in which JPs were required to swear to uphold and put into execution all statutes and 
ordinances touching their office. Morice maintained that, like the oath taken by coroners, the 
oath ofJPs concerned nothing unknown or concealedJ9 The last two statutes cited by Cosin 
related to oaths for d1e maimenance of the privileges of the church (13 Edward III c. 3) and 
the oath of great officers to suppress heresy diligently (2 Henry V c. 7). Morice noted that 
since he was only concerned with statutes and acts of Parliament still in force, these two need 
not be answered, but even if those acts had not been repealed, the oaths which were made legal 
by them were wholly dissimilar to ex officio oaths.8o 
Morice accused the high commissioners of committing seven particular errors in 
exercising their jurisdiction. The first error involved the commissioners' presumed authority to 
command JPs to arrest and attach the queen's excommunicate subjects, to send them up as 
prisoners to appear before the commission, to cause JPs to take bond from them for 
74 Cosin, Apologie, III, 213-4, quoted by Morice, LPL, MS 234, fo. 50v. More had claimed that heresy was 'treason to god' 
and used the two terms as if they were nearly equivalent. More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, 70, 80-1. 
75 LPL, MS 234, fos. 144r-v; Smith, De republiCil /lnglo>'UlI!, ed. Dewar, 117. 
76 Cosin, Apologie, Ill, 98-110. 
77 4 Edward I c. 1. See SR, I. part 2, 40. 
78 LPL, MS 234, fo. 155r. 
79 LPL, MS 234, fo. 155r-v; See SR, II, 63 
80 These 'dead and buried ordinances called and conjured upp agayne, to speake for this civilian' were in fact particular in 
their intention, though the wording of the oaths was general. At any rate, Morice thought that the deponent, by these 
statutes, mif!;ht have some knowledf!;e of the matter before his oath was taken. LPL, MS 234, fos. 155v-156r. 
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appearance, and to constrall1 them to obey the commands of inferior ecclesiastical officials 
such as archdeacons. Morice charged that such orders from the high commission violated the 
statute De excommunicato capiendo (5 Elizabeth c. 23), which stated that excommunicate 
persons were not to be proceeded against by ecclesiastical jutisdiction before the specified 
forry days had expired, and even after then only by the queen's special writ de 
excommunicato capiendo .81 Morice enquired whether it was the office of a justice of the peace 
to apprehend men deemed arrestable by some authority other than themselves? Did it perrain 
to their duty to take bonds for appearances before ecclesiastical commissioners, or could they 
justly commit to prison those who refused or could not enter bond? In short, what law had 
made JPs gaolers for the high commission? The duties and office of a JP, said Morice, were 
expressed in his commission and numerous other statutes, and Morice knew of no law [hat 
assigned such powers to JPs.82 
The second error which Morice accused the judges of committing concerned the legality 
of the warrant quorum nomina, deemed lawful by the commissioners on the basis of the Act 
of Supremacy. Morice described this writ as a command to JPs to arrest and attach suspects 
and send them to appear before the commissioners despite the fact that the cause for their 
arrest was not expressed in the warrant, and on occasion the warrams were handed down with 
no names on them. 83 Besides the issue of legality, Morice thought it was impudent to suggest 
that any such precept of quorum nomina could be found in the queen's leners patent. 84 The 
third error attributed by Morice ro the commissioners was forcing men on the grounds of the 
Elizabethan Act of Supremacy (1 Elizabeth c. 1) to answer general oaths without accusation, 
presentment, or other judicially received information. 85 
81 See also SR, IV, part 1, 45l. 
82 The prince indeed may will and command all her offycers and mynisters of iustice to be aydinge and asistinge, but that is 
to be intended where and in such cases as by the lawe and by the iustice of the land they may be aidinge and asistinge.' 
LPL, MS 234, fo. 1(,8r. JPs in East Anglia were especially uncooperative in their relations with ecclesiastical courts and 
were occasionally replrmanded by the privy council for their feisty independence. Collinson, Bizabethan puritan 
movement, 204-5,408,409; Elton, Constitutioll, 464-8; Emmison, Morals & the church courts. 
83 LPL, MS 234, fo. 172r; see 3.150 above, 96-7. 
84 LPL, MS 234, fos. 173v-174r. 
85 Morice evidently wanted to force ecclesiastic3.1 courts to use principles of common hw, 3.ccording to Cosin (ApoloKie, III, 
108). Morice replied that he knew the commission as it was now empowered to be of both ecclesiastical and civil 
jurisdiction, but it should use the proper form of the proceeding for the case which was pending, that is, common law for 
civil cases, ecclesiastical law for church cases. LPL, MS 234, fo. 174r-v. 
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TI1e fourth error Morice noted in the C0l1U111SSlOners concerned whether a judge was 
authorised to proceed ex officio to examine a defendant. eosin had claimed it was the 
opinion of learned men that defendanrs might lawfully be put to answer upon general oaths 
without accusation, presentment, indictment, or lawful information if the offence were 
notorious or ifir were known to the judges themselves to be dangerous or scandalous. Morice 
insisted, however, that a third person was needed besides the defendant and the judge in order 
for the proceedings to be just and fair, notoriety of the fact notwithstanding. 86 
The fifth error was the acceptance of secret denunciation. eosin had cited the example 
of the Babington plot against the queen in his attempt to prove the validity of secret 
denunciation. Information was brought secredy in that case, and the informer was not, and 
still had not been, made public. Was it unjust to allow such a 'backbyter' to bring information 
secretly, eosin had asked? 87 It was indeed un just, Morice countered, in that the traitors were 
not proceeded against by way of indictmenr. The fact that the names of the givers of 
intelligence were suppressed 'was nothinge materyall in that iudicyall accion.' 88 
The sixth error accorded to the commissioners was that of professing themselves publicly 
to be the accuser as well as the judge. 'The lustice of this land, detestinge such lawles 
proceedinge suffered1 not any man to be Accusor and wimes, an Inditor and a I mor for the 
tryall of the facre, much lesse any magistrate to be both iudge and accusoL' 89 Morice 
suggested eosin would respond to such a charge by maintaining that the judge was not an 
accuser, but simply the representative for the prosecution, which might variously be fame, 
clamorous insinuation, or anod1er means to initiate a suit.9o But the reality of ex officio 
proceedings was a judge who, in the absence of an accuser, presenter, informer, or indicter, 
took upon himself the business of the prosecution. 91 
86 'I haue learned that a iudge ought not to knowe but as a 1udge, his private knowledge may directe his conscyence but can 
offer him no course to 1u<4;e by.' LPL, MS 234, fo. 179v. 
87 Cosin, Apolor.ie, III, 108-9. 
88 Morice conceded that a( length Cosin had moderated his position, admitting (hat such secret informations were not 
usually sufficiem ground for special enCjuilY unless (hey were frequem or the offence was scandalous, and that secret 
informations were as rare in ecclesiastical COUrts as in common law courts. Morice, however, denied that secret information 
ever took place at the common law. LPL, MS 234, fos. 179v-180v. 
89 Cosin undoubtedly would have denied that ecclesiastical judges openly proclaimed themselves accusers as well as ju<4;es. 
LPL, MS 234, fo. 180v. 
90 See above, 122-6 for the eleven ways to initiate criminal suits in ecclesiastical cOUrts other than accusation or presemment. 
91 Cosin's attempt to Cjualify the term 'accuser' by suggesting that witnesses, too, were in some sort accusers was rejected by 
lv10rice: 'in apte speache a witnes ys no accusor, neither mayan accusor be a witnesse sins he is rightelie tearmed a witnesse, 
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The seventh and final error of the commissioners, according to Morice, was their practice 
of imprisoning without bail or mainprise those who, not knowing their accuser or the matter of 
accusation, refused to take the oath. He noted that eosin himself had admitted that by 
ordinary ecclesiastical jurisdiction, no man could be imprisoned for refusing the oath. The 
matter was resolved, eosin had argued, by understanding that the Act of Supremacy gave the 
commissioners general powers of ordering and redressing in ecclesiastical matters. Though 
legislation did not specify exactly how malefactors were to be convented and punished, the 
details were to be supplied subsequently by tl1e queen's letters patent. Thus imprisonment for 
refusal to take (he oath was an extraordinary punishment allowed by the queen's grant. 92 
While Morice allowed that there were many learned men who held that the queen's 
letters patent fully authorised the commission to administer the oath, he believed such men 
'doe greate vyolence vnto that good statute' by perverting its intended use and 'wrestinge the 
same vnto a wronge sence contrarie to the verie plaine and expresse wordes theroE' 93 Believing 
himself that the act merely restored and united pre-Marian authority, Morice 'looked for a 
warranty before the Acte' to justify the practice of imprisonment for refusing the oath. The 
Act of Supremacy, he asserted, only restored ecclesiastical authority that was previously lawful 
- not just the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction but also the manner and form of citation 
and punishment. But eosin had alleged that the specific means of conventing and punishing 
was left to the queen, 'supplied by those generall woordes viz. according to the tenor & effect 
of the lettres patenres.'94 Morice responded [hat the means available to the commission for 
conventing and punishing were shown by that act ro be the same as [hey ever were: 
for they are either graunted or restored and annexed as thauncient Lawfull course & manner of 
proceeding, and that as expressdy as any thing els. If then th'auncyent iurisdicion cccksiasticall 
to Convent by cytacion & to proceed to ecclesiastical! Censures doe stil! con tinew in force and 
are annexed to the crowne, as Iurisdicions ecclesiasticall from thence to be delegate by 
commission vnto others, how then may the commission ecclesiastical! appoint or assigne any 
that is indifferent and cometh not till he be called. An accusor ys not intended indifferent & voluntarcly offreth him sdfc 
to complayne.' LPL, MS 234, fo. 181r; Cosin, ApofoKic, II. 18. 
92 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 108-9; LPL, MS 234, fo. 183v. 
93 LPL, MS 234, fo. 165v. 
94 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 110; LPL, MS 234, 184v. 
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new forme of Conventing proceeding or punishing? sins by the Cyvillians owne confession a 
commission may not be graunted to chaunge any !awe in force. 95 
Furthering his point, Morice added, 'here ys an act of restitucion and vniring, not a woord of 
chaunge or alteracion of any manner or forme of ecclesiastical! Iurisdiccion.' Noting the 
provisions of the act he asked, 'ys there anything to be executed according to the tenor and 
effect of the lettres patentes but the premises?' If the letters patent introduced innovatory 
methods of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he mainrained, the Act of Supremacy could not be 
considered simply as a rescoration of ancienr jurisdiction.96 
But Cosin had employed a keen analogy. He had compared the vagueness of the 
wording of the commission's powers in the Act of Supremacy to the vagueness in wording of 
the statute authorising the president and Council in Wales co act upon present and future 
letters patent from the king. Although corture was illegal according co the common law, letters 
patent directed co the council from time to time empowered it to use torture in cases of 
suspected felony or murder. 97 Cosin's point was that the sovereign could, through letters 
patent, authorise punishments contrary to the ordinary course oflaw - torture by the council 
in Wales, imprisonment by the high commission in England. Morice chose to interpret Cosin's 
example as a boast that the queen could empower the commission co corture men. 'By which 
his speach and strange interpretacion doth he not fullie and plainlie affirme that if it should 
please the prince ... ro committe the rackinge and torturinge of her subiectes co the 
Commissioners ecclesiasticall that then they might lawfuUie vse and execute the same.'98 Here 
Morice attempted to expose Cosin as an advocate of cruelty, but he was unable to refute the 
logic of Cosin's argument. 
If the Act of Supremacy did not empower the queen to specify punishments to be used 
by the commission, Cosin had contended, the authority given to her by that act was useless. 
This sent Morice into one of his sharp tirades, declaring, 'I doubte not but he meaneth olde 
ecclesiasticall Iurisdiccon is to base, co milde, to favorable, we muste haue a more highe and 
95 LPL, MS 234, fo. 185r-v; Cosin, ApoioKie, I, 110. 
9G LPL, MS 234, fo. 185r-v. 
97 Sec above, 163-4 
98 LPL, MS 234, fo. 186v. 
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supreme authoritie, more greivous peynes and punishementes'. In these days there must be 
'rough and hard handlinge by messingers and pursevantes: chargeable bondes for apparances: 
dauncinge attendaunce from day to day till the purse be well purged, greivous fYnes: forced 
oathes: [and] punishinge of the body by longe streighte and close imprisonment'.99 
Surrounding this complaint were charges of abuse and corruption - a recurring grievance in 
both the Treatise and 'Defence'. As we will see in the next chapter, Morice was outwitted on 
the issue of the Act of Supremacy and was forced to resort to empty protests such as the ones 
above. Cosin's analogy of imprisonment by the high commission with torture by the Council 
of Wales illustrated that Pariiamem had given authority to the sovereign to act above the 
common course of law on special occasions, irrespective of the separate issue of royal 
prerogative. 100 
Turning his attention to Magna Carta, Morice declared that Cosin's attempts to 
reinterpret the text to exonerate the clergy from their dury to obey chapter 39 had been 111 
vain.IOl Cosin believed Magna Carta had essentially comprised two separate grants, one to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the other to the temporal, and he had poinred to the first chapter of 
Magna Carta as being the place where this severance took place. The confirmation of the 
church's liberties at the beginning of the charter indicated to Cosin that the rest of the 
document was impertinent to ecclesiastical jurisdiction except where it was plainly expressed 
co be relevant. 
Morice recited the words of the first chapter of Magna Carta: 'ffirst (saith (he king) we 
haue graunted co god and by this our present Charter haue confirmed for vs and our heires 
foreuer, that (he churche of lngland shall be free and shall haue all her noble rightes and 
liberties vnhurte.'lo2 He suggested that these words provided for, among other things, 
freedom from foreign laws: 
99 LPL, MS 234, fo. I 87v. 
100 Sce below, 224, footnote 105. 
101 See above, 92, 93, 100; as well as Cos in, ApoloKie , I, 102 and II, 73-4. 
102 LPL, MS 234, fo. 250v. 
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yf the courtes Ecclesiastical! notvvithstanding shall be suffered to drawe men before them vppon 
secreate complainte, suspition, and fame supposed, put them to vndiscrc'te othes to bewraye 
them selves, then haue not the fremen of this realme that which was prouided for them. 103 
Morice hoped to prove that chapter 39 of Magna Carta applied to ecclesiastical as well as 
temporal courts, which proof would invalidate any ex officio proceedings which did not 
accord with common law procedures. Professor Holt suggests that the precise namre of the 
grants made in Magna Carta is confusing. The document, he states, 'admitted the corporate 
capacity of the Church ... but for the rest it conveyed its privileges severally to all free men.' 104 
At any rate, there was no solid evidence to prove that chapter 39 obliged ecclesiastical courts 
to observe common law processes: Morice's argument rested on subjective assumptions. 
Cosin had pressed his point further by suggesting thar because the statute De 
excommunicato capiendo spoke of the ecclesiastical laws of the realm, affirmed by 
Parliament, Morice had no grounds for claiming them to be strange and foreign laws. Morice 
replied that the preamble to that act did indeed mention the ecclesiastical laws of the realm, 
but it did not state which laws! 105 Could it be, asked Morice, that the Parliament in that act 
sought to endorse popish, foreign laws as part of the ecclesiastical laws of the realm? The 
answer being negative, Morice vowed to continue his opposition to ex officio 'inquisition' as a 
foreign custom that never achieved status as a law of realm. Rather dun proving anything, 
however, Morice had simply arrived back at his long-standing disagreement with Cosin that 
the ex officio oad1 was foreign to the laws of the realm. This was already slightly at variance 
with his own admission at the end of the Treatise that the oath had corruptly crept into 
England over time. 106 He seemed to be caught throughout much of his writing between 
claiming the oath was foreign and had never been accepted into the realm and claiming that it 
had been accepted into the realm, though illegally through the abuses of the clergy and their 
misapprehension of the Act of Supremacy. 
103 The argument was that the foreign procedures used by ecclesiastical courts were in direct defiance of the provisions of 
Magna Carta. Ibid. 
104 Holt, MaKna Carta, 278-9; see also 272-3, 327-31; Faith Thompson, Magna Carta: its role in the rrtllkinK or the EnKlish 
constitution, 1300-1629 (Minneapolis, 1948) 121-5, 14(), 142; Giles Jacob, A new law dictionary (London, 1732) sig. 
Mmm4v-Nnn1r. 
105 SR, IV, part 1, 451. 
106 Morice, Treatise, 58. 
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The sixth chapter of the 'Defence' was devoted to refuting Cosin's statement that oaths 
administered in Star Chamber and Chancery were similar to the ex officio oath. Morice 
reviewed Cosin's discussion of ex officio promoto (the act of public officers prosecuting in the 
sovereign's name),107 contending that suits in the king's courts could not be said to be 
preferred ex officio simply because the courts were the king's. After ail, it was expressed in law 
that the king himself was a party in all cases before his courts, and since he could not be the 
judge in his own case, as Morice explained, the case could not really be said to be ex officio .1 08 
The question, he noted, was not whether temporal courts administered oaths to defendants 
for the truth of their answer - that was granted. What was in controversy was whether they 
compelled defendants to take blind or general oaths concerning criminal matters. 109 
Regarding Star Chamber, Morice objected to Cosin's comparison between oaths in that 
court and the ex officio oath. He repeated his assertion in the Treatise that in Star Chamber 
the accuser was always known and the defendant fully apprised of the crime objected against 
him. Cosin had insisted that there was not always an accuser: a public official might act in the 
common interest to stir up and excite the attorney- or solicitor-general to his duty. But 
Morice thought Cosin had nor answered the main point which was that the defendant knew 
his accusers and his charge before his oath was required. Cosin concurred that bills were 
exhibited in Star Chamber previous to a defendant's answer - as were articles in ecclesiastical 
courts. 'A close and couerte answeare', remarked Morice. lIO The truth, he clarified, was that 
no one exhibited articles in ecclesiastical courts, but the judge himself framed them, 
occasionally beforehand but most often after the defendant had taken his oath. 
Is it so in the consistorie ecdessiastical? no, he must first sweare to answeare trulie not what he 
hath hearde or vnderstoode, but what shalbe afterv{ard read and opened vnto him; Is not heare 
thincke yow a iust and discrcate ministring of an oathe? Is this the same that is vsed in the 
Chaunceric or Starchamber?111 
107 See above, 127-8, 133. 
108 LPL, MS 234, fos. 206r-207r. 
109 LPL, MS 234, fo. 216v. 
110 LPL, MS 234, fo. 217r. 
111 LPL, MS 234, fo. 217v. Even Cosin's assertion that the defendant was not allowed counsel in ore tenus cases was confuted 
by Morice. In some cases, noted Morice, the defendant did not desire counsel or the judge deemed it unnecessary, but the 
defendant was certainly allowed this liberty. When the proceeding was ore tenus, however, a defendant's counsel could 
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Concerning Cosin's statement that the defendant was also not allowed counsel when 
answering interrogatories, Morice intended to show this statement false as well. Although the 
defendant might not have his counsel present during the interrogation, 'yet taketh he aduise 
and direction how, and in what manner, and to what kinde of Interrogatories he shall 
answeare', which was nor strictly tl1e same as being denied counsel. His attorney generally 
instructed him not to answer any interrogatories 'impertinent to the matter of accusation 
conteyned in the bill of complainte or Informacion' or to any questions he had previously 
answered. 112 If d1e od1er party in the case objected to the silence of the defendant on any 
question, contended Morice, he might move the court to order the defendant to justifY his 
reasons for remaining silent, and the defendant might do this with counsel. Cosin had 
admitted thar defendants in ecclesiastical courts could refuse to answer impertinent questions 
just as they might in Star Chamber, bur, as in Star Chamber, the judge determined what 
constituted impertinence. 113 It was right and good, affirmed Morice, that in Star Chamber 
the judge should decide that question since the bill of complaint or information, which set out 
the issues of the charge clearly, was put in by the accuser. But the same procedure could not be 
justly done in ecclesiastical courts, 'sins the Iudge him selfe is (heare the proferrer of the 
articles and no indifferenr person to I udge and decide his owne cawse.' 114 As a contrast to the 
specific and pertinent questions asked by judges in Star Chamber, Morice gave two examples 
of impertinent questions asked of defendants in ecclesiastical courts: 'What thincke yow of 
suche a man or matter?' or 'what meane or enrende yow to doe heareafrer in suche a case?' 115 
Morice's implication was that interrogatories in the high commission had a discursive quality, 
and as he asserted several times, he believed these questions purposed (0 discover matter upon 
which to ground a charge against the defendant. 
not speak for his client; the defendant himself must answer. LPL, MS 234, fo. 218r; Hudson, 'Star Chamber', Collecttllletl 
juridica, cd. Hargrave, 128. 
112 LPL, MS 234, fo. 218r-v. 
113 Cosin, Apolor,ie, III, 95. 
114 LPL, MS 234, fo. 220r. 
115 LPL, MS 234, fo. 222r. 
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The major allegation of Morice's 'Defence' came in the eighth and final chapter. He 
concluded that any flagrant violation of the king's laws by ecclesiastical judges constitured 
praemunire according (0 acts of Parliament defining that offence. 116 In the Treatise Morice 
had grounded his charge 011 the stature 16 Richard II c. 5, the primary act of Parliament 
which defined praemunire. 117 eosin had objected (0 this for two reasons: first, he claimed that 
stature did not address ecclesiastical jurisdiction at all; and second, that because ecclesiastical 
courts' powers were derived down from the crown, praemunire was not possible in the post-
Reformation church. eosin had adopted a narrow interpretation of the act, holding that 
praemunire could only be the result of specific actions mentioned in the stature, such as 
translations, processes, sentences of excommunication, bulls, instruments, etc. and for them to 
be accounted praemunire, they must be purchased or pursued in the court of Rome. 118 The 
difference of opinion between eosin and Morice on the rendering of this stature centred on 
the meaning of the word alibi, or 'elsewhere'. Morice interpreted alibi to include not only 
Rome but anywhere else, such as ecclesiastical courts, where an attempt was made to defeat a 
decision given in one of the king's courts. The definition of the word alibi, he asserted, could 
not be limited to another country or place such as Rome, but must be taken to mean anywhere 
the royal prerogative was infringed. Thus the operative sense of alibi was not primarily 
geographical bur jurisdictional. 119 This was a well-accepted precept in the fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries, but in Elizabethan England the issue arose less frequently among the 
judges, given t11e union of temporal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions after the break with 
Rome. 120 
eosin had asserted in the Apologie that alibi could no longer pertain to the ecclesiastical 
courts since, being the queen's courts, they were annexed (along with their canons) to the 
crown. Moreover, the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy had empowered the queen through her 
letters patent to authorise bishops and commissioners to conduct processes in their courts 
116 LPL, MS 234, fa. 315r. 
117 Sce abovc, 68-9, 71; SR, II, 85-6. 
118 LPL, MS 234, fo. 300r; see also 100-4. 
119 LPL, MS 234, fa. 320r. 
120 Moric" still had advocates in Sir John Spelman and Sir Edward Coke, who continued to adhere 1:0 the theory that any 
attempts to defeat judgements in the king's coutts constituted pracmullire. Gray, 'The boundaries of equitable function', 
AfLH 20 (1974) 193-4; Speim:ln, Report,·, ed. B:lker, 66-9; Helmholz, Romi/II Cilnon law, 25-6. 
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according to the provisions laid out in that statute. But Morice noted that bishops now held 
court in their own names and with their own seals, which argued for a certain amount of 
autonomy from the crown. Though eosin had insisted that ecclesiastical courts derived their 
authority from the queen, Morice would not surrender the possibility that they could still be 
guilty of praemunire. 121 This was a complicated and seemingly fruitless argument. Since 
Morice himself in other places argued that the Act of Supremacy was merely a uniting and 
restoring act rather than an innovative one, it was disadvantageous to concede here that the 
commissioners were extraordinarily authorised by the queen's letters patent simply for the 
sake of demonstrating that they could be guilty of praemrmire when tl1foughout both works 
he argued that the high commission could only exercise ordinary jurisdiction. It would have 
been more consistent with his logic to state that the commissioners could be guilty of 
praemunire by virtue of their abuse of ordinary power restored and united by the Act of 
Supremacy rather than by their use of extraordinary power created by the Act of Supremacy. 
Morice admitted, however, that not every misjudgemenr by an ecclesiastical official 
should be accounted praemunire. For instance, if anyone sued in an ecclesiastical court for 
laying violent hands on a cleric when in fact he had previously been sued in a temporal court 
for debt of trespass and was merely trying to wriggle out of it, Morice suggested that a 
prohibition was sufficient. If the ecclesiastical court were ignoranr of the first matter, they 
should be served a writ of prohibition rather than praerntmire. It was an entirely different 
matter, however, if an ecclesiastical court knowingly interfered with a suit determinable by a 
temporal court. 
Summarising his principal argument, Morice stated that compelling defendants to take 
the ex officio oath was worthy of praemunire because it was an injury to the crown's dignity 
and prerogative. eosin had complained that Morice, by seeking to replace prohibitions with 
writs of praemrmire,' had lost all sense of degree. eosin believed that prohibition and 
attachment were sufficient to prevent ecclesiastical courts from meddling with temporal 
jurisdiction, but Morice emphatically disagreed. 'No no. [he sword of prohibicion and 
attachement is ouer blume. It is the sharpe and two edged sworde of premunire whiche 
121 LPL, MS 234, fo. 302r-v. 
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protecteth and preseruethe hir maiesties rightes and prerogatiues from the Iniurie of ordinaries 
and their substitutes.' 122 Here, at the end of his 'Defence', Morice felt obliged to attack his 
opponent more forcefully: he predicted eosin would one day be called to account for his 
deceitful dealing against the laws of the realm when the queen was made aware of how her 
trust had been misplaced. The Apologie for sundrie proceedings, he maintained, had been 
nothing more than a defence of encroachment upon the royal prerogative for the sake of 
bringing the queen's subjects into thraldom and servitude at the hands of a corrupt and 
abusive clergy by way of ex officio procedure and lawless imprisonment. 123 He hoped for a 
public book of retractions by eosin not only for his false opinions concerning sundry 
proceedings ecclesiastical but also for his misquotations and misrepresentations of Morice's 
viewpoints. 124 
Even after his failure in the 1593 parliament which ended with a reprimand from the 
privy council, Morice still seemed unable to believe that Elizabeth fully supported the 
disciplinary tactics of the high commission. He was so deeply rooted in institutional 
anticlerical ism and a belief in the superiority of common law that he became professionally 
marginalised at the end of his life, oblivious to the new authoritarian tendency of Elizabethan 
government. eosin was never called to account for his opinions, but died honourably in the 
same year as Morice (1597), and came to be seen in the sevemeenrh century as a pioneer of the 
civil law in England. 125 
Morice claimed that the only cause of his grief was the offence offered by unjust general 
oaths 'to godes holie name; her maiesties crowne and regalitie, and the freedome of the 
subiectes of this lande'.126 Whether ex officio procedure was used against evil or just men was 
immaterial; justice ought to be ministered to all men equally. 
122 LPL, MS 234, fo. 320v. Morice was probably aware that many of the prohibitions issued by the common law COllrts in his 
own day were ultimately ineffectuaL This fruitlessness increased during the early years of James' reign, as the number of 
prohibitions swelled outrageously. Usher, Rise and fall, ed. Tyler, 167-8, 170-9, 182-3, 188-93, 198-201; Levy, Fifth 
A melldmcnt, 225. 
123 This pa'Sage contains "-,me of l\1orice\ strongest language, and his choice phrases did not ,s"pe the pen of Whitgift. 
LPL, MS 234, fos. 324v-325r. 
124 There is som<: justiflcation in this particular complaint, as many of Cosin's quotations from the Treatise were either 
incomprehensibly truncated or simply did not appear in the primed text and might have mistakenly been drawn from 
some other author's work. 
125 See also 256. 
126 LPL, MS 234, fo. 52r. 
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1t is tht' due and sincert' admini,tracion of Lawe and lustice (1 would tht' doctor should knowt') 
that I sceke and contend for (without any partial! respect to any particukr person, or causes as 
ht' slaunderouslit' imputeth) fearinge that tht' contagion of this iniustict' and wrongt' will in timt' 
spredd and enlarge yt selfe to the suhuercion of our pollicie and common wealth which god 
forbid. 127 
The 'Defence' was a spirited rejoinder. Intellectual, anecdotal, and passionate, it (Ook a 
proto-constitutional approach to law that would not gain substantial acceptance until 1689. 
Morice caught eosin on several errors, though he added a few of his own. Most importantly, 
the 'Defence' failed (0 dislodge some crucial assertions of eosin's Apologie, and we will 
examine why this was the case in the next chapter. We have studied the literary controversy 
between eosin and Morice in their own words. The resolution and significance of this 
controversy now remains (0 be unravelled. 
127 LPL, MS 234, fo. 52r-v. 
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Sixteenth century English rhetoricians believed that the revival of preaching that came 
with the Reformation should be accompanied by a revival in the art of speaking. 1 Tudor 
authors of books 011 rhetoric followed the classical authorities Quimilian and Cicero in 
stressing the 'need for an alliance between reason, wisdom, and eloquence' in public debate. 
Rhetoric, according to Quintilian, was simply the art of eloquence and could be taught by 
those who had mastered it. 2 One of [he foremost among the Tudor rhetoricians, Thomas 
Wilson, believed that the study of rhetoric was indispensible to counsellors and active citizens, 
and his contemporary Henry Peacham observed that the gift of persuasion was the surest 
means of elucidating the beauty and power of wisdom. 3 In practical terms rhetoric could be 
used for the profitability of the commonwealth, wrote Richard Beacon, by inducing the 
people (even deceitfully) to accept virtuous though sometimes unpleasant new laws. 4 
Rhetorical strategies formed a large part of the writings of Cosin and Morice, neither of 
whom was short-sighted enough to rely on his legal arguments alone. In fact they both 
resorted to literary devices when they lacked an adequately convincing argument based on 
logic and reason. One of the main techniques they employed was repetition, and this was 
characteristic of their legal training. Cosin cited authorities endlessly in the marglll, 
particularly in part III of the Apologie, and Morice tended to compile as many examples to 
prove his point as he could bring to mind. This habit, common to all polemical works of the 
time, was borne out of the necessity for the writer to appear to be expounding and explaining 
authoritative law rather than asserting it. As it was clearly noted in chapter one,5 to be seen in 
Elizabethan England as an 'innovator' in religion or politics was a kiss of death for the 
ambitious statesman. In an age when it was still believed that all of (he greatest wisdom lay in 
Sir John Cheke, Sir Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham, and Thomas Wilson were all rhetoricians at Cambridge, either as 
students or teachers (or both) in the 1530s and '40s. Notable rhetoricians of the later Tudor period included Dudley 
Fenner and Henry Peacham. Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 67, 73; Stanford E. Lebmberg, Sir Thomas Elyot, Tudor 
humanist (Austin, 1960) 34-5,76. 
2 Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 86. 
3 Wilson was a student at Kings College, Cambridge in the 1540s and studied under Sir John Cheke. In 1554 he wrote The 
arte oj'rhetorique (1553) (STC2 25799) which went through at least eight editions during Elizabeth's reign. In fact, it 
helped start a trend of vernacular treatises on rhetoric in England. Peacham's famous work was The Karden or eloquence 
(1577) (STC2 19497). Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 52-3, 67-8, 85-6, 99. 
4 A book on statesmanship and politics, Beacon's SoLon his joLLie, or a poHtique discourse, touchillK the reformation or 
COIJ/lilIJllweales (1594) (STC2 1653) was his only work. It has generally been seen only in its context to the Irish campaign 
of the 1590s but Markku Pe!tonen believes it has a much wider significance regarding late Elizabethan government in 
generaL Peltonen, Classical hUlllanism, 75 and footnote 90, 75-88. 
5 See above, 22-3. 
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the past rather than in the futute, an orator, lawyer, academic, or tract writer was expected to 
summon up the sagacity of the ages to prove his contention. 
The art of 'redescribing' a fact or someone's character for the purpose of enhancing 
moral value or exaggerating evil qualities was a powerful tool in the hands of a skilled orator or 
writer, and it was an indispensible strategy in literary controversy where a writer sought to 
colour the arguments or assertions of his rival. Redescription was thus an effort to reshape the 
audience's opinion about a fact that had already occurred or had previously been described by 
one's opponent. 6 This technique was favoured by Morice in his attempts to undermine the 
moral integrity of the clergy and especially ecclesiastical judges. Spurred on by his 
anticlericalism, he repeatedly adumbrated his criticisms of ex officio procedure and the oath 
with revelations of greed, vanity, incompetence, bias, and malice on the part of ordinaries and 
high commissioners.7 Morice exploited the anticlerical bias in most chronicle accounts of 
English history and other contemporary works, producing tales of spiritual corruption and 
abuse of power from dIe lives of archbishops Arundel, Becket, Anselm, Langton, and Boniface; 
Cardinal Wolsey; and dIe Marian bishops Bonner and Longland. R These biased examples of 
corruption amongst ecclesiastical officials Morice juxtaposed with Cosin's protestations of the 
sincerity and integrity imputed to ecclesiastical judges by the canon law. 9 
Another rhetorical device employed by both writers, but especially by Morice, was the 
use of nicknames. He variously described Cosin as 'the patron of officious Illquisicions', 'our 
consistoriall doctor', the 'wylie Apologer', 'our Cannonicall Cyuilian', and 'our resdesse 
Inquisitor' among many others. 10 He was also given to bragging about the irresistible force of 
his own arguments and the supposed failings of Cosin. 11 These mocking names and confident 
6 Skinner, Remon ilnd rhetoric, 138-44. 
7 Morice's anticlerical ism was probably enflamed by the fact that Cosin was a student of the civil law. The MarpreJate tracts 
showed that puritans, especially radicals, 'saw the Pope and his minions lurking behind the robes of the civilians.' But the 
civilians thought this was ridiculous. They continued to study continental civilian literature not because they were secretly 
papistical, but because it was good. Helmholz, ROllllln canon law, 147. 
8 For prime examples see Morice, Treatise, 16,40-1, 51-5; LPL, MS 234, fos. 48v, 244r-245r. Morice relied mostly on Foxe's 
Act and monument., (1536) (STC2 11222) and John Britton's A tretltise on the law., o(EnKland (1533) (STC2 5803) for 
his historical material. He may have also relied on William Tyndale's popular The pnlctyse or prelates (1530) (STC2 
24465). 
9 See above, [def! 
10 LPL, MS 234, fos. 81r, 63r, 65r, 121r, and 121v, respectively. 
11 'Bel:lOlde here I beseech you howe our Civilyan staggereth to and fro, he speaketh indeed but confusedlie, and as a man 
sodenlie awaked out of a dreame.' LPL, MS 234, fo. 173r. 'meere ignorance ys the mother of this our Civillians simple 
speache, for had he knowne what ys meant by these woords Inditor and Iuror he would no doubte for his credites sake 
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boasts sometimes concealed weak Of inconsistent arguments on Morice's part, probably as a 
diversionary tactic. This was dearly the case in his response to Cosin's argument that the queen 
could not empower commissions contrary to common law. 12 
On rarer occasions Morice made use of imagery and invention, particularly in his mock 
trial in the 'Defence'.13 This memorable section proved that he was a skilled writer when he 
wanted to be, and the Treatise would have greatly benefitted from this kind of scenic 
dialogue. In response to eosin's dry concepts of canon and civil jurisprudence, Morice 
allegorically constructed living characters appearing in an Elizabethan consistory and 
articulated his own views through the two defendants on triaL This was a literary achievement 
far beyond anything in the Apologie. Like a medieval didactic play, the imaginary court 
described by Morice illustrated judicial principles through a dialogue of arch-types - fictional 
protagonists representing conflicting ideas and guiding the reader towards moral 
condusions. 14 
Cosin's rhetorical tactics also included redescription. His main strategy was to portray 
opponents of the high commission as trouble-makers intent .on dissolving rightful spiritual 
authority and impugning the royal prerogative. His warnings to the puritans at times implied 
charges of treason. For example, he asserted that it was impossible for ecclesiastical courts to 
be guilty of praemunire since ecdesiasticaljurisdicrion was united to the crown, and suggested 
that those who made this claim tried 'to implie an incompatibilitie betwixt the Crowne and 
Ecclesiasticall iurisdiction ... which is most erroneous to thinke, and traiterous to affirme.' 15 
Again, he rejected Morice's definition of alibi as extending to bishops' courts: ' .. .let such as 
shall so affirme, beware they incurre not (hereby) the danger of implied, if not direct denyall; 
haue bin silent hearein'. LPL, MS 234, fo. 182r. 'Yea this our defcndor of those abuses fearinge leaste these his conceiptcs 
would be accompted but for (Oyes and fantasies of a weake brayne at lengch ... betaketh himself (0 an other course .. .' LPL, 
MS 234, fo. 188v. 
12 LPL, MS 234, fo. 186r-v; see also above, 191-2, for discussion. 
13 See above, 176-9. 
14 It is even possible that Morice's imaginary trial was based on the trial of Duessa in Spenser's Faerie queene, though instead 
of the judge being the wise and just Mercilla (Elizabeth), it is the 'unjust' Cosin. See M. Pauline Parker, The illlegOlJ of' 
the Faerie qlleene (Oxford, 1960) 40-1, 220-2. 
15 Cosin, ApoloyJe, I, 128-9 (pages misprinted '126' and '127'). 
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of a part of her Highnesse Royall stile; and the breach also of their oathes taken, for assistance 
and defence of all Prerogatiues, &c vnited or belonging to this Imperial! crowne.' 16 
References in the Apologie to puritan arguments were generally coloured by an 
overexaggeration of their radical nature, and Cosin spent the last five chapters discrediting and 
marginalising his adversaries while positioning himself as a stay and anchor for lawful, orderly 
society. Contrarily, when describing inquisitional procedure in ecclesiastical courts, Cosin was 
given to habitual understatement. This was mainly accomplished using a tone of 'fatherly 
correction' in discussing the need for punishment of crimes. 17 He asserted that punishments 
for aU crimes except heresy, apostasy, and atheism ought to be viewed as medicinae, or 
tending to the defendant's spiritual healing, rather than poenae. I8 Even the most heavy-
handed tactic of the high commission, forcing defendants to take the ex officio oath, was 
described in gentle terms. Ecclesiastical judges, said Cosin, 'for auoyding scandall to Christian 
religion, and for reformation of the partie, may thus enquire of the offence, to see it redressed, 
and punished', that is, they could compel defendants on oath to accuse themselves of their 
crimes. 19 These rhetorical tactics on the part of Cosin and Morice helped fill out (or distract 
attention from) their arguments, but the bulk of their respective writings was devoted to 
complex, adversariallegal debate that required an impressive amount of learning. 
The literary controversy began with the ecclesiastical schedule issued by Cosin and eight 
other high commissioners in 1590 or 1591 at the request of the privy coullcil.2° Morice used 
this memorandum to spark a public debate on the legality of certain ecclesiastical procedures, 
notably the ex officio oath. In both the Treatise and the 'Defence' he attacked the oath as 
unjust and contrary to the laws and equity of the realm of England. Cosin defended the 
procedures of the high commission as reasonable, necessary, and demonstrably lawfuL 
The issue of ex officio procedure is not easily or perhaps satisfactorily untangled, but 
some conclusions can be drawn. The battie between Morice and Cosin over of the legality of 
16 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 86. 
17 Cosin, ApoloKie, 1, 46, 115; II, 59, 66, 94; III, 42-3. 
18 This was also the view expressed by the commissioners in the 1591 memorandum on oaths. LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r-v. See 
also Cosin, Ap%Kie, III, 42-3. 
19 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 79-80 (pages misprinted '81' and '82'). 
20 See above, 52, footnote 4 L 
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the oath was fought on many fronts, one of which was the proper interpretation of medieval 
heresy law. Three statutes had summarized medieval legal concepts of heresy in England. 
These laws were enacted in 1382 (5 Richard II SL 2 C. 5, commonly called 'An Act against 
Lollardy'), 1401 (2 Henry IV c. 15, De heretico comburendo), and 1414 (2 Henry V st. 1 c. 
7). The first of these acts was not controverted by Morice or Cosin, and the third was only 
briefly referred to,21 but the significance of De heretico comburendo was forcefully 
disputed. 22 Briefly, the statute De heretico comburendo proscribed Lollardy, sloppily 
defining its adherents as 'diverse false and perverse people of a certain new sect' who espoused 
'divers new Doctrines'. Outlawed by this act were preaching or writing without license, 
publications that opposed catholic doctrine, and conventicles (unauthorised religious 
meetings). All books owned by Lollards were (0 be submitted to the bishop for review. Those 
who were 'defamed or evidently suspected' of contravening the act were arrested and either 
fined or imprisoned 'till he or they of the Articles laid (0 him or them in this Behalf, do 
canonically purge him or themselves, or else ... do abjure, according as the lawes of the Church 
do require.' Second time offenders were burnt (hence the name of the act).23 It was 
commonly believed that by the general words of this statute Parliament had authorized the ex 
officio oath, especially against heretics. De heretico comburendo was repealed by the Heresy 
Reform Act of 1534 (25 Henry VIII c. 14) and the causes for the repeal preoccupied Morice 
and Cosin. Did the repeal of De heretico comburendo indicate that ex officio oaths and 
procedure had been deemed contrary (0 the law of England? 
Morice spoke of this law in vicious terms, adopting the vocabulary of tlle Henrican 
parliament that repealed it. It was, said Morice, a 'bloudie and broyling lawe' which defined 
the terms 'canonicall decrees' and 'lawes of the Church' so vaguely that it enabled the church 
to widen the scope of ex officio procedure and the oath at the expense of the common law 
procedures of accusation or presentment, witnesses, and juries. 24 Cosin likened De heretico 
21 Cosin pointed to 2 Henry V st. 1 c. 7 in an attempt to establish statutory precedent for the ex ol11do oath, but his 
argument, based on the power of ecclesiastical judges to enquire of hospitals, was weak. Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 98. 
22 For a thorough analy,is of all three medieval heresy statutes on their own merits, see More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, 
McGugan, X, xlvii-Ixvii. 
23 SR, II, 127. 
24 Morice, Treatise, 32-3; LPL, MS 234, fos. 214r-215r; see also Lehmberg, Reformation parliament, 186-7. 
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comburendo to the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy (1 Elizabeth c. 1) in that it empowered the 
clergy to enquire of nonconformity and to punish it. 25 The best response Morice could 
provide to this was a simple disagreement that De heretico comburendo legally established the 
ex officio oath - a conclusion which would have been contrary to the word of God and thus 
void in law. 26 Cosin attributed the repeal of De heretico comburendo, however, entirely to its 
generality, noting that heresy was not clearly defined by that act and that many were wrongly 
convicted of heresy as a result of that generality. A further reason given was that some 
canonical decrees at that time were dearly popish and foreign and infringed upon the royal 
prerogative. 27 Agreed upon by both writers was that, rightly or wrongly, ex officio procedure 
had been used and justified by ecclesiastical courts on the basis of De heretico comburendo. 
During its one hundred and thirty-three years of existence, De heretico comburendo 
was never universally regarded as a binding law. 28 Its repeal in 1534 laid to rest the question of 
the legality of the law, but it raised another question: why had it been repealed, and what 
judicial principles had been affirmed by way of the repeal? The preamble to the Heresy 
Reform Act of 1534 repudiated De heretico comburendo, complaining that it did not 
specifically define heresy, that the words 'canonical sanctions' were unnecessarily imprecise, 
and that 'capcious interrogatoryes' administered by ordinaries often caused innocent men to 
be convicted of heresy. In a passage often quoted by Morice, the preamble continued by 
affirming that 'it stondeth not with the right order of justice nor good equytie that any person 
shuld be convycte and put to the losse of hys lyfe good name or goodes onles it were by due 
accusacion and wytnes, or by presentment confession or proces of outlarye .. .'29 Cosin opted 
for a narrow interpretation of the preamble, suggesting that it treated only of heresy, not other 
matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 30 He maimained, therefore, that the concluding section 
of the preamble which read, 'wherfore it is not resonable that any Ordynarye by any 
suspeccion conceyved of hys owne fantasie without due accusacion or presentment shuld put 
25 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 100-I. 
26 LPL, MS 234, fo. 157r. Motice accepted, however, that it was thought by ordinaries at the time (though unjustly) that ex 
offlcio procedure was implicitly condoned by De heretico comburendo. LPL, MS 234, fos. 158r-159r. 
27 Cosin, ApofoKie, III, 74 (page misprintcd as '76'). 
28 More, Works, cd. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, li-liii. 
29 SR, III, 454. 
30 Cosin, Apologie, II, 78,107. 
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any subjecte of this Realme in the infamye and slaunder of heresie to the perell of lyf losse of 
name and goodes ... ' could only be applied to cases of heresy}l 
Morice countered that by taking such a strict view of the preamble Cosin 'shutteth his 
eyes as an owle in the brighte sunne shine'. He admitted that the act was brought about as a 
result of grievances concerning heresy trials, but he argued [hat the historical context of the act 
was crucial. 32 A comparison with the words of the preamble to the Act of Dispensations (25 
Henry VIII c. 21), drafted by the same parliament, shows a similar style of language that 
bolsters Morice's argument. Like the Heresy Reform Act, the Act of Dispensations declared a 
judicial principle in its preamble: that 'It srondith ... v/ith naturall equytie and good reason' that 
all humane laws 'made within this Realme or induced into this Realme by the seid sufferaunce 
consentes and custome', may be dispensed with at any time by the king and Parliament. 
Although the specific occasion for the making of the Act of Dispensations was the payment of 
money to Rome and suing for licenses, it was acknowledged that the preamble expressed a 
general legal maxim that any foreign laws introduced into England by consent and custom 
might be repealed, not simply the ones mentioned in that statute. 
By the same reasoning, a case could be made that the preamble to the Heresy Reform 
Act enunciated a principle of law applicable to other cases besides heresy.33 The Commons' 
Supplication against the Ordinaries (1532) had criticised the use of ex officio procedure for 
various causes. 34 This background to the act, argued Morice, ensured that (he words of the 
preamble ro the Heresy Reform Act were inrended as general principles of justice, suitable to 
other crimes or misdemeanours besides heresy. The language of the Act of Six Articles, passed 
seven years later, seemed to reinforce his assertions. This act reasserted catholic doctrine and 
empowered ecclesiastical officials severely to punish offenders against the articles. But 
common ro all of the punishments listed 111 the act was the proviso that offenders be 
31 SR, III, 454; Cosin,Ap%git', II, 78,107; Ill, 74 (page misprinted '76'). 
32 LPL, MS 234, fo. 214r. 
33 SR, III, 464. 
34 The Supplication complained that many subjects were conventcd before ordinaries, 'at the pleasures of the said 
ordinaries .. .for displeasure without any provable cause .. .' and that 'they be committed to prison without bailor mainprize' 
and are 'constrained to answer to many subtle questions and interrogatories ... by the which a simple unlearned or else a 
well-witted layman without learning some time is and commonly may be trapped and induced by an ignorant answer to 
the peril of open panance to his shame .. .' Nowhere in the Commons' complaint about 0.: officio procedure and oaths was 
there any mention of heresy. Elton, Constitution, 334; Cooper, 'The Supplication against the Ordinaries reconsidered', 
English Historial Review, 72 (1957),616-41. 
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proceeded agamst only by accusanon or presentment and the testimony of witnesses. 35 
Frustrating Morice's line of reasoning, however, was the fact that the Heresy Reform Act had 
itself been abrogated by an act of 1547, 1 Edward VI c. 12, which was part of Protec(Or 
Somerset's general repeal of conservative legislation.36 
The causes of the act's repeal were clearly expressed 1I1 its terminaring statute of 1547. 
The preamble explained why this act and many others (over ten) were to be abolished. Ie 
stated that it was better to show too much clemency and forgiveness than to be overly severe, 
and that although there were difficult times in any commonwealth which required a need for 
strict laws, in more peaceful times these laws might be relaxed or simply done away with.37 
The tone is one ofleniency and forbearance, making it seem unlikely that the Heresy Reform 
Act was repealed because its preamble - which articulated a need to safeguard defendants 
against unjust criminal procedures - was considered too cruel. But because the repeal of any 
act nullified everything in that act, any new legal maxims that may have been expressed in the 
Heresy Reform Act were swept away and, by default, De heretico comburendo would seem 
to have been restored. In case there was any doubt, Queen Mary consciously resurrected De 
heretico comburendo along with the two other medieval heresy statutes in the first year of her 
reign. 38 
eosin attempted also to use the Act of Six Articles (0 show that its wording allowed ex 
officio procedure to be as warrantable and legitimate as accusation or presentment. 39 He 
alleged that the act, H1 'grounding proceeding ecclesiasticall euen 111 the crime of 
35 The law authorised ordinaries 'to take informacion and accusacion by the othes and deposicions of twO able and laufull 
persons at the lease'. All accusations or informations were required to state the matter of prosecution, the name of the 
offender, his dwelling place, the time and date of crime, and the place where the crime was committed. Admittedly, these 
conditions were intended to supplant verdicts by jUlY, yet the act's attention to procedure was uniform. In later articles of 
the act whenever punishments are mentioned, it is always in the context of an accusation or presentment having occurred 
previously, suggesting that proceeding ex officio by special enquiry was not intended. Even article XI, which empowered 
commissioners to commit offenders to prison, speaks of those offenders as having been presented or accused. Likewise, 
article XII declared that commissioners found guilty of violating the act should be accused and presented themselves. SR, 
III, 739-42. 
Professor Elton's remark that the parliament which drafted the Act of Six Articles had forgotten its own opposition to 
heresy trials only seven years before misses the point that the procedure by which heretics were to be convented was, by 
both the 1534 and 1539 acts, essentially the same (accusation and presentment). Elton, COIlS/iiI/lion, 396. 
36 See M.L. Bush, The Kovernmenl policy of Protector SOll/ersel (London, 1975) 
37, ... as in tempest or winter one course and garment is convenyent, in cawlme or warme weather a more liberal! rase or lightcr 
garment bothe maye ... be followed and used ... ' SR, IV, part 1, 18. 
38 SR, IV, part I, 244. 1 & 2 Philip and Mary c. 6 revived 5 Richard II Sf. 2 C. 5 (1382), 2 Henry IV c. 15 (De herelico 
c07JZburendo, 1401), and 2 Henry V St. 1 c. 7 (1414). 
39 Cosin, Apoloy,ie, II, 98. 
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heresie ... prouideth besides Accusation and Presemmem, not onely information by two 
witnesses; but also enquirie, and that is alwayes of Office.'40 But this was an unprovable 
pretension in light of the words of the act. Granted, in the context of the controversy, the 
wording of all of these acts is almost defeatingly vague, but that (he word 'enquiry' must 
necessarily be taken to indicate special enquiry ex officio is not certain. Article VIII of the act, 
for example, designates that commissioners may enquire and take informations and 
accusations during their visitations, but it is not clear from the text whether special enquiry ex 
officio (complained of angrily by the Commons in 1532) is what is thereby signified. Near the 
end of the same article it is mentioned that commissioners may enquire upon the oaths of 
twelve men, which suggests that enquiry might refer to the judge acting by virtue of his office, 
though not necessarily ex officio in the sense of the controversy. 41 
But ignoring whether the word 'enquiry' could be taken implicitly to mean special 
enquiry ex officio, Morice held that the Act of Six Articles merely provided for a commission 
to receive information or accusation regarding cnmes punishable by ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. 42 In answering Cosin's rejoinder that the act made no mention of oaths at all, 
either for or against,43 Morice pointed out that it had considered 'heresies & matters of 
Relligion, cawses subiecte to the Iurisdiction of courtes ecclessiasticall', which, according to 
Cosin's lengthy argument in parts I and II of the Apologie , had historically included 
administering the ex officio oath. 'yf it weare so,' continued Morice, 'how happened yt then 
that the Realme at this tyme was so iniurious to those courtes and consistories, as to depriue 
tl1em of their due & legall course of proceedings in cawses concerning their rightfull 
Iurisdicion', unless Parliament had decided that they weren't rightful proceedings?44 Again, 
the arguments of both lawyers were undermined since the Act of Six Articles was repealed by 
1 Edward VI c. 12. Bur Cosin's argument that the act validated special enquiry was hampered 
by two things: first, tl1e vagueness of the word 'enquiry' as it was used in the statute does not 
really supporr his interpretation as explained above; and second, the preamble to the Heresy 
40 Cosin, Apo/ngie, II, 107. 
41 SR, III, 741-2; Lehmberg, Later parliaments, 119,187,198. 
42 Morice, Treatise, 35-7. 
43 Cosin, Apologie, III, 74-5, (pagcs misprinted '76' and '77'). 
44 LPL, MS 234, fo. 162v. 
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Reform Act makes it seem difficult to suppose that the Commons would have supported the 
very procedures they condemned in 1532 and 1534.45 The individual sections of the Act of 
Six Articles, in fact, suggest that the principle of accusation or presentment as a necessary 
prerequisite for depriving criminals of life, good name, or goods was considered reqUlSite in 
1539. 
It would be tempting to see these four acts, De heretico comburendo, the Heresy 
Reform Act, the Act of Six Articles, and the act abolishing these latter two (1 Edward VI c. 
12) as one extended statutory dialogue on the issue of ex officio procedure. Whatever else 
they were, they were the main statements by Parliament on this subject. The first of these acts 
- seen to establish or at least condone ex officio procedure for heresy trials - was 
extinguished in 1534 by the second act for being contrary to justice and the royal prerogative. 
The preamble to this act enunciated that men should not be put to loss of life, good name, or 
goods unless it were by accusation or presentment - but this was in the context of heresy. 
The third act in 1539 empowered ordinaries again to use commissions for visitation and 
enquiry - not necessarily regarding heresy, and it specifically retained the safeguards of 
accusation and presentment mentioned in the second act in 1534. These two statutes were 
together voided by the fourth act in 1547 on the grounds that they were too severe. But all of 
[hese statutes were long and complex, addressing many issues besides ecclesiastical court 
procedure, and it would be misleading to view them as articulating any definitive 
constitutional statements on ex officio procedure or the ex officio oath. 
The Elizabethan Act of Supremacy, however, re-repealed De heretico comburendo in 
1559, and thus the only statute that could be cited to have established the ex officio oath in 
England was invalidated. 46 But the issue does not end there: the oath had originated 
canonically, not by means of the common law. What, therefore, was the status of the oath 
after 1559 according to the laws of the church? If Elizabeth specifically empowered the high 
commission to exact the ex officio oath in cases other than heresy, she was authorising them in 
45 Based on the Supplication of the Ordinaries and the Heresy Reform Act, it seems probable that the Commons opposed ex 
officio procedure in general as a contrary judicial philosophy, even though they did not technically outlaw it except in 
heresy cases. At any rate, it would be very difficult to prove that the Act of Six Articles condoned ex offIcio procedure. 
46 SR, IV, part 1, 351. 
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contradiction to the Gregorian Decretals which stated that no one was bound to incriminate 
themselves in a criminal case. 47 But there was widespread dispute and confusion among 
canonists regarding the medieval canon law. There were contradicting glosses and contrasting 
opiniones doctorum which naturally resulted in variations in local practice and an acceptance 
that canon law interpretations varied from place to place. 48 
Professor Helmholz cautions us not to draw parallels between how canon law was 
adjudicated in Reformation England and how binding statute law is enforced by modern 
appellate legal systems. Canon law judges in England and on the continent were allowed a 
wider latitude to interpret and contribute to the development of legal principles than their 
modern counterparts. '[Canon law] left more room for judges whose "hands were free" from 
temporal bindings to follow local traditions and needs, sometimes even where decretal law 
appeared to direct the contrary. That sort of freedom, far from making the English Church 
"insular", shows that it was fully a part of Continental legal traditions.'49 It is therefore 
important to make clear that although Cosin's arguments in favour of the ex officio oath in 
non-heresy cases was contrary to the decretals, this did not mean Cosin was necessarily 
condoning a procedure that was illegal according to canon law. 
The act confirming the Submission of the Clergy in 1534 (25 Henry VIII c. 19) 
effectively severed English canon law from papal control by abolishing all present canons that 
were contrary to the royal prerogative and by requiring new canons to be submitted to the 
king for approval. Acceptable canons already in force were to be reviewed by a committee of 
thirty-two (selected from the clergy and parliament by the king) and appropriately reaffirmed 
or nullified. The result of the committee's work, the Reformatio legum ecclesiasticarum, was 
never ratified, throwing into manifest confusion the future of English canon law.5° Without an 
official revision of canon law, the determination of which canons were repugnant to the 
imperial crown became a case-by-case affair. 
47 Guy, 'Elizahethan establishment', Reign of Elizabeth I, cd. Guy, 146-7. 
48 Helmholz, Roman canon law, 14-8; Brundage, Medie1'(/1 canon IlTw, 158-9. 
49 Helmholz, Roman Cll11011 liJw, 19. 
50 For a discussion of the Reforwtltio, see above, 7-8. 
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Cosin and Morice stumbled onto the issue of the status and viability of canon law as a 
resuh of Morice's claim that ex officio procedure violated chapter 39 of Magna Carta,51 rhe 
famous chapter which stated that no freeman could be deprived of his freehold or convicted 
and imprisoned but by the judgement of his peers or by the law of the land. In the 1590s ex 
officio procedure was mainly used against ministers who refused to take an oath to uphold the 
Articles of Subscription and was a particularly powerful weapon in depriving them from their 
benefices. 52 Morice argued that benefices were freeholds, that ministers were freemen and that 
they could not be deprived by ordinaries 'for not subscribing to articles of their owne 
Invencion' without divesting them of their rights granred by Magna Carta. 53 Cosin did not 
deny that ministers were freemen or that benefices were freeholds, but he insisted that chapter 
39 of Magna Carta was irrelevant to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 54 This surprising twist from 
Cosin opened a debate over the nature of ecclesiastical law. 
The Henrician royal supremacy had united all ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the crown in 
name as well as fact: it proclaimed that although the authority of the pope had been tolerated 
in England in times past, that he was in fact no more than the bishop of Rome and possessed 
no legitimate authority in England. But was the uniting of ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the 
crown by Henry VIII retroactive? Cosin said no. In assessing Magna Carta he noted that the 
words of chapter 39 which ensured the libeny of freemen 'haue no relation to Iurisdiction 
ecclesiasricall: for that which was done by that iurisdiction, was not (at that time) taken to be 
done by the King or by his authoritie: and the lawes that ecclesiasticall I udges practised; were 
not then holden to be the lawes of the land, or the Kings lawes'. Cosin believed that since 
ecclesiastical law in the thineend1 century was independent of the king's power (as it was 
thought to be under Roman control), Magna Carta was simply written to curb the lay powers 
of the king. 55 This claim, of course, tended to conflict with Henry VIII's claim thar 
51 Morice, Tre!ltise, 47. 
52 This oath was reinforced by the act, 13 Elizabeth c. 12, which required subscription by all ministers ro the Articles of 
Religion on pain of deprivation from or non-adminance to a benefice. LPL, MS 234, fo. 176v; SR, IV, part 1, 546-7. 
53 LPL, MS 234, fo. 176v. 
54 Cosin, ApoloKie, I, 115. 
55 Cosin, Apologie, I, 102. 
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ecclesiastical jurisdiction had always been united to the crown, even in the Middle Ages, and 
thus by means of this argument Cosin was altering the normal framework of the debate. 
Other English clergy had taken a stance similar to Cosin's in the past. For example, 
during his King's Bench trial Sir Thomas More cited Magna Carta against the pretensions of 
Henry VIII, arguing that the grant of liberty to the clergy in chapter 1 was being violated in 
Henry's attempt to remove England from papal authority.56 An irate Morice digressed into a 
long, unhappy ramble, arguing that kings before Henry VIII had been fully conscious of their 
power to reform the church in an effort to show that chapter 39 of Magna Carta had 
addressed both temporal and spiritual jurisdiction.57 But his labour was beside the point. Even 
if he could prove that Magna Carta addressed both jurisdictions, Cosin's claim that 
appointment to and deprivation from benefices had always belonged to ecclesiastical courts 
was unassailable. 53 
But for the sake of the argument, Cosin's view was closer to being correct. He noted that 
Magna Carta required trial by jury, yet judgements in Tudor ecclesiastical courts were rarely 
by jury. Furthermore, heretics were never convicted of heresy by juries.59 More controversially, 
Cosin claimed that chapter 1 of Magna Carta, which declared the church of England free and 
guaranteed the rights and privileges of all ecclesiastical persons, was a prior grant to the clergy 
(coming before the guarantees of chapter 39). This opening chapter, said Cosin, clearly 
showed that all subsequent chapters only addressed temporal jurisdiction unless spiritual 
jurisdiction was specifically expressed. But Morice believed chapter 1 simply freed the church 
from foreign laws. 60 The evidence seems ro indicate that chapter 39 did not encompass church 
courts. Papal annulment of Magna Carta was anticipated, which probably accounted for the 
56 J. Duncan M. Derrett, 'The trial of Sir Thomas More', English HistoriCtlI Rel,jew 79 0uly 1964) 449-77. This article is 
reprinted in Essential Articles /fJr the Study or Thomas More, cd. R.S. Sylvester and G.P. Marc'hadour (Hamden, 
Connecticut; 1977) 55-78. 
57 Hc submitted that the many medieval statutes in which the king directed orders to churches and religious houses 
concerning purveyances, taxation, lands, etc. fully showed that ecclesiastical jurisdiction had always belonged to the king. 
He added that the statute of praemunire (16 Richard II c. 5) complained of new encroachments and usurpations by the 
pope, and that the first statute of Westminster (3 Edward I c.1), especially its preamble, proved that the king has always 
had the power to reform abuses of the clergy appeared in . LPL, MS 234, fo. 245r-v; SR, l, 26-39; II, 85-6. For Morice's 
full argument see above, 192-3. 
58 The one exception was in cases of right of patronage. Cosin, Apolof!ie, I, 31, 103-4; Hclmholz, ROJ/liln Cilnon law, 170; 
Lyndwode, PrfJ1linciale (STC2 17113). 
59 Cosin, Apoiogie, I, 103-4; More, Works, ed. Guy, Keen, Miller, McGugan, X, I-Iv. 
60 LPL, MS 234, fo. 250v. 
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wording and placement of chapter 1, and the history of the English church in the founeenrh 
and fifteenth centuries appears to confirm that the provisions of chapter 39 did not apply to 
them. Ifit had, every deprivation of a minister since 1215 would have been illegal unless it had 
been accomplished by a jury rria1. 61 The claim, therefore, that chapter 39 encompassed 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction as wen as temporal seems to have had its origin in late Elizabethan 
and puritan thought. 
The interesting thing about Cosin's argument was that he spied in Magna Carta an 
affirmation of the ancient rights and privileges of canon law in England, implicitly including 
ex officio procedure. His interpretation of the act confirming the Submission of the Clergy 
(25 Henry VIII c. 19) was almost identical - that it ratified the ancient privileges of the 
clergy - with the exception of popish canons contrary to the royal prerogative (here he parted 
ways with More).62 Morice reminded Cosin of the forgotten plan proposed by the clergy 
themselves some sixty years before to review and amend the canon law, 'ffor that diuerse of 
those lawes were thought not onely much preiudicyall to the kinges regall Iurisdicion & 
repugnant to the lawes statute of this Realme, but also overmuch Onerous to the king and his 
subiectes.' The committee of thirty-two was supposed to determine which canons violated the 
king's prerogative and abolish them. This committee, said Morice, 'hath not as yet been 
accordinglie perfected, althoughe in a generalitie all Canons and constitucions contrarie or 
repugnant to the lawe of god, or of this Realme are abrogated and abolished.' 63 The point 
which Morice wished to stress was that the act confirming the Submission of the Clergy in 
1534 had indicated that a great many canons of the English church were in flagrant violation 
of the crown's authority and were due to be abolished. But while Morice believed canon law 
had been restrained by the Submission of the Clergy, Cosin asserted it had been maintained. 
The act, stated Cosin, 'doth argue, that ordinaries might (without further leaue 
obteined, as in former times they did) execute their jurisdiction ecclesiasticall', 64 and that it 
only prevented new and unauthorised canons from being introduced without royal assent. 65 
61 Holt, Maff,na Carla, 272-3, 278-9, 327-31; Thompson, Maff,l1a C'arla, 121-5, 130-6, 140. 
62 Cosin, Ap%ff,ie, I, 4. 
63 LPL, MS 234, fo. 87 [-v. See also fo. 313r. 
64 Cosin, Apoioff,ie, 1, 2-3. 
65 Cosin, Apoloff,ie, I, 4-5. 
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Furthermore, he observed that the Act of Dispensations, passed in the same session as the act 
confirming the Submission of the Clergy, had used the term 'humane laws' in its preamble to 
include 'those Canon lawes; which by such suffirance, vse, and custome are (now) as the 
accustomed and ancient Lawes of this Realme, originally established as Lawes of the same: 
howbeit by the meanes aforesaid, but induced into the Realme, and not here at first made nor 
ordeined.' In other words, canon law, which originated on the continent, had been made part 
of English law voluntarily by Parliament. 66 This statement by Cosin was intended to breathe 
life back into English canon law by asserting that it had unconditionally been grafted into the 
common law, but the fact remained that canon law had been roundly condemned by the 
Submission of the Clergy as being imperfect on many points. What those points were was 
never decided, but Cosin's assertion that the Act of Dispensations implicitly admitted the 
whole of canon law as part of the 'humane laws' of the realm was hampered by that same 
parliament's decree that canon law was seriously impaired. 67 Cosin was unique among the 
conformists of the 1590s in attempting to lift the prestige of canon law from the ashes. This 
interesting facet of Cosin's contribution to the conformist cause in the 1590s will be 
scrutinised in the next chapter. 
The quarrel over the status of canon law had been picked as an extension of the debate 
over the legality of the ex officio oath. Morice repeatedly attacked the oath as foreign to 
English justice, but Cosin affirmed that it had been established by canons long preceding the 
1534 parliament and had yet to be deemed contrary to the laws of the realm. 68 If one wanred 
to know 'what the humane Iawes Ecclesiasticall of this realme are', offered Morice, one should 
look at the acts of Parliament and other 'home made Canons & ordinaunces' which were 
originally established in the realm or came in through the acceptance of the people and king, 
which were the conditions established by the Act of Dispensations for the validation of 
foreign-made laws. 69 
66 Cosin, ApoloKie, 1, 103. Also SR. III, 464. 
67 Cosin also poimed the 1563 statute De eXCflmlllllniCllto cflpiendo (5 Elizabeth c. 23), claiming that its reference to 'the 
ecclesiasticalllawes of the realme' proved that canon law was alive and well. Morice pointed out, however, that that statute 
did not define what the ecclesiastical laws of the realm were. Cosin, ApoloKie, 1, 103; LPL, MS 234, fo. 250r-v. 
68 Cosin, ApoloKie, III, 129-30. 
69 LPL, MS 234, fo. 249v; Morice, Treatise, 53. 
115 
Chapter 7 - The resolution of the controversy 
Canon law after 1534 became subordinate to the crown in theory but as long as the 
Reformatio remained a mere proposal, individual canons nor specifically repealed lived a 
fugitive existence, surviving alongside common law in a legal grey area. Ex officio procedure, 
including the oath, undeniably a foreign practice in origin, had been induced into the realm 
from the continent and given canonical approval by the provincial synod of Otho and 
Octobone in the thirteenth century as well as statutory acceptance by De heretico 
comburendo (2 Henry IV c. 15) in 1401.70 With the final repeal of De heretico comburendo 
in 1559, the legality of the ex officio oath according to common law seems doubtful. But 
whether the abolition of that law had the force of anulling the thirteenth century canons which 
established the oath for the use of the church is also doubtful, since the queen was the supreme 
governor of the church and therefore the guarantor and protector of its rights, privileges, and 
liberties. Thus, whether the oath was legal in the 1590s according to the laws of England 
remains, at this point in our discussion, unresolved. 
The extent of the high commission's authority, which remains to be considered, provides 
us with the key to unlock the unanswerable questions about the legality of the oath. Several 
important legal developments took place between the parliament of 1534 and the Cosin-
Morice debate over ex officio procedure in the early 1590s. The Elizabethan Act of Supremacy 
of 1559, the statute most relevant to the high commission's authority, must be carefully 
studied in conjunction with the 1595 Queen's Bench verdict in Robert Cawdrey's case, which 
reflected on the implications of the Act of Supremacy and the controversial powers of the high 
commission to deprive ministers for nonconformity. 
Perhaps the greatest disagreement between Cosin and Morice regarding the Act of 
Supremacy was whether it allowed new powers to the queen or merely restored old powers. 71 
Morice believed that the Act of Supremacy only gave the monarch limited authority over her 
ecclesiastical commissions, that is, powers specificially delineated by Parliament either in that 
act or used generally before it. Contrarily, Cosin affirmed that the act gave the queen the 
same power the pope had previously wielded, that is, aU of the ancient ecclesiastical 
70 See also above, 48. The legality of the oath, as authorised by the synod, was complained of but not denied by St. German. 
Constitutions, chapter 4. 
71 For the text of article VIII of the Act of Supremacy, see appendix 1. 
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jurisdictions that had been considered foreign before the Submission of the Clergy. According 
to this view, Elizabeth's letters patenr could be interpeted broadly since they were a product of 
her royal prerogative. 72 
The high commission had been accused by its puritan adversaries of using processes 
other than citation and punishments other than excommunication, despite the fact that 
ordinary ecclesiastical courts had traditionally only used these two. 73 The most notorious 
process used by the commission not specifically delegated by the Act of Supremacy was (he ex 
officio oath. Morice accused the commissioners of forcing people on the grounds of the Act of 
Supremacy to answer 'vppon such generall oathes, no accusacion, suite, lawfull Informacion, 
presentment, or inditemenr I udicially prededinge or dependinge. '74 Morice was convinced he 
was towing the historical parliamentary line, consistent with the Heresy Reform Act of 1534 
and the Act of Six Articles of 1539, that it was contrary to justice to put men to loss of life, 
good name, or goods unless by due accusation and witness or by presentment. 
But Cosin's view was bigger. He recognised that by ordinary ecclesi~tical jurisdiction 
men could not be forced (0 take the oath or be imprisoned for refusing it, but he contended 
that because the Act of Supremacy had not explicitly enumerated the exact powers of the high 
commission, the queen might empower her commission as it pleased her. 75 Morice insisted 
that no new powers were given to Elizabeth by that act, and thus the high commission was 
only empowered to exercise ordinary jurisdiction. In his opinion, the commission was 
restrained by the laws which governed ecclesiastical authority at the common law before the 
Act of Supremacy.76 And besides, he added, the act itself reaffirmed the same principles 
spoken of in the preamble to the Heresy Reform Act, providing in one of the later articles that 
no person should be indicted or arraigned for any of the offences adjudged by that act, unless 
there were at least two witnesses to testify and declare the offences to the court, and that those 
72 Professor Thompson has suggested that Cosin's interpretation was historically more accurate. Thompson, Magna Carta, 
205-9. 
73 Cosin, Apologie, l, 101-2. 
74 See also above, 188-9. 
75 The high commission might even, added eosin, proceed by juries if they wished, as did Archbishop Grindal\. Cosin, 
Apologie, l, 106-9. 
76 This went for heresy as well, LPL, MS 234, fos. 170v-171 v, 185v. 
217 
Chapter 7 - The resolution of the controversy 
witnesses should be brought forth in person face to face before the accused party. 77 Therefore, 
was it not unjust for the high commission to proceed to administer ex officio oaths without 
accusation or witnesses? At this point in Morice's manuscript, there is a potent marginal 
notation by Archbishop Whitgift stating: 'noe. vnless you thinqk that her maiestie can not 
gyve vnto them authoritie to deale otherwise, as yt semethe you doe.'78 This bold statement 
begged the question that we have been broaching for some time: whether the queen's letters 
patent could contravene acts of Parliament. 
Was the high commission limited by the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy or by the 
queen's letters patent? A careful reading of the act shows that Parliament clearly gave the 
queen a blank cheque to empower the commission as she chose. Morice vehemently denied 
this, but there were signs that even common law judges accepted this. Sir James Dyer and his 
colleagues held that ecclesiastical judges were authorised to fine recusants since the Act of 
Supremacy united all ecclesiastical authority to the queen to delegate as she wished, even 
though the Act of Supremacy did not specifically authorise fining. 79 And Sir Edward Coke, as 
we will see in a moment, delivered a verdict with similar implications in Cawdrey's case. Thus 
if the queen could empower her commissioners as she wished, fining was only one of the 
processes she could choose. Henry Hobart, James' attorney-general from 1606 to 1613, was 
enlisted to defend the high commission on behalf of the king during the debates between the 
common law judges and (he bishops in the 1610s. He declared that the commission's powers 
were not limited to (he Act of Supremacy - if that were true, he stated, all the letters patent 
since 1559 would have been illegal. He correctly observed that the act itself allowed the 
commissioners to exercise their power according to the tenor and effect of the letters patent, 
anything in the statute notwithstanding. He also stated that the act was a restoring act 
declaratory of the royal supremacy of Henry VIII and Edward VI, not a restraining act. 80 
But even if the commission was empowered primarily by the letters patent, what made 
the queen's letters patent to the commission authoritative? There were three possibilities: 1) the 
77 Article XXI. SR, IV,!, 354. 
78 LPL, MS 234, fo. 175v. 
79 Dyer, Reports, ed. Baker, lxxiv. 
80 Usher, Rise and {all, ed. Tyler, 193-7. 
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letters patent described ancient clerical privileges that had existed before the Reformation and 
were now united to the crown; 2) the letters patent were an extension of the queen's royal 
supremacy; or 3) the letters patent reflected the sovereign's ancient prerogative to regulate the 
church through commissions. Interestingly, none of the letters patent dealing with 
commissions for visitations before the second half of Elizabeth's reign mentioned the royal 
supremacy. Professor Tyler has suggested that this showed 'that the origin of Tudor 
Ecclesiastical Commissions lay not in the legal quibbles of the royal supremacy as interpreted 
by parliament, but in the traditional duty of the Crown to safeguard the Church and the 
Christian community.'81 
The mystery is more easily resolved by studying the verdict in Robert Cawdrey's 
Queen's Bench case. Cawdrey had been deprived by the high commission in 1587 for 
defaming the prayer book and for refusing to celebrate divine service properly,82 but his 
deprivation was contrary to the terms of the Act of Uniformity (1 Elizabeth c. 2) which 
asserted that ministers should only be deprived after their second offence; Cawdrey was 
deprived after his first. The method of attack chosen by Cawdrey was to sue his successor to 
the benefice, George Atton, for trespass, hoping thereby to convince the judges that his 
deprivation had been unjust and that the benefice ought to be returned to him. His counsel in 
the case was Morice with the advice of two other lawyers whose futures would be eventful, 
Nicholas Fuller83 and George Croke. 84 
Even as the case in Queen's Bench was getting underway in 1591, the main participants 
were writing to Lord Burghley to defend their positions. Bishop Aylmer, who handed down 
the deprivation aga1l1st Cawdrey, called the defendant a stubborn, incorrigible man who 
deserved no credit. 85 Morice (to whom Burghley passed copies of Aylmer's letters) 
81 Usher, Rise and fall, ed. Tyler, xxiv. 
82 See Morice's statement of the case at BL, Lansdowne MS 115, doc. 17, fos. 31 r-32 I'. 
83 Fuller had won notoriety by defending Thomas Cartwright in Star Chamber tbe same year and was shortly thereafter to 
find himself in prison for a short spell. He was present in the 1593 parliament when Morice introduced his famous bill to 
outlaw the ex oflicio oath but is not known to have spoken during the debate. In the first decade of James I's reign, he 
defended two p~ritans who had refused the ex officio oath and was again imprisoned, this time by the high commission 
itself, for nearly a year. Hasler, Commol1s, II, 161-l. 
84 Croke was one of the two judges in 1637 who, along with Sir Richard Hutton, refused to grant that the king was 
empowered in emergencies to raise ship money by pretogative. Hasler, Commons, 1, 675-6. 
85 BL, Lansdowne MS 68, doc. 54. 
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complained in July, 1591 of the bishop's unjust dealings and hoped for victory in the appeal. 86 
But William Aubrey, one of the ecclesiastical commissioners who had been involved in 
Cawdrey's deprivation, wrote to Burghley later that same month. His letter touched the 
central nerve: he argued that if the commissioners had only been acting on the Act of 
Uniformity, then Morice's argument was true; Cawdrey's deprivation would have been unjust. 
But if one was to understand 'the lawe ecclesiasticall beinge in suche force for maner of 
proceedinge, as it was before the makinge of that statute and the comission warrantinge the 
Commissioners to proceede accordinge to the lawe ecdesiasticall or accordinge to theire 
sounde discreacons', it was evident that Morice's argument was invalid. He noted further that 
the chief justice of the Common Pleas, the chief baron of the Exchequer, and the attorney-
general had been present at Cawdrey's deprivation and consented. 87 
As Cawdrey's attorney, Morice submitted two main reasons why the judges should 
declare Cawdrey's sentence of deprivation void. First, he should not have been deprived until 
his second offence, according to the Act of Uniformity; and second, the same act provided 
that actions against ministers could only be by verdict of a jury, confession, or notorious 
evidence of the fact - not for non-attendance before the commission. 88 The case lasted four 
years, verdict not being reached until Hilary term, 1595. It was 'solemnly and oftentimes 
debated at bar by the Counsel of either party, and at the bench by the Judges' and was only 
decided 'after great and long deliberation and consultation ... with the rest of the Judges'. 89 
The court responded to Morice's two points regarding the Act of Uniformity, saying 
first that that act, 'being in the affirmative, doth not abrogate or take away the jurisdiction 
ecclesiastical, unless words in the negative had been added, as, "and not otherwise, or in no 
other manner or form,"'. This was a general rule in statutes concerning matters of the church, 
they noted. In answer to Morice's second reason, they noted that ecclesiastical authorities were 
empowered to deprive ministers according to ecclesiastical law as had always been the case. 
86 BL, Lansdowne MS 68, doc. 55. 
87 BL, Lansdowne MS 68, doc. 56. Cawdrey himself had supposed that his argument that he should not have been deprived 
for his first offence against the Act of Uniformity would have perked up the ears of the two common law justices present 
at his deprivation, but 'The Lord chiefe Justice and the Lord chiefe baron beinge there, yet woulde they not saye one 
worde herevnto.' BL, Lansdowne MS 68, doe. 57. 
88 Sir Edward Coke, The reports o(Sir Edward Coke, Knight, (London, 1826), book V, xix-xxii. 
89 Coke, Reports, V, xix. 
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Even the Act of Uniformity, they contended, had not designated any punishment for 
depraving the prayer book, and thus ecclesiastical courts were free to punish offenders by their 
own Iaw.90 The judges continued, 
And therefore by the ancient laws of this realm, this kingdom of England is an absolute empire 
and monarchy consisting of one head, which is the King, and of a body politic, compact and 
compounded of many, and almost infinite several, and yet well agreeing members: all which 
the law divideth into two several parts, that is to say, the clergy and the laity, both of them, 
next and immediately under God, subject and obedient to the head: 91 also the head of this 
politic body is instituted and furnished with plenary and entire power, prerogative and 
jurisdiction, to render justice and right to every part and member of this body, of what estate, 
degree, or calling soever in all causes ecclesiastical or temporal, otherwise he should not be a 
head of the whole body. 92 
Thus England was an empire and the queen was furnished with full authority over both 
the temporal and spiritual estates - the language was drawn from the preamble to Henry 
VIII's Act in Restraint of Appeals (24 Henry VIII c. 12). The court continued, noting that as 
cases in temporal courts were determined by (emporal judges, 'so in causes ecclesiastical and 
spiritual...the same are to be determined and decided by ecclesiastical Judges, according to 
the King's ecclesiastical laws of this realm.' Some ecclesiastical laws were admitted by the 
judges to be foreign in origin. Just as rhe Romans borrowed from the Greeks and the 
Normans from the English, the English had borrowed ecclesiastical laws from elsewhere, but 
those laws which had been approved and allowed in England 'are aptly and rightly called, the 
King's Ecclesiastical Laws of England, which whosoever shall deny, he denieth that the King 
hath full and plenary power to deliver justice in all causes to aU his subjecrs, or (0 punish all 
crimes and offences within his kingdom'. 93 
The echo of Cosin's Apologie here is clear. In part I Cosin answered the puritans' claims 
that the queen could not empower the high commission to use extraordinary procedures by 
90 Coke, Reports, Y, x:.xii-xxiv. 
91 This expression of equality between the temporal and spiritual estates undCT the prince accorded perfectly with Cosin's 
view. See also above, 95, 163-4. 
92 Coke, Reports, Y, xxviii. 
93 Coke, Reports, Y, xxvi ii. 
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saying, 'These opinions if they be not well grounded vpon lawe, see me to me to touch her 
Maiesties prerogatiue roiaH, and supreme gouernment (that was yeelded vnto her highness by 
statute) very deeplie; whosoeuer be Author of them.'94 He discoumenanced their attempts to 
circumscribe the queen's authority to direct the commission, cautioning, 'And if this authoritie 
that is hereby impugned, be (in trueth) a preheminence vnited and annexed to the Imperiall 
crowne of this real me, by Parliament: and if he be a man of any qualitie, (so that hee hath 
taken the oath of Obedience) let him vse good aduisement, how it may stand with such his 
oath and allegeance.' 95 This warning, directed to public officers of the realm, was intended to 
clarifY that foreign laws which had been accepted imo the realm 'be often called, The Kings or 
the Queenes ecclesiastical lawes.'96 In later printings of Coke's Reports, the reference to 'Dr. 
Cousins's Apology 102' is duly acknowledged. 97 
The reason why Cawdrey lost his case was not because he could not convince the judges 
that the high commission acted against the terms of the Act of Uniformity - it is clear that 
they did - but because the power to deprive ministers was the prerogative of bishops aside 
and apart from statute law. The implication was that deprivation was not really restricted by 
the Act of Uniformity, which act, according (0 the judges, only provided positive commands 
enabling ecclesiastical authority, not negative ones prohibiting it. Thus, although the act stated 
that ministers must be deprived after their second offence, rhey could still be deprived after 
only their first offence according to ecclesiastical law. In the sense, therefore, the Act of 
Uniformiry's provisions were meaningless.98 
The basic verdict in Cawdrey's case did nothing to enhance the prestige of the high 
commission, because what was in question was a punishment that had been ordinarily 
determinable by the clergy before the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy (deprivation) rather than 
one that had not (fining or imprisonment). If the judges had merely stated that Cawdrey was 
lawfully deprived because deprivation from a benefice had always belonged to the clergy, even 
before 1559, they would not by that verdict have validated the high commission's power to 
94 Cosin, ApoloKie, l, 102. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Coke, Reports, V, xxviii. 
98 Usher, Rise flnd {tTlI, ed. Tyler, 137-8. 
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fine or imprison. But, oddly, the judges chose to make two much bigger and broader 
statements than the case actually required. First, they asserted that common law judges did 
not have a monopoly on interpreting statutes. Laws that applied to ecclesiastical courts ought 
to be interpreted by ecclesiastical judges, they concluded, and each court should give credence 
to the other's decisions since d1ey could be trusted to be experts in their own matters. 99 
Second, the judges concluded that the commission was not only empowered to use the 
ecclesiastical law as it existed before 1559, it was also authorised to execute anything in the 
queen's letters patent, since she had imperium to create and direct such a commission. 100 This 
extended statement, though not necessary for the case at hand, had major implications 
because the judges insisted on making a philosophical statement about the high cOmrnlSSlOn'S 
power. It was judicial activism, and it made Cawdrey's case a landmark. 
If the commission was empowered by the queen's imperium via letters patent and the 
letters patent directed the commissioners to fine or imprison, they were lawfldly empowered 
to do so, though these powers were not enjoyed by the Enlgish clergy at large as they were 
contrary to ecdesiasticallaw. 101 Thus, the high commission's powers were far more expansive 
than those of other courts who were bound to abide by ordinary ecclesiastical or common law. 
According the Act of Supremacy, only the commissioners could decide what crimes 
constituted 'enormities', and since the queen's letters patent permitted them to punish any 
notorious or flagrant enormities, the commissioners had tremendous discretion in determining 
what constituted a crime. 102 
Hence, there were no set judicial procedures or punishments assigned by the letters 
patent to the commissioners, which left them free to use any that suited them. Archbishop 
Grindal was known to favour indictments and verdicts by juries of twelve; Whitgift preferred 
99 The decision in Cawdrey's case casts doubt on Professor Helmholz's contention that common law courts exclusively 
interpreted parliamentary statutes. 'Whenever a statute came into play, the civilians were bound to follow the construction 
put upon it by the temporal courts. Where there was doubt, they had to consult the common law judges.' A little below 
this he remarked that ecclesiastical courts 'gave a limited kind of assent' to this arrangement. But if this was true 
throughout most of Elizabeth's reign, the verdict in Cawdrey's case altered judicial practice, because the Queen's Bench 
judges held that statutes of an ecclesiastical nature should be interepreted by ecclesiastical courts, not temporal courts. 
Helmholz, Romtl/1 callon laU', 173. 
100 See also Usher, Rise tlndfidl, ed. Tyler, 139, 198. 
101 In 1611 when the debate over the high commission's authority was again raging between the common law judges and the 
bishops, Archbishop Abbot reminded Coke that he himself had reported the results of Cawdtey's case, which showed that 
the commission was lawfully empowered to imprison and fine at its discretion! Usher, Rise lIlId (all, ed. Tyler, 217-21. 
102 SR, IV, part 1, 352. 
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ex officio procedure and the oath to answer all interrogatories. The procedure chosen was 
largely a matter of preference. 103 Sometimes the commission mixed different procedures 
together. For example, Thomas Cartwright's attempt to reform the church of England 
through the introduction of the Book of Discipline was discovered and obstructed by the 
commission, but the way this was done was simply the old visitatorial method and nothing 
new. Cartwright's criminal examination, however, was by ex officio procedure. 104 In rhe final 
assessment, therefore, the use of the ex officio oath by the high commission was perfectly legal 
- not because it accorded with canon law or common law, but because the commission was a 
delegate body of officers licensed by the queen (on the basis of her royal prerogative) to 
regulate and govern the English church according to her written instructions. 105 
If the commission could exercise judicial authority contrary to the ordinary course of 
English law, what limits or restrictions were there on the queen's letters patent to the 
commission, if any? Could she 'giue them authoririe to hang men' as the puritans feared? 106 It 
is important to look beyond the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy as well as the entire 
Reformation to find a dear answer. The power of the high commission to fine and imprison 
offenders was not a prerogative of the medieval English church, so it could not be defended 
on the basis of the annexation of ecclesiastical authority to the crown that occurred at the 
break with Rome. The power to fine and imprison was first given to the commission 111 the 
letters patent of Edward VI, 107 so this was clearly a post-Henrician development. Likewise, 
any semblance of legality the ex officio oath enjoyed according to common law was 
eradicated with the second and final repeal in 1559 of De heretico comburdendo, the 
medieval act which was believed to have originally legalised the oath.I08 
103 Thompson, Mngnn Cnrtn, 213; Usher, Rise lind foIl, ed. Tyler, xi-xii, xxxii. 
104 Usher, Risellndfall, ed. Tyler, 50-I. 
105 This was not the only example of imperial authority contravening statute law. The Council of Wales, whose disciplimry 
powers had originally been granted in the statute 34&35 Henry VIII c. 26, was periodic..'llly empowered through 
Elizabeth's letters patent to torturc mcn suspected of trcason, murder, or felony, though this was clearly against common 
law. The queen authorised the council to use torture on at least five occasions: in 1560, 1570, 1576, 1586, 1601, and 1602. 
Williams, Council, 24-7,47-53, 56-7 and footnote; Smith, De republiCil dllKloruliI, ed. Dewar, 117-8; Langbein, Torture, 
73-4, 134-9. 
106 Cosin, ApoloKie, 1, 106-7. 
107 Usher, Rise tll1d(afl, cd. Tyler, 145. 
108 To review briefly the confusing history of this law: it had first been repealed by the Heresy Reform Act of 1534 (25 
Henry VIII c. 14). But this act plus the Act of Six Articles of 1539 (31 Henry VIII c. 14) were repealed by an act of 1547, 
I Edward VI c. 12. Thus, with the repeal of the Heresy Reform Act, De heretico comburendo was resuscitatcd and with 
it, the only statutory basis of the 0; officio oath. For good measure, De heretico comburendo was formally reenacted by 
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It can be argued that the sovereign could not authorise the commission to fine, imprison, 
or exact the oath based either on medieval clerical privilege or on the two Acts of Supremacy 
but only on the right of the crown to safeguard the church via commlSSlOns - an old 
prerogative of the king that pre-dated the Reformation and had never been shared with 
Parliament. 109 From medieval times English monarchs appointed ecclesiastical commissions to 
regulate the church, and the primary business of these commissions was the enquiry into and 
suppression of ecclesiastical crimes, particularly heresy. 110 Not much changed in the sixteenth 
century except that the methods of prosecution had evolved to meet new political pressures. 
Whitgift, finding himself presiding over a church riven with faction and rebellion, sought the 
queen's support for stricter procedures in detecting crimes, punishing crimes, and terrifying 
others from committing crimes. III 
It is important to clarify that the Act of Supremacy of 1559 did not empower the 
commission to exact the oath. This is proved by the fact that the Act of Supremacy was not 
necessary to validate the fining and imprisoning of offenders by the commission, a practice 
which, though contrary to the act, existed both before and after it in letters patent directed to 
ecclesiastical commissions. The authority to exact the oath derived ultimately from the 
queen's prerogative to appoint commissions to order and govern the church. The Act of 
Supremacy, like the Act of Uniformity, was only a positive act of confirmation, not a negative 
act of prohibition. Thus the 1559 Parliament merely ratified a power that already existed 
under the medieval kings, Henry VII 1, and even Queen Mary. 112 
It is inevitable in human history that the nature and limits of political authority will 
always need to be more precisely defined in future days. Statutes can only address the political 
questions of the present and the foreseeable future, not the unforseeable future, and this has 
Mary (1&2 Philip and Mary c. 6) and then abolished again by the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy (1 Elizabeth c. 1, article 
VI). With this second repeal of D,> heretiCf) comburendo in 1559, therefore, the oath was deemed illegal by common law, 
though it continued to be legitimately used on the basis of the royal prerogative to regulate the church, which was not 
depcndenr on the common law for its approval. SR, II, 125-8; III, 454, 739; N, part 1, 35l. 
109 Usher, Rise flnd/izll, cd. Tyler, xxiii. It should be noted that fining and imprisonment by the high commission during the 
Tudor was never defended on the basis of rhe imperial supremacy but always on the ancient prerogative of the sovereign to 
safeguard the church. 
110 Helmholz, Cl/lO/7 [,Ui; Helmholz, Roma/7 ('llI/OIt [,Ui, 46-7; Usher, Rise andfirll, ed. Tyler, xviii. 
III The best discussion of Whitgift's campaign against nonconformity is in Collinson, Elizabethlln puritlln JII01'ement, 243-
72. See also Guy, 'Elizabethan establishment', Reign of Elizabeth I, ed. Guy, 138-40. 
112 Usher, Rise Ilnd fall, cd. Tyler, 223-9. 
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led to crises in authority when old definitions of prerogative or rights suddenly seemed vague 
and disputable where they had once seemed perfectly dear. This was the case duting the last 
decade of Elizabeth when important statutes such as the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy and 
the act confirming the Submission of the Clergy could no longer command a consensus of 
interpretation even from judges. Professor Usher asked where 'residual judicial authority' lay 
in Elizabethan England, that is, to whom was judicial authority given when the laws of the 
land were silent?113 Was it given to the king, to Parliament, to the king-in-Parliament, to the 
people? 
Common lawyers such as Morice, Sir Edward Coke, and Nicholas Fuller whole-
heartedly believed that residual authority lay in Parliament and in the accumulated precedents 
of the common law. But Cosin, Richard Hooker, and Archbishop Laud believed that the king 
was the source of residual judicial authority.114 If Morice was right, Elizabeth's royal 
supremacy could be circumscribed by statures. If Cosin was right, Elizabeth could create an 
infinite number of prerogative courts like the high commission without the consent of 
Parliament. Despite the emergence of proto-constitutional ideas in the writings of Morice, 
Coke, and Beale, the historical evidence shows that residual judicial authority had always been 
with the king. 115 This is why Morice's attempt to pass a bill in (he 1593 Parliament to outlaw 
the ex officio oath and restrict the high commission was a failure. 116 The high commission was 
not a branch of the common law but a subsidiary of the royal prerogative. He was meddling in 
an area forbidden to the Commons - the governance of the church, which was strictly a 
matter of the queen's royal supremacy. If Morice's bill had been passed, it would have proved 
that the queen's prerogative could be pruned and dipped when Parliament found it necessary. 
The view held by Morice, Coke, and the common lawyers, that residual authority was found 
in the common law, was a constitutional innovation of the Elizabethan era. 117 
113 Usher, Rise alldfilll, ed. Tyler, 223-4. 
114 Thompson, MIZ?,1Ul Carta, 354-74; Levy, Fifth Amendment, 225, 229-65; Lake, Al1gliCtll1s ilnd puritans, 201-5. 213; 
W.].T. Kirby. 'The royal supremacy in the thought of Richard Hooker', Oxford University thesis, 1987. 
115 Burgess, Ancient constitution, 162-7; Holdsworth, A history of English laUl, J 90-6; Usher, Rise tll1dfall, ed. Tyler, 230. 
116 For a detailed account of Morice's bill, see below, 246-9. 
117 Howell A. Lloyd, 'Constitutionalism', PolitiCtll thought, ed. Burns and Goldie, 254-5; Usher, Rise tTlldfall, ed. Tyler, 
230-1 
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With the resolution of the controversy we now turn our attention more broadly to the 
issues of the 1590s as they relate to (he struggle for order and authority in the church of 
England. Cosin's Apologie carefully articulated a new view of the Elizabethan church that 
emphasized strong central authority, jurisdictional might, the danger of sectarianism, and a 
fear of the collapse of stability. His defence of the high commission's massive powers of arrest, 
administering the oath, fining, and imprisonment occurred against a background of religious, 
social, and economic turmoil in which the conformists themselves were divided on how to 
govern the church and stave off a growing sense of chaos. As we will see, Cosin's Apologie 
marked a turning point in the evolution of Elizabethan conformism, bringing the movement 
further to the right than it had even been before. 
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What binds a polis together, even in a far-flung state where men's culcural backgrounds 
and places of residence might vary, is a unified constitution. So taught Aristotle in book III of 
the Politics,1 and this need for unity and order was a central concern of the Tudor regime in 
both its civil and religious dimensions. 2 The growing religious dissension of the last two 
decades of the sixteenth century brought into doubt the continuation of what Professor 
Tyacke has labelled the 'Calvinist consensus'.3 This broad generalisation refers to the relative 
religious peace amongst English protestants during most of Elizabeth's reign with regard to 
flutters of doctrine, particularly double and absolute predestination and the nature of grace, 
and adiaphora ('things indifferent').4 The maturation of puritan political consciousness in the 
1580s, culminating in parliamentary defeats in 1584 and 1586 and the arrest of Thomas 
Cartwright in 1591, proved that a serious gulf was opening between protestants who sought 
further reformation in the church and those who stressed the importance of defending tlle 
church from the twin dangers of catholic insurrection and radical protestant revolution.5 
Suddenly the meaning and definition of 'conformity' in the English church was uncertain. 
Starting in 1583 Whitgift had begun to narrow the definition of conformity. Though 
puritans initially expected good things from the new archbishop, his inaugural sermon 
delivered at Paul's Cross on 17 November 1583 demonstrated that there was something 
distinctly unpuritan about his approach: he emphasized the authority of magistrates and 
bishops, called for obedience to lawfully instituted authorities, and condemned recusants, 
anabaptists, and tllose who clamoured for further reformation. 6 Shortly thereafrer, all 
ministers were required to assent to three articles of belief: that the queen was supreme 
1 Aristotle, The politics, d. Stephen Everson (Cambridge, 1988) 54-5. 
2 J .G.A. Pocock dismissed the idea th:u Elizabeth:lI1 England was a polis in The lIlachitll'elliall moment (Princeton, 1975), 
arguing instead that every privy councillor took separate oaths and counselled the queen severally, renaissance fashion. But 
Professor Collinson has convincingly demonstrated that the opposite was the case. There was legitimate resistance theory 
in Elizabethan England which recognised the difference between monarchy and ryranny; there existed a 'background' 
authoriry auxilialY to the prince (the body politic) as evidenced by such devices as the Bond of Association and the Act for 
the Safery of the Queen's Person (both 1584); and there were clearly two governments in operation: one by the queen and 
the other by the privy council. Patrick Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Queen Elizabeth 1', Bulletin of the John 
Rylands UniZ'ersity Library, 69 (1986-7) 394-424. 
3 See Tyacke, AlltiCtlIZ'inists; Nicholas Tyacke, 'Anglican attitudes: some recent writings on English religious history, from the 
Reformation to the Civil War', Journal of British Studies, 35 (April, 1996), 139-67. 
4 For a brief discussion of a4iaphom see below, 269-70. 
5 Guy, Tudor EIlKland, 304-8; Collinson, Elizabethan puritan mOl/emellt, 59-100; Haigh, EnKlish reformations, 268-84; 
MacCulloch, Later Reformation, 44-64, 82-92, 144-62; ReiKI1 of Elizabeth I, ed. Guy, 11-5. 
6 MacCulloch, Ltlter Reformation, 48-9; Collinson, Elizabethan puritan mOl'ement, 243-4. 
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governor of the church, that the Book of Common Prayer contained nothing contrary to the 
word of God, and that the Thirty-Nine Articles were consonant with scripture. The only 
remarkable request here was the subscription (0 the prayer book, and this was the first 
narrowing of conformism. 7 
Previous to 1584 there had been moderate criticism of some elements of the prayer 
book, but this was acceptable within a broad definition of conformity (0 the established 
church. Now any minister who refused to subscribe was removed from the ministry. This was 
a courageous beginning for Whitgift since ir threatened (0 decimate the ranks of preaching 
clergy if a substantial number refused. And this might have occurred at a time when the fear 
of catholic uprising, given recent urgency by the assassination of William of Orange by 
catholics in the Netherlands, was quite strong. 8 Subscription met not wid1 serious but with 
well-placed resistance. Most ministers conformed quietly, but the privy council irritated 
Whitgift by hearing the suits of disgruntled puritan ministers and sending d1em on to the 
archbishop for conferences. Whitgift bickered with the council dut the government of the 
church had been expressly entrusted to him by Elizabeth and asked that his credibility not be 
impeached.9 
Eventually he moderated somewhat and allowed ministers simply to promise to use the 
prayer book and that prayer book only, which caused many who had been holding out to 
subscribe at last. But now Whitgift turned his attention to another device. The queen had 
issued new leners parent in December 1583 (0 the high commission, and he used this recent 
commission to construct twenty-four articles to be administered ex officio to those puritan 
nonconformists who were suspected of being involved 111 unauthorised religious 
organisations. 10 The articles were extremely unpopular and Burghley, among others of the 
council, complained. Whitgift had his way, however, and over the next five years he 
persevered in his disciplinary tactics, eventually rising from his initial unpopularity at Lambeth 
into the privy council itself. 
7 Under Archbishop Grindal thc prayer book was widely, even officially used, but there was no litmus test for ministers which 
forced them to subscribe to it. Collinson, Elizabethan puritan mOllemmt, 245. 
8 Collinson, Elizabethan puritan mO[lement, 246-7. 
9 Collinson, Elizabethan puritan mOl!e171ent, 251-6. 
10 See Usher, Rise and (fill, ed. Tyler, appendices. 
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Whitgift was made a councillor in 1586 while Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, was 
away in the Netherlands. Leicester was not only vigorous in the puritan cause, he wielded 
extensive power of patronage. But Leicester died in 1588, followed by the other moderate 
puritan councillors Sir Walter Mi~may in 1589, and the earl of Warwick and Sir Francis 
, 
Walsingham in 1590. By this time Sir Francis Knollys was very old, and Burghley was losing 
influence. Whitgift, on the other hand, was gaining supporters: in the aftermath of the 1588 
defeat of the Armada Sir Christopher Hatton, one of Whitgift' s solid allies for many years, 
spoke of puritans as being as dangerous as papists. Like Whitgift, Hatton was of the second 
Elizabethan generation of councillors who disliked even moderate puritanism, and had a 
distincdy authoritarian bent. 11 Hatton died in 1591, but there were other new faces on the 
privy council who shared his views. Lord Buckhurst and Lord Cobham, who had never liked 
Leicester or his circle, also joined forces with the archbishop against puritanism, as did 
Whitgift's clerical subordinates, Richard Cosin, Richard Bancroft, and John Aylmer. 12 These 
men saw disturbing trends in the parliamentary calls of 1584 and 1586 for a learned ministry, 
an end to subscription, and a new system of presbyteries. They resisted the first Elizabethan 
generation's slide to the left by moving sharply rightward, seeking d1e queen's direct authority 
for validation of their agenda. Between 1586, therefore, and 1590 d1e complexion of the privy 
council changed considerably. The first generation of conformists, 'men of business' who 
relied on strong links with the counties were replaced by a second generation of new-style 
conformists who disliked puritanism and did not generally rely on provincial patronage 
networks but tended to worked closely with the queen herself.13 
These new conformists were alarmed at more than just puntan religious initiatives. 
Between 1586 and the end of the century, war and socio-economic conditions combined (0 
produce some of the most threatening years in Elizabeth's reign. In 1603 [he population of 
England reached about 4.5 million, a strong increase of about 35% since the beginning of the 
11 MacCulloch, Later Reformation, 44-6; Guy, 'Introduction', Reign of Elizabeth J, ed. Guy, 3, 6, 12; Guy, 'Elizabethan 
establishment', Reign of Elizabeth J, 129-30. 
12 Collinson, Elizabethan pur'itan 1Jlot'e1llent, 385-7. Aylmer, though a somewhat radical protestant in the 1550s and 1560s, 
made a distinctive swing to the right in the 1580s after becoming bishop of London. 
13 'Men of business' were influential gentry who had close personal connections with privy councillors and acted as advisors, 
lobbyists, and informers to the council. Sec Collinson, Elizabethan essays, 59-86; also Tyacke, 'Anglican attitudes', Journal 
of British Studies, 35 (April, 1996), 139-67. 
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reign. Prices had also been rising since the 1520s, bur the availability of food and employment 
lagged behind these increases. 14 Grain harvests were generally good until 1594 when there 
began a series of bad years, particularly for wheat. In the same year the price of consumables 
rose sharply. Livestock prices had begun rising in 1588, peaking in 1594-5, and only tapering 
off slightly at the end of the decade, and the price of grain and consumables did not improve 
significantly until 1600. 15 The worst of these years, when impoverishment, malnutrition, and 
starvation were at their highest, were 1596-8 and the death rate may have been as high as 
6%.16 In other years when harvests were good, such as 1592, 1593, and 1603, there were 
outbreaks of the plague. I7 
The inflation and scarcity of food during the 1590s were also being compounded by the 
cost of war. England had intervened in the Netherlands in 1585, which precipitated the long 
war with Spain and the Catholic League. The campaigns to suppress rebellion in Ireland 
between 1593 and 1601 were particularly expensive commitments for the crown (over 
£1,000,000 against an annual income of roughly £900,000), besides which there were naval 
expeditions to support in 1589, 1591, 1595, and 1597 as well as defensive troops in northern 
France. The money for these foreign wars was generally raised by taxation, borrowing, and the 
selling of crown lands, all of which still could not balance the crown's books. In addition to 
raising the money for these foreign wars, Parliament overconfidently repealed anti-enclosure 
legislation in 1593. This encouraged landowners to convert arable land to pasture, which only 
amplified the effects of inflation and poverty when the first of a series of bad harvests (some of 
the worst of the century) came a year later. 18 
The crisis was not perceived only amongst the landless wage-eanung poor. In 1595 
Archbishop Whitgift described 'this tyme of Scarcitye & Dearth of Corne and Victualls', and 
in the same year the lord mayor of London informed Burghley that the shortage of grain was 
14 Jim Sharpe, 'Social strain and social dislocation, 1585-1603', ReiKn or Elizabeth I, ed. Guy, 194; Paul Slack, The EnKlish 
poor law (London, 1990), 11. 
15 D.M. Palliser, The aKe or Elizabeth (second edition; London, 1992) 456. 
16 Paul Slack, POlIerty & policy in Tudor & Stuart EnKland (London, 1988) 49-50; Slack, EnKlish poor law, 13. 
17 Slack, POl>erty & policy, 139. 
18 The restrictions against enclosure were enacted again by P,uliamenc in 1597, but by then the damage had been done. Slack, 
POl'erty & policy, 51; R.B. Outhwaite, Infl.ation in Tudor and early Stuart EnKland (London, 1969), 43; Sharpe, 'Social 
strain', ReiK" orElizabeth I, ed. Guy, 196; Palliser, The aKe or Elizabeth, 31-3; see also The European crisis 0( the 1590s: 
essays in comparative history, ed. Peter Clark and Paul Slack (London, 1985). 
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likely to be the ruin of many poor folk who had already been near the brink of starvation the 
year before. 19 The social implications of dearth were just as disturbing to the authorities as to 
those who were suffering the most. There were food riots in London in the summer of 1595 
which required martial order to quell and similar disturbances in Oxfordshire the same year. 
In fact, there were at least twelve grain riots between 1594 and 1598. 20 The number of 
wandering beggars and vagrants increased during the 1590s as well, as did bastardy, thefts, 
and felonies. Apparently as a result of this increase in crime, judicial authorities became more 
willing to use the death penalty than in the past. 21 
These socio-economic factors could not help but be stirred into the mix of church and 
state. The Somerset JP Edward Hext, the Kent JP and author William Lambarde,22 and the 
earl of Bath, among many others in authority, were afraid economic misfortune in the 
countryside was likely to produce major social disruption before long. 23 Sir Francis Bacon 
similarly believed that dearth was one of the 'causes and motives of sedition'. 24 Such fears of 
general social upheaval combined with fresh memories of puritan agitation in the 1580s hleled 
the new-style conformists in their drive for conformity and order. 
But there were difficulties in suppressing religious dissent. In medieval England the 
threat and use of excommunication had usually been sufficient to keep the laity in line and 
terrorise them, if need be, into obedience. The reformation did much to weaken the efficacy 
of excommunication, however, and many an Elizabethan layman remained voluntarily 
excommunicate for years. The growing indifference of men towards excommunication was in 
part due to late Tudor religious defiance but also had to do with the fact that common law 
courts no longer stripped excommunicates of their right to initiate lawsuits. 25 In the face of 
these setbacks, ecclesiastical courts needed to harness new methods of enforcing discipline. 
The answer came in the form of the power to fine and imprison, and Whitgift, who tended to 
19 R.B. Outhwaite, Derzrth, public policy. and social disturbance in England, 1550-1800 (London, 1991) 10-I. 
20 Palliser, The age o(,Elizabeth, 32; Outhwaite, Detlrth, 48. 
21 Slack, Ptl1'erty & policy, 49-50,102; Sharpe, 'Social main', Reign ofEliztlbeth J, ed. Guy, 201-2. 
22 Lambarde was the author of Archion, or [/ comentar] upon the high courts 0(' justiCt' ill England, written in 1591 and 
dedicated to Sir Robert Cecil (though not printed until 1635). (STC 2 15143). 
23 Sharpe, 'Social strain " Re~,<n of Elizabeth J, 192-3, 203; 
24 Outhwaite, Dem1h, 11. 
25 This was a result of the temporal courts' jealousy of the mushrooming jurisdiction of ecclesiastic.1.l courtS. Usher, Rise flnd 
fitll, ed. Tyler, 99-100,182-3. 
Chapter 8 - Richard Cosin and the 15905 
see upheaval in the church as 'an operational problem',26 encouraged the high commission to 
make use of these sanctions soon after his elevation to Canterbury. Writing on this subject in 
1607 the civil lawyer John Cowell observed, 'For the world being growne to that loosenes as 
not to esteeme the censure of excommunication, necessitie calleth for those censures of £)rnes 
to dle prince and imprisonment, which doe affect men more neerely.'27 
The threat of instability posed by puritanism, socio-economic distress, and the 
apparently waning power of ecclesiastical courts to control religious dissent provided the new-
style conformists with ammunition mat they had lacked until the last decade of Elizabeth's 
reign. The puritans had taken me offensive early in the 1580s but having failed to achieve any 
substantial reforms in church government by the end of the decade, they were clearly running 
out of steam. The new-style conformists on the other hand, propelled by Whitgift's 
competent sense of direction and willingness to act swiftly and forcefully, began to mature. 
Whitgift deployed the high commission to enforce his vision of conformity to the established 
church, but there were other fronts to cover. The puritans were strong in Parliament and 
Whitgift was ever watchful of its proceedings. The day Morice introduced his bill against the 
high commission in the 1593 Parliament,28 Whitgift wrote an animated letter to queen. In it 
he named Morice 'a great patron' of sectaries and accused him of using his bills for the 
protection of the same. He implored the queen to uphold the current ecclesiastical 
establishment which 'must of necessitie be continewed vnlesse we will suffer vice to abownd 
and sects, schimes [sic], and disorder to have the uppar hand'. With a piece of rhetoric that 
aimed not to flatter the queen by his personal devotion but to incite her to protect her state, 
Whitgift closed ruefully, 'for in the end your maiestie wyll find that dl0se wich now impugne 
the ecdesiasticall Iurisdiction indevor also to impare the temporall and to bring even kings and 
princes vnder mere Censure.' 29 
Whitgift's interpretation of the conflict as a war that ranged the forces of law and order 
against the splintering power of faction became the mainstay of new-style conformist polemic 
26 John Guy, 'Elizabethan establishment', The Reig17 of Elizabeth J, cd. Guy, 139. 
27 John Cowell, The' interpreter, sig. Q4v. 
28 Actually he had prepared two bills for consideration but only one bill was debated. 
29 BL, Additional MS 28571, fo. 172. 
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in the 15905. In fact the puritans' views of civil authority, rather than their views of doctrine 
and liturgy, became the prime focus of the new conformist strategy)O Afrer all, the meaning 
and interpretation of scripture and the fathers could be endlessly debated, but puritan 
opinions regarding civil authority touched closely on law, and law could (and would) be more 
certainly established. The conformists accordingly focused on this aspect of puritanism in their 
polemical writings and attacked the puritans as subversives. 31 The 1590s writings of the new 
conformists, particularly the forceful, absolutist tones of Richard Bancrofr and Hadrian 
Saravia, dispelled (at least in their own minds) any ambiguity that remained in the royal 
supremacy. 32 
But the portrayal of the puritans as a threat to the peace of church and state was only half 
of the conformist strategy. They then proposed to subdue this threat by empowering the 
monarch on the grounds of preservation of order. This made simple political sense from the 
standpoint that the queen would be a shield against the frothing anticlericalism of the puritan 
iaity,33 but it also aimed at tilting real political power towards Elizabeth at the expense of the 
mixed polity by which England had operated for the first thirty years of her reign. This 
transformation was the end of the 'first reign' of Elizabeth and the beginning of the 'second 
reign' which lasted from the late 1580s until 1603 and was marked by a centralisation of 
authority in both church and state. 34 
Leading the way for the new conformists were John Bridges, Thomas Cooper, Thomas 
Bilson, Hadrian Saravia, Richard Cosin, Matthew Sutcliffe, and Richard Bancrofr. Bridges, 
30 This tmdency is an interesting contrast to the idcntific.uion of puritans during the reigns of James and Charles primarily 
by their views on doctrine and liturgy. Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity', Mental world, ed. Peck, 113-4. 
31 Similarly, Charles I and Archbishop Laud believed that calvinism was subversive to the church and state because it 
encouraged smugness amongst the elect that reduced the need for obedience to earthly authority. They also saw anti-
popery as an ultimately destablising force. Nicholas Tyacke, 'Archbishop Laud', Early Stuart church, ed. Fincham, 65; 
Anthony Milton, Catholic anri rtjormed: the Roman ilnd protestant churches in Enf!:iish protestant thouKht, 1600-1640 
(Cambridge, 1995) 529-31. 
32 Lake, AnK!iCilIlS tlnd purittlllS?, 102-13,212. See also Hadrian Saravia, O{the diuerse deKrces o(the ministers o{ the Kospell 
(London, 1591) (STC 2 21749) II, 182-91; Richard Bancroft, A SUr-lIIl)' 1)( the pretended h1)0' discipline (London, 1593) 
(STd 1352) 250-81. 
33 There was a parallel here to the Submission lOf the Clergy in 1533. Professor Guy: 'Thus to politically alert bishops royal 
supremacy was the better of two evils: the clergy wlOuld not have to counter the approaching anticlerical backlash without 
the necessary filter of royal mediation.' John Guy, 'ThlOmas Cromwell and the intellectual origins of the Henrician 
revlOlution', ReassessinK, ed. Fox and Guy, 173. There Was also a further parallel with the late Stuart church's rejection of 
sacerdotalism. See Champion, Pi!liar5 1)( priestcrtl(t, 93-8. 
34 The conscious division of Elizabeth's reign into two parts has been pioneered by Professors Guy and Collinson. See 
especially Guy, 'Introduction', ReiKn o( Elizabeth I, ed. Guy, 1-19; and Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Elizabeth 
1', Bulletin o(the jolm Rylands University Library, 69 (1986-7) 394-424. 
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dean of Salisbury and later bishop of Oxford under King James, was the first conformist to 
advance the iure divino argument for episcopacy in his anti-calvinist A defence of the 
gouernement established printed in 1587.35 It was this massive treatise that sparked the 
publication of the outrageous Marprelate tracts, which were in turn answered by Cooper, the 
bishop of Winchester in An admonition to the people of England in 1589.36 Saravia, a Dutch 
theologian who came to England in 1588, also made a powerful case for the divine right of 
bishops in his De diuersis minisfrorum euangelii gradibus published in 1590.37 By the early 
1590s the new-style conformists were clearly on the offensive. The year 1593 saw an 
outpouring of important conformist works unparalleled in any previous year. Richard 
Bancroft's Dangerous positions and proceedings was a historical narrative dealing with 
attempts to bring presbyterianism into England under the pretense of reformation. 38 Shortly 
after the publication of this book, Bancroft was translated to the bishopric of London. Also in 
the same year Bancroft produced A survey of the pretended holy discipline ,39 in which he 
drew only from presbyterian sources (similar (0 what Cosin had done in his 1592 Conspracie 
for pretended reformation). Another signal conformist publication in 1593 was The perpetual 
government of Christ's church by Thomas Bilson,40 warden of Winchester College, which 
argued eloquently against the presbyterian discipline in a disputative style, unlike Bancroft's 
historical narratives. 41 The fourth book to come out that year was Cosin's An apologie for 
sundrie proceedings ecclesiasticall, which was substantially unlike anything the conformists 
had yet produced. 42 
All of these works shared remarkably similar views about the government of the church 
and the secular state. With one voice the new conformists labelled presbyterianism as 
35 STC2 3734. 
36 STC 2 5682. DNE, VI, 320-1. 
37 STC2 21746. So popular was Saravia's De dil'ers;s that hc was made a doctor of divinity at Oxford. After 1595 he was 
appointed to a prebendaty of Canterbury where he became dose friends with Richard Hooker. DNB, L, 300. 
38 STC21344. 
39 STC2 1352. 
40 STC23065. 
41 Stlype, AllnaLs, 194-7. 
42 Although Cosin's ApoloKie had first been published in 1591, this edition was only half as long as the 1593 edition and did 
not yet contain Cosin's responses to Morice's and Beale's tracts, nor did it contain the extensive paft III that was the focus 
of the second edition. Furthermore, only about forty copies were printed and they were mostly retained by private 
individuals. Hence, it is not accurate to state that Cosin's ApoloKie made its mark until 1593. 
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refractory, defended the sovereignty of the royal supremacy by denying it was subject to 
democratic ratification, and attempted to enhance the status and authority of the clergy, 
chiefly via the iure divino argument for episcopacy but also by actively promoting clericalism 
and sacerdotalism. 43 But Cosin's arguments, though often sharing some of the assumptions of 
his fellow conformists, were clearly unique. Nothing like the Apologie had ever been 
attempted before in English history - a full-scale defence of ecclesiastical jurisdiction - but 
the flood of puritan treatises in the late 1580s and early 1590s lambasting ecclesiastical courts 
as repressive and illegal had necessitated a powerful response. While the religious arguments of 
the presbyterians were being scrupulously dealt with by orner conformist polemicists, it was 
not until Cosin's Apologie was published that the high commission received a systematic (and 
badly needed) defence. 
The significance of Cosin's Apologie in the religious debate of the 1590s can hardly be 
underestimated. Cosin managed to resuscitate the forgotten prestige of English canon law by 
showing that it was the equal of secular law, a parallel jurisprudence not repugnant to the 
prerogative of the monarch or the laws of the realm but an extension of the royal supremacy. 
The ramifications of the suggestion that common law was only one system among equals were 
to be rediscovered in 1628 during the debate over the Petition of Right. 44 Ever since the act 
confirming the Submission of the Clergy in 1534 (25 Henry VIII c. 19) when it was agreed 
that canon law was defective and in need of serious revision, Christopher St. German's implicit 
thesis that common law was superior to canon law had been generally received. The 'fall' of 
the canon law at the break with Rome and its subsequent failure to be amended seemed to 
confirm that it, along with its relative, civil law, were hopelessly 'Romish' and 'continental' and 
that common law was (he only legal system suitably adapted for protestant England. The 
depths (0 which morale of ecclesiastical officers sank in (he decades between the 1530s and the 
1570s, evidenced by low levels of litigation in ecclesiastical courts, sloppy or inefficient record-
43 Lake, Anglican., and Puritans?, 97-101; Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity', Menta! world, ed. Peck, 114; Champion, Pillars o( 
pries/craft . 
44 See Glenn Burgess, The poLitics of the Ancient Constitution: an introduction to English political thought, 1603-1642 
(London, 1992) 120, 194-9; Margaret A. Judson, The crisis of the constitution: an essay il1 constitutional and political 
thought in EngLmd, 1603-1645 (second edition; London, 1988) 242-8; 257-62; John Guy, 'The origins of the Petition of 
Right reconsidered', Histm';cal Journal 25 (1982), 289-312. 
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keeping, and a grim state of suspense about the future of the church, was a somber reflection 
on the apparent insignificance of canon law in England. 45 
None of this aspect of ecclesiastical jurisdiction - the legitimacy of canon law - was 
addressed by other conformist polemicists. They generally rested their cases on the supposed 
theological errors inherent in presbyterianism and the divine right of episcopacy, but eosin 
approached the problem differently. He reminded his adversaries that Tudor parliaments had 
always referred to the 'queen's ecclesiastical laws' in discussing the government of the church. 
What else could this mean but that the canon laws which remained in operation were as 
legitimate as the temporal? 
For if her Maiesties Supreme Royal! auctoritie and power Ecclesiastical! granted by commission 
to others be as highly vested in her crowne as is her Temporall: then will it bee probably 
gathered, both of them being in their seueral! kindes supreme, and the exercise of them 
committed ouer to others vnder the great seale; that the one of them is not to be abridged, 
restrained, or controlled by the other. 46 
I n the process of reviving the authority and prestige of canon law eosin had a definite goal in 
mind, which was ro use (his powerful conception of resrored spiritual regency to justify the 
more controversial proceedings of the high commission, particularly the despised ex officio 
oath, which was the linchpin in the commission's power to police the church. In doing this he 
had an extremely difficult task. As we noted in the last chapter, the legality of the ex officio 
oath in the 1590s is not a cut-and-dried issue, and in fact several hisrorians are disagreed about 
whether the oath was legal, and at least a few are undecided. 47 Quintilian had observed that 
the deft usage of reason did not always produce consensus among wise men, and that there 
were cases when reason could be on both sides of a question, an opinion echoed by Tudor 
rhetoricians such as Henty Peacham.48 It was thus necessaty for eosin, especially in defending 
the oath, to transcend the academic debate of precedents and laws for which he had been 
45 Hdmholz, Roman canon law, 28, 42-3. 
46 Cosin, ApnloKie, III, 225-6. The same point is made in a different context in part III, 85. 
47 After much research and cogitation on the issue I am still inclined to agree with Professor Hclmholz: 'it was far from clear 
which side had the stronger argument'. Helmholz, ROlllan callon law, 157. 
48 Skinner, Reasoll Ilnd rhetoric, 97-8. 
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trained and to cultivate a fresh style of polemic that he had begun to develop 111 the 
Conspiracie for pretended reformation. 
This new polemical style was the rhetoric of order and dominion, the 'reason of state'. In 
his 1589 Of Reason of State , Giovanni Botero had claimed that the most important duty of a 
prince was to become acquainted with the 'means appropriate to establish, maintain and 
enlarge a state' as well as to enrich its reputation. Botero's emphasis had not only drifted away 
from the renaissance standard of virtuous counsel of the prince but away from a call to the 
citizenry as wen. The new reason of state was a language only for the few. The old politics had 
been deemed fit for the citizen of a republic, for the masses themselves. Renaissance civil 
philosophers, building on Plato and Aristotle, had encouraged all men to take part in the 
communal task of creating the just society. But the new language of reason of state only 
applied to the cabinet of the state, that is, the prince and his court. After all, the state did not 
belong to every man and woman but every man and woman to the state. 49 
The English author, Anthony Nixon, similarly encouraged the 'reason of state' as a 
means of preserving the well-ordered commonwealth. In The dignitie of man, he warned that 
states were corrupted by 'the increase of private commoditie', that is, the petty concerns of 
private citizens at the expense of 'the publique profit' of the realm - which language closely 
resembled both eosin's as well as Richard Hooker's.50 Sir Francis Bacon also wrote in favour 
of state preservation in stark terms, suggesting that 'Necessity (the great god of the powerful), 
and peril of state, and communion of interest' were crucial weapons in the arsenal of any 
prince and ought to be used in times of need. 51 Professors Peltonen and Skinner have 
established this trend toward authoritarian devices of statesmanship in the last decade of the 
sixteenth century and the first decade of the seventeenth by srudying influential works on 
rhetoric and government, and a common theme emerges from this period. Those who offered 
49 Should ordinary citizens seek to involve themselves in manns of the state, they would destroy it, returning it to a republic. 
Viroli, Reason 0rstate, 252-7, 259. 
50 When considering the machinery of state, Hooker addressed the danger of private reason usurping the public good of the 
commonwealth. See discussion of Hooker below in the conclusion, 264. Peltonen, Ci.I1ssical humanism, 154-6; Anrhony 
Nixon, The diKnitie orman (1612) (STC 2 18584). Nixon's work was based partly on the 1605 anonymous publication, 
OrKanol1 reipublicae: or the north starre orpollicie, by which the wurse or a common-wealth IIllly be directed. 
51 Francis Bacon, The advancement o(learnillK (STC2 1164); Francis Bacon, EssllYs (STC 2 1137); Francis Bacon, De stlpientia 
veterum (STC2 1127); Francis Bacon, De diKllittlte et allKlilentis (STC 2 1108); Francis Bacon, NOIII/in OrKa/l1l1il (STC2 
1162); Pdtonen, Classical hUllIanism, 157-8. 
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advice to princes and rulers were increasingly advocating techniques of state preservation based 
on a dual standard of ethics. The traditional standard of private morality and justice 
continued to apply to private individuals, they argued, but in matters of state what might 
seem unjust in a private context might be justifiable in a public sense if the necessity of the 
state required it. Official government policies sanctioned by the new 'reason of state' included 
dissumulation, secrecy, even viciousness. 52 These machiavellian overtones were undoubtedly 
made more palatable in light of the tense religious, social, and economic atmosphere of the 
1590s we have been describing. 
This shift in focus towards the prince and his court and away from the citizenry, a 
literary theme which noticeably flourished at the beginning of James' reign, marked an 
important change in officially-sanctioned English political literature. St. German primed his 
Treatise concerning the division in blackletter English for the express purpose of taking his 
message to the street, in fact hoping to gain the attention of Parliament. Morice similarly 
played to popular senriment in A briefe treatise of oathes, hoping to exploit anticlerical 
prejudices and adopt the famous polemical styles of John Foxe and William Tyndale. eosin's 
Apologie, on the other hand, was not pitched at the masses for the purpose of winning hearts 
and minds to the conformist way of thinking. It was a receding voice, spoken in defence of the 
exercise of ecclesiastical power even as the doors to public discourse on the subject were being 
closed by Whitgift. The Apologie was intended to be the last word. 
Like Sir Thomas More who tried to profit from St. German's popular appeals by 
equating them with an affront to authority,53 eosin copiously portrayed his adversaries as 
variously misguided or seditious but universally dangerous, and he held up the lawfully 
instituted power of ecclesisastical jurisdiction as the only possible bulwark against a steadily 
rising tide of faction and chaos in the church. The preservation of the stare as well as the 
church became eosin's capital objective in the Apologie, and he often referred to 'the public 
interest' as an inseparable representation of the two. 54 The ex officio oath was ultimately 
52 Peitonen, Classical humanism, 157-8. 
53 More, Works, cd. Trapp, IX, 99-100; More, Works, X, cd. Guy, Keen, Miller, McCugan, Ixxxiii-Ixxxiv. 
54 Examples of this throughout the Apologie abound. Cosin usually employed the term in conjunction with punishment, 
hence, 'the Common wealth hath interest to haue offences punished' (II, 46); 'the publike interest which the Church or 
Common weith hath, to haue crimes punished' (II, 81). The phrase and concept of the rei publicae interest was derived 
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justified in terms that comprised a strange synthesis of Cosin's rhetorical techniques of 
'fatherly correction'S5 and the more forceful 'reason of state': 
[The oath] may be vrged by a Magistrate and ought not to be denyed by the subiect, where a 
common good to an whole Christian state is sought, and the parties owne re£\)[mation, by due 
correction and punishment, concurring besides with the lawes of the Lande that requireth this 
parte of obedience in all subiects. 56 
The only alternatives were to allow his opponents d1eir intended reforms: to determine the law 
based on conscience, thus allowing each man the opportunity to judge his own judges. To 
teach people to resist the laws ordained57 in England would be very dangerous and wrong, and 
thus instructing men to resist an oath established and administered by the authorities could 
not be right. If men felt free to resist laws on the basis of 'conscience', no end of mischief 
would ensue. 58 Hence the alternative to the present state of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as seen 
by Cosin, was the unravelling of all authority in short order. There were no middle ways. 
Cicero and Quintilian had conceded that it was sometimes necessaty to distract people 
from the truth in order to win them to the truth. Likewise, the English humanist Thomas 
Wilson confessed the occasional necessity of exaggeration and hyping the importance of the 
matter. George Puttenham and Francis Bacon made similar statements (Bacon favoured the 
word 'dissimulation'). Despite the ethical dubiousness of such approaches, Tudor rhetoricians 
agreed they must be used sometimes if we are (0 succeed in our arguments,59 As we reflected 
in the last chapter, both Cosin and Morice availed themselves of these techniques, but outright 
fibs on both sides were rare; like most polemicists they employed subtle methods of 
redescription which were at once more subversive and believeable than fabrications. Though 
from the civil lawyer Julius Clarus who had borrowed it from medieval canon law tradition where the phrase was common 
currency. See Brundage, lvlediet,al canon law, 145-6, as well as Richard M. Fraher, 'The theoretical justification for the 
new criminal law of the high Middle Ages: "rei publicae interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita", University of' Illi nois 
Law Reuiew (1984) 577-95. 
55 See above, 204, for a discussion of this techniqut' used by Cosin. 
56 In this declaration there was both the gentleness of the priest and the iron rod of the ruler. Cosin, Apoloy;ie, III, 151. 
57 Cosin's use of the term 'ordained' is interesting; 'accepted into and affirmed' would have been a more accurate (but less 
useful) description of canon law, since its origin was entirely foreign to England. 
58 Cosin, Apolof(ie, Ill, 132-3,202. 
59 Peltonen, Classical hUlllanism, 157; Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 134. 
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there had been numerous warnings down the ages, not Just from rhetoricians but also from 
poets and dramatists, against the moral dangers of rhetorical redescription, no suitable moral 
alternative seemed to have presented itself to late sixteenth century writers in political 
controversy.60 Cosin and other conformists were consequently given to redescribing 
presbyterians as far more radical and dangerous than they actually were. Some, even Hooker, 
went so far as to doubt their civic loyalty, and recently Hooker scholars have found this unfair, 
since the vast majority of presbyterians had fully assimilated into Elizabethan society and were 
law-abiding and loyal citizens.61 
But Cosin must also be implicated, considering the disparity between the moderate 
puritan tracts he used as sources and his spurious portrayal of them in the Apologie as 
extremisr. 62 Nevertheless, Cosin was more adept at rhetoric (han Morice, not merely in light 
of his characterization of puritans as a threat (0 the state but also because of his slick treatment 
of English history, particularly the 1530s. Renaissance education stressed that the greatest way 
to become wise was to study moral philosophy and history, and Tudor and early Stuart 
humanists were particularly sold on the study of history as an indispensible tool in obtaining 
wisdom. 63 Both Morice and Cosin were aware of this, and they appealed to their own personal 
versions of English history which differed at crucial points, one of those being the 1530s and 
the significance of the Submission of the Clergy. It is necessary then to review some of the 
events of that decade which had a particular bearing on our present debate. 
The second book of St. German's Doctor and student appeared in 1530, arguing more 
forcefully than the first that most of the jurisdiction currently exercised by the church 
ultimately related to property and rightfully belonged to temporal courts. The only obedience 
owed to the church was in matters of faith. He suggested that canon law be picked over and 
revised so that it only took cognisance of matters which it could rightly claim as its own 
60 Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 157-63, 179-80. 
61 Richard Hooker, O(the law,' o( cede."ia,ticd polit)" ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade (Cambridge, 1989) xvii. 
62 LPL, MS 2004 contains several puritan tracts (mostly against the ex officio oath) which do not really amount to a 
compendium of seditious or radical ideas. Even the tracts representing the opinions of Cartwright (fos. 49-59), Humphrey 
Fenn (fo. 83r-v), and Edmund Snape (fos. 85-7) did not appeal to radical legal principles such as 'conscience' but 
employed only standard, commonly-held puritan arguments against the oath, such as that it was contrary to scripture or 
Magna Carta. Cosin misrepresented the moderate nature of these essays by making them seem seditious. 
63 Skinner, Reason ilnd rhetoric, 81-3; Peltonen, Classical humanism, 197-8. 
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jurisdiction. The implication was impossible [0 ignore: St. German was saying that common 
law was superior to canon law. 64 His strange anticlerical stance made his writings useful [0 
Henry VIII, 'for it was becoming clear that the quarrel with Rome might be pressed [0 
extremes, and the true extent of ecclesiastical authority was now a parry question.'65 
Henry declared himself above canon law and to make his claim stick it was necessary to 
subverr the influence and prestige of canon law. 66 This was achieved by one of his most fluent 
polemicists, Edward Foxe, in his De vera differentia (1534).67 F oxe argued (not unlike St. 
German) that scripture had never intended [0 furnish canon law with any jurisdictional 
authority other than control over merely sacramental matters. Furthermore, he described 
canon law as cus[Om, suggesting it had grown through centuries of misguided reverence into 
law. 68 By destroying the potency of canon law (and abolishing the study of it at universities), 
Henry inevitably dampened its reputation in England. But although he had subdued the 
canon law, he never bothered to rehabilitate it or reform it, and the failure to enact the 
Reformatio legum ecclesiasticarum in the 1550s, as we have seen, seemed to indicate that 
canon law could not be assimilated into an England that had broken from Rome. 69 
Despite this unpromising backdrop Cosin carefully reworked the history of the 1530s, 
airbrushing the 'fall' of canon law by ignoring the negative implications behind the 
Supplication against the Ordinaries and Submission of the Clergy. He argued a materialist 
interpretation of the Act for the Submission of the Clergy (25 Henry VIII c. 19), suggesting 
that it meant no more than it literally said: that those canons which were repugnant to the laws 
and prerogatives of the prince should be abolished. Those canons which were not repugnant, 
he asserted, remained in force with as much authority and antiquity as everJo Cosin was 
careful to accept the assumptions behind the Acts of Appeals and Supremacy, both of which 
64 Doctor and student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, xx-xxv, 242-3, 30'); see also St. German, New Additions, reprinted in 
Doctor and student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, 317-40. 
65 Doctor and student, cd. Plucknett and Barton, xii. 
66 Professor Brundage has observed, 'Critics of the Roman church frequently identified what they most disliked about the 
medieval religious establishment with canon law and canonists.' It was thus understandable that Luther chose to burn a 
copy of the canon law tCxt Liber extra in 1520 to show his disgust with Roman authority. Brundage, Mediwal canon law, 
182. 
67 STC 2 11218 or 11220 (1548 English translation by Henry Lord Stafforde). 
68 Guy, Thomas Cromwell', RelZssessinJ!" cd. Fox and Guy, 170-I. 
69 For discussion of the Reformalio lef!:um ecclesiasticarum, see above, 7-8. 
70 Cosin, ApoloJ!.ie, l, 2-4. 
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had been based on the Collectanea satis copiosa, though he turned them to a new purpose. 
They asserted that the king's imperium was antecedent to the jurisdiction of the clergy and 
that any privileges the clergy possessed had been lent them in the past by English kings and 
could be discontinued at willJ1 
eosin extended this concept II1to Elizabeth's reign. The enabling clause of the 
Elizabethan Act of Supremacy which authorised the queen to empower the high commission 
via letters patent was the centerpiece of this argument, since it granted full authority to the 
high commission to order and govern the church according to the tenor of the letters patent. 
This demonstrated that ecclesiastical jurisdiction was now grafted on to the royal supremacy 
by statute (another paradox?). And since Elizabeth in her letters patent had chosen to give 
ecclesiastical courts wide latitude in their methods of enforcing religious uniformity, it stood 
to reason that the vehicle chosen by ecclesiastical courts to govern the church, canon law, was 
vindicated from ignominy. The queen had empowered the clergy by means of her royal 
supremacy and therefore they enforced the canon law by right.72 This theory was a far cry 
from anything yet heard by either puritans or conformists. Cosin's unabashed defence of 
canon law might indicate that the divine right argument for episcopacy being propagated by 
the likes of Bridges and Saravia masked an insecurity on the part of conformists about the 
status of canon law which they concealed with heavy-handed, dogmatised scriptural exegesis 
and pretensions to an almost absurdly theocratic absolutism. But Cosin's brand of royal 
supremacy exuded a confidence in three things: the unbroken legitimacy of canon law, the 
equality of all systems of law under the crown, and a hands-off royal endorsement of the high 
commission's methods of policing the church. 
Cosin's redefinition of the Submission of the Clergy and the validity of canon law was a 
new chapter in the conformist campaign against puritanism in the last decade of Elizabeth's 
reign. Stated simply, Cosin put ecclesiastical jurisdiction back on the map, and in doing so he 
71 Guy, 'The Henrician age', Varieties, cd. Pocock, 35-7; see also Graham Nicholson, 'The nature and function of historical 
argument in the English Reformation" Cambridge University thesis, 1977, passim but especially 175-273. 
72 Like Hooker's theoty of popular consent which asserted that kings ascended to power by the will of the people and yet 
once that will was expressed the king ruled by right, Cosin ascribed 'rights' to the high commission which were established 
once the queen's consent had been secured through her letters patent. For a discussion of Hooker's limited notion of 
'consent', see Lake, AI1;;licam and puritans?, 203-5. 
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justified the controversial aspects of the high commlSSlOn from a legal perspective. But (he 
Apologie was not talk without action. The events of the 1590s bore out all of Cosin's 
pretensions regarding the imperial nature of Elizabeth's supremacy and the rediscovered 
authority of the church to deal with disorder and schism. 
Richard Beacon, the author of Solon his Jollie (1594), asserted that there were two ways 
to govern a commonwealth wisely. The first was to employ rhetoric persuasively and the 
second was to use coercion. Though he believed force should only be used when other courses 
failed, Beacon unhesitatingly advocated state-sponsored coercion in times of crisis and cited 
Machiavelli's Discorsi as his authority.73 Though perhaps Beacon's intended context was the 
conquest and reformation of Ireland, (here were obvious internal parallels in England, and as 
we have seen, other late Elizabethan and early Stuart rhetoricians were advocating similar styles 
of authoritarianism. Cosin's Apologie was quite clearly a massive exercise in rhetoric which 
attempted to persuade at an academic level, but it was also declaratory of government policy, 
and the 1590s saw the fulfillment in practice of what Cosin propounded in theory. 
The high commission and other courts, particularly Star Chamber, became increasingly 
involved in the government's campaign against nonconformity, resulting in a centralisation of 
power at Lambeth and Westminster over disciplinary matters in the church. Although 
Cartwright's case was a panicular failure for the high commission,74 Whitgift's astute removal 
of the case to Star Chamber brought the desired results: though never convicted, Cartwright's 
loyalty to the queen was brought into considerable doubt and his reputation forever sullied. 75 
His subsequent imprisonment, though brief, was a sufficient advertisement to England that if 
the head of the dassis movement could be brought to heel, anyone could. As important as 
Cartwright's case was, the verdict in Robert Cawdrey's Queen's Bench case in 1595 was 
equally momentous. 76 The judges, citing the Act of Appeals of 1533, recorded that England 
73 Pdtonen, Classical humanism, R9-90. 
74 The commission had not yet evolved a procedure to prevent defendants' refusal of the ex ofTicio oath from bringing the 
case to a halt. In the 1590s high commission defendants could only be convicted by their confession on oath. Refusal to 
take the oath therefore blocked this process and the only alternative left to the commissioners was to imprison the 
defendant for contempt. Not until the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century was the concept of pro confesso 
applied to such contumacious defendants, thereby equating refusal of the oath with implied guilt and thus confession. See 
Usher, Rise alld/all, cd. Tyler, 247 footnote 2. 
75 For a fuller discussion of Cartwright's trial, see above, 164-5. 
76 The verdict in Cawdrey's case is fully discussed above in chapter seven, 219-23. 
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was an empire with two estates under one head, that ecclesiastical matters were to be decided 
by ecclesiastical judges just as temporal matters were by temporal judges, that foreign laws 
were legitimate if legally accepted into the realm, and that denial of any of these things was a 
denial of the sovereign's prerogative. The influence of Cosin's Apologie in this verdict, clearly 
demonstrated in the last chapter, illustrates that Cosin's polemic was not only accompanied by 
like-minded government action, it was helping shape government policy itself. 
While the temporal courts were now supporting an imperial royal supremacy and 
acknowledging the authority of the high commission as parallel and equal to their own, 
Parliament proved less yielding. In 1593 James Morice declared to d1e house three indignities 
offered to the realm by ecclesiastical judges: an intolerable inquisition (ex officio procedure), 
lawless subscription (to the prayer book, Thirty-Nine Articles, and royal supremacy), and 
binding absolution (the oath of purgation). He submitted two bills for consideration which 
would finally put an end to these abuses, and a lengthy and well-recorded debate followed. 77 
James Dalton from Lincoln's Inn, a former moderate puritan who had suddenly disassociated 
himself from the movement in 1584-5,78 spoke first. He denied that any of the practices of 
ecclesiastical courts were illegal and suggested Morice's bill was nothing more than a device to 
protect puritans. More importantly he foreshadowed the judges' decision in Cawdrey's case 
by claiming that temporal and spiritual jurisdictions were distinct from each other and that 
temporal authorities should not seek to interpret ecclesiastical law. He asked for the bill to be 
tabled, but the house greatly disapproved of his speech by coughing and spitting. 79 Sir John 
Wolley, a solidly conformist privy councillor, spoke next. He warned the house that the queen 
had forbidden them to deal in ecclesiastical matters and seconded Dalton's motion to table 
the bill. The third speech was by William Lewin, himself a high commissioner. He 
condemned the bill, defended episcopacy, 80 justified inquisition and ex officio procedure, and 
condemned accusation as odious and dangerous. 81 
77 The three main sources for this debate are Cambridge, Baker MS 40; BL, Conon MS, Titus F.ll, fos. 30v-34r; and LPL, 
MS 2019, fos. 3r-5v. 
78 Hasler, Commons, II, 8. 
79 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 61 r. 
80 Lewin's approach is interesting in that nothing in Morice's speech or bills questioned the place of bishops or suggested 
presbyterian reform. It was typical conformist rhetoric of the 1590s in that it modified the terms of debate, causing the 
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Sir Francis Knollys was the first member to speak in favour of the bil1. 82 He approved of 
Morice's speech and clarified that the Essex lawyer had only spoken against abuses among the 
clergy, not the clergy themselves. He also sent a sharp rejoinder to commissioner Lewin that 
'your Lawes', if they were repugnant to the laws of the realm, 'must stoope & submytt 
themselfes.'83 A certain Stephens spoke next and defended the bill but wished the queen to be 
consulted first, 84 and he was followed by Henry Finch. Finch, a presbyterian who had written 
at least five books on religion, noted that while innovation had been forbidden by the queen, 
'renovation' had not. He spoke forcefully against Lewin's speech, citing Magna Carta and 
arguing that the antiquity of inquisition was not sufficient to justifY it. The ex officio oath, he 
maintained, was contrary to the laws of the realm. 85 Finally Sir Robert Cecil spoke, 
commending Morice's character and his motivations bur wished the queen to see the bills 
before they were read. He also disliked 'the newe contention (as hee toke it) betwene Dr 
Lewyn and Mr Fynche'.86 And so the debate ended. 
'Yet the house called for the reading of the bilL' The speaker, Sir Edward Coke, 
reckoned that the dispute had been lengthy and that no time was left to read the bill which 
was eight pages in length. He asked if the bill should be committed to some privy councillors, 
but he was advised that it was the custom of the house to have a bill kept safe umil it was read. 
When Coke suggested that the bill be submitted to some privy councillors who were members 
snuggle (0 be seen in norms of a defence of (he esrablished governmem of (he church against 'innovators' who wished to 
tear ir down. 
81 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 61 r-v; LPL, MS 2019, fo. 3v. Lewin's dislike of the accusatorial method is highly 
reminiscient of chap(er four of part II of (he ApoloKie. Since rhe second edition of Cosin's Ap(lloKie appeared in prinr in 
March, 1593, it is likely that Lewin, being one of Cosin's colleagues, might have seen 3. pre-press manuscript of it. 
82 The author of the account in Titus F.II inadvertently confused the order of the speeches, putting Knollys' before Lewin's. 
BL, Cotton MS, Titus F.II, fo. 31v. 
83 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 61 v. KnoUys was a long-time puritan on most issues, but he perhaps had a unique perspective 
on canon law being the only man in that parliament who had sat in the reformation Parliament of 1534. 
84 This was probably Richard Stephens from Newporr-by-Launceston, a puritan Middle Temple lawyer rather than Thomas 
Stephens of Weymouth and Melcombe, though he was also from the Middle Temple. At this time Morice was master of 
the bench of the Middle Temple and was likely held in high esteem by his juniors. LPL MS 2019, [0. 4r; Hasler, 
Commons, III, 444-5. 
85 Wilfrid Prest, The Rise (If the B,misters: A social history of the EnKlish bar, 1590-1640 (Oxford, 1986) 219; LPL, MS 
2019, fo. 4r; BL, Cotton MS, Titus F.Il, fos. 32v-33r; Cambridge, Baker MS 40, f{). 61v. Morice's acCOunt (Cambridge, 
Baker MS 40) placed Finch's speech immediately after Lewin's and immediately before KnoUys', but the other two 
diarists place Finch after Knollys. 
86 Quotation from LPL, MS 2019, fo. 4r; sec also BL, Cotton MS, Titus F.Il, 33v; Cambridge, Baker MS 40, fo. 61v. 
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of the house, he was again opposed. At this point he promised to keep the bill himself and 
return it to the house the next day for reading. 87 
The significance of this debate is that it was the last attempt by the laity in the 1590s to 
perpetuate the subjection of ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the temporal, a condition which had 
been accepted de facto since [he 1530s with [he exception of the Marian years (1553-8). 
Disguised behind the pleas for 'renovation' and 'reformation of abuses', Morice's bills were no 
less than an effort to undercut the high commission's power to enforce the oath. By extension 
this would have meant that dle queen could not by letters patent empower the commissioners 
to govern the church according to their discretion. Thus, in seeking to strip the commission 
this power, Morice was also seeking to limit the queen's supremacy without looking like he was 
limiting the queen's supremacy. But the ttue implications of the bill were recognised by 
Whitgift who had been apprised of the debate in Parliament by one of his agents. 88 Not 
intending to repeat his personal appearance in Parliament as in 1585, he immediately wrote to 
the queen begging her to intercede and quash the bill. Though he had personally admitted to 
Morice in the spring of 1591 (hat he knew nodling about canon law, 89 Whitgift now alleged 
that the ex officio oath had been used in England 'ever sens your maiestie came to the crowne 
and long before tyme owte of mynde' and that its continued use by ecclesiastical courts was 
imperative. Using a style similar to Cosin's in the Apologie, Whitgift beseeched the queen in 
terms that described civil tumult and chaos. 90 
Elizabeth reacted remarkably swiftly, summoning speaker Coke to court only two hours 
after Parliament had adjourned for the day with orders to bring dle biU. 91 Upon his arrival 
Coke was relieved of Morice's bill and given in return a letter from the queen to deliver to 
Parliament at its next session the following day. The purpose of dlis parliament, the queen 
87 LPL, MS 2019, fos. 4r-5r. One should appreciate the" sensitivity of Coke's position here. Cawdrey's case was still being 
considered by the judges of Queen's Bench :It this time with no verdict having been reached, yet Morice was hoping to 
buttress his own client's case by sponsoring legislation that would prove his contention: that the high commission's ex 
o[{tc;o procedures were contrary to the laws of the realm. Coke surely was aware of this tangled business, and his attempt 
to involve the privy council in the consideration of the bill must have seemed the safest option. 
88 This agent is the anonymous author of the tract in Lambeth, MS 2019, fos. 3r-5v. 
89 This occurred when they met in London in February, 1591. PRO, SP12/238, doc. 75, fo. 107r. 
90 BL, Additional MS 28571, fo. 172r. Whitgift had by this time undoubtedly read the full text of the Apolof(ie which he 
had commanded his former pupil to write in the first place. See Cosin's references to Whitgift's patronage in the 
Apoiof(ie, I, sig. A4r-v; I, 124; and III, 241. 
91 BL, Corron MS, Titus F .II, fo. 33v. 
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proclaimed in the letter, 'was not to make any newe Lawes, or to spend any tyme abour other 
matters' but only to determine the best ways to assure the safety of the realm and the gueen's 
person. And seeing that she had authority to summon and dissolve Parliament at will, 'so had 
shee likewise power to apoynt vmo them vpon what causes they were to treat of, and meant 
when those causes were dispatched, to dissolue the meeting and send them home to their 
contreyes'.92 Elizabeth's determination this time around was a contrast even with the 
rambunctious Parliamems of 1584 and 1586 and showed that she was not only determined to 
prevent the laity from interfering with her royal supremacy, but that any attempt by temporal 
assemblies to subjugate ecclesiastical jurisdiction was out of the question. 
Morice was summoned before the privy council the next morning and chastised (though 
somewhat lightly due to Burghley's presence) and put under house arrest at Sir John 
Fortescue's house. There he remained for two months in relative comfort but without liberty, 
until he was finally released in April. Morice was finally summoned by Burghley and Lord 
Keeper Buckhurst, one of Whit gift's allies, and told that it was the queen's pleasure that he be 
released, 'thinckinge me notwithstandinge any thinge past, to be both a honest man & a good 
Subject.' He was, however, admonished that ifin the future 'ought were amisse in the Churche 
or Comon wealth', he should not appeal to 'the Comon sort' but should bring his grievance 
directly to the gueen. 93 He did not live to see another parliament, and in the last four years of 
his life he received no preferment though he petitioned Burghley, protesting his good faith 
and distinguished career. 94 
Sir Robert Beale had also been removed from Parliament by the queen due to his 
ttoublesome opposition to the subsidy bill. Thus the sessions continued without Morice or 
Beale, and Nicholas Fuller and Henry Finch (both from the puritan-friendly Gray's Inn) tried 
to carry the puritans' banner in their absence. 95 But there was little hope. In the Parliamem of 
1584 the privy councillors Sir Francis Knollys and Sir Walter Mildmay had taken active roles 
in the Lords, supporting puritan plans for reform of the church, giving some measure of 
92 LPL, MS 2019, fo. 5r. 
93 Cambridge, Baker MS 40, 130-2. 
94 BL, Lansdowne MS 82, doc. 68. 
95 Hamilton, Shakespt',zre, 62-3. 
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authority to the proposals, but no such picture emerged in 1593. Mildmay was dead, Knollys 
was silent after the crown expropriated Morice's bill, Fuller's reputation had been tarnished by 
representing Cartwright in the Star Chamber case, and Finch's presbyterianism was all too 
widely known. Two acts, one against recusants and the other against sectaries (both engineered 
by the bishops in the upper house), further strengthened the crown's position - at the expense 
of what Morice would have called 'Iibertie'. 
The first, called 'An act against popish recusants', specifically allowed suspects to be 
administered an oath ex officio to answer truly whether they were jesuits or not. 96 The second 
statute punished those who degraded the queen's authority in ecclesiastical matters by 
imprisonment without bail. 97 Persistent offenders were to be forced into exile or hanged if 
they would not abjure the realm or if they returned unlawfully. (The ostensible impetus of this 
second bill, entitled 'To retayne the quenes subjects in obedyence', was the hanging of the 
separatist] ohn Penry and the imprisonment of his entire congregation.) The Lords passed the 
bill first, but the Commons would have none of it. The next morning two radical puritans who 
had been condemned to die and then given a reprieve, Henry Barrow and John Greenwood, 
were hanged as a message from the crown that it would like to see the bill passed. It finally 
passed in an amended form 'by earnest labouring of those who sought to satisfY the bishops' 
humours', but the amended version still included rhe penalty against persons speaking against 
the queen's authority in ecclesiastical causes and was thus materially unchanged. 9R 
The practical effect of this second bill was that nonconformists were treated harshly with 
long imprisonments and no trial. 99 The 1593 Parliament was thus an unmitigated disaster for 
the puritans and an unexpected one, but it was a stunning victory for the new breed of 
conformists. Not only had the specific reforms plotted by the puritans been put down, they 
were powerfully reminded of the consequences of meddling in ecclesiastical affairs. The 
puritans had finally forced the question of whether the church could be legislated through 
Parliament, whether common law was to be the favoured son to whom the inheritance of 
96 PRO, SP12/244, doc. lOR. 
97 Neale, Parliaments. 1584-1601,293-4. 
98 PRO, SP12/244, doc. 124. 
99 Hamilton, Shakespeare, 50. 
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protestant England would belong. The resounding 'no' returned by Elizabeth marked the 
beginning of a rebuilding of the clerical estare that has often been attributed ro James 1. 
The key events of rhe early 1590s that we have mapped out thus far: Cartwright's defeat 
in Star Chamber in 1592, the decision in Cawdrey's case in 1595, and the Parliament of 1593 
all demonstrate critical victories for the new-style conformists and a marked shift towards an 
imperial royal supremacy reminiscent of Henry VlII's. Thus Cosin's Apologie, while providing 
a rhetoric that defended ecclesiastical jurisdiction based on the 'reason of state', was 
accompanied by important political episodes which were either influenced by the Apologie or 
else were aligned with its claims, in effect, validating the conception of the royal supremacy as 
expounded in the Apologie .100 The deaths of the moderate puritan privy councillors Leicester, 
Walsingham, Warwick (Leicester's brother), and Mildway between 1588 and 1590 certainly 
hastened the collapse of organised puritan political pressure,101 but the lapse into obscurity of 
Morice, Beale, and Cartwright after their release from confinement showed that even the 
pluckiest puritans no longer had any sromach for the fight. Conformism in its revitalised 
incarnation remained on the offensive throughout the decade. New canons in 1597 and 1604 
empowered the bishops ro impose the oath of supremacy, subscription to the Thirty-Nine 
Articles, and wearing of the surplice. In the Parliament of 1597 there were minor complaints 
against the ex officio oath but no bills were drawn up to disallow it. I n the 1601 parliament 
there were no complaints at all. 
William Barlow, who had paid for Cosin's education, is the only chronicler of the third 
session of the Hampton Court Conference in January, 1604 to have detailed how James 
discoursed about the power of the high commission with some of his lords. The question of 
the ex officio oath was debated but James announced that he was in favour of it completely. 
There was also discussion of extending the power of fining and imprisonment to bishops as 
well as commissioners and of extending the bishops' jurisdiction, while limiting the 
commission only to serious ecclesiastical offences. Nothing came of these ideas, though, and 
100 These things provide further evidence of Professor Tyacke's recent assertion of 'serious religious tensions' between the 
break with Rome and 1630, a claim denied by modern revisionist Anglican historians. See Tyacke, 'Anglican attitudes', 
Journal of British Studies, 35 (April, 1996), 139-67, especi:llly 144-5. 
101 Collinson, Elizabethan puritan mOllement, 387,444. 
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there is no evidence dlat the commission was reformed in any way at all - the letters patem 
of 1605 were an exact word-for-word copy of the 1601 patent but with an increase in 
membership.I02 
There were fresh attempts by [he commission in 1604 to root out and punish pUrItan 
ministers. But the puritans sought an ally in the common law courts by playing upon their 
resentment of the high commission and they developed a system of obstruction which 
frustrated me commission's jurisdiction. The puritans were able to get prohibitions, writs of 
habeas corpus, or writs of trespass which had the effect of annulling their deprivations by the 
commission. I03 When the government finally noticed that the puritans were 'working the 
system' in an organized fashion, some of these ministers were called to account in Star 
Chamber. In the end, the high commission was exonerated and found completely justified in 
its proceedings. The Star Chamber judges held (quoting Usher) that 'me king ... possessed "the 
Supream Ecclesiasticall Power which he hath delegated to the Commissioners whereby they 
had the power of Deprivation by the Canon Law of the Realm". The Act of Supremacy 
conveyed no new power, and therefore they held it clear that "the King without Parliament 
might make Orders and Constitutions for the government of the Clergy".'104 Born the 
language and the guiding principles were scarcely different from the verdict in Cawdrey's 
case, the only novelty being the notable addition of the phrase 'the canon law of the realm', a 
concept first pioneered by Cosin in the Apologie ten years earlier. 
Later in 1604 Convocation published new canons for the church (heartily approved by 
James) but the parliament of that year, which met immediately afterward, refused to approve 
them. 105 Both the Commons and Lords had to be stopped from considering bills which 
would have applied the penalties of praemunire to the clergy for ordaining canons without the 
consent of Parliament - further evidence that Cosin's desire for a potent, revitalised clergy 
was becoming a reality. 106 In 1610 Parliament issued a 'Petition of Grievances' to James, the 
102 Usher, Rise ({nd {tdl, ed. Tyler, 164-n. 
103 The high commission complained in the early years of J3.mcs that there were more prohibitions in the last twenty years 
than there had been between then and the Norman conquest. BL, Cotton MS, F.L fos. 107-58. 
104 Usher, Rise ({lId/;dl, ed. Tyler, 167. 
105 J.P. Kenyon, The Stuarl cOllstillilion, 1603-1688 (second edition; Cambridge, 1986) 113. 
106 See John Morrill's essay, 'A British patriarchy? Ecclesiastical imperialism under the early Stuarts', Essays il1 hOl1or of 
Patrick Collinson, ed. Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (Cambridge, 1994) 209-37. 
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second article of which criticised the high commission. It asked for a 'convenient' remedy, but 
the letters patent issued by James in 1611 were hardly different. One final conference was held 
in 1611 between the common law judges and the bishops to discuss the questioll of the 
commission's authority, but again James was not convinced any changes needed to be made, 
and none were. 107 
One remarkable feature of the last decade of Elizabeth's reign and the first decade of 
James' is the apparently seamless transition from one supreme head of the church to the next. 
In general James merely continued Elizabeth's practice of preventing Parliament from 
discussing ecclesiastical matters as well as allowing the high commission to govern tlle church 
freely. Like Elizabeth, James had high ideas about his own royal supremacy. He insinuated 
that anyone who had grievances against the high commission ought to approach him directly 
with their complaint rather than seek to undermine the commission's authority (which was 
really his authority) through parliamentary legislation or common law judicial activism. In 
protecting their absolute prerogative to regulate the church through whatever channels they 
wished, Elizabeth emphasized the unimpeachability of her letters patent while James offered 
to justifY his ecclesiastical polity verbally and in person. lOS In this respect it could be argued 
that the last decade of Elizabeth's reign bore a closer resemblance to the first decade of James' 
reign than to the first three decades of her OWll. 
Another interesting aspect is how the influence of Richard Cosin spanned the latter years 
of Elizabeth and the early years of the Stuarts and played a decisive role in rehabilitating the 
status and confidence of English divines. We have seen how Cosin's Apologie helped to shape 
political discussion and events in the 1590s, but what was Cosin's particular contribution to the 
status of the clergy and how did this contribution overflow into the Stuart period? Cosin's 
entire theory of ecclesiastical authority was ingeniously summarised in the following quotation 
from the Apologie: 
107 Levy, Fifth Amendment, 203, 214; Usher, Rise 11I7dfilIl, ed. Tyler, 205-7. 
lOS John Guy, 'The "imperial crown" and the liberty of the subject', Bonnelyn Kunze and Dwight Brautigam, Court, co II n tr}" 
and culture: essays 017 early modern British history in honor of PO'fZ Zagorin (Rochester, N.Y.; 1992) 73-4. 
253 
Ch:lpter 8 - Richard Cosin :lnd the 1590s 
And are not Ecclesiasticall persons nowe parte of the Queenes people? Are not the Liberties and 
Franchises that bee giuen and confirmed vnto them by the goodnesse of Princes [()r holding 
plea in certaine matters the vsages of this Realme) Are not the receiued Lawes, which lawfully 
they may practise, termed Ecclesiasticall Lawes of this Realme, no !esse then temporall be) And 
is not the Prerogatiue royall, in and for causes Ecclesiasticall as high, and as rightfully setled in 
the Prince and incident to her Highnesse Crowne and Regalitie as the same is for temporall 
power and authoritie? 109 
Three key assumptions are apparent 111 the passage. First, Cosin accepted the standard 
politico-religious interpretation of the break with Rome: that the English sovereign was by 
right head of the Church of England. Second, that subsidiary authority in the church was 
derived directly from the sovereign's royal prerogative. Third, that ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
being derived as directly from the crown as the temporal, was equal in all respects to the 
temporal. The 'receiued Lawes, which lawfully they may practise' meant the canon law, 
though a canon law severed from its papal origin and 'customised' for use in England. In 
expounding this view of the church, Cosin could not be successfully labelled 'popish' by his 
opponents even though he invested English canon law with extraordinary power. Except 
during Mary's reign, never since the break with Rome had any English cleric attempted to 
equate canon law with common law, but Cosin showed that the relative superiority of rival 
systems of law was not ultimately measured by reason, scripture, or tradition, but by the 
sovereign's determination of the utility of those law systems to maintain peace and stability in 
the realm. Elizabeth had given Whitgift and the high commission full sanction to use canon 
law to govern the church just as the temporal justices and courts were authorised to govern 
civil life by the common law. To deny dut she could do this was (0 deny her supremacy. 110 
Hence Morice's and Beale's claims that the canon law should bow down (0 common law at all 
points of contradiction betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the royal prerogative. 
The implications of Cosin's argument were far-reaching both for the status of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction as well as for the clergy themselves. The increasingly audacious 
109 Cosin, Apflloy,ie, III, 87. 
110 ' ... if this authoritie that is hereby impugned be (in tructh) a preheminence vnitcd and annexed to the Imperial! 
crowne ... let him vse good aduisement how it m:ly stand with such his oath and allegeance.' Cosin Apologie, l, 102. This 
was the S:lme section of the Apolo:z.ie p:lraphrased by the juc4;es in Cawdrey's Queen's Bench c:lse. 
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involvement of the laity in matters of church government in the last two decades of the 
sixteenth century had been predicated on a combination of Calvinist ideals of further 
reformation and a notion of the superiority of common law to canon law. The collapse of 
presbyterian political organisation in dle 1590s through ex officio prosecutions in dle church 
courts eliminated one of these pillars. Cosin's Apologie, with its novel emphasis on the equality 
of all systems of law in operation under the queen destroyed the other. English churchmen no 
longer needed to dodge the awkward question of that embarrassing legal stepchild, canon law. 
Even iure divino episcopacy, an uncertain theological device, was technically rendered 
unnecessary by Cosin's more compelling legal device, the continuing validity of canon law. 
The Apologie as well as the events of the 1590s had affirmed that the clergy's jurisdiction was 
one edge of a two-edged sword with which the sovereign ruled England, and for the first time 
in decades there was cause to feel important. 
It is now rather easy to see the link between Cosin's influence in the 1590s and the 
revitalisation of the clergy that occurred under James. Andrew Foster has suggested that this 
process began in 1603, but his own arguments actually show that the real starting point was the 
last decade of Elizabeth. 111 It is quite true, however, that under James English divines enjoyed 
heightened prestige at court, increased pay, and began to be seen as a separate estate or 
societas for the first time since Mary's reign. They became regular counsellors to the king112 
Qames named six bishops to the privy council), and were appointed justices of the peace. He 
restored the position of the clergy as interpreters of the laws of England and 'spoke openly of 
their rights and place in society.' 113 
Though Cosin died in 1597 he was seen by his immediate Stuart successors as an 
unequalled defender of the established church: The polity of the church of England l14 was 
III As evidence of this clerical renaissance Foster specifically cited conformist works by Bilson in 1585, Saravia in 1593, 
Bancroft in 1592, and Sutcliffe in 1590, all of which are well before 1603. He also noted that the huge range of grievances 
voiced in the Long Parliament of 1640 against the clergy and their ever-growing jurisdiction could be traced back to the 
1590s. Andrew Foster, The clerical estate revital ised', Early Stuart church, ed. Fincham, 145-51, 159. 
112 Though junior members of the clergy at the Hampton Court Conference in 1604, Cosin's friends Lancelot Andrewes and 
William Barlow were invited, and there seems every reason to believe that Cosin, the author of the Polity o{ the Church or 
El7y:lLll1d which was presented to James in the same year, would have attended as well, had he lived that long. Tyacke, 
AnticaizJinists,20. 
113 Fincham, 'Introduction', Early Stuart church, ed. Fincham, 11; Foster, 'The clerical estate revitalised', Early Stullrt 
church, ed. Fincham, 14l. 
114 STC2 5824. 
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published for the first time in 1604 for presentation to James I, he was cited in high 
commission procedural manuals,115 and he was credited with reviving the repuration of civil 
law. Thomas Ridley, writing in 1607, paid tribute to 'that famous man of worthy memory 
Doctor eosin' and 'his learned Apologie for certeine proceedings in Ecdesiasticall Couns' .116 
In 1632 Calibute Downing specifically praised Cosin as one of the pioneering civil lawyers 
who laboured in the days when 'they knew they had but few friends, and themselues small in 
number...when there was such scarcitie of Civilians that the Vniversities tooke little notice of 
their degrees or profession, or the Courts of their practise.' He further reported that although 
the study of civil law had been waning for many years, 'now wee haue a most happy and 
hopefull increase'. 117 Jacobean civil lawyers did not become interested primarily in common 
law as they might have done if common law had continued its march for judicial domination 
after 1593. They remained interested in and informed by continental canon and civil law, even 
recent glosses from the latter sixteenth century. 118 Although James began a conscientious 
campaign to renew the fortunes of his clergy, the legal assumptions that justified that 
rehabilitation had been mapped out in the last decade of Elizabeth's reign by Richard Cosin. 
115 LPL, MS 2085, 80; Helmholz, ROJ/lon cflnon lflw, 131; Owen, MedieMI c{/nOI1 lflw, 53. 
116 Thomas Ridley, A l'ieu' of the ciz,i 11' lind {'celesia,ticallaw, 109. 
117 Calibute Downing. A discourse o(the stllte ecclesillsticfll!, 30-1. 




In the last chapter we placed Cosin in the context of the final decade of Elizabeth's reign 
and examined his role in reshaping the royal supremacy and the ascendancy of the new-style 
conformist movement in the church. The conclusion of this thesis will step back again and 
view Cosin in the framework of the entire Elizabedun and early Smart churches, placing his 
life and influence in a wider context of history. 
In the wake of the accession of Queen Elizabeth there was a palpable need for the English 
church to justifY itself to the outside world. What was immediately necessary was a defence of 
the Elizabethan Settlement against the church of Rome, which had just been driven out of 
England for the second time. In his famous sermon at Paul's Cross on 26 November 1559, 
Bishop John Jewel of Salisbury challenged anyone to prove to him that d1e early church had 
accepted the authority of the pope, administered the bread without the wine, believed in 
transubstantiation, or adhered to a number of other doctrines that the catholic church had 
affirmed at the Council of Trent as necessary for salvation. If anyone could prove these things, 
he offered to recant and become catholic. Jewel justified his challenge on the assumption that 
the church of Rome had, through its corruption, surrendered its right to be considered the 
true church. The church of England on the other hand had gained the right to be considered 
the true church, since it had shed the abuses of the catholic church and remrned to the true 
faith. Jewel's so-called 'challenge sermon', which was heard by many members of court and 
which he was twice compelled by the government to repeat (once at Paul's Cross and once at 
court), had put the ball in the church of Rome's court, so to speak, hoping to force catholic 
polemicists onto the defensive. Before Jewel it had been the other way around, with English 
protestants reflexively taking up a defensive position against an attacking and skeptical catholic 
church. Jewel shifted the terms of the debate, claiming protestantism as the stams quo that 
did not need to be defended. 1 
The Elizabethan government recognised in Jewel someone who could provide a learned 
justification of the English church and sought to enlist him to publish d1is defence to the 
world. With the encouragement and supervision of William Cecil, Jewel produced An apology 
1 Collinson, Elizabethan essays, 230-1; White, Predestination, 70-1; J.E. Booty, John Jewel as apoloKist of the church of 
En!(Iand (London, 1963) 15-9. 
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of the church of England, which was published in Latin in 1562. In the next year an English 
edition appeared, translated by Ann, Lady Bacon. Jewel's starting point in the Apology was 
the criticism of the English clergy brought by catholics that it was a heretical splinter of the 
true church. He denied the charges, saying they proceeded either from malice or ignorance 
and in the second chapter provided a positive case for the church of England by stating its 
doctrine rather than arguing the points of catholics. This affirmative position was the core of 
the Apology. In the later chapters he came to the aid of the continental reformed churches, 
defending them against catholic charges of schism. The sixth and final chapter justified 
England's supervision of her own reformation as well as her refusal to participate in the 
Council ofTrent.2 The massive success ofJewel's Apology is shown in the ecstatic reactions of 
Archbishop Parker and Edmund Grindal, the bishop of London. Grindal proposed that 
articles of religion for the English church be drawn from the Apology. Parker suggested the 
entire Apology simply be attached at the end of the articles. 3 
Jewel knew that the effect of the Apology on his Roman Cflncs would be doubly 
powerful if England was united in matters of religion. He therefore refused to enrenain 
notions of division within the established church. It was one, united faith and must remain 
that way. Jewel had liturgical and doctrinal affinities which, had he lived another decade, 
might have classified him as a moderate puritan, and he was thus a uniting factor between the 
establishment (Parker, Grindal, Cecil) and the early puritans. 4 But he was shocked at the 
Genevan-style reform efforts he witnessed in the 1571 Parliament. Thus when he and Whitgift 
emerged as allies against the puritan programs for reform, the puritans were taken aback at his 
apparently sudden change of direction.5 
Though the Apology provided a compelling argumenr for the autonomy of the church 
of England, it offered no ultimate solution to the problem of doctrinal authority. Indeed, 
2 Guy, Tudor England, 302-3; MacCulloch, Later Retorllllltion , 35-6; Collinson, Elizabethan essays, 160, 224, 230-1; White, 
Predestination, 71-2; John JeweL An apology of the Church of'England, ed. J .E. Booty (Ithaca, N.Y.; 1963) 
3 White, Prede,·tinatiol1, 67; W.M. Southgate, John Jewel and the problem of doctrinal authority (Harvard, 1962) 55-62. 
4 In a paper no longer extant entitled Certain frivolous objections against the government of the Church of England Jewel 
argued that the puritans should not destroy a whole church for the sake of a few minor flaws. This paper was included 
anonymously by Whitgift in his An answere to a arlen libel intituled, An admonition (1572) (STC2 10847). In 
CartWright's reply to Whitgift he recognised Jewel as the author of the paper and, though disagreeing, treated him with 
great respect for his 'learning and gravity'. Southgate, Jewel, 102. 
5 Neale, Parliaments, 1559-1581, 180-1, 185, 191-207 .. 
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Jewel could not have formulated one without falling into the errors he accused the Roman 
church of committing.6 As a rule, however, Jewel appealed to the early church fathers as the 
best authorities that could be called upon; they should be our chief guide in interpreting the 
Bible. The church fathers themselves had relied heavily on reason in exegeting scripture, hence 
Jewel made reason his standard by which to judge all matters of doctrinal authority. This 
eminently rational approach permitted him to accept no autllOrities as infallible, not even the 
church fathers themselves. 
The first major dash 111 the Elizabethan church concerned the wearing of vestments. 
Some protestants objected to the white surplice worn by ministers and wished it to be replaced 
by the black gown of Geneva. Archbishop Matthew Parker, who (significantly) was not a 
marian exile, published his determination on the matter of vestments in a tract of 1566 
entitled the 'Advertisements'. Ministers refusing to abide by the church's rradition of wearing 
both the surplice and the cap were either suspended or deprived of t11eir ministry.7 This 
controversy passed without any serious fractures in the settlement of the church. But by the 
1570s cracks were beginning to appear. The Admonition Controversy, a series of debates held 
at Cambridge between Thomas Cartwright and John Whitgift early in that decade over the 
nature of ecclesiastical government, as well as the appearance of a presbyterian force in the 
parliament of 1571 foreshadowed contentious days ahead. 8 The suppression of the Northern 
Rising, a catholic rebellion sponsored by the conservative earls of \Vestmorland and 
Northumberland, as well as the anti-catholic acts of 1571 9 and the execution of the duke of 
Norfolk in 1572 all reflected unified protestant defiance of Rome and catholicism, but as the 
decade progressed and the catholic threat dwindled, English protestant thought turned 
inward. 10 
6 Jewel. Apology, ed. Booty, 93. 
7 Collinson, Elizabeth essaY", 238, 240-1; MacCulloch, Later Relrlt'Jllation, 33-5. 
8 See especially Lake, Anglicans and puritans?, 13-70 for a good summaty of the Admonition Controversy; see Neale, 
Parliaments, 1559-1581. 191-207, for an account of the relgious demands of the Commons in 1571. 
9 The Treasons Act (13 Elizabeth c. 1) and the Act against Bulls from Rome (13 Elizabeth c. 2) were both a response ro the 
papal bull Regnans in excelsis which excommunicated Elizabeth and put all of England under an interdict. Elton. 
Constitution, 73-7, 428-31. 
10 MacCulloch, Lilter Ref,wmatiol1, 36-8. 
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Moderate puritans such as William Whitaker, who attacked Rome vociferously yet had 
surprisingly little to say about (he details of the Elizabethan Settlement at home, were 
common enough in the 1560s and 1570s but became passe as Thomas Cartwright and other 
Cambridge-based presbyterians began to assert that the English church was only half reformed 
because it had not thrown off the popish government of bishops. 11 Suddenly the focus had 
become the church of England's reformed status measured not against Rome but against other 
reformed churches, especially Geneva. Cartwright became the de facto head of the 
presbyterian movement in England in the 1570s, but he eschewed separatism as a means of 
achieving the discipline. Separatists, said Cartwright, confused what was desirable in a church 
with what was absolutely necessary. Comparing the English church to a wife, he noted that 
disobedience in a wife did not mean that she was no wife at all, and therefore the English 
church, though defective in many points, was still a true church. 12 
But the presbyterian movement, indeed the emire movement for further reformation in 
England, was becoming crowded with unlearned men, men that had little in common with 
professional, university-educated men such as Cartwright, Laurence Chaderton, and Walter 
Travers. This populist wing of puritanism cared little about a 'learned ministry' and had no 
desire to appease the governmem with a show of loyalty to the church of England. With the 
advem of Whit gift's subscription campaign in 1583-4,13 puritan opposition to the established 
church became en flamed across the board, from the moderate puritan gentry on down. 
Whitgift was intentionally trying to drive a wedge between the radical and moderate wings of 
the puritan movement, and he was ultimately successful. Radicals and separatists became 
isolated by their refusal to reform, and as it turned out, they were small in number. But the 
moderate puritans, those who subscribed but still favoured the puritan bills in the parliaments 
of 1584 and 1586, were both numerous and well-supported at court. As we noted in the last 
chapter, however, conformism was evolving very strangely during these years, resisting both 
radical puritanism as well as the moderate puritanism of the gentry and privy councillors. Men 
such as Richard Bancroft were convinced that puritanism in general was a slippery slide where 
11 Lake, Moderate puritan.<, 55-65. 
12 Lake, Moderate puritans, 80-3. 
13 See above, 230. 
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men could drift from being respecrable moderates to hardened separatists; the leftward career 
of Francis Johnson had illustrated this very point. 14 
Thus, by the 1590s conformism had travelled a great distance from the days of Bishop 
Jewel. The death of Mary Queen of Scots, the passing of important ami-recusant laws in 1571, 
1581, 1585, and 1593,15 the defeat of rhe Spanish Armada, and the likely accession of James 
had all reduced the fear of spontaneous catholic uprising or foreign invasion by catholic 
powers. The complete victory of protestantism in England seemed assured. Jewel could hardly 
have wished for more. But the corrosive internal battles of the Vestiarian Controversy, 
Admonition Controversy, and the proposals for presbyterian reform in the 1580s, were new 
dangers to conformism which required new responses. In addition, poor harvests in the 1590s, 
the fear of social disruption, and the sudden onslaught of opposition to ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction from the common lawyers intensified the need for authority and stability. 
It is interesting to compare the responses of two new-style conformists, Richard Cosin 
and Richard Hooker, to this crisis of authority in the 1590s. Hooker, who received patronage 
from Jewel while at Oxford and held him in extremely high esteem (as did Lancelot 
Andrewes),16 still hoped for a consensus in religion so (hat there would be agreement in the 
law,17 and he hoped this could be achieved through reason. Reason was thus one of the 
fundamemallinks between Jewel and Hooker. They both had high expectations for the role of 
reason in the debate over the English church. Their rationalism differed, though, as Jewel's was 
implied by the example of his own arguments, bur Hooker's was explicit, borrowed from the 
church fathers and given a life of its own. 18 Hooker's doctrine of reason was also more 
complicated than Jewel's and must be seriously qualified. 
Though tenaciously insisting that reason and persuasion might still bring unity, Hooker 
turned to law as the ultimate arbiter for the settlement of religion more decidedly than 
14 Lake, IV[oderate puritans, 77·8; Bancroft, A SUrtillY of the pretended holy discipline, passim. 
15 1571: Treasons Act (13 Elizabeth c. 1), Act against Bulls from Rome (13 Elizabeth c. 2); 1581: Act against Reconciliation 
to Rome (23 Elizabeth c. 1); 1585: Act against Jesuits and Seminary Priests (27 Elizabeth c. 2); 1593: Act against Popish 
Recusants (35 Elizabeth c. 2). 
16 John Jewel , ApoLogy, ed. Booty, xliii. 
17 Hooker defined the word 'law' as 'any kind of rule or canon, whereby actions are framed.' Hooker, Law,·, ed. McGrade, 
1/3/1,58. 
18 Hooker's debt to Jewel was considerable, as was his reliance on the writings of Whitgift and Saravia. Cargill Thompson, 
Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker (London, 1980) 143. 
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historians have been willing to admit. For this reason he has been seen by recent scholars 
primarily as a polemical writer rather than nobly' disinterested', as the majority of Hooker 
scholars have seen him through the ages. Hooker's reputation first began to be subject to a 
passionately whiggish imerpetation in the eighteenth century. In the nineteemh cemury the 
leader of the Oxford Movement, John Keble, portrayed Hooker as the balanced mainstay 
against radical puritanism. Throughout most of the twentieth cemury he has been seen to 
embody the Anglican values of scripture, tradition, and reason. All of these centuries have seen 
Hooker not only in glowing terms but also as an essentially unpolemical writer above the fray 
of politics. 19 To be sure, Hooker rooted his Laws of ecclesiastical polity in a vast array of 
ancient sources and this has earned him a conservative label, but he was in fact quite innovative. 
References to the ancients were obligatory in Hooker's time, as philosophers needed to be seen 
as being grounded in the wisdom of the ages, but Hooker synthesized his views in an 
extremely novel way and should thus not be seen exclusively as a conservative thinker. 20 One 
easily reaches the same conclusions about Cosin's Apologie, which is loaded with quotations 
and arguments from ancient and medieval thinkers, yet the selection and arrangement of 
Cosin's citations were designed to serve a foregone conclusion he had settled upon before ever 
putting pen to paper - a defence of the high commission's jurisdiction, specifically its right to 
exact (he ex officio oath - which was arguably a judicially liberal position. 
Hooker's emphasis on reason has been overstated by historians. He did not accept 
scripture as self-authenticating. If it were, he maintained, then all men would receive it. It was 
the authority of God's church (exercised through law) which was needed to verify that 
scripture is indeed the word of God. Though Jewel and Hooker shared a belief in rationalism 
- that rational men, coming together in positions of authority were capable of understanding 
God's will and obeying it - Hooker especially emphasized collective reason, the reason of 
men in the established institutions of society rather than individual men. He knew that 
individuals, ifleft to their fancies, would bring the state and church into anarchy. The consent 
of the realm was embodied in the decisions of the civil and ecclesiastical magistrates, yet the 
19 Hooker, Laws, ed. McGrade, xiv. 
20 Lake, Anglicans and puritans?, 225-6. 
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puritans had still refused to rest in the wisdom of these magistrates. They adhered to private 
reason, said Hooker, that conAined with the public reason of the realm. 21 
Both Hooker's confidence in lawfully instituted authorities and his denigration of private 
reason closely mirrored Cosin's views in the Apologie. To the puritans' charge that it was 
ruthless and cruel to force men to divulge their secret thoughts and to discover their private 
conversations at home or with friends, Cosin declared that 'the law of their loue and felowship 
and ius hospitale towards such their priuate friends as haue receiued them; is by them more 
esteemed & accounted of; then either the publike lawes and statutes of the realme, or then 
their duetie to the Christian Magistrate, and to their countrey'. 22 Thus reason was not as 
monolithic or universal for Hooker and Cosin as it had been for Jewel. They saw two levels of 
reason that existed in political discourse, one of which was superior. The concept of collective 
reason was, in practical terms, little different from Botero's 'reason of state' and applied only 
to the consensus of magistrates since, as Cosin put it, 'the law presumedl more stronglie for 
their integrities' than for the private reason of men who held no authority.23 Unlike Jewel, 
Hooker and eosin (particularly eosin) accepted tlle irrevocable split in the church. Hooker 
still entertained elevated notions of the possibilities of reason as Jewel had, but his definitions 
were so qualified that in the end it was but a diversionary tactic: final authority was to be 
decided not by reason but by the authorities to whom power had been given by the consent of 
the realm. 24 Hooker's and eosin's 'way forward' - through law rather than consensus - was 
an admission tlut faction was irreversible, and it showed the difference of thirty years of 
church politics. 
21 Lake, AIlf!JicdIlS Ilild puritans?, 154, 213. Despite Hooker's supposed conservatism, his warning to individual men against 
their involvement in the government of the state or to pretensions to 'reason' was identical to the civil philosophies of 
contemporary Italian humanists such as Giovanfrancesco Lonini and Giovanni Botero. See Viroli, Reaso/1 of state, 241-57; 
also above, 239. 
22 Cos in, Apolof!;ie, III, 21l. 
23 Cosin, ApoloKie, II, 59. 
24 Hooker believed that although laws were immediately made by the king, all laws ultimately derived from the people. 
'Which laws being made amongst us are not by any of us so taken or interpreted as if they did receive their force from 
power which the prince doth communicate unto the parliament or to any other court under him but from power, which 
the whole body of this realm being naturally possessed with, hath by free and deliberate assent derived unto him that 
ruleth over them .. .' This should not be confused, however, with monarchical republicanism. There was an insurance policy 
for the royal supremacy: once consent had been given by the realm (that is, by parliament and convocation) the king's 
supremacy was unimpeachable. Hooker, LaU's, ed. McGrade, VIIIlvil 11, 194-5. 
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In the 1590s the English church was under as serious arrack from within as it had been 
from without in 1559. In light ofrhe puritan d1feat to order, the need to solve once and for all 
the question of doctrinal authority was urgent. Or was it? Hooker dispensed with (he need for 
a complete solution by embracing Jewel's ideas of tradition and reason as working tools for 
defining and explaining doctrine. This idea was actually rather appropriate since Elizabeth was 
secular-minded and did not really care about the question of doctrinal authority. She was 
content with any theory as long as it did not threaten her supremacy over the church. For this 
reason she could not accept the Roman or Genevan models of absolute doctrinal authority as 
dley both subverted the royal prerogative to d1e power of the church. 25 Cosin' s primary 
objective in writing d1e Apologie proved Hooker's contention: the threat to the church, Cosin 
argued, was not posed by the unanswered question of doctrinal authority bur by forces which 
determined to lay waste to the royal supremacy and make off with the queell's scepter. 26 The 
question was not who defined doctrine but who enforced it. Cosin and Hooker concurred that 
the power to enforce doctrine lay with the established church, but what was the established 
church? After all, Thomas Cartwright had claimed that the established church included all 
believers and that there could be no head of the church but Christ alone. 27 
Hooker's definition of d1e established church was again almost identical to Cosin's. 
Both invested Parliament and Convocation with supreme authority (including the king's 
person present in both). 28 Since Hooker believed that a truly godly commonwealth proceeded 
from true religion, he affirmed that the cleq:,'Y should have a major voice in the affairs of the 
state. This could be achieved partially by Parliament, which he saw as quasi-ecclesiastical since 
it contained lords spiritual, and also by Convocation. The collective reason of these law-
making bodies along with the person of the king, therefore, defined supremacy in the church. 
In emphasizing the power of clerical authority, Hooker consciously sought to augment the 
clergy's professional status. Like Cosin, he wished to see English clergymen treated with the 
dignity accorded to statesmen. Every other profession in England, he asserted, was allowed to 
25 Southgate, Jewel, 118. 
26 Cosin, Apolof(ie, I, 4. 
27 W.J.T. Kirby, Richard Hooker's doctrine of the royal supremacy (New York, 1990) 92-4. 
28 Hooker, Laws, cd. McGrade, VIII/vil1l, 192; Cosin, Polity, table XVI. 
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reward its greater members with ornaments, honoraries, and vanous outward sIgns of 
greatness. Why could this not be extended to the clergy? If it were not, people from other 
nations would note that England did not esteem its clergy highly. 29 
The question of doctrinal authority was a false idol, easily ignored as long as the political 
power of the church to enforce conformity to the prevailing doctrine could be specifically 
identified and preserved. In this respect Hooker and Cosin shared an understanding of the 
practical way the church operated in the last decade of the Elizabeth's reign. The need to 
defend the church against Roman critics was for all intents and purposes greatly reduced from 
the 1560s as we have already noted. And the explosion of internal protestant nonconformity in 
the 1580s and 1590s had turned the church's sights witllin, focusing attenrion on the need for 
conformity to some sort of statutory church polity. Hooker and Cosin provided a defence of 
the jurisdictional authority of the church, arming the clergy in the process with a renewed 
image of prestige and authority with which to combat the forces of puritan anticlericalism and 
presbyterianism. 
We have thus far placed Cosin within the context of the Elizabethan church, briefly 
sketching his intellectual proximity to Jewel and Hooker and examining how the collapse of 
unity in the English church in the second halfofthe sixteenrh century necessitated that Jewel's 
hope for a unified church of England should give way to the legalistic approaches of Cosin and 
Hooker. Now we must turn to the seventeenth century and address Cosin's relationship to the 
early Stuart church. Professor Lake has posited that Lancelot Andrewes is the 'ideological link' 
between Hooker and William Laud. 30 Ir will be useful for our purposes, however, to draw an 
additional, if parallel link, placing Andrewes as the intellectual stepping stone between Cosin 
and Laud. This proposed connection is not based on liturgy or theology, however, but on law 
and the power of the church to enforce conformity. Religious doctrine in early Stuart England 
is a crowded field already, but few have pursued the topic from a legal rather than liturgical 
standpoint. A study of the early Stuart church from a legal perspective seems eminently 
justified, considering how the focal point of authority in the church shifted irrevocably in the 
29 Lake, AnKlicans and puritans?, 217-9. 
30 Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity', Mental world, cd. Peck, 114. 
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late sixteenth century away from reason and towards law, which as we have shown, was 
precipitated by the collapse of unity and d1e real threat of disorder. 
The connection between Andrewes and Cosin is bod1 personal and professional. 
Andrewes arrived at Pembroke Hall, Cambridge in 1571, eight years after Cosin and shortly 
after Cartwright had been deprived of his fellowship. Cosin had taken his B.A. in 1566 and his 
M.A. in 1569, receiving his LL.D. in 1580. He was thus involved in Cambridge life 
throughout d1e 1570s while Andrewes was a student. Andrewes took his B.A. in 1575 and his 
M.A. in 1578, and it seems likely from later evidence that they may have been acquainted 
with each omer as early as the 1570s. Around 1587 Andrewes became chaplain to Whitgift as 
well as Queen Elizabeth.31 The inclusion of a lecture Andrewes gave in defence of the ex 
officio oad1 in me second printing of Cosin's Apologie in 1593 makes a Cambridge 
connection seem more tenable. 32 
Andrewes' frequent business in London in d1e 1590s also would have brought him into 
regular contact with Cosin. In May, 1591 the privy council sent a letter to Whitgift requesting 
that the 'Deane of Paule's and Doctor Andrewes' be sent to confer with the nonconformists 
who were soon to be executed, Newman, Udal, and Hodgekins, to try 'by al good and earnest 
perswasions to drawe them to ... an acknowledgment of their defalt'.33 On March 30, 1593 
during the intense parliamentary sessions which had seen the censure of Morice for trying to 
regulate the high commission, Andrewes preached a sermon in London before Queen 
Elizabeth marked by 'over-elaborated eulogy of the crown' in which we can see a glimpse of 
his future sermon style during the reign of James which was much imitated by other Jacobean 
court preachers.34 In November of 1594 the queen asked Whirgift to 'inquire into the state of 
all the Ecclesiastical Courts in the Province of Canterbury.' The men Whitgift chose for this 
job were Lancelot Andrewes, Richard Fletcher (bishop of Worcester), and d1e high 
commissioner Edward Stanhope. These men were charged by Whitgift to administer an oath 
31 Unfortunately there is almost no information about Andrewes' chaplaincy to Elizabeth. Paul A. Welsby, Lllncelot 
Andrewes 1555-1626 (London, 1958) 32-3,67. 
32 QUllcstionis: nunquid per ius diuinum magistrlltui licellt a reo iusiurandum exigere? & id, quatenus ac quousque liceat? CA 
determination whether by divine law magistrates may exact an oath of defendants and if so, how far?'). This short treatise 
appears at the end of Cosin's 1593 Apologie, at pages 243-55. 
33 APe, ed. Dascent, XXI, 125, 130. 
34 Welsby, Andrewes, 67-8. 
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to several high ecclesiastical officers 'faithfully [to] demean themselves towards the Queen's 
Majesty and her subjects, in the execurion of their several offices and places'. Among the 
officials who were to take the oath of allegiance was Richard Cosin, the vicar-general of 
Canterbury. This investigation 'served much to stop the mourhs of such as clamoured so much 
against the bishops for their Commissaries, Officials, etc., and the pretended abuses of their 
courts'.35 Finally, Andrewes delivered the oration at Cosin's funeral in December, 1597)6 
These events show a strong personal connection between Cosin and Andrewes, bur what were 
the similarities in their beliefs? 
Perhaps most interesting is the inclusion of Andrewes' Determination at the end of 
Cosin's 1593 Apologie. In July, 1591 Andrewes read a theological treatise on the lawfulness of 
the ex officio oath in the divinity school at Pembroke Hall where he had become master in 
1589)7 Andrewes' lecture was intended to be a repartee against Cartwright and his associates 
who had published a defence of their refusal to take the ex officio oath before the high 
commission. In dle Determination Andrewes maintained that magistrates possessed aurhority 
over both the souls and bodies of their subjects, concluding that administering an oath was 
legal as long as three conditions were fulfilled: first, that by the oath only the truth was 
required; second, that the defendant was only compelled to answer according to his own 
knowledge; and third, that the proceedings were deliberate rather than hurried. Andrewes' 
lecture pur an unhappy end to any lingering hopes the Cambridge puritans might have had 
that he shared their sympathies. 38 In dle Determination we find an exalted view of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction nearly identical to Cosin's which complemented dle Apologie nicely 
by providing a second opinion from someone whom the puritans had tenatively hoped might 
be an ally. 
Bur before we discuss further the similarities between Cosin and Andrewes, we should be 
dear abour what issues might have set dlem apart. Cosin was almost certainly a Calvinist. We 
35 Welsby, Andrewes, 67. 
36 Cooper, Athenae CantabriKiensis, II, 230. 
37 There is an English edition of Andrewes' Determintltion in HMC, Hastings MSS, series 78, #2. Welsby, Andrewes, 41-2. 
38 H.R. Trevor-Roper, Archbishop Laud, 1573-1645 (London, 1%2),29; Welsby, Andrt'wes, 39, 41. 
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know that Whitgift was clearly a Calvinist as the Lambeth Articles, printed in 1595, testify.39 
Christopher Barker, who published dozens of conformist tracts as well as both editions of 
Cosin's Apologie, also printed most of the English editions of the Genevan Bible in the latter 
sixteenth century. In fact, Calvinists arguably dominated the English church clear through the 
second decade of the seventeenth century.40 Another difference between Cosin and Andrewes 
concerned their personal involvement in public conrroversy. When it came to 'the cut and 
thrust of temporal and ecclesiastical affairs', Andrewes' timid personality is well-documented. 
Though he was always ready to dispute with his theological opponents in sermons and 
writings, he was not known for his boldness in criminal prosecution in church courts. 41 Very 
little is known of Andrewes' involvement in the high commission, although it seems he 
attended sessions regularly. In May, 1606 he reported to the Lords on the ex officio oath, 
substituting for the bishop of Bath and Wells who was sick that day.42 In 1621 he was said to 
be often employed by the commission. 43 But given these likely differences between Cosin's 
and Andrewes' tlleological views and their respective involvement in controversial politics, on 
the issue of autllority in the church, there was solid agreement. Andrewes saw the puritans as 
fundamentally schismatic in the end and a threat to the peace of the church. He complained 
that they had reduced Christianiry to gnosticism, so many ideas, disputations, and narratives, 
making religion nothing more than information to be affirmed. He disliked popularity of any 
sort in religion and associated presbyterianism with it. Irreverence against God or the monarch 
were in his mind the same, and one would inevitably lead (0 the other in due course. 44 
Professor Lake has noted that issues of adiaphora, which had in the late Tudor and early 
Stuart church been left for the most part to the discretion of local bishops, were gradually 
(during the reign ofJames) found by the conformists to be issues that the church possessed the 
39 Tyacke, Anticalvinists, 30-1. Dr. White's assertion that the Lambeth Articles were intended to check both Calvinists and 
Anticalvinists is unconvincing mainly because of his definition of Calvinism. White, Predestination, xii, 101-9; Tyacke, 
'Anglican attitudes' ,journal of'British Studies, 35 (April, 1996), 145-6. 
40 Tyacke, Antical/lini.,ts, 3-7; Tyacke, 'Anglican attitudes', jourlwl of'British Studies, 35 (April, 1996), 139-67. 
41 'In the Council, on the High Commission, in the House of Lords, at the Hampton Court Conference, he is a shadowy 
presence, and his thoughts are inscrutable.' As a privy councillor (beginning 1616) Andrewes, 'spake and meddled little in 
civil and temporal affairs, being out of his profession and dement: bur in causes that any way concerned the Church and 
his calling he spake fully and home to the purpose, that he made all know that he understood and could speak when it 
concerned him'. Welsby, Andrewes, 13,228; Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity', }l.1ental world, ed. Peck, 132. 
42 journal of the HOllse of Lords, II, 428. 
43 Welsby, Andrewes, 22l. 
44 Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity', Mmtal world, ed. Peck, 115-7, 119-20. 
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authority to regulate for the sake of unity. Under Elizabeth there had been a comparatively 
wide latitude of choice offered to ministers regarding worship styles although the outer limit 
of tolerance had to be drawn more than once, such as during the controversies over vestments 
and church government when Archbishops Parker and Whitgift enforced the strict will of the 
queen.45 But the early Stuart church, influenced heavily by Lancelot Andrewes, experimented 
with ideas of more rigidly defined liturgy and ceremony, mandated by earthly ecclesiastical 
government for the sake of harmony. For example, it was deemed that people should kneel 
for the eucharist because it was reverent to do so, and also because it was an outward show of 
the unity of dle church, (as opposed to some standing, some walking around, and some 
kneeling). 46 If the church were authorised to enforce right doctrine, it was surely a lesser, easier 
matter to enforce liturgy and external ceremony. The church had, in effect, finally found its 
'law feet'. 
Given Andrewes' and Cosin's views on authority, it was perhaps natural that they viewed 
the clergy as the particular recipients of this power over things indifferent. Andrewes' theology 
was completely Christo-centric; Christ was the beginning and end of all things, which was 
useful for working James I into the symbolic role of Christ as shepherd of the flock, a model 
which was also conveniently applied to bishops.47 He also claimed that assurance of salvation 
was based on spiritual fruit, but that the determination of what constituted 'fruit' did not lay 
widl the laity but with the clergy. These were the seeds of a notion that Andrewes eventually 
developed into a serious doctrine of priestly absolution.48 Cosin's successful vindication of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the 1590s, especially his thesis that canon law was equal (under the 
sovereign) to common law, made possible Andrewes' theological vindication of tlle church's 
power to regulate things indifferent. If canon law had never lost its potency and all 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was united and annexed to the crown's prerogative, a justification of 
Andrewes' doctrines of priestly absolution and regulation of adiaphora was hardly needed. 
45 See also Professor Guy's 'The Henrician age', Vflridies, ed. Pocock, 41-3. 
46 Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity', Mental world, ed. Peck, 129-30. 
47 Nicholas Lossky, Lflncelot Andrewes the Preacher (I555-1626) (Oxford, 1991) 331. 
48 Lake, 'Avant-garde conformity'. Mental world, ed. Peck, 123. 
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Having illustrated the personal and intellectual connection between Cosin and 
Andrewes, it is now a simpler step to connect Andrewes with William Laud. The significance 
of Andrewes in the Stuart church and his intellectual relation to Archbishop Laud has already 
been well established by Professors Lake, Fincham, and others. Andrewes seems to have been a 
favourite of John Buckeridge's and Laud's mainly because of his anti-Calvinist views, his high 
regard for the eucharist, and his belief in the availability of salvation to alL Laud particularly 
liked Andrewes' analytical process and made every attempt to copy it. 49 Laud defended his 
forceful policies regarding the beauty of holiness, the substitution of altars for tables, and even 
his campaign against sabbatarianism on the simple basis that the church had power to 
adjudicate policy over matters of adiaphora.50 He sought power particularly for the purpose of 
ordering the church of England as he felt it should be ordered. Like Cosin and Andrewes, he 
envisioned a wealthier and more independent church, free from restrictions imposed by the 
laity,51 and to do this he recognised that the church's best hope lay in closer relations with the 
crown. Laud carried Whitgift's insistence on conformity a step further: there should be a 
national liturgy which would bind England together. This would include the sacrament as the 
centerpiece of worship rather than preaching, which had done more to divide the church than 
to unite it. 52 
But although Laud augmented the aims of Whitgift, the real jurisdictional base of his 
authority was hardly changed from that of the Elizabethan church. Charles 1's letters patent 
did not deviate much in wording or substance from the Jacobean patents, though under Laud 
the commission did increase its visitatorial functions. It is true, however, that the high 
commission in the 1630s was in practice more powerful than earlier commissions. The letters 
patent for the commission of 1625 enumerated powers almost identical to the letters patent of 
1601, but the membership and quorum of the commission was significantly increased. This 
swell in numbers created the possibility of a subdivision of the commissioners into more 
49 Trevor-Roper, Loud, 45. 
50 Peter Lake, 'The laudian style: order, uniformity and the pursuit of the beauty of holiness in the 1630s', Early Stuart 
church, ed. Fincham, 183. 
51 Laud complained in the 1630s that the church was still inextric.1.bly enveloped in common law regulations and was unl ikdy 
to be freed of them. Wilfrid R. Prest, The rise of'the barristen: a social history of'the English bar 1590-1640 (Oxford, 
1986) 226. 
52 Nicholas Tyacke, 'Archbishop bud', Early Stuart church, ed. Fincham, 58-9. 
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courts, which could sit more frequently and in more places than ever before. At the height of 
Laud's power, it seemed the high commission was sitting everywhere at once, yet it was still 
one commission, based on one issue of leners patent. 53 Laud used the commission as an 
instrument for driving 'backwardness in religion' out of England, and his order in 1634 that 
Cosin's Polity be reprinted at Oxford, showed (hat Cosin's vision of tl1e hierarchy of the 
English church was identical to his own. 
The Cosin-Andrewes-Laud connection IS interesting and deserves further study, 
especially within the context of the church's authority to define and enforce conformity 
through ecclesiastical courts such as the high commission. The focus of recent historical 
research on early seventeenth century liturgy and theology has been most illuminating, 
although tl1e legal angle of the church's jurisdiction still remains largely neglected. As I have 
endeavoured to show in this tl1esis, however, the influence and significance of Richard Cosin is 
a vitally important step in understanding the rehabilitation of the clerical estate during this 
crucial moment in the early modern English church. 
53 Usher, Rise and fall, ed. Tyler, 242-3, 331-2. 
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Excerpts from Article VIII of the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy 
(1 Elizabeth c. 1) 
And that also yt may Iykewise please your Highnes that it maye be established and enacted by 
thaucthorite aforesayd, That suche Jurisdictions Privileges Superiorities and Preheminences 
SpirituaU and Ecclesiasticall, as by any SpirituaH or Ecclesiasticall Power or Aucthorite hathe 
heretofore bene or may lawfully be exercised or used for the Visitacion of the Ecclesiastical 
State and Persons, and for Reformacion Order and Coreccion of the same and of all maner of 
Errours Heresies Scismes Abuses Offences Contemptes and Enormities, shall for ever by 
aucthorite of this present Parliament be united and annexed to the Imperiall Crowne of this 
Realme; And that your Highnes ... shall have full power and aucthoritee by venue of this Acte 
by lettre Patentes under the Create Seale of Englande, ro assigne name and aucthorise ... suche 
person or persons being naturall borne Subjectes of your Highnes ... texercise use occupie and 
execute under yout Hignes ... all manner of Jurisdiccions Privileges and Preheminences in any 
wise touching or concerning any Spirituall or Ecclesiasticall J utisdiccion within rheis your 
Realmes of Englande Ireland <etc.> ... and to visite refourme redres order correcte and amende 
all such Erroutes Heresies <etc.> ... whatsoever, which by any maner Spiritual! or Ecclesiastical! 
Power Aucthorite or Jurisdiccion can or maye lawfullye bee refourmed ordered redressed 
corrected restrained or amended, to the Pleasure of Almightye Cod ... And that suche person 
or persons so to bee named assigned aucthorised and appointed by your Hignes ... shall have 
full Power and Aucthorite by venue of this Acre and of the said lettres patemes, under your 
Hignes ... rexercise use and execute all the Premisses according to the tenor & effecte of the 
said lettres Patentes; Any Mater or Cause to the contrarye in any wise notwithestanding. 
- source: Statutes of the realm, IV, part 1,352. 
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Appendix 2 
Memorandum defending oaths issued by 
ecclesiastical commissioners, 1591 (LPL, MS 2004, fo. 65r-v) 
[This memorandum is written in the high commission's clerk's hand, III which many of the 
other documents in LPL, MS 2004 are also written.] 
Of Oathes in ecdesiasticall courtes. 
All matters handled in cownes Ecclesiasatical!, are eyther for duties 
and rightes there to be prosecuted or for punishinge of crymes by 
lawe there punishable. 
All oathes vsed in any cowne ecclesiastical I, are eyther taken by the 
partie suinge, by the partie convented or by witnesses. 
There is no controversie in the lawe ecclesiastical!, but that witnesses 
are to testifie by oalhe, both for duties ecclesiasticdl! in demaunde, 
and rowchingc their knowledge of orher mens crime.s punishable 
there. 
Neirher will it be denied, but tlldt the parties themselves that sue, or 
be sued, are to aLlllswere for righr.s dnd de"'!i"s in demaunde "pon 
rheir oathes. 
Therefore whether, or how farre, the parties themselves may be 
examined by their oathe towchinge lheir owne crimes punishable in 
a cowrte ecclesidsticdll; may on ely seeme doubrfull. 
In rhis behalf wee arc 10 consider proceedinges either by Ordinaries, 
or by the Q. Malries commissioners or ddegates; who proceed 
dccordinge to lheir commission warranted by Actes of parlement. 
No man may be vrged 10 bewraye himselfe in hidden and secrel[ 
crin1C.'\~ or sin1plic therein to dCCllse him sdfe. 
Al! crimes that be prohibitll 111ill Uhifr/, ,l' Simon ie, Adultel'ie. ,md 
such lyke; arc natural!ie sought bv the delinquents 10 be kept 
hidden. and are admitted secretlie, beeinge workes o( darknes. 
These ,1fe such as ,He hardclie to be pro\'Cd by witness"" yet when 
by circumstances (once knowne abrode) they become to be 
vehementlie suspected and olTensive to the well disposed, and 
daungerouse to be suffered, as beinge ill examples in a well governed 
common-weak and displeasinge the maltie god; they ,He meer.e by 
enquirie and all good meanes to be disc<)\'ered, that the), rna)' be 
refourmed, the partie brought to pcnitencie, and others discouraged 
from admittinge the lyke. 
The suspicion and fan1t' or crin1cs come to rhe ()rdir1dries cares 
either by manic bruites of credible persons. called clalilo.({[ 
insinUdtio; or by presentment of churchwardens and sidemen. 
sworne to enquire diligentlie, and trulye to present (from tyme to 
tyme) such crimes, or yle fames thereof. 
If r.he presentment be not so directlye ser. downe (r.hrollghe their 
ignoraunce or otherwise) as lawe requireth to prove d fame; and yet 
some scandal! lherevpon groweth: The Ordinarie by lawe 
ecclesiastical! ,md in good discretion may examine other 
neighbomes thereof as witnesses. towchinge their knowledges of 
such crime or fame, warninge yle partie suspected to be present at 
the takinge of suche deposicions 
If the fame be proved, or the first presentment be sufficient, 
whereby that (w/ch was secret before) is fownde to be so publicke. 
as it becomes offensive: Then yle Ordinarie of durie, and for the 
public truste reposed in him, is to proceede againste the infdmed, 
thoughe no other man wil! prosecute w/ch the lawe termeth 
Proceediny;c by CIIquirie specilll! ex officio, ne milieficill remanent 
impunita, vlq prwincill p"ry;elllr malis hominibus. 
If anye other man besides the Ordinarie will prosecute, makinge 
him selfe partie to prove y/c crime the!! the partie convented, alheit 
he must aunswere on his oa.the to other articles (not principally 
towchnge the verie crime objected) yet by lawe he is not bowndc to 
3tll1SWere "pon oathe any articles of the verie crime il selfe, 
But if the Ordinarie at no mans instance, vpon the fame presented 
proceede ex officio, if y/e party denye the crime obiected; then he is 
by Iawe enioyned his purgacion. At wlch tyme of purgacion he must 
dirc("tlic J.unswerc in cleeringe or convictinge himsdfc de tlcrittZtc lJd 
(iz/sitaie ipJO criminis obiecti. and his compurgatores arc to sweare 
d" credr<iitate (wevingc his leare of god and conversacion in former 
tymes) that they b'ele;ve he hath tak~n a true oathe. W/ch if they all 
doe, then he is holden cleere, and dismissed. If he fayle in his 
purgacion, then (fiction( jliriJ he is taken to be guiltie of the crime, 
and to be reformed. 
The reason of Ihis di\'trsitie ailer a fame proved, the lawe assignerh 
to be thi,,: lirc: iIC/110 :Ol(t,,1' JClI pr()dCTC; :tll1lnl pradltus PO" 
{{["!fUll tOlt't",. Seip.f/iJfl OJtt'UdcTt II/rum pO.Hit nanN hlJ1()Co!ti({lI! 
ostclIdcrc, et seipsum pfirgart'. 
The reason of that grown de of bwe in this bchdlfe is lhis; bewuse 
penaunces enioyned by the Odinarie are nor taken in lawe to be 
pOCl1lle, but medicirtae, or tendinge to the reformacion of the 
delinql1ent, the example of others, md satisfaction of the churehe 
offended iusr.lye, at his lew de conversacion: ,'\!ld therefore they are 
nor to make sllch scruple to discoyer them seln::s Jfter fame. 
These are vndoubted growndes in the lawe ecclesiastical I; accordinge 
to w/ch the proceedingcs in all ecdesidsticall cownes in this Realme 
haue bene vsed. tvme out of I1wnde. And if anve Iud"e 
ecclesiasticall haue l;roceeded otherw'ise, such proceedi:lges hd~le 
allwayes bene reformable byappelldcion. 











Richard Cosin's Ecclesiae Anglicanae politeia in tabulas digesta 
(Polity of the church of England) (STC2 5824) 
manuscript found at LPL, MS 324 
Cosin's Polity is one of the great unstudied documents of the late Elizabethan church. 
He compiled it in 1589 and used parts of it as an outline for constructing the arguments of the 
Apologie, but it was not published until 1604, seven years after his death. It seems that one of 
the primary reasons for publishing the Polity was to present it to James VI and I as a counter-
balance to the puritan agenda unveiled at the Hampton Court Conference. The message of 
the Polity was strictly conformist and could easily be interpreted as authoritarian, which 
makes it likely that it would have appealed to James. The Polity is structured as a series of 
sixteen flow-charts depicting, in Latin, the hierarchy and administration of rhe English church. 
As vicar-general of Canterbury, Cosin was eminently qualified to undertake such an exacting 
project. He divided the polity of the church into three categories: persons, possessions, and 
constitutions. Though they are no less important in Cosin's overall scheme, the latter two of 
these three categories were able to be briefly illustrated on Tables XV and XVI respectively. 
The persons category, on the other hand, makes up the bulk of the Polity, spanning Tables I 
through XIV. 
According to Cosin, all authority in the category of persons flowed from the prince. He 
names her tanquam supremus secundum Deum gubernator and allows that she is empowered 
to erect anything in ecclesiastical causes by her commandment as long as it is not repugnant to 
the statutes or customs of the realm. Particular powers of the monarch include those powers 
mentioned by statutes of the realm as well as all traditional ecclesiastical privileges restored to 
the crown with the Act of Supremacy of 1559. Interestingly, Cosin includes wid1in d1e 
particular powers of the sovereign the right to coUect first-fruits or annates as well as annual 
tithes from ecclesiastical benefices - a detail that was of great interest to the early Stuart 
conformists. Other particular powers of the sovereign mentioned by Cosin include 
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nominations, appointments, presentations, visitations, and the power to reform all abuses and 
errors in the church as listed in the Act of Supremacy. 1 
Table II and its branches (III, IV, V, Xl, XlI, XIII, and XIV) involve the administration 
of the church by persons other than the prince, foremost among them the two archbishops of 
Canterbury and York, and the vicar-general and official-principal. Peppered throughout these 
descriptions of the higher clergy are mentions of privilegio, immunitates, libertates, and 
praerogatiuam, which clearly derive from Cosin's understanding of chapter one of Magna 
Carta, which he comprehended as a bulwark protecting the rights of the church against the 
intrusions of the state. Tables III and IV detail the ceremonial and jurisdictional duties of 
archbishops in general (III) and the archbishop of Canterbury in particular (IV), and many of 
these such as interdiction, warnings, suspension, excommunication, sequestration, and 
deprivation are shared with ordinary bishops (Table V). Tables Xl and XlI address the lowest 
offices of ecclesiastical administration, namely those of ministers, deacons, subdeacons, 
chancellors, cantors, treasurers, and lectors. Regulations concerning calendars, rubrics, and 
sacraments that must be observed by ministers are found on Table XlII, while Table XIV 
details the duties of the laity, such as being custodians of church properties, maintaining 
charitable lifestyles in the community and parish, and presenting scandal or wrongdoing to 
ecclesiastical officers. 
The early chapters of part I of Cosin's Apologie are drawn almost verbatim from Tables 
VI, VII, and VIII of the Polity, which address voluntary and contentious jurisdiction of 
bishops, that is, jurisdiction which is voluntarily accepted by the party or that which is resisted 
by the party.2 Under the heading contentiosa iurisdictio on Table VIII the words publici 
interesse appear with respect to criminal proceedings against defendants in which there is no 
private accuser, showing again that most of Cosin's key arguments in the Apologie originated 
in the Polity.3 One branch of contentious jurisdiction details the persons involved in the 
judicial process (judge, presenter or accuser, defendant, and witnesses) while another branch, 
which becomes Tables IX and X, examines the judicial process itself. These two tables form 
1 See Appendix 1 above, 273. 
2 For Cosin's incorporation of these principles into the Apo[ogie, see above, 79. 
3 See also above, 121; 240, footnote 54; for discussion of the significance of 'the public interest'. 
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much of the backbone of part II of the Apologie, as eosin tracks and explains each facet of 
ecclesiastical cases from warnings or citations through formal contestation, judgement, and 
sentence. For example, Table X is devoted entirely to the topic of exceptions taken by the 
defendant (exceptio contra testium) either to the testimony of witnesses or to their elegibility 
as witnesses.4 
The second main category of the polity of the church, possessions or assets, is handled 
entirely on Table XV. This category eosin divides primarily into public and private assets. 
Included in public assets are cemetaries and, interestingly, moveable and immoveable feasts. 
Private church possessions are divided into those which are civil or ecclesiastical in nature, 
corporate or incorporate, and these include urban and country dwellings, lakes, forests, arable 
and cultivated land, pastures and meadows, courts, markets, estates, and benefices, among 
others. The third main category, detailed on the last table of the Polity, Table XVI, is 
constitutions. eosin divided constitutiones into written (statutes, provincial synods, and 
canons) and unwritten (customs). Provincials synods and canons are further explained by 
eosin as being neither repugnant to the laws, statures, or customs of the realm nor prejudicing 
or diminishing the royal prerogative. 
Curiously, eosin locates canones twice in the Polity. The second occasion is on Table 
XVI under the category of constitutions as mentioned above, but the first mention is on Table 
1. Here Canones siue leges ecclesiasticas are prominently placed not in the category of 
constitutions but of persons. In fact, they are portrayed by eosin as a branch springing from 
the heading Supremam magisque, absolutam, qui dicitllr primatlls Regius considerandus, 
which refers to the supreme dignity of the crown, the highest locus of personal authority in the 
church. This is perhaps the most significant statement in the entire Polity in that the ultimate 
source of canonical authority is not placed under parliamentary statute or even the customs of 
the realm, but under the queen herself. This fact plus the other similarities between the Polity 
and the Apologie already mentioned offer definitive evidence to prove that eosin's 
ecclesiology as expounded in the 1593 edition of the Apologie was already settled in his mind 
4 For Cosin's incorporation of these principles into the Apo[oy,ie, see above, 113. 
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by 1589 and that the Apologie was not so much a 'thinking exercise' for eosin as It was a 
declaration of a mature intellectual position. 
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Appendix 4 
Differences between the 1591 and 1593 editions of Cos in's Apologie 
It will be helpful briefly to delineate (he differences between the first and second 
editions of the Apologie. The first, or 1591, edition consisted of two parts, while the second, 
or 1593, edition contained three parts. The reason Cosin published the 1593 edition was for 
the purpose of answering the claims of Morice's Treatise and Beale's 'Notes' within the 
framework of the original Apologie. The 1593 edition was thus more than double the length 
of the 1591 edition, partly because of the incorporation of Cosin's answers to Morice and 
Beale and partly because Cosin chose to rewrite and expand certain portions of his original 
text (particularly part II) for greater clarification. 5 
Very little of part I of the 1591 edition was altered in the 1593 edition. Aside from the 
insertion of Cosin's rebuttals to the claims of his opponents at various points, the original part I 
is essentially duplicated in the second edition, although a few noteworthy changes were made. 
Cosin added a small section to chapter 2 to discuss more fully the powers of bishops to certifY 
excommunications, this being part of their voluntray jurisdiction. Moreover, the final chapter 
in the first edition, which addressed whether a cleric could be deprived of his benefice and 
whether an excommunicate could be dealt with by ecclesiastical jutisdiction after forty days 
without a writ de excommunicato capiendo, was split into two larger chapters for the second 
edition. And finally, the chapters in the 1591 edition on prohibitions and praemunire which 
appeared in middle of part I were moved to the end of part I in the 1593 edition. Because of 
these rearrangements, insertions, and expansions, the length of the original part I was extended 
from 65 pages (0 130 pages in the second edition. 
In part n of the Apologie the changes were more extenSIve. First, Chapter 1 of the 
original edition was retitled as the preface to part II for the second edition. Of the 1591 
5 For those wishing to comprehend the general drift of Cosin's answers to Morice and Beale without reading the entire 1593 
version (which is over 500 pages long), the 'Epistle to the Reader', which appears at the beginning of the 1593 version, 
provides a short summary. 
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edition's twenty chapters which comprised part II, Chapters 9 through 20, which discussed the 
ex officio oath in particular, became the basis for part III of the 1593 edition. In the early 
chapters of the original part II, Chapters 1 through 8, Cosin explained the basic workings of 
the judicial process. In the second edition, however, he greatly expanded his discussion, taking 
the original Chapter 2 and dividing into three chapters (3, 5, and 6) to give fuller explanations 
of accusation, denunciation, and ex officio procedure. Another chapter (4) was also added in 
the second edition to detail the reasons why accusation had fallen out of use in recent 
centuries, according to Cosin. The rest of part II in the 1593 edition (Chapters 1-8 of the 
1591 edition) is slightly rearranged for an unknown reason, and Morice's and Beale's assertions 
regarding the judicial process in ecclesiastical and common law courts are answered by Cosin 
in whole chapters (12, 14, and 16). With the additions, expansions, rearrangements, and 
removal of the original chapters 9-20, the 1593 edition of part II was sixteen chapters rather 
than twenty, totalling 140 pages to the original 130. 
As stated above, part III of the second edition was derived from the last twelve chapters 
of the 1591 part II, but Cosin added more than double the length to this section in compiling 
part III for the 1593 publication. The new Chapters 1, 3,4, 5,6,8,9, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 
represent the chapters taken from the first edition's part II, albeit much fuller in their 
explanations and examples than in the original, while the new Chapters 2, 7, 10, and 12 were 
entirely new chapters arguing against the claims of the puritans. Part III was 241 pages long, 
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